Laela Fitriyaningsih v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1555/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 December 2025.
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 10 September 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 August 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 1555/2024 [2025] HKCFI 6158 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1555 OF 2024
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 10 September 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 August 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found the applicant’s non-refoulement claim not substantiated on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 12 January 2024, which rejected her non-refoulement claim. Amendments 3.The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as both the putative respondents and the putative interested parties in Form 86. 4.In fact, only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party. 5.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a party at all. 6.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”. The applicant’s case 7.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, her parents would harm or even kill her, as the applicant refused to go back to Indonesia to marry someone she did not know. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 8.By her affirmation dated 8 July 2025, the applicant applied to cancel the Leave Application. 9.Further, by a letter dated 20 August 2025, the Director informed this court that the applicant had made a submission dated 6 August 2025 to close her case. 10.The applicant had in fact written two letters both dated 6 August 2025, one to the Director and the other to the Registrar of this court. In the applicant’s letter to the Director, she stated that she wanted to return to her country, Indonesia, as her problems had been solved. In her letter to the Registrar of this court, she stated that her issues in her home country had been resolved and she could return home. 11.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With the withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though she had previously requested one. 12.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
13.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large by granting leave to withdraw to the applicant. This court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 14.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that her problems/issues had been solved/resolved and she could return to her country. In other words, it is now safe for her to return to her country and the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 15.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 16.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 17.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 18.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 19.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 9th day of December 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment