Ali Mohammed Rashid v. Director of Immigration

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1548/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 12 November 2024.

1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 26 July 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1492 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

Cites 6 cases

Case No.HCAL 1548/2024[2024] HKCFI 2875
Court
High Court CFI
Date12 Nov 2024
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1548/2024

[2024] HKCFI 2875

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 1548 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

Ali Mohammed Rashid Applicant
and
Director of Immigration Putative Respondent

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung in Court
Date of Hearing: 14 October 2024
Date of Judgment: 12 November 2024

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J U D G M E N T

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THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 26 July 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1492 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 14 October 2024 and admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim.

The procedural history

4.The applicant is a national of India. He came to Hong Kong as a visitor on 15 July 2008. He overstayed and was arrested by police on 26 September 2008. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on the applicable risks[1].

5.By Notice of Decision dated 18 May 2017, the Director refused his claim on the applicable risks.

6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). The Board, by the Board’s Decision dated 23 July 2018, dismissed his appeal on all applicable grounds of his claim.

7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 18 November 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). He applied to the Court of the First Instance for an extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of the First Instance refused his application.

8.His appeal against the Court’s refusal of extension of time was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 19 July 2023.

9.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 13 June 2024.

10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

11.The applicant’s previous claim was based upon the fact that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by Anwar and/or his family because he had injured him in a fight arising from a dispute in a cricket game.

12.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated.

13.The Board found that the applicant’s evidence was not credible. Apart from it, the Board also found that the applicant had suffered no injury and internal relocation was a viable option.

14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

15.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer his statement together with some documents.

16.Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer found that his allegations were bare assertions based on hearsay evidence. His case had been considered by the Board in his previous claim and was rejected. The immigration officer further found that state protection would be available by the judicial process in India and internal relocation was viable.

17.For the reasons above, the Director therefore found that the applicant relied upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, would not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

18.The applicant has filed Form 86 on 9 September 2024 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

19.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant said that the Director failed to give proper weight to his evidence in support of his application; he had failed to take into account of the right to life and his danger if he returns to India.

Discussion

20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

16 The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.

18. The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision.

19. There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

20. I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say.

25.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

26.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

27.RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant.

  (K.W. Lung)
  Deputy High Court Judge

The applicant appeared in person.



[1]   The applicable risks are :

a. risk of torture under Part VII C of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);

b. Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (Risk of violation of the right to life) (“BOR 2 risk”);

c. risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and

d. risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).