Nguyen Thi Khanh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2371/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 December 2025.
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 28 December 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 19 December 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
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HCAL 2371/2023 [2025] HKCFI 6005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2371 OF 2023
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 28 December 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 19 December 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board refused the applicant’s appeal/petition and confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 30 August 2023. Amendments 3.In Form 86, the applicant named both the Board and “Director of Immigration Department” as the putative respondents and did not name any putative interested party, when only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party. 4.This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board and add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party. The applicant’s case 5.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Vietnam, she feared harm or death from a loan shark in relation to her outstanding debt. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 6.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the applicant wrote a letter to the Registrar of this court dated 16 September 2025 and filed an affirmation dated 16 September 2025 to withdraw the Leave Application because it was safe for her to return to her country. 7.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application. 8.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
9.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 10.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that it was safe for her to return to her country. In other words, the basis of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 11.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 12.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 13.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 14.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 15.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 9th day of December 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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