Nurhidayah v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 475/2025 [2026] HKCFI 4376 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 475 OF 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated 20 February 2025 and filed on 21 February 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 29 August 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant’s non-refoulement claim failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board rejected the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 December 2021 and confirmed the same. Late application 3.By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Board’s Decision was made. 4.However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 21 February 2025, which was more than 5 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 29 August 2024). The applicant was hence late for more than 2 months in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application. 5.As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria for granting an extension of time are:
6.The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and provided no explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave Application. 7.A delay of more than 2 months is substantial, and there was no explanation given for the delay. 8.Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone. 9.However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with the Leave Application as discussed below. The applicant’s case 10.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, she would be ill-treated and killed by her creditor and the creditor’s underlings as well as her ex-husband due to her unsettled loan. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 11.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the applicant wrote a letter dated 18 June 2026 to this court to cancel her case. The Director also informed this court on 7 July 2026 that the applicant wrote an undated written submission to the Department of Justice to withdraw the Leave Application. In both the applicant’s said letter and written submission, she stated that she was safe to go back home. 12.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though she had previously requested one. 13.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
14.Thus, it is right for this court to deal with the Leave Application instead of leaving the action at large by granting leave to the applicant to withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused, and this court will proceed to consider the Leave Application. Discussion 15.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that it was safe for her to go back home. In other words, the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 16.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 17.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 18.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 19.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 20.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 5th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment