Fontanilla Dominador Jr Abaya v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2593/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 March 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 16 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1536 of 2019 (“the previous application”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 2593/2024 [2025] HKCFI 739 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2593 OF 2024 _____________ BETWEEN
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 16 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1536 of 2019 (“the previous application”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 12 February 2025 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. The procedural history 4.The applicant, aged 42, is a national of the Philippines. He came to Hong Kong as a visitor on 7 November 2015 and was permitted to stay for one day. He overstayed and was arrested on 22 January 2017. On 24 January 2017, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his ex-employer Manuel Aspiras (“MA”) and his people because he ceased to work for MA. 5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that his claim was unfounded and dismissed his appeal. 6.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 6 August 2020. His application for extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 5 March 2024. 7.By letter dated 29 July 2024, the applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 8.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 9.Upon the immigration officer’s advice, he had submitted a letter dated 27 September 2024 from his son, advising him not to return to the Philippines as he would be killed by his enemy. 10.The immigration officer considered his evidence and found that the applicant relied on the similar reasons in his previous claim. His claim was therefore treated as a continuation of his previous claim [14]. Besides, the immigration officer also found that state protection would be available to him and internal relocation was viable. 11.For those reasons, the immigration officer was not satisfied with the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and he refused his application for subsequent claim. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 12.The applicant filed Form 86 on 23 December 2024 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 13.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has not raised any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 14.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 15.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied on the same grounds in his previous claim for this application. 16.There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 17.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 18.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 19.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 20.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 21.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 22.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 23.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 24.RPO in terms of paragraph 22 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment