Dam Quang Cong v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 2321/2024 [2025] HKCFI 5641 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2321 OF 2024
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 2 December 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 21 November 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out his non-refoulement claim on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 June 2024 and confirmed the same. Amendments 3.In Form 86, the applicant named “Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition office” and “Director of Immigration” as the putative respondents and did not name any putative interested party. However, the putative respondent should only be the Board and the Director should be the putative interested party. 4.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all. 5.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party. The applicant’s case 6.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Vietnam, his creditor would harm or kill him as he could not repay the debt to his creditor. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 7.By his affirmation dated 2 October 2025 and a letter to the Registrar of this court dated 2 October 2025, the applicant requested to withdraw the Leave Application as it was safe for him to return to his country. 8.Before this court could deal with the applicant’s withdrawal application, the Director informed this court on 30 October 2025 that the applicant was removed during the period 20 October 2025 to 26 October 2025. 9.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With the withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application. 10.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
11.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large by granting leave to withdraw to the applicant. This court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 12.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that it was safe for him to return to his country. In other words, the basis of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 13.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 14.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 15.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 16.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 17.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 19th day of November 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment