Ali Nur v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 760/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 17 April 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2463 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 760/2024 [2024] HKCFI 1761 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 760 of 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 17 April 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2463 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 17 June 2024. Before the Court, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim. 4.The applicant submitted that he had applied for legal aid. In view of his admission, this Court exercised its discretion not to adjourn the matter under section 15(4) of the Legal Aid Ordinance and section 7A of the Legal Aid Regulations, Cap. 91[1]. The procedural history 5.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered Hong Kong illegally on 4 May 2004. He overstayed and was arrested. He was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment suspended for 2 years. He returned to Bangladesh. In August 2006, he was arrested for illegal overstaying in Hong Kong. He was referred to the Immigration Department. He lodged a torture claim with the Director and his claim was rejected. His appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) was dismissed. However, the High Court remitted the matter to the Board for re-consideration. On 21 October 2013, he lodged a non-refoulement on all applicable risks[2] except torture claim for the reason that he would be harmed or even killed by members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) because he refused to join the BNP. Besides, he feared that he would be harmed by Tisa’s father and BNP people in Gaibandha town and also arrested by the police because he was implicated in the murder of Tisa and Mosharof. 6.By Notice of Decision dated 6 October 2017, the Director rejected his claim as they were not substantiated. 7.He petition to the Board. Having considered his evidence, the Board dismissed his petition. 8.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed his application. 9.His appealed and the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. 10.He pursued the matter further to the Court of Final Appeal, which dismissed his application for leave to appeal on 22 September 2023. 11.He applied by way of a written letter to the Director for a subsequent claim. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 14.He was legally represented by the duty lawyer scheme. His lawyer submitted a statement and two supporting documents to the immigration officer for her consideration. 15.The immigration officer assessed his application on the available information and found that there had not been significant change of circumstances since the applicant’s previous claim was finally determined. The Director thus refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 13 May 2024 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant raised the grounds below.
Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his application. 20.Those grounds under paragraph 17 do not assist the applicant’s application. They are his bare allegations or comments without evidence in support. The law provides no screening interview for subsequent applications. He admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application, which is an abuse of the process. His application is liable to be struck out for the abuse. 21.There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 22.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 23.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 24.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 25.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 26.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 27.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 28.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 29.RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the applicant. Dated the 23rd day of July 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1]. Section 15 (4) of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap.91:
[2]. The applicable risks refer to :
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Cases cited in this judgment