Bansal Manoj v. Director of Immigration and Another

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 601/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 January 2026.

1. I had, by an order dated 21 August 2025 ( “Order” ), refused the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board ( “TCAB” ) / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office ( “NRCPO” ) dated 26 March 2020 ( “TCAB Decision” ) for reasons set out in [2025] HKCFI 3665 ( “Leave Decision” ).

Cited by 2 cases · Cites 13 cases

Case No.HCAL 601/2020[2026] HKCFI 185
Court
High Court CFI
Date27 Jan 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 601/2020

[2026] HKCFI 185

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 601 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

BANSAL MANOJ Applicant
and
Director of Immigration Putative
1st Respondent
Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative
2nd Respondent
and
Director of Immigration Putative
Interested Party

________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) YW Hew in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 10 October 2025
Date of Decision: 27 January 2026

________________

DECISION

________________


1.I had, by an order dated 21 August 2025 (“Order”), refused the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 26 March 2020 (“TCAB Decision”) for reasons set out in [2025] HKCFI 3665 (“Leave Decision”).

2.As I did not direct that time run during the summer vacation, and as 14 September 2025 was a Sunday, the deadline for the Applicant to file a notice of appeal against my Order was 15 September 2025: see Do Hung Loi v Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office [2023] HKCA 1081 at §12; Re Muhammad Ali Pahat [2025] HKCA 657 at §3; RHC O. 3 r. 4.

3.However, the Applicant did not file a notice of appeal on or by that date, but instead on 15 September 2025 issued a summons (“Summons”) which was supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) whereby he applied to set aside the Order on the grounds that it was “unsatisfactory and unreasonable”.

4.Since by the time of the hearing on 10 October 2025 the Applicant was deemed to be out of time for filing a notice of appeal (see Muhammad Ali Pahat, supra, at §5; Rana Jaswant [2019] 2 HKLRD 347 at §§8.2, 8.3), I have dealt with the present application as one for an extension of time to appeal, as to which the relevant considerations are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346, Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510). Whilst the fact that the applicant filed the Summons when a notice of appeal could have been filed within time is a matter in his favour (which, depending on the facts of the case, may incline the court towards extending time), the merits may still be taken into account, and the prospect of success is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Do Hung Loi, supra, at §15 citing inter alia Usman Yumiati [2021] HKCA 992; Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408).

5.In that regard, at the hearing the Applicant confirmed that his ground of appeal was that the Leave Decision and the Order were “unsatisfactory and unreasonable”. He sought to add, in relation to such, that he had been in Hong Kong for the last 18 years and that he had not committed any crimes or “bad record”. He repeated the claims that he had made before me at the hearing of his leave application (see Paragraph 21 of the Leave Decision), and added the new claim (again, without documentary evidence in support) that his problems back home had apparently also led to the loss of his brother. He also said that he wanted to be allowed “some time”, and that the problem he was facing was “still there”.

6.I do not see that the above raise any basis (in the nature of an error of law, a failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse the Order and Leave Decision (Nupur Mst, supra). This is particularly so given that:

(1) The Applicant has not identified how my Leave Decision and the Order were “unsatisfactory and unreasonable”. Indeed, and on the contrary, I do not see any reasonable prospect of his making such an argument on appeal, given my analysis and explanation in the Leave Decision of the nature of judicial review proceedings, of the issues before the TCAB/NRCPO, and of the TCAB Decision which I had reviewed with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and saw no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. I do not see or accept that his presence in Hong Kong as a non-refoulement claimant for over 18 years and/or the alleged status of his criminal record in Hong Kong, is/are relevant to any potential ground of appeal; and

(2) The Applicant’s allegations as to his family circumstances in India (including the new allegation regarding the reason for his brother’s death) were and are not relevant to the application for leave or his intended appeal, given the nature of the issues before the TCAB/NRCPO, the nature of judicial review, and as they are not supported by any relevant and admissible evidence having had regard to the criteria in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Powis [1981] 1 WLR 574 (CA), Nguyen Ho & ors. v Director of Immigration & anor. [1991] 1 HKLR 576 at 579, 582H-583I[1] and (in relation to the matter of the intended appeal) at least the first and second of the conditions in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489.

7.While I am prepared to accept, in the Applicant’s favour, that he filed the Summons when a notice of appeal could have been filed within time, as the intended appeal is unarguable it would be futile for me to extend time for the Applicant to file a notice of appeal. Moreover, such an order would also substantially and needlessly prejudice the respondent.

8.In the circumstances, I dismiss the Summons.

  (YW Hew)
  Deputy High Court Judge
  (Non-refoulement Claims)

The applicant appeared in person



[1]   Which criteria are relevant as the Court of Appeal had (subsequent to the Leave Decision) in Chidomere Christian Okechukwu v TCAB/NRCPO [2025] HKCA 694 conclusively clarified that the criteria in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 do not apply where an applicant seeks to admit new evidence in relation to applications before the court of first instance for leave to apply for judicial review, contrary to the approach which had been taken in several first instance decisions (e.g. Paclipan Neil Oliver Ones [2025] HKCFI 403, which had not been the subject of negative commentary in Paclipan Neil Oliver Ones [2025] HKCA 811 as was handed down, by a differently constituted Court of Appeal, one day before the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chidomere, supra).