Tampus, Mary Joy Dumaguing v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 176/2026

[2026] HKCFI 3501

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 176 OF 2026

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or counsel in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1.  The applicant’s application to withdraw the application for leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

2.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 14 January 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 December 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”).

2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 20 October 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

The applicant’s case

3.The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to the Philippines, she would be harmed, ill-treated or killed by her partner, named Melchor Parilla, due to a relationship problem.

Withdrawal of the Leave Application

4.Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed this court on 12 May 2026 that the applicant submitted a letter dated 20 April 2026 to withdraw the Leave Application. In her said letter, the applicant stated that her issues in her home country had been resolved and she could return home.

5.There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application.

6.However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-

“The applicant on his own motion applied to the Court to withdraw his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge acceded to his application, whereupon there was nothing outstanding in the action. The Judge was correct to conclude the action by ordering a dismissal of the application instead of leaving the action at large.”

7.Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application.

Discussion

8.It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that her issues in her home country had been resolved and she could return home. In other words, it was safe for her to return to her home country, and the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer exists.

9.It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose.

10.It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015).

11.Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743).

12.It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed.

Conclusion

13.For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 17^th day of June 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1