Nur Jannah v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 361/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 13 May 2026.
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 22 February 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 December 2024.
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HCAL 361/2024 [2026] HKCFI 2689 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 361 OF 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 22 February 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 December 2024. 2.The Board’s decision was in fact dated 4 December 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). It is clear that the applicant made a mistake in putting down the date of the Board’s Decision in Form 86, as she had attached a copy of the Board’s Decision to her supporting affirmation dated 22 February 2024, which showed the date of the decision as “4 December 2023”. 3.The Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board refused the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 3 January 2023 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Amendments 4.The applicant named both the Board and the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondents and the putative interested parties in Form 86, when only the Board should be the putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative interested party. 5.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative party at all. 6.As aforesaid, the Board’s Decision should be dated “4 December 2023”, not “4 December 2024”. 7.Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, the name of the putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”, and the decision in respect of which relief is sought is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 4 December 2023”. The applicant’s case 8.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, she would be ill-treated and killed by her creditor, Suhadi, and/or his underlings, due to her outstanding debt. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 9.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed this court on 2 March 2026 that the applicant had written a letter dated 26 January 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In her said letter, the applicant stated that she was safe to go back to Indonesia. 10.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave Application even though she had previously requested one. 11.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
12.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application. Discussion 13.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that it was safe for her to return to Indonesia. In other words, the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 14.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 15.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 16.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 17.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 18.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 13th day of May 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment