Le Thi Oanh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 783/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 14 January 2026.
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 31 March 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 19 March 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”).
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HCAL 783/2025 [2026] HKCFI 253 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 783 OF 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 31 March 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 19 March 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 23 January 2025 and confirmed the same. Amendments 3.In Form 86, the applicant named “Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office” and the Director as the putative respondents but did not name any putative interested party. 4.In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent and the Director should be named as the putative interested party. 5.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all. 6.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party. The applicant’s case 7.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Vietnam, she would be tortured or even killed by her creditor as she had not repaid her loan. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 8.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, on 31 October 2025, the Director informed this court that the applicant had written a letter dated 29 September 2025 to the Registrar of the High Court to withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant also filed an ex parte application by way of her affirmation dated 29 September 2025 to withdraw the Leave Application. 9.As stated in the applicant’s said letter and affirmation, it is now safe for her to go back to her home country and she wants to return to her home country as soon as possible. 10.On 24 December 2025, the Director further informed this court that the applicant had been removed from Hong Kong during the period from 15 December 2025 to 21 December 2025. 11.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though she had previously requested one. 12.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
13.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 14.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that it is safe for her to return to her home country. Thus, the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 15.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 16.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 17.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 18.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 19.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 14th day of January 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment