Lai Wai Chun v. Chan Pui Chuen
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 1933/2021 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 10 April 2025.
1. This is a trial of the plaintiff’s ( “P” ) action for possessory title of the land known as Lot 1085 in DD 107 in Yuen Long, New Territories (“the Disputed Land”), and the defendant’s ( “D” ) counterclaim for recovery of possession of the Disputed Land and mesne profits against P.
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DCCJ 1933/2021 [2025] HKDC 650 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 1933 OF 2021 --------------------------- BETWEEN
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------------------- JUDGMENT ------------------- INTRODUCTION 1.This is a trial of the plaintiff’s (“P”) action for possessory title of the land known as Lot 1085 in DD 107 in Yuen Long, New Territories (“the Disputed Land”), and the defendant’s (“D”) counterclaim for recovery of possession of the Disputed Land and mesne profits against P. 2.On 5 November 2018, D entered into a sales and purchase agreement with Ricas Properties Limited to purchase the Disputed Land at a consideration of HK$ 4,100,000.00 and became the registered owner on 19 December 2018. 3.P commenced the present action on 28 April 2021. She claimed to be in adverse possession of the Disputed Land and in occupation of other lots adjoining the north of the Disputed Land since 1983 under the circumstances explained in the following paragraphs. For ease of reference, two Lot Index Plans are annexed to this Judgment. The area demarcated in yellow in Schedule 1 is the Disputed Land, whereas areas marked ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ on Schedule 2 being the other sections occupied by P (“Section A, B, C, D”). P’s CLAIM 4.P claimed that she bought the Disputed Land together with Section A to D (collectively the “Occupied Land”) in 1982 at HK$ 60,000.00 from one Mr Sin Cheung (“Mr Sin”), who was allegedly the former occupant of the Occupied Land. 5.P, who was in her sixties at the time of the trial, moved to the Occupied Land with her husband in 1983. The couple have three children who were all born and raised there. It transpired in the trial that P and her husband divorced in early 2000s and the eldest daughter moved out from the Occupied Land after she grew up. 6.P averred that she took exclusive possession, occupation and control of the Occupied Land by building various structures over it since 1983. While the family resided in one of the structures in Sections A & B, a structure erected on Section C was originally for chicken farming. She said she also used the Disputed Land to raise some free-range chicken and to carry out different agricultural activities on an exclusive basis. Fences and gates were erected to ward off buffalos and kept the chickens in the enclosure. A septic tank was installed on the Disputed Land in or around 1989 to conform to the regulations of the Environment Protection Department (“EPD”). 7.P said no one had ever objected to her use and/or occupation of the Occupied Land until the present dispute occurred. 8.D’s case was straightforward. D’s father (“DF”) paid two visits to the Disputed Land before deciding to purchase it in the name of D in November 2018. The first visit was made in the evening which he did not see much, and during his second visit, DF averred the Disputed Land was vacant and bare, and despite there were dilapidated fences, there was no sign of occupation. He appointed contractor to erect fences along the boundary of the Disputed Land in January 2021 but the work was suspended due to obstruction caused by P and/or her family members. 9.On 18 January 2021, DF through his solicitors issued demand letters requesting P and/or the occupiers to deliver vacant possession of the Disputed Land. In response, P via her solicitors denied any unauthorised use, and a writ for the present action was taken out by P in April 2021. LEGAL PRINCIPLES 10.To establish adverse possession, the burden is on the plaintiff to show both physical possession or control, and animus possidendi, i.e. the requisite intention to possess for a duration in excess of the statutory limitation period. See paras 35-39 of Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai David & Anor (1997-1998) 1 HKCFAR 55. Evidence of exclusive possession and intention must be compelling in order to be commensurate with the serious consequences of finding that the holder of the paper title has been extinguished: Tsang Foo Keung v Chu Jim Ma Jimmy [2017] 3 HKC 527 at para 22(4). Limitation Period 11.Section 7(2) of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 provides:
