Yiu Kenneth Lik Kin v. HKSAR

FAMC000006/1997

FAMC No. 6 of 1997

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 6 OF 1997 (CRIMINAL)

(ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
FROM CACC 101 OF 1997)

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Appeal Committee: Mr Justice Litton PJ, Mr Justice Ching PJ and Mr Justice Bokhary PJ

Date of Hearing: 5 December 1997

Date of Determination: 5 December 1997

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D E T E R M I N A T I O N

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1. This is the determination of the Appeal Committee, pursuant to s32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.

2. The applicant was, on 29 January 1997, convicted in the District Court on ten charges of using a false instrument, contrary to s73 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200. These charges alleged that on ten occasions between 1st November 1994 and 2nd January 1996, the applicant had used an instrument, namely a rent receipt, which purported to show that a sum of HK$29,000 was received from him being the rental payment for Flat 24H Pak Hoi Mansion, Tai Koo Shing, which was, and which he knew or believed to be, false, with the intention of inducing a staff member of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University to accept it as genuine and by reason of so accepting it to do some act to his own or any other person's prejudice.

3. On 26 September 1997 his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against conviction was dismissed. The applicant then, on the same day, asked that Court to certify under s32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance that a point of great and general importance was involved in its decision but this application was likewise dismissed. The applicant now renews his application before us and seeks a certificate under s32(2) to this effect: That, on a charge under s73 of the Crimes Ordinance, extraneous evidence is not admissible to establish the falsity in the document alleged by the prosecution to be false. Counsel's submission in the court below, as summarized by the Court of Appeal in its ruling, was to the following effect:

"It is submitted that the offence of using a false instrument contrary to s.73 of the Crimes Ordinance, which requires proof of falsity within the meaning of s.69 of that Ordinance, is exclusively concerned with the document itself, i.e. the document must tell a lie about itself, and that the court below and the Court of Appeal was not entitled to rely upon the extraneous evidence upon which reliance was placed to establish that lie."

4. The applicant, now acting in person, repeats in effect the same point before us.

5. The point is plainly without foundation. The aphorism - that the document must not only tell a lie but must tell a lie about itself - means no more than this: Telling a lie does not become a crime under s73 of the Crimes Ordinance simply because the lie appears in a document; it is the document which must be false and not merely the information in it. This is proved, like any other falsehood, by evidence from any admissible source. Here, the document purported to be a rent receipt, acknowledging the receipt of $29,000 by the landlord from the applicant, being the monthly rent for Flat 24H Pak Hoi Mansion, Tai Koo Shing. It was nothing of the kind.

6. There is no merit whatever in the point sought to be argued. This application is dismissed.

Representation:

Applicant, Yiu Kenneth Lik-kin, in person

Mr Kevin P. Zervos & Ms Maggie Yang Mei-kei, SGC of Department of Justice, for Respondent/Director of Public Prosecutions