Sisnorio Michele Sol v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2518/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 4 March 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 12 December 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2293 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 2518/2024 [2025] HKCFI 574 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2518 OF 2024 _____________ BETWEEN
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_____________ JUDGMENT _____________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 12 December 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2293 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 22 January 2025 and said that her new claim is her fear of her creditor, not her husband in her previous claim. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. She entered Hong Kong on 25 July 2016 as a foreign domestic helper and was permitted to stay until 25 July 2018. Her employment contract was however terminated. She did not depart within the limitation of stay and had overstayed since 16 October 2016. On 24 October 2016, she surrendered to the police. On 16 and 24 January 2018 respectively, she lodged a non-refoulement claim. Her claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, she would be killed by her husband Sisnorio, Jose Neri Molina and her sister in law, Nelly Sisnorio. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board accepted the facts of her claim, but found that the facts did not support any of the applicable risks[1]. The Board therefore dismissed her appeal. 7.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 27 September 2022. 8.She intended to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but she was out of time. She applied to the Court of the First Instance for extension of time to appeal. The Court of the First Instance refused her application. 9.She appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her appeal. She issued a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Her application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 8 November 2023. 10.She applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal and she is still waiting for the result. 11.By letter dated 22 September 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 14.The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials and the relevant country of origin information relevant to the application, the immigration officer, for the reasons set out in paragraph 12 of the Director’s Decision that she did not disclose her fear of her creditor in her previous claim, came to the factual conclusion as follows:
15.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicant filed Form 86 on 18 December 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.In her affidavit in support of her application, the applicant did not raise any specific ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she did not disclose her fear of her creditor in her previous claim because at the time of her previous claim, the problem was not so serious. Its seriousness intensified after the previous claim. 20.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer disbelieved the applicant’s evidence in relation to her fear of her creditor. He therefore came to his conclusion that the applicant failed to satisfy the conditions in support of her application for subsequent claim. 21.I consider that the immigration officer was entitled to come to his conclusion on the facts of the case. Even if the applicant is right to say that her problem in relation to her creditor has intensified, state protection and internal relocation will mitigate her risks upon her return to the Philippines. The applicant has not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 22.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 23.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 24.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 25.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 26.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. 27.The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 28.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
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