Pham Van Phong v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 79/2026 [2026] HKCFI 4947 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 79 OF 2026 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 8 January 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 8 December 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 10 September 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Amendments 3.In Form 86, the applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any putative interested party, when only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party. 4.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all. 5.Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and “Director of Immigration” is added as the putative interested party. The applicant’s case 6.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Vietnam, he would be killed by a money lender as he had a debt problem there. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 7.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed this court on 24 July 2026 that the applicant had written a letter dated 2 July 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In his said letter, the applicant stated that his problem in Vietnam had been resolved and he wanted to go back to Vietnam as soon as possible. 8.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application. 9.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
10.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 11.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that his problem in Vietnam had been resolved. In other words, it is safe for him to return to his country and the basis of his non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 12.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 13.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 14.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 15.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 16.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 2nd day of September 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment