Kasfiya Kamrun Nahar v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1797/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 May 2026.
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 13 August 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 July 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”).
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HCAL 1797/2025 [2026] HKCFI 2899 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1797 OF 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 13 August 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 4 July 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). 2.The Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board refused the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 16 June 2022 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. The applicant’s case 3.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Bangladesh or Myanmar, she would be harmed or killed as she was stateless and she was from the Rohingyan ethnic group. Withdrawal of the Leave Application 4.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed this court on 11 March 2026 that the applicant had written a letter dated 6 February 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In the applicant’s said letter, she stated that her issues in her home country had been resolved and she could return home. 5.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application. 6.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
7.Thus, it is right for this court to deal with the Leave Application instead of leaving the action at large by granting leave to the applicant to withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused, and this court will proceed to consider the Leave Application. Discussion 8.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that her issues in her home country had been resolved and she could return home. In other words, she could safely return to her home country and the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer exists. 9.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose. 10.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015). 11.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743). 12.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed. Conclusion 13.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 20th day of May 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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