Arora Tanya v. Sojobi Adebayo Olatunbosun

LDPD 174/2026

[2026] HKLdT 28

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

APPLICATION NO. LDPD 174 OF 2026

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.By my order dated 4 March 2026 (“Order”), this Tribunal:

(1) granted leave to the Applicant to withdraw the Notice of Application filed on 9 February 2026 (“Form 22”); and

(2) ordered the Respondent to pay the Applicant the costs of this Application summarily assessed at $365 (“Costs Order”).

2.By Form 1 filed on 17 March 2026, the Respondent applied for leave to appeal against the Costs Order (“Leave Application”).

3.At the oral hearing of the Leave Application, the Applicant was represented by Ms. Shweta Arora (“Ms. S. Arora”), while the Respondent attended in person.

Background

4.By the Form 22, the Applicant applied for recovery of vacant possession of 7/F, Wing Fung Building, 222 Chatham Road North, Hunghom (“the Premises”), payment of arrears of rent and mesne profits, and costs on the ground that the Respondent had failed to pay rent since 20 January 2026.

5.Clause 1 of the tenancy agreement reads as follows:

“The Tenant shall pay to the Landlord the Rent in advance on the 20^th day of each and every calendar month during the Term …”

6.Whereas Clause 7 of the tenancy agreement contains:

“… If the Rent and/or and charges payable by the Tenant hereunder or any part thereof shall be unpaid for seven (7) days after the same shall become payable (whether legally demanded or not) … it shall be lawful for the Landlord at any time thereafter to re-enter the Premises whereupon this Agreement shall absolutely determine… ”.

7.By Form 7[1] filed on 12 February 2026, the Respondent opposed the Form 22 by relying on a number of grounds[2]. In particular, he mentioned that the Applicant allowed him to repay the rent in arrears by 10 February 2026, but the Applicant filed the Form 22 on 9 February 2026.

8.On 3 March 2026, the Respondent lodged a copy of two bank pay-in slips, which indicate his payment of $9,700 on 13 February 2026 (for the rent due on 20 January 2026) and another payment of $9,700 on 21 February 2026 (for the rent due on 20 February 2026) to the Applicant.

9.At the (call-over) hearing on 4 March 2026, the Applicant was represented by Ms. S. Arora and the Respondent appeared in person before this Tribunal. Having considered that all outstanding rent had been fully repaid, this Tribunal granted leave to the Applicant to withdraw the Form 22.

10.The parties however had no agreement on the costs. The Applicant asked for costs at that hearing. The Respondent disagreed with it by the reasons that (a) he had done the maintenance of the Premises and the Applicant had not kept her promise to maintain the Premises; (b) he needed to be legally aided to appeal to the High Court (for his another case unrelated to the Applicant) but his legal-aid application was refused; (c) he needed public housing to be provided by the Government; (d) the Applicant still had the deposit held under the concerned tenancy; (e) the Applicant had not provided receipts for previous rent payments; and (f) he had already paid the rent for March. This Tribunal asked for the relevance of his grounds to the costs, and explained to the Respondent that the Applicant should be entitled to the costs since she had to commence these proceedings due to his non-payment of rent. This Tribunal then pointed out to the Respondent that the costs requested by the Applicant were the exact amount paid into the court for the filing of forms[3] in this action. This Tribunal then ordered the Respondent to pay the costs in the sum of $365 to the Applicant.

The Interlocutory Application

11.The Respondent filed the Leave Application. His grounds of application are summarised below.

(1) The Applicant refused “to accept a reasonable payment plan that were communicated in good faith”. The Respondent communicated with the Applicant on his financial challenges and proposed to settle all rent in arrears by 20 February 2026, but the Applicant insisted payment should be made by 10 February 2026. Eventually the Applicant did not keep to her word and unreasonably commenced the present action on 9 February 2026. Despite he had kept his promise by settling all outstanding rent before the hearing on 4 March 2026, the Applicant continued the action instead of withdrawing the case. The filing fee should therefore be paid by the Applicant, which is in line with Section 21F of the High Court Ordinance.

(2) According to Order 62, Rules of the High Court, Cap.4A, “the actions of the Landlord is unreasonable and vexatious” taking into account of the assurance of payment given by the Respondent and his compliance with that payment assurance.

(3) This Tribunal was erroneous in point of law. According to s.11A of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Cap.17 (“LTO”), this Tribunal “misapplied the ‘costs follow event’ rule when the litigation was unnecessary in the first place”.

(4) It is erroneous for this Tribunal to ask the Applicant if she wanted the Respondent to bear the filing fees. “The costs of the proceeding is at the discretion of the Tribunal and not the Landlord.”

12.At the hearing on 31 March 2026 for the Leave Application, the Respondent generally repeated the grounds set out above. He also added that Ms. S. Arora had said that she did not need the costs after the hearing on 4 March 2026. Ms. S. Arora responded that she had agreed in good faith to waive the costs. She did not expect the Respondent to file the Leave Application, and she had to go to the court again because of it.

13.After the hearing on 31 March 2026, the Applicant and the Respondent lodged a joint letter, signed by both Ms. S. Arora and the Respondent, with the following content:

“THIS IS AN AGREEMENT WITH REGARDS TO THE CASE NO:LDPD/174-2026; BOTH THE APPLICANT AND THE RESPONDENT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE COSTS RELATED TO THIS CASE LDPD 174/2026 AS AGREED IN COURT ON THE 31^ST MARCH’ 2026.”

14.Upon my requisition on the purpose of the joint letter, the Respondent replied on 15 April 2026 that the agreement was for the Tribunal’s record only. In his reply, the Respondent also mentioned that as he “won the case”, he was “not liable to any cost”, and he was “not interested in the applicant paying any cost” to him. The Applicant also replied on 15 April 2026 confirming that the joint letter is an agreement for the Tribunal’s record only and no further action is required. Nonetheless, this Tribunal has not received any withdrawal or discontinuation of the Leave Application by the Respondent.

Applicable Law on Leave to Appeal

15.Any party to proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a judgment, order or decision of the Tribunal on the ground that such judgment, order or decision is erroneous in point of law: s.11(2) of LTO.

16.Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the Tribunal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that (a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or (b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard: s.11AA(6) of LTO.

Discussion

17.The relevant principles for determining costs if a case is settled are set out in the judgment in Famous Marvel Company Limited & Others v Conversant Group Limited & Others, HCA 2153/2009 at §22.

“There is no dispute that even if a case is settled except as to costs, the Court still has power to determine which party should be liable for costs. There is no tradition for there to be “no order as to costs” in such a scenario. I am guided by the following principles in deciding costs:

(i) The Court is to decide if the party seeking costs has substantially obtained the reliefs sought in the litigation: Re Chinese United Establishment Ltd, HCCW 291/1994, 5 October 1995, Rogers J (as he then was), approved in CACV 214/1995; Lai Yuet Chun v Super Deluxe International Limited & ors, HCCW 186/2001, 3 June 2003 Kwan J (as she then was).

(ii) At each end of the spectrum there will be cases where it is obvious which side would have won had the substantive issues been fought to a conclusion. In between, the position will, in differing degrees, be less clear. How far the Court will be prepared to look into the previously unresolved substantive issues will depend on the circumstances of the particular case, not least the amount of costs at stake and the conduct of the parties. Brawley v Marcynski (No.1) [2003] 1 WLR 813.

(iii) The Court will first consider if it is in a position to say what the likely outcome after trial would have been. If it is not in a position to do so, the order may well be no order as to costs: Brawley v Marcynski (No.1),at para 18, Longmore LJ; followed in BCT Software Solutions Ltd v C Brewer & Sons Ltd [2004] FSR 150.

(iv) The Court may permit parties to adduce evidence on the question of costs: Ta Tung China & Arts Ltd v Fontana Restaurant Ltd [1999] 1 HKLRD 404; Lai Yuet Chun v Super Deluxe International Limited & ors, at para 12. However, to say that the parties must go to trial in order to resolve any outstanding questions of costs would be contrary to the underlying objectives enshrined in RHC Order 1A rules 1 and 2: Graham M Morley v Kwan Wo Wan & others, HCA 4366/2003, 30 December 2009, Recorder Jat SC.

(v) A broad brush can be taken by referring to all matters already laid before the Court, eg pleadings, correspondence, witness statements, transcripts of evidence and the terms of the settlement order: c.f. BCT Software Solutions Ltd v C Brewer & Sons Ltd, at para 9; Graham M Morley v Kwan Wo Wan & others.

(vi) The objective is to do justice between the parties without incurring unnecessary Court time and consequently additional cost: Brawley v Marcynski (No.1).”

18.In the present case, the Respondent has been in default of rental payment since 20 January 2026, for 20 days by the time the Applicant commenced the present action on 9 February 2026. By the operation of Clauses 1 and 7 of the tenancy agreement, the Applicant was entitled to commence this action for recovery of possession of the Premises and payment of rent/ mesne profits. The Applicant actually had a good cause of action to commence these proceedings against the Respondent.

19.The grounds of opposition provided in Form 7 by the Respondent are hardly relevant or valid. In the circumstances, the likely outcome of the case should have been in favour of the Applicant, if the Respondent had not settled the outstanding payment after the commencement of the action. Having considered the above, the Applicant should have the costs of the filing fees, which are $235 for the filing of Form 22 (Notice of Application), and $130 for the filing of Form 30 (Affirmation of Service).

20.Regarding the alleged breach of the Applicant’s promise to accept a late payment by the Respondent by 10 February 2026, there was no solid evidence produced to this Tribunal in support of the existence of an agreement actually entered between the parties, not to mention a legally valid agreement. The fact that the Respondent paid the outstanding rent on 13 February 2026, which was three days later than his alleged promised date on 10 February 2026, further undermined his own allegation. Having considered all the relevant circumstances, this Tribunal finds that the Applicant held a valid cause of action and was found reasonable to commence the present proceedings.

21.When dealing with the issue of costs during the hearing on 4 March 2026, Ms. S. Arora asked for costs in the sum of $1,200, which was alleged to be the actual costs incurred. Later Ms. S. Arora confirmed that she referred to the amount the Applicant had “put in”. This Tribunal reminded her that if she was referring to the filing fees of the forms the amount would be in the sum of $365, on which she agreed. This Tribunal found this amount reasonable and so allowed. I do not see any error of law in this Tribunal in the determination of the costs.

Conclusion

22.For reasons aforesaid, the Respondent was not able to identify any error of law made by this Tribunal in the Costs Order. This Tribunal is not satisfied that the intended appeal enjoys any reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice why it should be heard.

23.The Respondent’s application for leave to appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The Applicant, legally unrepresented, represented by Ms. Shweta Arora

The Respondent, legally unrepresented, appeared in person