Kathamuthu Muthukkaruppan v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 756/2020 [2025] HKCFI 5898 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 756 OF 2020
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 23 April 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 16 January 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant failed to establish a case of non-refoulement on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Thus, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 16 April 2018 and confirmed the same. Amendments 3.In Form 86, the applicant did not name the putative respondent correctly and did not name any putative interested party, when the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party. 4.This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party. Late application 5.By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Board’s Decision was made. 6.However, the applicant filed his Form 86 on 23 April 2020, which was 3 months and 7 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 16 January 2020). The applicant was hence late for 7 days in making the Leave Application. 7.This court has to consider whether the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application should be extended taking into account of the criteria laid down in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, which are:
8.The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and provided no explanation for the delay in making the Leave Application. 9.A delay of 7 days is not significant. However, as the applicant has applied for withdrawal of the Leave Application and confirmed that his issue in his country had been resolved, it is otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review as discussed below. 10.Having considered the above criteria, this court will not grant an extension of time for the applicant to file the Leave Application. 11.The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone. The applicant’s case 12.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to India, he feared he would be harmed by Pandian, Shanmuga and their gang as Shanmuga wanted the applicant’s share of his family farmland. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 13.By a letter dated 19 September 2025, the Director informed this court that the applicant had written a letter dated 21 July 2025 to withdraw the Leave Application as he wanted to return to his home country. In the applicant’s said letter, he stated that his issue in his country had been resolved and it was safe for him to go back home. 14.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With the withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application. 15.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
16.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large by granting leave to withdraw to the applicant. This court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 17.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that his issue in his country had been resolved and it was safe for him to go back home. In other words, the basis of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 18.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 19.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 20.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 21.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 22.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 2nd day of December 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment