鄧尉池 對 鄧灼全 also known as 鄧灼銓

HCA 202/2025

[2025] HKCFI 1935

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

高院民事訴訟案件編號2025年第202號

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判 決 書

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A.   前言

1.此判決書處理原告人在2025年2月14日以傳票(“該傳票”)所提出的申請。該傳票的內容如下:

(1)  被告人無論是他本人還是他的代理人或僕人或其他方式須立即遵從屋宇署命令 (頒令日期: 2020年9月11日) 拆卸在Kat Hing Wai Lot No.73 in D.D. 109 Yuen Long New Territories違規上蓋及一切非法建築物行事直到屋宇署解除該命令;

(2)  被告人無論是他本人還是他的代理人或僕人或其他方式須立即遵從屋宇署命令 (頒令日期: 2020年9月11日) 指定程序拆卸在Kat Hing Wai Lot No.73 in D.D. 109 Yuen Long New Territories違規上蓋及一切非法建築物行事直到屋宇署解除該命令;

(3)  被告人無論是他本人還是他的代理人或僕人或其他方式必須確保所有租戶搬離該處所，並賠償每位租戶在預定拆除房產之前所造成的任何損失;

(4)  是次申請一切訟費由被告人支付。

B.   沒有爭議  / 不容爭議的背景

2.被告人是原告人的兄長。他們由1975年起以聯權共有方式持有丈量約份第109約吉慶圍地段第73號 (“該地段”) (即新界元朗吉慶圍92號)。由2011年10月起，他們轉為以分權共有的形式持有該地段。

3.在該地段之上現有一物業 (“該物業”) 。該物業的前身為原告人及被告人兩兄弟的祖屋 (“該祖屋”)。

4.在大約1996年，被告人在拆卸該祖屋後，出資於該地段興建了該物業，並於其後將該物業出租。

5.在2020年9月11日，屋宇署根據《建築物條例》(香港法例第123章)第24(1)條的規定，向該地段的業主(即原告人及被告人) (“該地段業主”)發出命令(編號VVS/H18/100189/20/NT) (“該屋宇署命令”)。

6.根據該屋宇署命令及《建築物條例》的相關規定,該地段業主須:

(1)  拆卸該物業;

(2)  聘請1名認可人士，負責統籌上述拆卸工程;

(3)  在展開上述拆卸工程前，向建築事務監督提交拆卸建議書，並在屋宇署同意後方可展開工程;

(4)  僱用1名屬拆卸類別的註冊專門承建商進行有關工程 ，並委聘1名認可人士就工程所須的安全設施提供意見 ，確保有關人士採取所需的安全措施;

(5)  在90天内展開上述拆卸工程及在180天内完成拆卸該物業。

7.於2020至2022年間，被告人曾向屋宇署申請暫緩執行該屋宇署命令及要求屋宇署從寬處理，但俱被署方駁回相關申請或要求。

8.直至現在，原告人及被告人仍未履行該屋宇署命令的要求。

C.  原告人的案情

9.根據原告人的誓詞:

(1)  被告人在1996年間是在沒有取得原告人的同意的情況下，非法興建該物業，而當時原告人正在英國居住;

(2)  原告人一直以為被告人是以合法方式興建該物業;

(3)  原告人在2022年7月15日才知悉該屋宇署命令早於2020年9月已被發出;

(4)  原告人隨即於2022年7月16日致函被告人，要求他在7天內拆卸該物業，但被告人一直未有如此行事，只是推說自己正和屋宇署商討解決方案;

(5)  如被告人不儘快根據該屋宇署命令拆卸該物業， 屋宇署便有可能展開檢控程序控告原告人 ，而原告人或會因此而被判罰款$200,000及監禁一年;

(6)  原告人在最近發現，由於該物業失修，故此有石屎掉落在地上。因此，該物業必須儘快被清拆，以保障住客及途人的安全。

D.  被告人的案情

10.被告人並沒有存檔任何反對誓詞。

11.根據被告人的答辯書，他指稱自己在1996年拆卸及重建期間，原告人 “從沒有向[他]出過聲”。被告人又聲稱拆屋及重建歷時一年，並非是可以秘密進行的事，而他們的母親當時仍然在世，亦目睹整個過程，他因而質疑為何原告人會不知道相關事宜。

12.從被告人用作回應原告人質詢書的誓詞中，可以看到:

(1)  他確認在興建該物業時，由於資金短缺，故此他並沒有聘請相關專業人士(例如建築師)協助;

(2)  他並不會挑戰該屋宇署命令的合法性，亦從沒有就該屋宇署命令提出上訴;

(3)  他只是一直強調自己有繼續與屋宇署人員進行商討，“尋求在符合成本效益下，能夠以最快的速度滿足屋宇署的規定”。

E.  適用法律原則

13.有關適用於非正審強制令 (interlocutory injunction)的法律原則，本席於HKCOLO.NET Limited v Hong Kong Telecommunications (HKT) Limited [2023] HKCFI 138一案中有以下闡述:

“35. It is trite that the American Cyanamid principles are applicable in an application for interlocutory injunction. Pursuant to those principles, the Court has to consider:

(1) Whether there are serious issues to be tried;

(2) Whether damages would be an adequate remedy for either side and where the balance of convenience lies.

36.  In an application where interlocutory mandatory injunction is sought, the court should also bear in mind what Ma J (as his Lordship then was) said in the case of Music Advance Limited & Another v The Incorporated Owners of Argyle Centre Phase I [2010] 2 HKLRD 1041:

‘11. The applicable principles for interlocutory injunctions are well-known and do not need repetition. Generally, one needs to look no further than American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 and the relevant text in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002 Volume 1 at paragraphs 29/1/8-29/1/50.

12.  I would, however, only highlight one aspect.  Where, as in the present case, the plaintiffs seek an interlocutory mandatory injunction (that is, an order requiring the defendant to do something, in contrast to a prohibitory injunction which restrains the defendant from doing something), the following matters should be borne in mind as being the court’s approach : 

(1)  In the case of interlocutory mandatory injunctions, it is often said or assumed that a court will not grant one unless it feels a high degree of assurance that at the trial of the action, it will be shown that the injunction was rightly granted : see Shepherd Homes Ltd v. Sandham [1971] Ch 340 at 351.  This has been explained and sometimes understood as meaning that in the case of an interlocutory mandatory injunction, the applicant’s case on the merits has to be made out to a higher standard of proof than in the case of prohibitory injunction : see the Court of Appeal’s observations in TKI Limited v. New Happy Limited [1995] 1 HKC 551 at 554 B‑D.

(2)  Broad statements such as the above must, however, be properly put in context.

(3)  The basic approach to interlocutory injunctions, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is the same. Section 21L of the High Court Ordinance, Chapter 4 makes no distinction between these two types of injunctions and simply states that interlocutory injunctions may be granted if it appears to be just or convenient to do so.

(4)  At the interlocutory injunction stage, the principal concern of the court is that it might make a wrong decision in the sense that after trial, the party to whom an interlocutory injunction has been granted may lose or the party who has been refused one, may win.  The court will therefore take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out that it is wrong.  This ‘fundamental’ principle is the source of the guidelines that have evolved for the determination of interlocutory injunctions (included are, of course, the American Cyanamid guidelines) and therefore, in the application of any guidelines, sight must not be lost of this principle.  See here : Films Rover International Ltd v. Cannon Films Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670 at 680 D‑G, in a passage from the judgment of Hoffman J which was approved by the House of Lords in R v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited (No.2) [1991] 1 AC 603 and recently reiterated in the English Court of Appeal decision of Zockoll Group Ltd v. Mercury Communications Ltd [1998] FSR 354 (which Mr Au was kind enough to place before me).

(5)  Two common guidelines are of course the consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim and the balance of convenience.  Here, it is of course easy to see at once how they are linked to the fundamental principle : there must be a risk of injustice if the plaintiff cannot even establish a serious question to be tried or that one or the other party will be put to substantial inconvenience or prejudice if an interlocutory injunction were or were not granted.

(6)  In the case of interlocutory mandatory injunctions, the risk of injustice (being wrong in the sense referred to above) can be quite acute.  In Films Rover International Limited, it was put thus by Hoffman J at 681 B‑E :

‘In Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham, Megarry J. spelled out some of the reasons why mandatory injunctions generally carry a higher risk of injustice if granted at the interlocutory stage : they usually go further than the preservation of the status quo by requiring a party to take some new positive step or undo what he has done in the past; an order requiring a party to take positive steps usually causes more waste of time and money if it turns out to have been wrongly granted than an order which merely causes delay by restraining him from doing something which it appears at the trial he was entitled to do; a mandatory order usually gives a party the whole of the relief which he claims in the writ and makes it unlikely that there will be a trial.  One could add other reasons, such as that mandatory injunctions (whether interlocutory or final) are often difficult to formulate with sufficient precision to be enforceable.  In addition to all these practical considerations, there is also what might be loosely called a ‘due process’ question.  An order requiring someone to do something is usually perceived as a more intrusive exercise of the coercive power of the state than an order requiring him temporarily to refrain from action.  The court is therefore more reluctant to make such an order against a party who has not had the protection of a full hearing at trial.’

(7)  This passage in my view explains just why it is that generally a court will have to feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial of an action it will be shown that the interlocutory injunction was rightly granted before an interlocutory mandatory injunction will be given; all this being an exercise in assessing the strength of the plaintiffs’ case : see sub‑paragraph(1) above.  However, I emphasize that this is only generally the court’s approach.  Where it is shown, as an exception to this general approach, that the case is one in which the withholding of on interlocutory mandatory injunction would in fact carry a greater risk of injustice than granting it even though the court does not feel the ‘high degree of assurance’ as aforesaid, it would be right to grant an interlocutory mandatory injunction : see Films Rover International Limited at 681 A‑B.

(8)  This of course brings into focus the balance of convenience.  Thus, if a plaintiff in seeking an interlocutory mandatory injunction cannot demonstrate more than a serious question to be tried, it will have to show that the balance of convenience tilts so much in its favour that justice requires such an injunction to be granted, even taking into account those aspects of an interlocutory mandatory injunction expressed by Hoffman J in Films Rover International Limited.

(9)  At no stage, however, in the consideration of the matter does the court lose sight of the practical realities of the situation to which the injunction will apply : see NWL Limited v. Woods [1979] 1 WLR 1294 at 1306C per Lord Diplock.’

37.  Cheung JA had also given the following reminder in Lai Hoi Ping (suing on his own behalf and on the behalf of all other members of Hong Kong Taxi Association) & Another v Persons Occupying Portions of Nathan Road near to and between Argyle Street and Dundas Street to prevent or obstruct normal vehicular traffic from passing and repassing the occupied areas & Others (HCMP 2975/2014, unreported, 15 November 2014):

‘[…] it has to be borne in mind that the court’s jurisdiction to grant an injunction, whether interlocutory or final, is based on section 21L of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) which provides that where it appears to the court to be ‘just or convenient’ to grant an injunction, the court may do so. The cases have given various guidelines on when it is ‘just or convenient’ to grant an interlocutory injunction, which, if granted, is, by definition, granted before the final outcome at trial is known. It is to address this peculiar feature of an interlocutory injunction that considerations such as whether there is a serious question to be tried (so that the plaintiff’s claim is not a ‘frivolous or vexatious’ one), whether damages is an adequate remedy, and where the balance of convenience lies, come into the picture, so that the court may, putting it negatively, choose the course of ‘lesser evil’, or putting it positively, decide whether it is ‘just or convenient’ to grant an interlocutory injunction before the final outcome at trial is known.’ (at paragraph 9)

38.  Hence, it is clear that it is not an inflexible rule that whenever a mandatory injunction is sought, the plaintiff must satisfy the court that there is a high degree of assurance that he shall succeed at the trial.  It all depends on the circumstances. At the end of the day, the ultimate question is whether the requirement in section 21L of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4) is satisfied – whether the court considers it just or convenient to grant the injunction.  The court will take whichever course that carries the lower risk of injustice if it turns out to be wrong.”

14.以上被引述的原則可被歸納如下:

(1)  American Cyanamid一案所解釋的原則是適用於非正審強制令。根據該原則，法庭應:

(a)  考慮訟案是否有慎重的議題需要進行審訊 (serious question to be tried);

(b)  考慮損害賠償是否構成足夠的補救;

(c)  權衡頒下與不頒下命令相對的不便。

(2)  雖然有案例解釋 ，一般而言，非正審強制性強制令 (interlocutory mandatory injunction) 的申請人需要令法庭在很大程度上信納於正審後仍會認為應該頒下強制性強制令 (意思是在非正審時，要達致比一般更高的舉證準則) ，但在理解這說法時，是需要注意，不論是非正審禁止性強制令 (interlocutory prohibitory injunction) 還是非正審強制性強制令，適用的基本原則始終是一樣的: 《高等法院條例》(香港法例第4章)第21L條並沒有將這兩類命令區別開來，而是一概地規定，在原訟法庭覺得如此行事是公正或適宜的所有情況下，便有權發出上述命令。

(3)  在非正審階段，法庭最主要的憂慮，是可能做了一個在正審後發現是錯誤的決定。故此，法庭會採取一個即使後來發現決定是錯誤的話，會有較小風險帶來不公義的做法。

(4)  就非正審強制性強制令而言，由於命令本身通常涉及要求訴訟一方採取積極的步驟而不是局限於維持現狀，故此，錯誤地發出這命令所帶來之金錢及時間上的損失一般會比相反情況為高。此外，強制性強制令很多時已是申索人興訟的終極目的，故此，一旦法庭發出此命令，其後便不大可能會有正審。這些原因都解釋了為何法庭一般都需要在很大程度上肯定在正審後仍會認為應該頒下強制性強制令的情況下，才願意在非正審階段頒下此命令。不過，這只是法庭的一般做法。即使法庭不是那麼肯定在正審後仍會認為應該頒下強制性強制令，但倘若法庭認為因不發出非正審強制性強制令而帶來不公的機會反而比發出該命令所引致不公的風險為高，法庭還是會偏離一般的做法。

(5)  由此可見 ，“令法庭很大程度上肯定在正審後仍會認為應該頒下強制性強制令” 並不是一成不變的要求。法庭最終其實也只是考慮申請人的申請是否符合《高等法院條例》第21L條的要求: 法庭是否覺得如此行事是公正或適宜。

F.  討論

F1.  需要進行審訊的慎重議題

15.代表被告人的侯大律師同意，本訟案的主要議題是原告人是否有同意或默許被告人在1996年拆卸該祖屋並興建該物業。她亦同意，倘若法庭在正審時接納原告人的證供，裁定他從沒同意被告人的建屋行為，法庭是有權對被告人頒下強制性強制令。

16.原告人在他的誓詞中，已清楚闡述他從沒同意被告人的建屋行為，而被告人並沒有存檔任何誓詞反駁原告人的說法。

17.侯大律師強調，由於這點屬於事實爭議，故此法庭不應在現階段就妄下判斷，而應該將此議題留待正審時，經過盤問證人程序後才作定奪。

18.恕本席直言，這陳詞是混淆了不同的法庭程序。現在法庭所要做的，並不是就本案所牽涉的事實爭議作出任何裁決，而只是考慮原告人所提出的證據，是否能達致法律所要求的標準，從而同意在非正審階段便發出強制性強制令。

19.就本案而言，本席認為原告人明顯地能夠符合相關的要求:

(1)  被告人並沒有存檔任何誓詞反駁原告人從沒同意被告人的建屋行為這說法;

(2)  被告人在答辯書中，並沒有提出任何說法，指原告人同意其建屋行為;

(3)  被告人在答辯書中，極其量也只能說原告人“從沒有向[他]出過聲” 。 不過，本席認為這說法模稜兩可，並不清晰;

(4)  被告人在答辯書中，又聲稱拆屋及重建歷時一年，並非是可以秘密進行的事。他似乎是暗示原告人因此必然知道建屋的事。但是，由於原告人已解釋他當時已定居英國，故此，被告人的論點並不成立;

(5)  即使被告人知道該屋宇署命令已被發出多年，但沒有證據顯示他曾要求原告人分擔拆卸該物業的費用，或就有關遵守該屋宇署命令的事宜諮詢原告人的意見。

20.就以上各點，侯大律師指由於被告人一直都沒有律師代表，故此他有可能是詞不達意。本席不同意這說法。從被告人所撰寫的文件可以看出，他明顯是知道本案的爭議，在於原告人是否有同意過被告人的建屋行為。這是一項簡單的事實爭議。本席認為，觀乎被告人所撰寫的文件，即使他沒有律師，他也有足夠能力以文字表達他的案情。

21.總括而言，本席認為原告人已成功地令法庭信服，他在正審後會有很高的勝訴機會。換句話說，他已讓法庭在很大程度上肯定，於正審後仍會認為應該頒下強制性強制令是正確的。

F2.  損害賠償是否構成足夠的補救

22.本案的要點 ，在於訴訟雙方都同意該屋宇署命令是必須被遵守的。他們的分歧只是在於法庭應否下令被告人獨自履行該命令。

23.在這情況下，本席認為損害賠償明顯地會構成足夠的補救: 倘若最終被告人的案情獲接納，他是可以要求原告人分擔為履行該屋宇署命令所付的一半費用。

F3.  權衡相對的不便

24.侯大律師指出，法庭不批予原告人所索求的強制性強制令，事實上是不會為原告人帶來任可分別，或避免面臨刑事檢控的結果，原因是原告人身爲該地段註冊擁有人，仍然會面臨因未有遵從該屋宇署命令的刑事檢控 。

25.本席不接納這陳詞:

(1)  首先，被告人無從爭議的事實是，雖然該屋宇署命令的限期已屆滿多時，但直至現在，屋宇署仍未對訴訟雙方提出檢控。倘若該屋宇署命令能儘快被履行，署方或仍有可能決定不再向原告人及被告人提出檢控;

(2)  即使刑事檢控是無可避免 ，倘若該屋宇署命令能及早被履行，原告人及被告人最低限度也可以省下部份每天累積的罰款[1]。

26.總括而言，既然雙方都同意理應遵守該屋宇署命令，本席認為權衡相對的不便這步驟在本案中是一面倒傾向頒下強制性強制令的。本席實在想不到雙方可以有任何合理的理由在此事上繼續拖延。

27.此外，根據原告人未受爭議的誓詞，該物業已有石屎剝落的情況出現。經考慮被告人當年在建屋時從沒諮詢專業人士的意見這情況，本席認為儘快根據該屋宇署命令肯定比繼續拖延對雙方都更為有利，以免在意外發生時，帶來更嚴重的後果。

28.侯大律師又指稱，在法庭還未經正式審訊裁定原告人是沒有同意及/或准許及/或授權下拆卸該祖屋及興建該物業的情況下，而按該傳票批予原告人所索求只針對被告人的非正審強制性強制令是會對被告人造成很大的不公 (特別是他因此要獨自承擔拆卸該物業的開支)。

29.如前所述 ，沒有證據或任何文件顯示被告人在過去數年曾要求原告人分擔拆卸該物業的費用，或就有關遵守該屋宇署命令的事宜諮詢原告人的意見。換句話說，被告人一直也是獨個兒處理有關該屋宇署命令的事宜，就好像原告人並非業主一樣。在這情況下，本席不接受被告人指稱要他在現階段獨力支付相關支出會做成不公這說法。

F4.  強制性強制令的條款

30.基於以上原因 ，本席認為法庭絕對應該對被告人發出非正審強制性強制令。不過，本席就原告人在該傳票所要求的命令，有以下看法:

(1)  該傳票的第1和第2段基本上是完全重疊的 (除了第2段多了 “指定程序” 這幾個字)。由於該屋宇署命令已清楚列明履行該命令的步驟，而那些步驟亦屬該命令的一部分，故此，本席認為在強制令中，只需明確要求被告人履行該命令便足夠;

(2)  為避免爭議，本席不會如原告人的建議使用 “違規上蓋及一切非法建築物” 這字眼。被告人的責任應以該屋宇署命令所註明為準;

(3)  本席認為應該為被告人履行這非正審強制性強制令定下限期。由於雙方均未有提交證據證明何謂 “合理的時間”，故此，本席會採用該屋宇署命令所定的期限，即被告人須於由本命令起計90天內展開拆卸工程並在180天内完成拆卸該物業;

(4)  本席認為無需就被告人的租客搬離該物業及賠償的問題頒令，理由是這是被告人為履行這非正審強制性強制令要自己處理的事情，特別是在賠償方面，這是他和租客之間的事，無需法庭在本案插手干預。

G.  命令

31.本席現頒令如下: 在原告人向法庭承諾，如法庭稍後發現本命令導致被告人遭受損失而決定應向被告人賠償該項損失，則原告人會遵從法庭可能作出的任何頒令的前提下[2]，被告人須遵從屋宇署在2020年9月11日向丈量約份第109約吉慶圍地段第73號的業主所發出的命令(編號VVS/H18/100189/20/NT) ，並由本命令起計90天內展開拆卸工程，及在本命令起計180天内完成拆卸工程。

H.  訟費

32.本席經參考 China Medical Technologies, Inc (in liquidation) 及其他人訴 Samson Tsang Tak Yung 及其他人 [2022] 2 HKLRD 517, [2022] HKCA 421, [10] – [12]  後，初步認為被告人應向原告人支付該傳票的訟費。

33.以上訟費命令屬暫准性質，如法庭於本判決書日期起計14天內沒有收到任何更改訟費命令的申請，此暫准命令將隨即轉為絕對命令。倘若任何一方有此申請，必須於14天內向法庭提出。

34.為節省雙方的訟費及時間，本席認為適宜根據《高等法院規則》(香港法例第4A章)第62號命令第9A(1)(a)條規則，採用簡易程序方式，來評定原告人應得的訟費金額。為此目的，本席指示如下:

(1)  原告人須於本判決書日期起計21天內向法庭呈交及向被告人送達訟費陳述書。

(2)  被告人於收到原告人的訟費陳述書後7天內須向法庭呈交及向原告人送達反對陳述書。

(3)  法庭於上述限期過後(不論是否收到被告人的反對陳述書) ，會以書面形式評定訟費。

35.被告人須於法庭評定訟費後14天內，向原告人支付經評定之訟費。

原告人: 無律師代表，親自出庭應訊

被告人: 由沈黃律師事務所轉聘侯碩甄大律師代表