Chan Sun Judy v. Qin Xiaojian, The Sole Administrator of the Estate of Chan Wai Hing Alexander, Deceased
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 2396/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 4 November 2025.
1. These 2 actions concern the estate of the late Chan Wai Hing Alexander ( “the Estate” ), in respect of which Qin Xiao Jian ( “the Widow” ), the widow of the Deceased, has been appointed as the sole administratrix by virtue of the Letters of Administration granted on 16 February 2024 ( “the Letters of Administration” ).
Cites 7 cases
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HCMP 2396/2024 [2025] HKCFI 5225 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2396 OF 2024 ________________________
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________________________ HCMP 142/2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 142 OF 2025 ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ INTRODUCTION 1.These 2 actions concern the estate of the late Chan Wai Hing Alexander (“the Estate”), in respect of which Qin Xiao Jian (“the Widow”), the widow of the Deceased, has been appointed as the sole administratrix by virtue of the Letters of Administration granted on 16 February 2024 (“the Letters of Administration”). 2.The first set of proceedings (HCMP 2396/2024) (“the 2396 Proceedings”) was commenced by Chan Sun Judy (“Judy”), the Deceased’s daughter (born out of his first marriage), on 15 November 2024. 3.The second set of proceedings (HCMP 142/2025) (“the 142 Proceedings”) was started by Chen Taocheng (“Taocheng”) who alleged to be a son of the Deceased born out of wedlock subsequently on 23 January 2025. 4.Both actions are commenced primarily for the purpose of obtaining an order of removal of the Widow as the administratrix of the Estate (“the Applications”). Hence, by virtue of an order dated 7 May 2025, these actions have been ordered to be heard together. BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATIONS 5.The Deceased married one Gu Wangjiang (also known as Kuk Mong Kong) (谷望江) in 1970 and they had a daughter (Judy). The couple divorced in 1991. 6.According to Taocheng’s evidence, he was born in 1989, out of the relationship between his mother and the Deceased who were cohabitees since around 1987. 7.On 14 March 1998, the Deceased and the Widow had a son, Chan Kwun Shing (“Kwun Shing”), who is the 2nd defendant in the 142 Proceedings. 8.In 2003, the Deceased got married with the Widow. 9.Prior to marrying the Deceased, the Widow had a daughter from her previous marriage, Chen Miaoxiang (“Miaoxiang”). 10.The Deceased died intestate on 29 July 2023. 11.As aforesaid, the Widow was granted the Letters of Administration in February 2024. 12.It is undisputed that:
13.The Applications have been made on the basis of, inter alia, the Transactions. THE WIDOW’S STANCE 14.On 19 December 2024, the Widow filed an affirmation in opposition to the 2396 Proceedings (“the Widow’s 1st Affirmation”). As far as the Transactions are concerned, the Widow explained that:
15.However, in the Widow’s 2nd Affirmation filed on 29 April 2025 in the 2396 Proceedings (which was nearly identical to another affirmation which was filed by her on the same day in the 142 Proceedings), the Widow asked to “withdraw” her 1st Affirmation on the basis that she had not received legal advice at the material time, and as a result she did not have clear understanding on legal concepts concerning “estate” and “debt”. 16.In the Widow’s 2nd Affirmation, she no longer referred to the Loan Agreement nor the Transactions. On the other hand, she treated as if the Silvercord 1612 Property, the Yukon 17A Property, the Yukon 18A Property and the Yukon 20A Property had never been sold by the HK Company, and referred to the total value of these properties as part of the “現時遺產的估值”. On the above basis, she estimated that the total net value of the Estate is about $70 million, and as a result, she anticipated that Judy and Taocheng[1] would be entitled to around $11.58 million each from the Estate. 17.According to the Widow’s 2nd Affirmation, the grounds of opposition of the Applications are that:
TAOCHENG’S LOCUS 18.Before I turn to the substantive merit of the Applications, I would deal with 2 preliminary points raised by the Widow first. 19.The first point concerns the locus standi of Taocheng in bringing the 142 Proceedings. 20.The Widow alleged that she had never heard of the existence of Taocheng before and therefore his biological connection with the Deceased is not admitted. 21.For the above reason, her counsel submitted on her behalf that Taocheng had no locus to commence the 142 Proceedings. 22.This argument may be disposed of quickly. 23.Section 33(3) of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap.10, Laws of Hong Kong) (“the Ordinance”) provides that:
24.In Tristram & Coote’s Probate Practice (32nd Edition), the learned author stated at paragraph 28.1 that:
25.On the above basis, it was submitted by Mr Martin Ho for Taocheng that it is adequate for Taocheng to show that it is possible that he has an interest in the Estate for him to have locus to commence the 142 Proceedings. In other words, it is sufficient for Taocheng to establish that it is possible that he is indeed a son of the Deceased as far as locus is concerned. 26.While Ms Tang for the Widow accepted that that was all Taocheng had to show so as to have the necessary standing to make the present application, she argued that he had failed to pass the threshold. 27.With respect, Ms Tang’s submission must be rejected:
28.Indeed, Ms Tang accepted at the hearing that it is possible that Taocheng is a biological son of the Deceased. That being the case, with greatest respect, it is difficult to understand why Ms Tang still thought fit to challenge the standing of Taocheng to commence the 142 Proceedings. 29.To conclude, I accept that Taocheng has the locus required to commence the 142 Proceedings. DUPLICITY OF PROCEEDINGS 30.It can be seen that 2 separate actions have been commenced for the same purpose of removing the Widow as the administratrix of the Estate. 31.This was caused by the refusal on the part of Judy to join Taocheng as a party in the 2396 Proceedings, which in turn, as explained by Mr Kwan, was attributed to Judy’s worry that the proposed joinder would delay the disposal of the 2396 Proceedings. 32.With greatest respect, while the proposed joinder would indeed lead to delay of the resolution of the 2396 Proceedings, this does not justify Judy’s refusal to join Taocheng, for this would amount to a breach of the requirement set out in paragraph 45 of Practice Direction 20.2 which provides that:
33.Be that as it may, I do not think this Court should dismiss the 142 Proceedings as advocated by the Widow, as this would only lead to further delay of the resolution of the whole matter. Further costs would also have to be incurred unnecessarily. 34.The most that the Widow may say is that, in the event she is unable to oppose the Applications successfully, she should not bear the entirety of the 2 sets of costs. I will deal with this matter at the end of this Judgment if required. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR 35.The statutory basis for the Court to remove an administrator is provided by section 33(3) of the Ordinance (see [23] above). 36.The court’s discretion under section 33(3) of the Ordinance has been summarised in Law Wai Hay v Law Po Chong Priscilla [2021] HKCFI 3017 at [28]:
37.In Chang Wing Ka John v Chang Wing Dee & Another [2021] HKCFI 47, DHCJ To further explained the legal principles on the removal of administrators under section 33(3) of the Ordinance as follows:
38.Both plaintiffs herein relied on the rule against self-dealing which has been examined by B Chu J in Ng, Rose Kai Ching & Others v Liang Yum Shing Howard& Another [2023] HKCFI 1867 as follows:
DISCUSSION Removal of the Widow as administratrix of the Estate 39.At the outset, I should point out that, once an affidavit/affirmation has been filed, it cannot be “withdrawn” as such on the basis that the deponent/affirmant has had a change of mind as to what he/she would like to adduce as evidence. In the event he/she finds that there was any mistake made in a previous affidavit/affirmation, it is up to him/her to file another affidavit/affirmation to make necessary correction(s) with reasons as to why the mistake was made in the first place. It is then up to the Court to consider the weight which should be given to the deponent/affirmant’s evidence (both generally and the evidence which was said to have contained mistake(s)). 40.In the present case, the Widow stated that she would like to withdraw her 1st Affirmation because she was not legally advised at the material time. With respect, this cannot be an acceptable reason to disregard the evidence filed in her 1st Affirmation, because it is trite that an affirmation should only contain factual matters rather than legal arguments. Although I can understand that the lack of legal advice might lead to the omission of relevant evidence and inclusion of irrelevant evidence, I cannot see how the availability of legal advice would have any bearing on the correctness of factual matters (for example, the existence of the Loan Agreement and the Transactions in the present case). 41.I therefore take the view that the Court should not disregard the Widow’s 1st Affirmation in the deliberation of the Applications. 42.Adopting the above approach, I have no hesitation to conclude that this is a clear case in which the Widow should be removed as the administratrix of the Estate for the due and proper administration of the Estate and for the protection of the interests of the beneficiaries. 43.First, according to the Widow’s 1st Affirmation, the Silvercord 1612 Property and the Yukon 20A Property had been sold to herself. This is in clear breach of the self-dealing rule, even if those properties had been sold at market price. This is so even though those properties were held only indirectly by the Deceased through the HK Company because the conflict of interest must still exist given the value of the shareholdings in the HK Company (which are properties of the Estate) must be affected by the sale of those properties. This is a weighty factor to be taken into account. 44.Second, the fact that the Transactions had taken place is a matter which is not only a factual assertion made in the Widow’s 1st Affirmation but reflected by legal documents which have been formally executed and registered at the Lands Registry. Hence, this is something which has to be sorted out further, and cannot be treated as if they had not taken place simply by the Widow “withdrawing” her 1st Affirmation. 45.Given the Widow’s involvement in the matter, she apparently is not an appropriate person to be entrusted with the resolution of the issues concerning the Transactions. 46.Third, as a related matter, the contradictory evidence given by the Widow on the existence of the Transactions has rendered it necessary to look into the proprietary of those alleged transactions and the documents executed. 47.In fact, the more the Widow said about it, the more puzzled other bystanders (including this Court) have become in relation to what had actually happened while the Widow was the sole administratrix of the Estate. This is not helped by her submissions as follows:
48.If the sale proceeds of the Transactions have already been used to repay the BVI Company pursuant to the Settlement Agreement (as a result of which the HCA Action was settled), how can the Transactions be “reversed” as the Widow seems to be suggesting? Does it mean that no money has ever changed hand in the Transactions in the first place? 49.The above matters are apparently subject to further investigation, particularly when there is suggestion that Miaoxiang is in fact the sole director of the BVI Company. 50.In these circumstances, the Widow simply cannot be a suitable person to discharge the duty to investigate. 51.Fourth, as submitted by Ms Tang for the Widow, the continuation of the administration of the Estate would involve the “return” by the Widow, Kwun Shing and Miaoxiang of the properties concerned to the HK Company. While the Widow alleged through counsel that she was in a position to procure such return by Miaoxiang (of the Yukon 17A Property), it is noted that Miaoxiang is not a party to either of the proceedings herein, nor has she made any affirmation for the purpose of confirming that she is willing to return the said property. That being the case, the Widow has not satisfied the Court that she has any authority to express Miaoxiang’s stance at all. In the event Miaoxiang is not cooperative in the process, the Widow will be caught in a conflict of interest position if she remains the sole administratrix of the Estate. 52.Fifth, there may well be conflict of interest even on the Widow’s and Kwun Shing’s own case. 53.In their written submissions, it was argued that:
54.To say the least, the aforesaid “dual role” may lead to conflict of interest. Identity of the new administrator 55.Having reached the above conclusion, the next issue is the identity of the administrator who should replace the Widow. 56.All parties, except Taocheng, agreed that in the event the Widow is removed, an independent administrator should be appointed. 57.For Taocheng, his counsel informed this Court that his primary position is that he should be appointed given the Estate appears to consist only of shares in the HK Company and limited bank balances. 58.With greatest respect, this suggestion is unrealistic, given Taocheng’s status as the Deceased’s biological son is still not admitted by all beneficiaries of the Estate. It is therefore possible that there will be conflict of interest if he is appointed. 59.The appointment of an independent administrator is hence unavoidable in the present case. 60.Judy suggested that a certified public accountant should be appointed because there is a need to investigate into various matters including:
61.Judy therefore proposed that either Mr Wong Kwok Keung or Mr Osman Arab should be chosen. 62.On the other hand, Taocheng submitted that a solicitor should be more appropriate in the present case, and he proposed to appoint Mr Wong Tak Shing who is a practising solicitor. 63.While the Widow agreed (in the event she is replaced) that a solicitor should be appointed, she put forward Mr Ng Kin Yuen for the Court’s consideration. 64.On my part, I have serious doubts as to whether there is anything to investigate into in relation to the alleged investments in the Mainland, particularly when most of the alleged projects were said to have been done in the 1990s. Indeed, according to the Widow’s latest affirmation, the HK Company did not have much business activities other than holding landed properties and earning rental income (“倍源沒有甚麼商業活動，主要是持有物業和收租”[4]). It should also be noted that the Widow had not referred to those alleged investments in the Mainland in her Affirmations filed in April 2025. 65.Even if there is any such alleged investments, it would probably be necessary to appoint a professional in the Mainland for the purpose of such investigation. 66.In relation to the accounts to be produced and the alleged liabilities owed by the Deceased, there is no evidence that such matters are complicated. 67.Hence, having regard to the nature of the possible disputes, I am of the view that it is more appropriate to appoint a solicitor to be the independent administrator of the Estate in the present case. 68.Out of the candidates put forward by the parties, I am of the view that Mr Wong Tak Shing should be appointed, purely because the fee quoted by him is more attractive. 69.I therefore make the following orders in both Applications:
COSTS 70.As a matter of principle, costs should follow the event. 71.The slight complication as far as cost herein is concerned is that Judy should have joined Taocheng as a party in the 2396 Proceedings. As a result of the non-joinder, Taocheng had to commence a separate action himself. 72.Having said that, I take the tentative view that not much duplicated work has been caused as a result. 73.Ms Tang has drawn my attention to the fact that the Widow has to file 2 separate affirmations in the 2 sets of proceedings and that has led to extra costs. This may be so. However, in my view, given the Widow’s way in the conduct of these proceedings, she would have to file further evidence to support her stance on Taocheng’s lack of locus anyway even if Taocheng were to be added as a party to the 2396 Proceedings. There was therefore no “extra work” as such. As to the other part of the Widow’s affirmation filed in the 142 Proceedings, she could have simply referred to her own 2nd Affirmation filed in the 2396 Proceedings. The duplication of work is thus minimal. The same applies to the costs of perusal of the documents filed in the 142 Proceedings. 74.Ms Tang also argued that she had to lodge two sets of submissions in light of the fact that there are 2 cases. With respect, this argument is misconceived, because there was nothing which stopped her from lodging one single set of submissions covering both Applications, particularly when many of the issues involved are common to both actions. 75.The only “extra” cost which had been incurred by reason of the separate action seems to me to be Taocheng’s costs of filing the Originating Summons in the 142 Proceedings. Given Judy’s involvement in the Mainland Proceedings, it is indisputable that she has had knowledge of Taocheng’s potential claim as the Deceased’s son and the content of the DNA Reports. In my view, it is unreasonable for her not to join Taocheng as a party in the 2396 Proceedings, not to mention refusing to join him as such despite his express request. 76.I therefore take the tentative view that the filing fee of the Originating Summons in the 142 Proceedings together with the costs of correspondences between Judy’s solicitors and Taocheng’s solicitors should be borne by Judy. 77.For the above reasons, I make the following costs order nisi:
78.The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, will be disposed of on paper) within 14 days hereof.
Mr Kwan Ping Kan, instructed by K. B. Chau & Co., for the plaintiff in HCMP 2396/2024 and the 3rd defendant in HCMP 142/2025 Mr Martin Ho and Mr Adrian Kwan, instructed by Kwok, Ng & Chan, for the plaintiff in HCMP 142/2025 Ms Hannah Tang, instructed by S. W. Wong & Associates, for the defendant in HCMP 2396/2024 and the 1st and 2nd defendants in HCMP 142/2025 [1] On the assumption that he was indeed a son of the Deceased and hence a beneficiary of the Estate [2] Order 38 rule 36(2) of the Rules of the High Court reads: “Nothing in paragraph (1) [which stipulates that ‘Except with the leave of the Court or where all parties agree, no expert evidence may be adduced at the trial or hearing of any cause or matter unless the party seeking to adduce the evidence has applied for and complied with expert directions’]shall apply to evidence which is permitted to be given by affidavit or shall affect the enforcement under any other provision of these rules (except of Order 45, rule 5) of a direction given under this Part of this Order.” [3] As per the skeleton submissions lodged by the Widow and Kwun Shing in the 142 Proceedings. Nearly identical argument has also been incorporated in the Widow’s skeleton submissions lodged in the 2396 Proceedings. [4] Paragraph 6 of the Widow’s Affirmation filed on 29 April 2025 in the 142 Proceedings |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 2396/2024