Sun Leasing Management Ltd 對 West Town Development Ltd

LDPD 750/2026

[2026] HKLdT 51

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

申請編號LDPD 2026年第750宗

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判決書
(上訴許可申請)

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1.答辯人於2026年8月18日提出非正審申請, 要求就本席於2026年7月21日的判決（「該判決」）申請上訴許可, 並要求暫緩執行有關之命令。

背景

2.根據一份日期為2023年4月25日的Tenancy Agreement (下稱「涉案租約」)，申請人把香港西源里23號的地下、1樓、2樓、3樓、4樓及天台，即整幢物業 (下稱「涉案處所」) 租予答辯人，租約期為3年，由2023年6月15日起至2026年6月14日止，每月租金為60,000元（包括政府差餉、地租及管理費）。

3.惟根據涉案租約附表5，租客，即本案答辯人，有權在涉案租約屆滿日期2026年6月14日前以不少於一個月的書面通知本案業主，即申請人，要求續約3年，新租約的租將為每月65,000元（包括政府差餉、地租及管理費）。該續租條款的原文如下[1]:

“… both parties now agree to accept that if the tenant informs the landlord in writing to renew the lease at least one month before the expiration of the lease on 14^th June 2026, the landlord must renew the lease with the lease[2]. The landlord and the tenant sign a new three-year lease …”

4.同樣，租客可享有續租權由2029年6月15日至2031年6月14日，條件同樣是:

“… both parties now agree to accept that if the tenant informs the landlord in writing to renew the lease at least one month before the expiration of the lease on 14^th June 2029, the landlord must renew the lease with the lease[3]. The landlord and the tenant sign a new three-year[4] lease …”

5.此外，根據涉案租約的備注第6條[5]，「租客須完成該物業的所有私人及公用命令包括驗窗，驗樓及其他政府部門發出的命令及/或通告。租客須於有關命令及/或通告中的指定期限前完成一切所需工作，並向相關部門報告完成命令及提交一切所需文件等事宜。租客亦須向業主提供遞交至政府部門的所有證明文件，…… 否則業主有權終止租約，並就逾期一事向租客追究責任及費用。」

6.該備注的7條[6]更特別訂明，「租客同意負責該物業租用期間及之前所收到之一切消防命令（包括但不限於現有命令號碼FSD/FSDn/8320-8325/2019及FSD/FSDn/6691-6696/2014等）; 並須於簽訂租約時，向業主提交該等消防命令之工程報價副本 （“消防報價”）。租客須於接收該物業的十二個月內完成一切所需工作及工程，並於工程完成後1星期內通知業主有關工程之完工日期及提供遞交至政府部門的所有證明文件。」

7.申請人於2026年6月15日向土地審裁處（下稱「審裁處」）提出收回涉案處所，並追收由2026年6月15日起的中間收益 （如有的話），其理由為申請人已於2026年5月18日向答辯人發出「不再續租及收回單位通知」，要求答辯人於2026年6月18日之前把涉案處所「騰空並交還予本公司」，其內容如下:

「本公司為上述單位的業主，根據我們於2023年4月25日簽訂之租約，租期將於2026年6月14日屆滿。本公司決定不再續租，並正式通知 貴方須於2026年6月18日之前，將上述單位騰空並交還予本公司。

依據租約規定，香港法例第219章《物業轉易及財產條例》第58條發出訂明, 貴方未履行租約相關責任，已構成違約。具體而言，根據租約第26頁Remarks 第7條之約定，閣下同意負責該物業於租用期間及之前收到之一切消防命令（包括但不限於現有命令編號FSD/FSDn/8320-8325/2019及FSD/FSDn/6691-6696/2014等）; 並須於簽訂租約時向業主提交該等消防命令之工程報價副本。閣下須於接收該物業的十二個月內完成一切所需工作及工程，並於工程完成後一星期內通知業主有關工程之完工日期及提供遞交至政府部門的所有證明。然而， 閣下至今仍未遵從消防處處長根據《消防安全（建築物）條例》第5(8) 條於2019年10月11日發出之消防裝置及設備命令，未能履行完成相關命令之責任。

基於此情況，為保障業主權益，不得不收回單位。請注意: 若 貴方在上述限期屆滿後仍繼續佔用該單位，將被視為非法覇佔行為。本公司將立即向土地審裁處申請收回單位之命令，同時要求 貴方支付訴訟費用、覇佔期間的佔用費及其他一切因此而引致的損失。

……」

8.就以上的消防命令要求，申請人曾於2025年11月25日向審裁處提出申請收回涉案處所，案件編號為LDPE 1589/2025。該收樓申請於2026年1月9日於本席席前聆訊，答辯人的代表鄧哲恒先生（下稱「鄧先生」） 稱，已於2026年1月8日收到消防處以 e-mail 通知，已經收到答辯人提交有關消防水泵、消防喉轆、消防警報器等消防處所要求的資料，並得悉答辯人於涉案處所遵辦有關指令有所進展，因此暫不考慮就有關指令作出進一步檢控云云。鄧先生更稱已委託高保工程（香港）有限公司與消防處跟進有關事宜。

9.基於上述情況，本席根據《物業轉易及財產條例》（香港法例第219章）第58條准予收樓寬免，但本席在該2026年1月9日的聆訊中已提醒鄧先生，涉案租約會於2026年6月14屆滿[7]，鄧先生當時澄清涉案租約是有賦予答辯人續租權的。

10.因此，就申請人於2026年6月15日提出的收樓申請，答辯人於2026年6月26日向審裁處遞交反對通知書，其反對理由除包括答辯人已繳付由2026年6 月15日起的租金65,000元外，更解釋答辯人已一直在跟進並處理相關消防安全指示，並於2026年3月16日已按消防處指示提交與消防顧問簽署的合約及作延期申請，而後者已獲消防處批准。答辯人稱申請人不能以此為理由收回涉案處所。

2026年7月21日的聆訊

11.本案於2026年7月21日於本席席前聆訊，申請人及答辯人雙方也沒有聘用律師代表。申請人由李潔心女士（下稱「李女士」）代表應訊，答辯人則繼續由鄧先生代表應訊。

12.鄧先生確認答辯人是於2026年6月18日才把銀碼為65,000元的支票存入申請人的帳戶。但本席已即時向鄧先生指出，答辯人若要行使續租權，它必須於2026年6月14日前以不少於一個月書面通知申請人。鄧先生回覆稱，根據他的WhatsApp 紀錄，答辯人是於2026年5月29日向申請人的職員發出續租通知。

13.本席又即時向鄧先生指出，答辯人於2026年5月29日的WhatsApp通知並不符合行使涉案租約的續租權規定，至此鄧先生承認這是答辯人的疏忽。鄧先生補充，答辯人曾於2026年5月14日與申請人代表有溝通，但並沒有提出續約。

14.根據香港上訴法庭於黃玉英訴陳貝珊，CACV265/2013 (無彙報的案例，日期為2016年3月4日）及 Chow Kin Ying 訴 Hussain, Shoukat, HCMP 1535/2016 (無彙報的案例，日期為2016年7月11日） 的判決，定期租約一旦到期屆滿，任何一方並不需要向對方發出任何終止租約通知，而答辯人並沒有根據涉案租約的續租條款行使續租權，所以本席作出以下的頒令:  

(1)  答辯人須把涉案處所的空置管有權交還申請人;

(2)  答辯人須支付申請人由2026年8月15日[8]至交回處所的空置管有權為止的中間收益，以每月65,000元計算;

(3)  答辯人須支付申請人本申請的訟費，即時評定為365元。

答辯人的上訴許可申請

15.根據鄧先生代表答辯人於2026年8月18日提交的誓章， 答辯人擬上訴的理據主要包括:

(1)  本席錯誤地未有應用《物業轉易及財產條例》（香港法例第219章）第58條、《高等法院條例》（香港法例第4章）第21F條及法院固有衡平法管轄下之寬免沒收權利原則;

(2)  本席錯誤地未有應用審裁處在 Kwok Hon Shing 訴 Happy Team (China) Limited, LDPE 145/2015 (無彙報的案例，日期為2015年9月30日）所確立的隱含棄權原則;

(3)  本席錯誤地未有認可已註冊續租權為獨立土地權益的原則;

(4)  本席錯誤地將嚴格遵守時間為關鍵原則 (time is of the essence) 凌駕於衡平法比例原則 (proportionality) 之上;

(5)  本席錯誤地未有考慮衡平法禁止不當得利原則 (unjust enrichment);

(6)  本席錯誤地未有區分整幢式物業租賃的特殊法律性質;

(7)  本席錯誤地未有給予具體履行令 (specific performance) 之考慮;

(8)  申請人曾於2026年5月14日及2026年6月9日主動與答辯人溝通，此行為構成對嚴格遵守行使續租權的要求隱含棄權。

2026年9月7日的聆訊

16.此非正審申請於2026年9月7日於本席席前聆訊 。雙方也沒有律師代表，申請人仍由李潔心女士代表應訊，而答辯人同樣由鄧哲恒先生代表應訊。

《物業轉易及財產條例》第58條

17.《物業轉易及財產條例》第58條的題目是「對租契及分租租契的沒收租賃權的限制及寬免」。其第(1)款的內容如下:

「因租契內的任何契諾或條件被違反而根據租契所載的但書或規定產生的重收權或沒收租賃權的權利，不得藉訴訟或其他方式予以強制執行，除非及直至批租人向承租人送達以下的通知 ——

(a) 指明某被投訴的違反事項; 及

(b) 如該違反事項可予補救，則要求承租人就該違反事項作出補救; 及

(c) 指明批租人就該違反事項而要求的補償(如有的話)，

並且承租人在其後一段合理時間內，並沒有對可予補救的違反事項作出補救，亦沒有就違反事項作出令批租人滿意的合理金錢補償。」

18.正如本席於於2026年7月21日的聆訊中向鄧先生闡釋， 本案的關鍵點是涉案租約期滿，而答辯人並沒有根據涉案租約的續租條款行使續租權，並不是答辯人違反涉案租約的任何契諾或條件而被申請人沒收租賃權。《物業轉易及財產條例》第58條並不適用。

《高等法院條例》第21F條

19.同樣，《高等法院條例》第21F條的題目是「對因欠交租金而藉訴訟沒收租賃權的濟助」，其第(1)款的內容如下:

「如出租人就任何土地在原訟法庭藉訴訟着手針對承租人欠交租金而強制執行重收權或沒收租賃權，本條在不抵觸第(1A)款的條文下具有效力。」

20.本案的關鍵點也不是答辯人欠交租金，而是涉案租約期滿，而答辯人並沒有根據涉案租約的續租條款行使續租權，因此《高等法院條例》第21F條並不適用。

21.基於同樣原則，衡平法管轄下之寬免沒收權利濟助並不適用，答辯人應是受到人工智能的誤導。

Kwok Hon Shing (郭漢盛)及萁他人, 訴 Happy Team (China) Limited (喜匯(中國)有限公司)，LDPE 145/2015

22.同樣，此Kwok Hon Shing 案亦是一宗有關租客違反租約條款的案件，審裁處在其2015年9月30日的判案書的第1段已開宗明義說:

“This is an application for recovery of possession and costs. The applicants alleged the respondent had breached the terms of the tenancy agreement, while the respondent submitted the complaints raised by the applicants were not supported by fact or evidence. The parties also argued over waiver as a matter of law and entitlement to relief against forfeiture.”

23.因此這案並不能與本案的涉案租約期滿，而答辯人並沒有根據涉案租約的續租條款行使續租權相提並論。

24.至於該判案書提及的棄權原則（waiver），其第46段已清楚表明，當業主向法院提出沒收租賃權訴訟後，即使業主收取租客租金，這也不構成放棄沒收租賃權:

「… an application for forfeiture is an unequivocal and final election to determine the lease and there could be no waiver after the bringing of proceedings for forfeiture, whether by acceptance of rent or otherwise.」

涉案租約已於土地註冊處註冊

25.根據《土地註冊條例》（香港法例第128章）第3(2)條:

「…… 凡上述的所有契據、轉易契及其他書面形式的文書和判決沒有作出註冊，對於就同一幅地、物業單位或處所付出有值代價的任何其後真誠買方或承按人，在所有用意和目的上均絕對無效 ……」

26.因此涉案租約已在土地註冊處註冊與否，只為確定涉案租約對於就同一幅地、物業單位或處所付出有值代價的任何其後真誠買方或承按人的優先次序，與涉案租約期滿扯不上任何關係。

27.至於答辯人提及的 Markfaith Investment Limited 訴Chiap Hua Flashlights, Limited [1990] 2 HKLR 84， [1991] 2 AC 43一案， 這是涉及有一物業買方拒絕成交，理由是買賣契約中聲稱有未有註冊的租約續租權。當此案上訴至英國樞密院，買方被裁定敗訴，因為未有註冊的租約續租權對同一幅地、物業單位或處所付出有值代價的任何其後真誠買方是無效的，所以不會影響買方的權益。Lord Templeman 在第59D-E 頁如是說:

“In the present case each tenancy agreement was an instrument in writing which created a lease and made an irrevocable offer to grant a further lease. The lease is preserved by the proviso to section 3(2) of the Ordinance, but so far as the offer of a further lease is concerned, the instrument is null and void against a purchaser. On 31st March 1988 when the sale agreement was entered into, and for that matter, on 18th April 1988 when the sale agreement was registered, the purchasers were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration of a Crown lease of parcels of ground, tenements and premises in Hong Kong affected by the previous instruments in writing, namely, the unregistered tenancy agreements. Those instruments in writing thereupon became and remained null and void against the purchasers except in so far as they created leases at rack rents for terms not exceeding three years.”

28.因此，這Markfaith Investment只是解釋註冊文件對於就同一幅地、物業單位或處所付出有值代價的任何其後真誠買方的重要性，與涉案租約期滿扯不上任何關係。

時間為關鍵原則 (Time is of the Essence)

29.答辯人稱，它為涉案處所整幢物業翻新、維修、裝修及完善設施，這包括外牆工程、大廈設施完善工程，各樓層裝修及結構性維修。此等投資超過港幣200萬元已固化為建築物本體，這包括:

(1)  外牆工程;

(2)  整幢大廈設施完善工程;

(3)  結構性維修;

(4)  其他相關工程如門窗、燈飾、保安系統等。

30.答辯人稱這些投資無法拆除或帶走。倘若因為它只區區延遲了15天通知申請人行使它的續租權，卻導致它損失超過港幣200萬元的投資，兩者嚴重不成比例。因此本席在法律上錯誤地未有應用比例原則 (proportionality)。

31.有關行使續租權的時間為關鍵原則，早於英國的United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904一案已被確立。Lord Diplock 首先在其判案書的第929頁引用Lord Denning MR在United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74的說話如下:

“In point of legal analysis, the grant of an option in such cases, is an irrevocable offer (being supported by consideration so that it cannot be revoked). In order to be turned into a binding contract, the offer must be accepted in exact compliance with its terms. The acceptance must correspond with the offer.”

32.隨後，Lord Diplock 補充說:

“Exact compliance with the terms of the offer in an "if contract" had been required in courts of equity as well as in courts of common law…. A rationale of the distinction which was drawn between the two kinds of contracts in courts of equity is that equity was concerned with the performance of contracts into which parties had already entered. It did not force any person to enter into a contract with another.”

33.在同案，Lord Simon of Glaisdale在參考有關普通法和衡平法就合約中的時效問題後， 在判案書的第945-946頁有這樣的評論:

“The law does not purport to bring parties into a relationship of contractual obligation which they themselves have failed to create. This is the true ground of decision in those cases where a stipulation as to time is contained in an option. An option is a type of unilateral contract. When, as is usual, it is supported by consideration it constitutes an irrevocable offer which turns into a bilateral contract by an acceptance in strict compliance with its terms … The legal reality is that this type of unilateral contract never matures into a bilateral contract at all unless the option is exercised in time. But, as Diplock L.J. pointed out in the United Dominions Trust case (p. 84G), it is quite possible to have this sort of unilateral obligation in an otherwise bilateral contract. An option in a lease to terminate or to renew the tenancy or to purchase the reversion will be such a term. In each such case the parties, on the exercise of the option, are brought into a new legal relationship.”

34.惟答辯人引用英國最高法院的Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi (Rev 3) [2015] UKSC 67一案，稱該案已確立比例原則。可是該案主要是重新審視在合約法中，甚麼才是懲罰性條款，與本案的涉案租約期滿沒有任何關係。

35.比方，在該判案書的第227段，Lord Hodge 說的也只是有關違約的懲罰準則:

“… There is no reason in principle why a contractual provision, which involves forfeiture of sums otherwise due, should not be subjected to the rule against penalties, if the forfeiture is wholly disproportionate either to the loss suffered by the innocent party or to another justifiable commercial interest which that party has sought to protect by the clause. If the forfeiture is not so exorbitant and therefore is enforceable under the rule against penalties, the court can then consider whether under English law it should grant equitable relief from forfeiture, looking at the position of the parties after the breach and the circumstances in which the contract was broken.”（後加強調）

36.可是本案的重點從來也不是有關違約的。

37.答辯人又引用美國紐約州上訴法院的J N A Realty Corp v Cross Bay Chelsea Inc （42 NY 2d 392, 366 N.E.2d 1313 (1977)）一案， 該案的背景卻與本案有點相似。J N A Realty Corp 把一物業租予一食肆的租約也賦予租客有續租條款。期間Cross Bay Chelsea Inc欲購入該租約，但欲修改它的續租期由24年轉為10年。J N A Realty Corp亦表示同意。Cross Bay Chelsea Inc遂購入該租約成為租客， 並花費15,000美元修葺物業，但卻忘記根據續租條款須於租約屆滿前6個月行使續租權。紐約州上訴法庭認為J N A Realty Corp沒收租約會對Cross Bay Chelsea Inc造成重大損失，所以將此案發還重審。

38.但此案有紐約州上訴法庭法官Chief Judge Breitel持反對意見, 認為如法庭純然因為租客的疏忽而頒下衡平法的濟助，勢將摧毀過去的案例（established precedent）及商業穩定（commercial stability）。

39.可是值得注意的是，此美國案件的判案書把租約終止理解為業主沒收租賃權，但於United Scientific Holdings一案，續租權的用意是要賦予租客新的租約，所以業主以租約完結收回物業並不是沒收租賃權，兩者在法律的詮釋上是有分別的。由於香港一向是採納United Scientific Holdings一案作為判案準則，亦從來沒有採納J N A Realty Corp一案作為判案標準，根據《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》第8條及《香港回歸條例》第7條，已被採用為特區法律的香港原有法律，即普通法、衡平法、條例、附屬法例(亦指附屬立法)及習慣法，繼續適用。本席不會考慮美國的J N A Realty Corp 一案作為判案準則。

40.此外, 根據基本法第84條,「香港特別行政區法院依照本法第十八條所規定的適用於香港特別行政區的法律審判案件，其他普通法適用地區的司法判例可作參考。」，很明顯, 美國不是普通法適用地區。

41.就此，答辯人再引用加拿大安大略省Superior Court of Justice 的案例Velouté Catering Inc. v. Bernardo, 2016 ONSC 7281 以支持法院有權寬免行使續租權的限期，但於此案，業主Frank Bernardo Ciddio 兩度錯誤引導租客Velouté Catering Inc租約的正確屆滿日期， 致使租客忽略行使續租權的正確時間:

“35. First, Bernardo was told many times by Kotb that Velouté wished to renew its Lease well before the October 20, 2015 deadline for delivering a written notice of renewal. At that time, Velouté was led to believe by Bernardo that it was only in the fourth year of the Lease and, thus, a written notice of renewal would not be required until October 20, 2016. I find that Velouté’s failure to provide written notice of renewal by the October 20, 2015 deadline was a result of Bernardo’s misstatements.

36. Second, once Kotb became aware on November 10, 2015, that the Lease would expire in April 2016, he attempted to arrange an appointment with Bernardo to secure the extension of the Lease. Kotb and Matos also waited to hear back from Bernardo after the meeting regarding the Lease renewal. These steps were reasonable and diligent given the long, trusting and informal relationship that they shared.

37. Third, I find that Velouté, Kotb and Matos had made a significant investment in improvements and repairs to the Property, which would be lost because of the failure to provide timely written notice.” 

42.但於本案，申請人沒有犯上該判決第35段所指的錯誤。況且， 安大略省Superior Court of Justice在其判案書第32段認同，在較早前的Mapleview-Veterans Drive Investments Inc v Papa Kerollus VI Inc, 2016 ONCA 93, 393 D.L.R. (4th) 690 一案 ，安大略省的上訴法庭曾指出，法院是否有權寬免行使續租權的限期有相悖的判決。

43.同樣，答辯人引用加拿大安大略省Superior Court of Justice 的案例 8750297 Canada Inc v Ambassador Realty Inc， 2025 ONSC 5479 以支持法院有權寬免行使續租權的限期，但於此案，加拿大的法院是根據 Commercial Tenancies Act, RSO 1990, c. L 7 及 Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C 43 兩條法例而作出以下判決[9]:

“The applicant acted in good faith and verbalized an intention to renew to the property manager;

His failure to comply was due to illness and inadvertence, rather than deliberate disregard;

He assumed he would receive a reminder from the respondent as had been the past practice; and

As soon as he was told about the missed deadline, he immediately advised the respondent he wished to renew the lease.”

44.首先，香港卻沒有類似相關法例。在2026年5月29日 以前，沒有證據顯示本案答辯人曾向申請人表示行使續租權的意願。於2026年7月21日的聆訊，本席已提醒鄧先生，答辯人若要行使續租權，它必須於2026年6月14日前以不少於一個月書面通知申請人。正如安大略省Superior Court of Justice在該案判案書第41段所說: “Owners of commercial premises are entitled to expect compliance with leases in order that they can plan for rentals and manage their properties.”

45.答辯人又引用加拿大最高法院Saskatchewan River Bungalows Ltd v. Maritime Life Assurance Co [1994] 2 SCR 490有關保險受益人遲交保費會否導致喪失保險賠償的案例。很明顯，這案例於本案沒有幫助。無論如何，此案的受益人被加拿大最高法院裁定敗訴:

“The respondents[10] are not entitled to any of the benefits under the policy. The demand for payment in the November letter was a clear and unequivocal expression of Maritime's intention to continue coverage upon payment of the July premium and, as such, constituted waiver of the time requirements for payment under the policy. The waiver was not still in effect, however, when SRB tendered payment of the missing premium in July 1985. Waiver can be retracted if reasonable notice is given to the party in whose favour it operates. A notice requirement should not be imposed, however, where there is no reliance on the waiver. Here, the respondents were not aware of Maritime's waiver until they received the November letter in April 1985 and therefore did not rely on it. The statement that "this policy has lapsed" contained in the February lapse notice accordingly took effect on its terms. In any event, once the respondents opened their mail in April 1985, they clearly became aware of Maritime's intention to retract its waiver. Even if a reasonable notice requirement were imposed, it would thus be adequately met by the respondents' failure to tender a replacement cheque until July 1985, three months later. Maritime had no obligation to accept the replacement cheque, and the policy lapsed. Maritime was required to reinstate coverage only if the respondents provided evidence of insurability, which was not possible in this case.”

不當得利原則 (Unjust Enrichment)

46.根據《物業轉易及財產條例》第2條，土地的定義包括附連在土地的物件或牢固於任何此類物件上的東西。而根據Ponsford v HNS Aerosols Limited [1978] 2 EGLR 81，(1979) AC 63一案，英國上議院裁定，當租約載有租金重定條款時，市值租金的考量會包括租客在租賃物業時任何的添置或改良。

47.況且，根據涉案租約備注第2條，「租約完結時，業主無須租客拆除單位裝修，以現狀形式交」。因此，申請人因涉案租約完結收回涉案處所，並沒有因此而獲得不當得利。

48.至於答辯人聲稱的港幣200多萬元投資，其支出主要是付予第三者如工程顧問等。

49.在Shanghai Tongji Science & Technology Industrial Company Limited v  Casil Clearing Limited [2004] 2 HKLRD 548, (2004) 7 HKCFAR 79一案，原告人是一家享有海外貿易權的國內公司，被告人則是一名香港放債人。被告人早前曾借出款項予一第三方，但第三方要求進一步借貸，還款方法是由第三方的其中一名顧客開立以被告人為受惠者的信用證。這第三方其後與原告人接觸，擬安排由原告人輸入一些美容物品的托運協議， 原告人便開立信用證。原告人與被告人沒有任何接觸，但隨後發現所付運的物品貨不對版，原告人沒有向第三方追討款項，但卻針對被告人提出訴訟。香港終審法院裁定，雖然被告人作為最終收取信用證下的款項的人，因而獲利，但這並非不公，因為令被告人得利的是它提交適當文件後收取款項。

50.香港終審法院更以Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574，588一案舉例，於該案，Lord Goff在其判案書說:

“In truth, the test is not whether the promisee has received a specific benefit, but rather whether the promisor has performed any part of the contractual duties in respect of which the payment is due. The present case cannot, therefore, be approached by asking the simple question whether the property in the vessel or any part of it has passed to the buyers. That test would be apposite if the contract in question was a contract for the sale of goods (or indeed a contract for the sale of land) simpliciter under which the consideration for the price would be the passing of the property in the goods (or land). However before that test can be regarded as appropriate, the anterior question has to be asked: is the contract in question simply a contract for the sale of a ship? or is it rather a contract under which the design and construction of the vessel formed part of the yard's contractual duties, as well as the duty to transfer the finished object to the buyers? If it is the latter, the design and construction of the vessel form part of the consideration for which the price is to be paid, and the fact that the contract has been brought to an end before the property in the vessel or any part of it has passed to the buyers does not prevent the yard from asserting that there has been no total failure of consideration in respect of an instalment of the price which has been paid before the contract was terminated, or that an instalment which has then accrued due could not, if paid, be recoverable on that ground.”（後加強調）

51.基於同樣理由, 本席不同意申請人因租約屆滿而獲得不當得利。

52.至於答辯人引用的The Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [2020] 2 All ER 81, [2019] UKSC 46, [2019] 3 WLR 852, [2020] AC 1161案例，它同樣是涉及租客欠租因而違反租用許可而被業主沒收許可證:

“1.  Vauxhall Motors Ltd own a substantial manufacturing plant at Ellesmere Port close to the Manchester Ship Canal. Under the terms of a Licence granted in 1962 by the Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd (MSCC) they were entitled to discharge surface water and trade effluent into the Canal through a drainage system constructed by Vauxhall on MSCC's land under the terms of the licence. The Licence was granted in perpetuity in consideration of an annual payment of £50. It contained a provision entitling MSCC to terminate the Licence by notice if the annual payment remained in arrear after a warning notice had been given. It is now common ground that the Licence was terminated by notice on 10 March 2014. The current value of the right to discharge surface water and trade effluent is of the order of £300,000 to £440,000 per annum.

2.  The issue on this appeal is whether HHJ Behrens was wrong to grant Vauxhall relief against forfeiture of the Licence, thus enabling them to continue to exercise the rights granted by the Licence at the contractual rate of £50 per annum. MSCC says he was; both because he had no jurisdiction to do so, and also because the application for relief was made too late.

3. …” （後加強調）

53.因此Manchester Ship Canal一案並不適用於本案的租約期屆滿，而答辯人並沒有根據涉案租約的續租條款行使續租權。

涉案處所涉及整幢物業 

54.答辯人稱涉案處所涉及整幢物業，並不能與一般租賃單位相題並論，因為兩者在商業性質、投資規模及租期長度上的本質上有所不同。涉案租約更是涉及大額翻新與維修，租期更因「三年加三年加兩年」共八年。

55.本席看不到合約法的基本原則會因標的物的規模或合約年期有所不同。大額租賃，包括酒店、食肆及近期流行的學生宿舍等比比皆是，租賃年期一般也可多至8，9年不等。

強制履行令的考慮 (Specific Performance)

56.答辯人聲稱本席未有考慮涉案租約涉及「三年加三年加兩年」共八年，應以衡平法給予濟助。

57.可是涉案租約並不是八年租約，其賦予的續租權必須依規行使 (strictly enforced)。

58.就此，答辯人引用Far East Consortium Limited v Full Wealthy International Limited, HCA 2080/2005 (無彙報的案例，日期為2006年6月2日）[11], 聲稱此案要求業主行使沒收權時須嚴格遵循程序。 可是此案並非如此，在其判案書的第34段只是說：“I am satisfied that there is a triable issue on issue (1)”。此第一事項是因為Full Wealthy International 欠租，所以Far East Consortium 早於2005年4月30 日入禀法庭沒收Full Wealthy International的租賃權[12]，Full Wealthy International 認為Far East Consortium再不能引用租約內的提早終止租約條款收回該物業。

59.此Far East Consortium案的性質與本案風馬牛不相及。再者，此案的裁決只是認為案件可爭議（triable），並非最後判決。

申請人曾於2026年5月14日主動與答辯人溝通

60.答辯人稱，申請人曾於2026年5月14日透過 WhatsApp與答辯人主動溝通，討論整幢物業的簡樸房的登記事宜[13]:

日期	發訊息人		內容
2026年 5月13日	申請人代表莊先生		請交15/5/2026-14/6/2026租金[14] 下午3:28
2026年 5月14日	申請人代表何先生		余生，什麼時候交租？ 飛達地庫 合共$31,389 上午9:41
	申請人代表李小姐		請填回附件2，針對簡樸房登記及認證，你們有什麼意向，請在附件2交代 請提供地下以上每層啲 FLOOR PLAN 有空打比我呵 上午11:55
		答辯人代表	有的 我們會登記簡樸房，需要你們業主方簽署授權並同意 中午12:02
			稍後會發書面同意書範本出來給你們查閱並簽署，我們會遞交上房屋局 中午12:05

61.答辯人又稱，申請人曾於2026年6月9日透過 WhatsApp與答辯人主動溝通，查詢滿足有關消防命令的進展，答辯人認為這是暗示申請人會與答辯人續租[15]:

發訊息人		內容
申請人代表李小姐		鄧先生，最重要係你幾時完成有關消防設備 以及簡樸房條例你能否通過，我們需要你的FLOOR PLAN 下午3:49
申請人代表莊先生		鄧先生，我們已經在去年11月25日發了警告信給你去完成消防命令，但直至現在你們還在拖延執行消防命令，你想我們收回單位嗎？ 下午4:39
	鄧先生	麻你們先仔細閱讀這份消防處官方發出的正式通告[16] 下午5:14

62.李女士於2026年9月7日的回應稱，申請人於2026年5月14日向答辯人發出的WhatsApp訊息，只是希望提醒答辯人的相關要求。答辯人則回應，如果申請人並不準備與答辯人續租，又何必多此一舉。

63.無論如何， 本席看不到申請人方於2026年5月14日或2026年6月9日的 WhatsApp內容有構成對嚴格遵守行使續租權的要求隱含棄權。況且2026年5月14日仍是答辯人行使續租權的最後關鍵日期，申請人的WhatsApp只是在當天早上發出，並不能排除答辯人正準備或已剛巧行使續租權。

64.在Wellfit Investments Ltd v Poly Commence Ltd & Anor [1997] HKLRD 857 at 861A-D一案，香港上訴法庭對「棄權」的法理要求有以下論述:

“11. As it seems to me, it is necessary to focus on the legal consequences of the conversation between Doris and Cecilia. Did this effect a variation of the contract between Poly and Wellfit? If not, did the conversation operate as a waiver by Poly of its right under the contract to insist on performance by Wellfit by 3.00 p.m.? Or did Cecilia, by what she said (or did not say) in the course of the conversation, create an estoppel which precluded Poly from asserting that it was entitled to insist on performance by Wellfit by 3.00 p.m.? In the absence of any variation, or waiver, or estoppel, there would be no ground in law for challenging Poly's rescission of the contract. But what about equity? Even in the absence of any variation, waiver or estoppel, might not equity, having regard to the content of the conversation, view Poly's purported rescission of the contract at 3.24 p.m. as unconscionable, and therefore to be disallowed? All these possibilities fall to be considered. Any one of these, if established, might justify the judge's decision. But, if none of these is established, then the judge's decision cannot stand; and that is the conclusion to which, as I have said, I have come. I shall now deal in turn with these various possibilities, and attempt to explain why, in my judgment, none of these can avail Wellfit.

…

13. … But I would not be prepared to hold that a party had waived his right to rescind, to this or any other extent, unless he can be shown to have done so in clear and unambiguous terms. It would be ludicrous to conclude that words which were too vague or uncertain to create a contract or raise an estoppel would nevertheless be sufficient give rise to a claim of waiver. On this point, the difficulty in Wellfit's way is the same as one of the difficulties in its way on the variation point; that the effect of the conversation between Doris and Cecilia is much too unclear to support Wellfit's case.

14.  If Poly can be held to have led Wellfit to suppose that Poly's right under the contract to rescind in the event of non-performance by 3.00 p.m. was to be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, its exercise of its right to rescind will not be upheld if Wellfit altered its position in reliance on Poly's attitude. But this is not as promising from Wellfit's point of view as might initially appear, first, because in this connection, too, the promise or assurance given by Poly to Wellfit will not do unless it was clear and unambiguous (which it plainly was not) and secondly, because Wellfit did nothing at all in reliance on it anyway; Wellfit's solicitors simply got on with getting the cheques to Poly's solicitors as soon as they could. The whole purpose of the requirement, in a case of estoppel (or waiver) that the promise or representation relied on must be clear and unambiguous is to prevent a party from losing his legal rights merely because he has granted some indulgence by failing to insist on strict performance of the contract. In the present case, the conversation between Doris and Cecilia does not come anywhere near establishing a clear and unambiguous promise or representation on the part of Poly that it would not rescind the contract if the cheques arrived before some certain time, nor even before some such unspecified time as would enable Poly to use them in order to complete with Yorku. Nor do the facts support the conclusion that Wellfit altered its position on the facts of any such representation or promise. So, in the end, estoppel is of no help to Wellfit, either.”

65.同樣，在法律典籍The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel （第3版, 2012) 中第4.45段, 其作者Sean Wilken QC & Karim Ghaly已清楚寫明某人若要放棄其法律權利，其語言或行為必須是毫不含糊的。

66.在Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd (No 2) [2000] RVR 283, [2000] 3 EGLR 97, [2000] EWCA Civ 191一案，申訴人ARC Limited ("ARC") 因被Hillingdon London Borough Council ("LBH")強制收回土地而於1982年4月提出賠償申索。雖然雙方期間一直有保持溝通，於1987年10月，LBH的總估值師Mr Douglas去信ARC查問有關後者的賠償申索進展:

“I would now like to conclude this claim as soon as possible and if the matter is not going to be capable of settlement by agreement I would wish to refer it to the Lands Tribunal as soon as possible.”

67.可是在1988年4月，ARC 可以向英國土地審裁處提出申索時限屆滿。雖然如此，LBH再次去信ARC表示願意解決有關的賠償問題:

“I agree with you it should now be possible to resolve the compensation payable to your company due to the Yiewsley by-pass works. If you will submit your claim we will endeavour to reach agreement with you as Mr Douglas has now left for greener pastures.”

68.LBH及ARC繼續保持溝通至1994年10月，LBH通知ARC其申索時限已經屆滿，因而拒絕賠償。英國上訴法院在其判案書的第62段解釋:

“A shared assumption is not on the authorities sufficient to establish an estoppel unless it is communicated. It follows that if in this case there was no shared assumption to the effect that ARC had a valid claim that was not time-barred, there could be no communication by LBH that it was making any such assumption. It also follows from what we have said above that the communication required would in any event be not simply that ARC had a valid claim but also that LBH would not take any defence that might be open to it on the basis of a statutory limitation period.”[17]

拒絕上訴許可申請

69.根據《土地審裁處條例》第11(2)條，「除第11AA條及任何條例中關於就審裁處的決定而提出上訴的條文另有規定外，在審裁處席前進行的法律程序的任何一方，均可以審裁處的判決、命令或決定在法律論點上有錯誤為理由，而針對該項判決、命令或決定向上訴法庭提出上訴。」

70.但土地審裁處條例第11AA(6)條規定，除非法庭信納: (a)有關上訴有合理機會得直; 或(b)有其他利於秉行公正的理由，因而該上訴應進行聆訊，否則不得批予上訴許可。

71.基於以上的分析和理由，本席認為答辯人擬提的上訴沒有合理的得直機會，或有其他有利於秉行公正的理由，而應允許上訴。本席因此拒絕答辯人的上訴許可申請。

72.基於同樣理由，本席拒絕暫緩執行收樓令狀。

訟費

73.最後，由於答辯人於本非正審申請不被本席接納，答辯人須支付申請人有關本非正審申請引致的費用/支出等訟費。經聆聽申請人的陳述，本席現裁定答辯人須支付申請人的訟費為200元。

申請人 : 無律師代表，由李潔心女士代表應訊。

答辯人 : 無律師代表，由鄧哲恒先生代表應訊。