Vu Van Hoang v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 1770/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3499

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1770 OF 2025

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1.  On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.

2.  The applicant’s application to withdraw the application for leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

3.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 11 August 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 19 May 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”).

2.The Board found that the applicant failed to establish his non-refoulement claim on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 19 February 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Amendments

3.The applicant named the Board and the Director as the putative respondents, and did not name any putative interested party in Form 86. In fact, only the Board should be the putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative interested party.

4.Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of Immigration” is added as the putative interested party.

The applicant’s case

5.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor, Nguyen Van Son, due to his inability to repay his debt to the creditor.

Withdrawal of the Leave Application

6.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the applicant filed an ex-parte application by way of his affirmation dated 7 May 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In the applicant’s said affirmation, he stated that his debt problem in Vietnam had been resolved and it was safe for him to return to Vietnam.

7.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave.

8.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-

“The applicant on his own motion applied to the Court to withdraw his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge acceded to his application, whereupon there was nothing outstanding in the action. The Judge was correct to conclude the action by ordering a dismissal of the application instead of leaving the action at large.”

9.Thus, it is right for this court to deal with the Leave Application instead of leaving the action at large by granting leave to the applicant to withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused, and this court will proceed to consider the Leave Application.

Discussion

10.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that his debt problem in Vietnam had been resolved and it was safe for him to return to Vietnam. In other words, the basis of his non-refoulement claim no longer exists.

11.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose.

12.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015).

13.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743).

14.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed.

Conclusion

15.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 17^th day of June 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1