12.If the registered owner’s cause of action against the squatter accrued after 1 July 1991, the applicable limitation period is 12 years. If the cause of action accrued before 1 July 1991, the old limitation period of 20 years should apply: see Tang Moon Lam, the person appointed to represent the estate of Tang Shau Ki v Tang Ying Yeung [2019] 5 HKLRD 556 at paras 26-50. Factual Possession 13.Factual possession is physical control and dealing with the land as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no one else had done so. In Lau Kwai Ping Joyce, the executrix of the estate of Tsang Fung Ying (deceased) v Fulland International Ltd [2020] HKCFI 1501 at para 21, Marlene Ng J re-affirmed earlier authorities and stated that ploughing up and cultivation of agricultural lands are usually considered to be unequivocal acts of possession:
14.Other acts which were approved to suggest control and possession include enclosure of land as Cockburn C J said in Seddon v Smith (1877) 36 LT 168 that ‘Enclosure is the strongest possible evidence of adverse possession’. Further, erection of building on land or paving land was said to be clear act of possession per Queeny Au-Yeung J in Yeung Wai Tong v Srikornvit Pranee [2022] HKCFI 606 at para 34. 15.With the guidance from above, I also bear in mind that the question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. Animus Possidendi 16.The definition of intention to possess is an intention in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessory, so far as it reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow: per Slade J in Powell v Mcfarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452. The question of intention to possess, as with any other question of intention, is one of fact. It was held in Ho Hang Wan v Ma Ting Cheung [1990] 1 HKLR 649 where the act of possession is unequivocal, it may in itself be sufficient to show the necessary animus. Thus in certain circumstances, a strong conduct exhibited from a squatter ‘serves the twin masters of factual possession and intention to possess’. ISSUES 17.In light of the above, the law on adverse possession is well-settled and trite. The main issues to be tried are twofold, namely whether P have exclusive possession of the Disputed Land for the requisite years, and whether such exclusive possession as coupled with the necessary adverse intention. In the course of deliberations, the following aspects of this case call for analysis:
Landscape of the Disputed Land and the Occupied Land 18.P called Joseph Wong Yiu-cho (“JW”) and D called Eric Sze-kin Tang (“ET”) as their respective surveyor experts. A joint expert site visit was paid on 16 August 2022 (“the Site Visit”). Each of the expert prepared their detailed report and also a Joint Statement dated 29 November 2022, which summarized their agreed and disputed issues (“Joint Statement”). I set out below the agreed and/or indisputable landscape features and structures found on the Occupied Land as described by the respective experts. Terrains 19.The Occupied Land comprised of Sections A to D and the Disputed Land. To the north of the Disputed Land, there are Section A and Section B. The former is situated in government land whereas the latter covers some government land and some Lot 1088. Section C adjoins the northwest of the Disputed Land and is adjacent to Section D. Both Sections C and D are situated in Lot 1088. To the west of the Disputed Land is Lot 1086, which is not occupied by P. 20.While the north and northwest of the Disputed Area has been bounded by structures found in Sections A to D at the time of the Site Visit, there was a stream running from northeast to southwest along the outskirts of the Disputed Area. 21.Besides the northern portion of the Disputed Land, the majority of the Disputed Areas were and are covered with vegetation. Structures 22.It is indisputable that the following structures were found on the Occupied Land before D became the registered owner of the Disputed Land.
23.It is agreed that S5 and a pool (the “Pool”) were erected as early as around 1992 in the northern portion of the Disputed Land while the majority of the area was covered with vegetation. 24.The mere existence of S5 and the Pool however cannot constitute adverse possession of the entire Disputed Land if the vast amount of the area thereat was abandoned. P has the burden to show her unequivocal intention to extent her possession, control and enjoyment over the other parts of the Disputed Land. 25.In considering whether acts of possession on one piece of land will be treated as also constituting possession of other land, there must be ‘a common character of locality’ as to raise a reasonable inference that, if one part belongs to the person in possession, so did the other parts. In this connection, DCHJ Marlene Ng (as she then was) stated in Nam Ching Wun, a mentally incapacitated person by her next friend and daughter Lo Suet Yung Conny v Tsun Un Pawn Shop & ors HCA 2151/2008 on 22 November 2016:
26.In order to ascertain if P has any physical control and intention to possess the Disputed Land in its entirety, I have carefully studied her evidence together with the expert reports from both parties. D’s evidence 27.D has three witnesses including himself, DF and his mother. D and his mother did not enter the Disputed Land, and thus of little relevance to the claim of this case. 28.Mr Chan criticized DF did not carry out due diligence before purchasing the land despite he had over 20 years of experience working as an estate agent. DF was never shown the entirety of the Disputed Land and his account of the land being vacant could therefore not be relied on. Further, the vacant possession provision was crossed out in the preliminary sale and purchase agreement and such provision did not exist in the formal sale and purchase agreement. DF must therefore understood the risk that the Disputed Land was occupied. 29.I agree DF could not provide any satisfactory explanation as to why the vacant possession provision was crossed out, and his alleged belief that the Disputed Land was bare and deserted was skeptical. However, I reminded myself that it is not necessary for the court to make any positive finding for the D’s case or for the holder of the paper title to prove a case that the land in dispute was in fact unoccupied. The burden is on the P to prove with compelling evidence that she was in possession of the Disputed Land in her own right and without permission from anyone else. P’s evidence 30.The Occupied Land is and was essentially P’s family habitat that also provided for the family’s living. Her second and third child were born in 1984 and 1988 respectively, and thus their birth certificates were registered with the address of the Occupied Land. There was electricity and water supply to the Occupied Land but the utility bills were registered under her ex-husband’s name, which she never changed after the divorce. She also gave evidence that there was a power distribution box in the Disputed Land. 31.She claimed to run a chicken farm from 1983 to 1996 with Sections C & D being the barns, and the chicken farm was registered under her name with the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (“AFCD”) and New Territories Chicken Breeders Association Limited. Besides running her chicken farm, P also grew ginger lilies when she first moved to the Occupied Land but stopped so around 1986. After she stopped running her chicken farm, she started to plant fruit trees and other vegetation there in the 1990s. 32.P gave evidence that she put up fences around the Occupied Area since 1983 to ward off buffalos and to keep the chickens inside. She said the fences were made from recycled materials that were around 4 feet high, but she also planted trees as natural barriers. There was a gate to the south of the Disputed Land (marked as “Gate 1” on the Lot Index Plan attached to P’s Amended Statement of Claims) which was built by her back in around 1983, along a cement footbridge（石屎橋）next to it, which allowed her to walk through the Disputed Land to Kam Tin market. 33.Besides fences and gates, P also paved footpaths on the Disputed Land shortly after she moved in in around 1983/1984. She said she built more footpaths in the mid-1990s. 34.P’s youngest son gave evidence for P’s case. He affirmed that he was born and raised in the Occupied Land, and he saw fences and barriers built on various parts along the border of the Disputed Land since he was a child. He has started to work in the renovation business with his elder brother since he was 16 years old (i.e. around 2004), and he stored waste materials from work and other household miscellaneous items on the Disputed Land. 35.As pointed out by D’s Counsel Mr Tsang, there are inconsistencies and weaknesses in P’s evidence, but in my view, not all of them are central to the resolution of the main dispute. Contemporaneous Documents 36.Objective evidence in this case was sparse as there was no photographic or other documentary record showing the purchase of the Occupied Land or P and her family’s occupation. 37.P claimed the one-page sale and purchase agreement with the former occupant Mr Sin was destroyed in a fire in 1987, and it was her belief that the HK$60,000.00 that she paid was to purchase the entire Occupied Land. Such belief nonetheless transpired during the trial to be unsustainable as P admitted part of the Occupied Land was Government Land and Lot 1088 (Sections C and D) belongs to a Tang’s Tso, which she needed to pay rent at HK$300.00 per month to the Tso between 1982 to 1993. 38.However, monetary consideration is immaterial in constituting adverse possession. P is not required to prove she had purchased the land in dispute, but to show that she has been dealing with the Disputed Land as an occupying owner and that no one else had done so for the requisite years of time. 39.P was being criticized for not producing a shred of documentary evidence showing her and her family’s occupation of the Disputed Land. Indeed, utility bills, family photos, various kinds of official documents are commonly produced as evidence in adverse possession cases. Given the long history of P’s alleged occupation, and the alleged official records from the AFCD and EPD in relation to the chicken farm, it was shocking to see none of this documentary evidence was produced in these proceedings. 40.P on the second day of the trial made an application to the Court to produce the birth certificates of her children, which allegedly bear the address of the Occupied Land. I disallowed such late application not only because it might prejudice D’s case, but also because the oral evidence from P and her son on the first day showed the address bears little probative value in determining the current dispute. 41.P and her son claimed that, all the times since their occupation of the Occupied Land, the address they used for all kinds of registration was‘52C Fung Kat Heung’（逢吉鄉52號C）. P averred it was her belief that this address reflected the entire Occupied Land despite postal service could only deliver to the village ‘nested letter boxes’. However, as suggested by Mr Tsang in his closing submissions, there is no evidence at all to show that such address equates Lot 1085/1088 or the Disputed Area. 42.In light of the circumstances, I come to the conclusion that P could not advance her case even if she could produce any official documents bearing the address of 52C Fung Kat Heung. Gate, Fence and footpaths 43.Without the aid of any documentary evidence, the case has to be resolved having regard to the nature and physical character of the Occupied Land and what P has done to manifest her intention of exclusiveness. It is a question of fact for P to prove and her case must be viewed in light of the experts’ reports. 44.While it was P’s case that she had fenced up the Occupied Land since she moved in, her evidence did not sit well with the Joint Statement. According to P’s Expert JW, the first mention of barriers/ fences was in 2019 which were said to be seen along the west of the Disputed Area. ET on another hand made a more thorough analysis of the government survey sheet (“S-Sheet”) and aerial photos (“A-Photo”), and the sightings of fence/gate are summarized as follows:
45.Both the experts gave evidence in the Joint Statement that no fence could be observed at the Eastern and Southern boundary of the Land between 1982 and 2022. I also borne in mind the evidence given by D’s Father that when he entered the Disputed Land from the west side and left from the north side, both his entrance and exit were not enclosed but he did see some dilapidated fences erected on parts of the boundaries of the Disputed Land. I view his descriptions to be consistent with the Joint Statement and am convinced that no fences/gates could be identified along the boundaries circumscribing the Disputed Land between 1982 and 2022. 46.However, enclosure of the land is not the only necessary evidence constituting factual possession. Mr Chan, Counsel for P urged the court to take reference to a recent case Li Pun Yin Helen v. Yeung Kwong Yan trading as Yan Yan Organic Farm [2024] HKDC 1573 where HH Judge A Kwong found exclusive possession was established in the absence of fences/gates. The learned judge stated the followings in paragraph 86 and 91 of the judgment:
47.Indeed, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that whether a squatter could establish factual possession and the requisite intention to possess is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of the case. In light of the above, not only are the context and the surrounding locality important, but the activities P engaged on the Disputed Land should be studied carefully. 48.This is a convenient juncture to reiterate the principle stated in paragraph 13 above where Marlene Ng J reaffirmed “ploughing up and cultivation of agricultural land are usually considered to be unequivocal acts of possession”. Alan Kwong J in Li Pun Yin Helen was also convinced that the squatter in that case used and occupied the disputed area for agricultural purposes and solely enjoyed the economic benefit arising therefrom throughout the material years. 49.After studying the Joint Statement, the respective expert reports together with some careful analysis of the A-photos, I considered that there are factual distinctions between this case and Li Pun Yin Helen that cannot be reconciled. Cultivation 50.It was P’s case that she stopped growing ginger lily around 1985 and started to plant fruit trees and other miscellaneous plants in early 1990s. As shown from the A-photos, straight lines representing farmlands were found on the west side of the Disputed Land, occupying roughly one third of the entirety of the Disputed Land between 1982 and 1985. However, besides some banana trees that were planted in the northern portion of the Disputed Land and Section A in 1986 (Joint Statement s. 5.1), both experts found the majority of the Disputed Land had been covered with dense vegetation for most of the time with no signs of cultivation. 51.With the benefit of the A-Photos, I am able to make my own observations as follows:
52.What can be deduced from the above analysis is the paucity of evidence to support long-term cultivation activities. First of all, as to the farmlands identified by the experts, we could see that no farmland could be identified by the experts between 1986-2014, but for most of the time the majority of the Disputed Land was covered with dense vegetation. Since both the experts did not examine the type of trees were grown, it is not possible to reach any definitive conclusion whether the trees seen on the A-photos were cultivated by man or grew naturally/wild. P gave evidence that she planted fruit trees but when asked about what kind of trees she planted, she was unable to give any definite answers. Bearing in mind that the practice of cultivation involves complicated stages, from deciding what to grow, where to grow, ploughing, planting, pruning, fertilizing and harvesting etc. Should P take full responsibilities in respect of the alleged agricultural activities in the Disputed Land, I would expect her to provide more details to the Court, and thus to prove that she did deal with the land as the de facto owner herself. 53.In light of above, I consider on the balance of probabilities, the dense vegetation found on the Disputed Land were more likely to be natural/wild grown trees. 54.In terms of paved road, observations were borne out even more clearly in the series of A-Photos that the East Footpath and the West Footpath could only be first identified in 2015 and 2017 respectively. I therefore do not accept P’s evidence that she built footpaths in the mid-90s. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS 55.Insomuch as the analysis set out hereinabove, I do not accept that P has proved she has been cultivating and/or dealing with the Disputed Land as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it, and that no one else has done so. I therefore reject Mr Chan’s submissions that P has demonstrated a sufficient degree of physical occupation of the Disputed Land with the requisite intention given her evidence showing the history of use, and my findings are as follows:
56.Overall, despite a small part of Disputed Land was once used by P and her family, it was soon abandoned and there was no evidence of continuous possession. There was no evidence from P showing how she had dealt with the Disputed Land as the de facto owner, even if the Court is to accept that some chickens were allowed to wander inside that part of the land, the lack of facilities or structures thereat was at most be seen as mere trespassing. There was in general no economic benefit nor recreational enjoyment arising from the use of the Disputed Land and the occasional storage of waste materials could not be seen as occupying the land for any meaningful purposes. 57.In the premises, P has not proved to my satisfaction that she has had both the factual possession and the requisite intention to possess the Land continuously since 1983 or by 2006 at the latest (20 years or 12 years). In this connection, P is also liable to pay mesne profit as damages in relation to her trespass of the Disputed Land from 16 January 2021, until the delivery of vacant possession. I am of the view that it is just and right for such order to be granted, and for the avoidance of doubts and further costs in arguing quantum, I took reference from recent case Suen Ma On v Suen Chun Yu & Suen Sze Kei Jess, the Executors of the estate of Suen Wing Ping, Deceased [2024] HKDC 1337 where DDJ Simon Ho has thoroughly explained the principles in assessment of damages for mesne profit under paragraphs 139-164. I considered the mesne profit payable by P owing her trespass of the Disputed Land should be awarded on a compensatory basis, by reference to market rental on agricultural use. DISPOSITION 58.Due to the above reasons, P’s claim be dismissed in its entirety and judgment be entered in favour of D’s Counterclaim, for which I also make the following orders:
59.Lastly, I thank Mr Chan and Mr Tsang for their assistance rendered to the Court.
Mr Sunny Chan, instructed by Franki Ho & Associates, for the Plaintiff Mr Jonathan Tsang, instructed by Leung Kin & Co., for the Defendant Appendix
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Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 1933/2021