Nasir Saeed v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 948/2025 [2026] HKCFI 2059 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 948 OF 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 22 April 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 8 April 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board refused the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 20 January 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Amendments 3.The applicant named the Board and Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondents and himself as the putative interested party in Form 86, when the only the Board should be the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party. 4.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”. The applicant’s case 5.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Pakistan, he would be ill-treated or even killed by the Pakistani Muslim League – Nawaz as he refused to join their party. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 6.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the applicant filed an ex-parte application by way of his affirmation dated 12 January 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. 7.As stated in the applicant’s said affirmation, all his issues were solved and he wanted to go back to his country Pakistan. 8.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though he had previously requested one. 9.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
10.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 11.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that all his issues were solved. Thus, the basis of his non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 12.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 13.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 14.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 15.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 16.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 15th day of April 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment