HKSAR v. Chan Kam Ching
Read the full judgment text of CACC 230/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 7 January 2021 before Yeung VP, Pang JA and Pang J.
Criminal law – false instruments – use of a copy of a false instrument contrary to s.74 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) – use of a false instrument contrary to s.73 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) – meaning of false instrument under s.69(a)(vii) – Ding Rights and Small House Policy – sham transactions in conveyancing – mortgage loan application supported by false Agreement for Sale and Purchase (ASP) and Assignment – applicant was a sole solicitor who had acted for the parties since 2000 – whether the ASP and Assignment were false instruments – whether the applicant knew the instruments were false – whether the applicant had a 'double intent' to induce the recipient to accept the instrument as genuine and to act to his or another's prejudice – whether trial judge erred in refusing to admit expert evidence from a solicitor – whether 'selling Ding Rights' arrangement with no genuine sale and purchase between registered owner and purchaser amounts to a sham. The applicant, a solicitor, prepared an ASP and Assignment in 2007 to facilitate a HKD1.5 million mortgage loan from GE Capital, falsely representing that CHAN (a nominal Ding) sold the Property to LAI for HKD3 million, when no such sale and purchase ever took place and no money passed between them. Held, dismissing the application for leave to appeal: (1) The ASP and the Assignment were false instruments within s.69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance because the purported sale and purchase between CHAN and LAI never occurred and the instrument was made in circumstances in which it was not in fact made; following HKSAR v Lau Kam Ying, the earlier arrangement vesting the Land in CHAN's name was a sham that did not pass legal title to CHAN, so the Assignment could not have transferred any title. (2) The trial judge was entitled to find the applicant knew the instruments were false, given his long-standing involvement since 2000, his verification of signatures, execution of the Land Registry Memorials, and communications with GE Capital; the 'standard practice' explanation demonstrated his understanding of the sham arrangement. (3) The applicant plainly had the double intent to induce GE Capital and the Land Registry officers to accept the false instruments as genuine and to act in the discharge of their duties to the applicant's advantage. (4) The trial judge did not err in refusing to admit expert evidence from a solicitor, as the proposed matters were not within the proper ambit of solicitor expert evidence and were not necessary for the court's determination. Leave to appeal refused; appeal dismissed.
Legal issues: Whether the ASP and the Assignment are false instruments under s.69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance · Whether the applicant knew or believed the instruments were false and had the requisite double intent · Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the defence to call a solicitor as an expert witness
Outcome: Application for leave to appeal against convictions refused; appeal dismissed. The applicant remains convicted on all three counts and the original sentence of 8 months' imprisonment suspended for 2 years stands.
Cited by 5 cases · Cites 6 cases
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[English Translation – 英譯本] CACC 230/2019 [2021] HKCA 7 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL CASE NO. 230 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 844 OF 2017) __________________________ BETWEEN
__________________________ Before: Hon Yeung VP, Pang JA and Pang J in Court Date of Hearing: 1 December 2020 Date of Judgment: 7 January 2021 ______________________ JUDGMENT ______________________ Pang J (giving the Judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.On 29 March 2019, after trial before HH Judge Lo (“the Trial Judge”), the Applicant was found guilty of 1 count of “Using a copy of a false instrument”[1] and 2 counts of “Using a false instrument”[2], and was sentenced to a total of 8 months’ imprisonment suspended for 2 years. 2.The Applicant applied for leave to appeal against convictions. 3.Charge 1 alleges that the Applicant, on or about the 18th day of June 2007, in Hong Kong, used a copy of an instrument, namely an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated the 4th day of June 2007 between CHAN Wai Man and LAI Yee Kum, Kate (“the ASP”) in relation to the property located at No. 13A Yeung Siu Hang, Tuen Mun, New Territories (“the Property”) which was, and which he knew or believed to be, a false instrument, with the intention of inducing GE Capital (Hong Kong) Limited (“GE Capital”) to accept it as a copy of a genuine instrument, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice. 4.Charge 2 alleges that the Applicant, on or about the 20th day of June 2007, in Hong Kong, used the ASP, which he knew or believed to be false, with the intention of inducing a staff member of the Land Registry (“the Land Registry”) of the Development Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice. 5.Charge 3 alleges that the Applicant, on or about the 5th day of July 2007, in Hong Kong, used an instrument, namely an assignment dated the 21st day of June 2007 between Chan Wai Man and Lai Yee Kum, Kate in relation to the Property, which he knew or believed to be false, with the intention of inducing a staff member of the Land Registry to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice. The Prosecution Case 6.Most of the facts in this case are not disputed, and were submitted to the Court as Admitted Facts. The important matters have been set out in the form of a table in the Respondent’s written submissions, which this Court has adopted and collated as follows:
7.Apart from the Admitted Facts, Mr. Ma Mo Shuet, who in 2003 was employed by GE Capital as the Manager of the Credit Department also testified in court. He pointed out that at the time of the offence the Company would not make loans for Ding Houses that required payments of premia; he also expressed that the ASP dated 4 June 2007 was for confirming that the mortgage loan application was for a new sale and purchase. He also pointed out that generally the mode of payment of the sale and purchase price would affect his valuation of the property, and the bank had to know, that if in fact no money was paid and received, there must be a problem with that sale and purchase; and if a transfer was facilitated by way of a deed of gift, that would also affect the bank’s decision on the mortgage security or the loan application, because this would pose risks to the title that the bank can acquire. 8.Chan Man Kin, GE Capital’s Credit Management Supervisor in 2003, was also called as witness by the Prosecution to testify. He pointed out that should a solicitor’s firm discover a problem with the title, the firm would have to report to the bank; and the bank’s release of a mortgage loan was based on the payment clauses in the agreement for sale and purchase. If there was in fact no payment or receipt of money, then the bank would not approve that mortgage loan application. DCCC 175/2013, a related case 9.Apart from the above, in the present case the Prosecution has submitted the audio recording and transcript of the Applicant’s testimony given in 2013 as a defence witness in DCCC 175/2013, another District Court case. The Applicant pointed out that he had dealt with many transactions of sale or purchase of land in the New Territories and assignments of Ding Houses, including the Property, for SHUM and LAI. Relevant details will be given in subsequent paragraphs. The defence case 10.The Applicant’s stance in this case is that SHUM was the beneficial owner of the Property. As such, there was nothing wrong for SHUM to sell the legal interests in the Land in his capacity as CHAN’s attorney, together with SHUM’s own beneficial interests in the Property, to LAI for HKD3 million. And for that purpose, it was necessary to prepare the ASP and the Assignment. The Defence called SHUM as DW1 to establish such facts. 11.SHUM gave evidence that as he had the Power of Attorney from CHAN, he acted for CHAN in that ASP as the vendor, and that the ASP reflected the truth, i.e., he was exercising the right by selling to LAI CHAN’s legal interests in the Land together with his own beneficial interests in the Property at the cost price of HKD3 million. He expressed that he had received from LAI HKD1.5 million as deposit, but chose to return to LAI what he had received, because although LAI and him were not officially married, LAI was his de facto wife. 12.SHUM agreed that subsequent to the execution of the ASP, he did not deliver to CHAN any money in relation to the Property, and CHAN had no right to receive any payment from him or from LAI either. SHUM also expressed that he did not know CHAN, had no agreement with CHAN, and he also did not know what agreement existed between CHAN, SO and LAU; but should there be the need to contact CHAN in the course of the transaction, he would give notice to SO or LAU for arrangements. 13.SHUM agreed that he instructed Chang Sau Man, a staff member of the Applicant’s firm, on 27 April 2007 to officially transfer the registered ownership of the Property to LAI, and to arrange a mortgage loan of HKD1.5 million; but he denied having knowledge that the bank would not accept property by way of a deed of gift as security for a mortgage; he also denied that the ASP was prepared by the firm on request for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of a mortgage loan. SHUM agreed that later he handed HKD1.2 million out of the mortgage loan to LAI. 14.SHUM said, even when no mortgage loan was taken out, he would still have instructed the firm to convey the Property to LAI. He also pointed out that all the building and construction costs of the Property were paid by him. As to the fact that they reported to the Ratings and Valuation Department that the building costs of the Property together with that of the fencing wall were in the sum of HKD1.3 million after they had moved into the Property, SHUM said that he had no recollection and it could be an approximate construction cost figure filled in by the Applicant’s firm on their own. 15.DW2 Chang Sau Man (“CHANG”) was a Senior Clerk responsible for land sales and purchases in the Applicant’s firm. She testified that in April 2007 when the Certificate of Compliance on the Property reached 5 years, the firm received SHUM’s instruction to convey the Property to LAI, his wife. This was the first time she dealt with matters concerning the Property. On 27 April 2007, SHUM instructed her to convey the title to the Property back to LAI and to take out a mortgage loan of HKD1.5 million, and asked her to get a bank to perform valuation first. At that time, SHUM did not give instructions on the price for the assignment. On 3 May of the same year, CHANG received a reply from the Bank of China that the valuation was HKD4 million and she immediately carried out an estimate on the stamp duty fee required, and notified SHUM of the situation by telephone. SHUM responded that he intended to sell the Property to LAI at a cost price of HKD3 million. 16.CHANG further said that afterwards, she prepared the formal ASP by herself based on the draft ASP. On 21 May of the same year, LAI called her and said she wanted to have the mortgage loan from GE Capital, and asked the firm to fax the draft contract to GE Capital. CHANG acted accordingly. Subsequently on 4 June, SHUM and LAI executed the ASP, which CHANG witnessed. The Applicant was not present at the execution. He only verified CHANG’s signature afterwards. 17.CHANG said that as SHUM was the attorney, he had the right to receive payments. Therefore, after the firm had received the mortgage loan money, the money was transferred to SHUM. 18.The Defence had applied for calling an expert witness, but that was refused by the Trial Judge. Reasons for the ruling 19.The Trial Judge pointed out that the Applicant started handling matters concerning the Land and those of building rights for LAI and SHUM since 2000, and since then SHUM and LAI had been giving instructions to the Applicant on matters relating to the development of the Land and the construction of the Ding House, and let him follow up on various legal matters. 20.The Trial Judge therefore found that:
21.The Trial Judge continued to point out that she had considered but was of the view that SHUM was not an honest and reliable witness, and therefore SHUM’s testimony was not accepted, because[8]:
22.The Trial Judge found that in the relevant context, the Applicant clearly knew that there was absolutely no agreement between CHAN and LAI for the latter to pay CHAN HKD3 million or 1.5 million. 23.The Trial Judge also considered the Applicant’s testimony under oath in DCCC 175/2013: the Applicant stated that his purpose of preparing the Assignment was to assign the legal rights of the Land from CHAN to LAI, and that LAI was the beneficial owner of the Property long ago; although LAI would not pay HKD3 million “hard cash” to CHAN, the Applicant was of the view that the statement in the Assignment that LAI purchased the Property for HKD3 million was “broadly speaking” a fact[9] , because LAI had paid moneys to procure the Land, to build the Property and the fencing wall. However, the Trial Judge held that since the Applicant had admitted that CHAN did not receive a cent from LAI or SHUM, and even expressed that stating a purchase price in the Assignment was just following the “standard practice” for transactions of this kind, then the Applicant had admitted that the Assignment was not made in the circumstances described. 24.Therefore, the trial judge ruled that the Applicant knew LAI and CHAN did not have the so-called sale and purchase transaction; LAI did not pay HKD 3 million to purchase the Property from CHAN, and the instruments referred to in Charges 1-3 were all false instruments[10]. The trial judge continues:
25.Regarding the point of whether the Applicant had a “double intent”, the trial judge found that the Applicant clearly intended to induce GE Capital to accept the copy of the ASP as a genuine copy, and to induce officers of the Land Registry to accept the ASP and the Assignment as genuine instruments, with the intention to induce them to do relevant acts in their discharge of job-related duties.[12] Grounds of appeal 26.The Grounds of Appeal put forward by Ms Maggie Wong, SC for the Applicant can be summarized as follows:
DISCUSSION
27.Ms Wong SC emphasized that the essence of the ASP and that of the Assignment was to convey the rights and interests of the Property, and in view of the overall evidence in this case, the nature of the instruments did exist, i.e., the legal interests of the Property had indeed been conveyed to LAI by CHAN by way of the Assignment; and in fact there was a bona fide consideration in this assignment of property. 28.Ms Wong SC cited a number of authorities[13] to submit that the law relating to “false instruments” was contravened because the document involved was false, that is, the document tells a lie about itself. If it is merely the case that the documents contain a lie, then this is not against the law. Ms Wong SC also cited the case of Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 2000)[14] to show that when the court considers whether a document tells a lie about itself, the focus is whether the background facts are contradictory to the nature of the document. 29.Hence, Ms Wong SC criticized the Trial Judge for having mistakenly held that the instruments lost their nature and became false simply because LAI did not pay HKD3 million to CHAN at the material time. At the same time, the trial judge did not take into consideration that there was in fact bona fide consideration on LAI’s part, that is, she had paid about HKD3 million to procure the Land, build the house and the fencing wall. 30.Apart from that, Ms Wong SC also cited the doctrine of estoppel in contract law to submit that an instrument which contains an untrue representation of payment receipt does not undermine its validity or binding effect. Therefore the lawful acts in civil law should not be treated significantly differently in criminal law. 31.This Court agrees that in order to determine whether a document is a false instrument, the nature of the document has to be considered, and that includes what is provided in section 69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance, which has been quoted many times by both parties in this case, that is, “an instrument is false, if it purports to have been – made or altered on a date on which or place at which or otherwise in circumstances in which it was not in fact made or altered”. 32.Although Ms Wong SC stressed that the nature of the ASP and the Assignment was to convey the interests in the Property, this Court has the following observations. 33.Generally, the nature of agreements for sale and purchase is to deal with sale and purchase transactions. In other words, in respect of the ASP, the sale and purchase negotiations and transactions by both parties in relation to the Land and the Property had to exist before the preparation of the ASP; and the nature of the document should reflect the sale and purchase in question. Hence, leaving aside the veracity of the sale price and the payment condition as stated in the ASP and by solely considering the facts admitted by the Defence, i.e., LAI and CHAN had never performed any transaction at any time, that would be sufficient to show that the ASP is a false instrument, because that instrument was ostensibly prepared under the circumstances of LAI and CHAN performing a sale and purchase transaction, but in fact it was not so. Because both parties did not enter into negotiations or reach any agreement in respect of that transaction, nor was there the intention to do so, the transaction did not exist in nature. Hence at all material times when CHAN (or SHUM as his attorney) and LAI executed the ASP, the identity of a real vendor and that of a real purchaser never existed, nor was there the intention to exercise the related legal rights or shoulder the related obligations arising from the provisions stated in the ASP. 34.In short, the circumstances of that sale and purchase stated in the instrument in question did not exist, and the terms on the price and payment set out by both parties were not facts either; to put it more directly, the instrument is just like a sheet of blank paper and does not reflect the truth, no matter in nature or in terms of the clauses. 35.As for the Assignment, even though Ms Wong SC emphasised that the nature of the instrument did exist, i.e., through the Assignment, CHAN did assign the legal interests in the Land and those in the Property to LAI, but this Court must point out that, in the case of HKSAR v Lau Kam Ying[15], which also deals with Ding Rights and assignment of land, Yeung VP has made the following observations:
36.At the same time, Kwan JA (as she then was), further pointed out:
37.Although the facts of the above case are not exactly the same as those in the present one, the legal principles expounded by the Court of Appeal in that case are equally applicable to the present one. 38.First of all, what is not disputed in this case is that the Land was first purchased by SO and LAU and then, by way of assignment, vested it in CHAN’s name. But in fact, CHAN was not the real buyer, and did not make payment to purchase the Land from SO and LAU. On the contrary, he just sold his Ding Right to the two persons. In other words, CHAN was never the owner of the Land. 39.In fact, the assignment agreement executed by SO, LAU and LAI on 26 October 2000 has clearly set out that SO and LAU were small house developers. After they had purchased the Land, they “allocated” it to CHAN’s name, so as to facilitate CHAN’s application to the Lands Department for a Free Building Licence, and this assignment agreement has also expressly stated that SO and LAU agreed to assign to LAI the beneficial interests of the Land and the building rights under the Building Licence for HKD1.05 million. This assignment agreement further proves that SO and LAU were the real holders of the Land. 40.Hence, although Ms Wong SC asserted that through the Assignment, CHAN did convey the legal interests in the Land and those in the Property to LAI; however, based on the legal principles expounded by the Court of Appeal in the Lau Kam Ying case, the assignment made between SO, LAU and CHAN at that time was actually a sham transaction, and did not vest the title of the Land in CHAN. 41.Because CHAN had never obtained the legal interests in the Land from SO and LAU, the Assignment executed on 21 June 2007 between SHUM as CHAN’s attorney and LAI could not have taken any effect, and did not convey the title from CHAN to LAI. 42.As such, the conveyance of legal interests that Wong SC had relied on was not achieved at all through the Assignment. What is more in line with the facts was that the legal interests of the Land were already vested in LAI under the assignment agreement executed in 2000 between SO, LAU and LAI; and if one were to say the Assignment was to vest the beneficial interests in the Property to LAI, then according to the defence case at the trial, that was merely a transaction between SHUM and LAI, with CHAN having no part in it at all, and it was entirely not the nature or the contents represented in the ASP and the Assignment. 43.Although the Trial Judge did not rely on the Lau Kam Ying case to conduct the above-mentioned fundamental analysis in her Reasons for Verdict, the reasoning in her Reasons for Verdict is correct and reasonable, and just as the Trial Judge has pointed out, even if SHUM had hoped to convey the legal interests in the Land and those in the Property to LAI’s name, an assignment could already achieve the purpose without the need to prepare the ASP separately. This Court is of the view that the Prosecution’s submission at trial that the preparation of the ASP was only for the purpose of obtaining a loan from GE Capital is reasonable. 44.Based on the above analysis of this Court, Ms Wong SC’s criticisms of the Trial Judge that the latter had not considered the bona fide consideration that LAI had actually paid, the principle of estoppel in civil law, and had wrongly considered hearsay evidence are all collateral matters, and could not have affected the finding of the fact that the ASP and the Assignment are actually false instruments. Hence, this Court is of the view that there is no need to deal with them one by one.
45.Based on the overall development of the incidents in the case and the Applicant’s long-term participation, this Court is of the view that there was very sufficient evidence before the Trial Judge and for her to rule that the Applicant did know that the ASP and the Assignment were false instruments. As the Trial Judge has pointed out in her Reasons for Verdict:
46.Ms Virginia Lau, Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions representing the Respondent, also submitted in her written submissions that the Applicant has participated in many matters relating to the Property, and was necessarily well aware that the Land and the Property already belonged to LAI since 26 October 2000. The reason why the assignment agreement between SO, LAU and LAI was not registered with the Land Registry was that the assignment was in contravention of the provisions and regulations of the Building Licence; that if an assignment was to be made within the 5 years after the issuance of the Certificate of Compliance, approval of the Lands Department and a payment of land premium would be required; further, if the registered ownership of the Property was changed to LAI in 2007 by way of a deed of gift, the title of the Property would be affected, and there would be accompanying legal risks, thereby affecting the bank’s decision to approve a mortgage loan. The proposition of a “standard practice” by the Applicant in DCCC 175/2013 further proved that the Applicant actually used this method to make a sham, with the intention of preventing the Lands Department or others from discovering that Ding Rights were being sold and that the Ding Houses were sold in breach of the regulations. 47.Hence, the Respondent submitted that the Trial Judge was certainly entitled to find that at the time of the offence, the Applicant knew that both the ASP and the Assignment were false. 48.In fact, when the Applicant testified in DCCC 175/2013, he admitted that he fully understood how “selling Ding Rights” worked, and also clearly stated that a developer merely “gave the piece of land to a Ding nominally, and the Ding did not have to pay out of his own pocket and indeed would have money to recieve.”[18] 49.Ms Wong SC also put forward the point that the Applicant only prepared the ASP and the Assignment in accordance with instructions and information from SHUM, so he would not question the instructions and the accuracy of the information. It would seem that Ms Wong SC was trying to show with this submission that there was no reason for the Applicant to know or believe that the instruments were false; but this proposition disregarded a more fundamental issue: no matter whether the transaction price was HKD3 million, or whether LAI had paid SHUM HKD1.5 million as deposit, the ASP and the Assignment did not formulate the transaction between SHUM and LAI, but rather the Applicant had prepared those instruments which on the face of them formulated the sale and purchase reached between CHAN and LAI and the details thereof when he clearly knew that CHAN and LAI did not undergo any sale and purchase transaction. 50.This Court is of the view that, based on the Applicant’s understanding of the matter and long-term participation, and his clear knowledge that there was actually no sale and purchase transaction between CHAN and LAI, he must know that the ASP and the Assignment were false instruments. In these circumstances, the Applicant’s claim that he only acted in accordance with the instructions, or the claim that he knew SHUM and LAI had indeed paid out about HKD3 million on building the house and the fencing wall are no reasons for exoneration. 51.Furthermore, Ms Wong SC submitted that the Applicant did not have any dishonest intent, but dishonesty is not an element of the charges in this case. 52.As for the issue of “double intent”, this Court is of the view that the Trial Judge has correctly pointed out:
53.Regarding this issue, Ms Wong SC takes the view that the Defence should have been allowed to call an expert witness to give opinions on the following matters: how a reasonably competent solicitor would handle the assignments of properties with Ding Rights; whether a property assignment without hard cash paid and received would affect the mortgagor’s title; and the validity of the related instruments. 54.This Court is of the view that the above questions are obviously not what a solicitor can give evidence as an expert on. First of all, against what background and with what knowledge the Applicant handled the instruments in this case bears no relation to how a solicitor would handle the assignments of properties with Ding Rights under general circumstances. Further, whether the “general practice” must be necessarily correct and in compliance with legal principles still leaves room for discussion; as such, calling a solicitor to testify on this issue may not assist the court in dealing with the matters in question. As for the other issues raised by Ms Wong SC, it is obvious that the court can only come to a decision after considering all the relevant evidence, which does not fall within the ambit of the so-called expert opinion that a solicitor can give. 55.Therefore, this Court is of the view that the trial judge has rightly refused to allow the witness in question to appear in court to testify. Conclusion 56.Based on the foregoing, this Court rules that none of the grounds of appeal put forward by the Applicant can sustain. This Court therefore refuses the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal against convictions and the appeal is dismissed.
Ms Virginia Lau, Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions and Ms Sabra Lo, Senior Public Prosecutor of Department of Justice, for the Respondent Ms Maggie Wong, SC, leading Mr Newman Wong and Ms Karry Lau, instructed by Chui & Lau, Solicitors & Notaries, for the Applicant Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and vetted by Mr. Richard K. L. Man, Barrister-at-law. [1] Contrary to section 74 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200. [2] Contrary to section 73 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200. [3] This is the copy of the ASP referred to in Charge 1. [4] For the Deed of Declaration, see p.228 of the Appeal Bundle. [5] This is the false instrument referred to in Charge 2. [6] This is the false instrument referred to in Charge 3. [7] Appeal Bundle pp. 58-59. [8] Reasons for Verdict paras 133-142, Appeal Bundle pp 61-63. [9] Reasons for Verdict paras 152-161, Appeal Bundle pp. 65-68. [10] Reasons for Verdict para 165, Appeal Bundle p. 69. [11] Appeal Bundle pp. 71 and 72. [12] Reasons for Verdict paras 184-189, Appeal Bundle p. 75 and 76. [13] Yiu Kenneth Lik Kin v HKSAR FAMC 6/1997, 5 December 1997, unreported; HKSAR v Lung Wai Hing CACC 217/2015, 28 November 2016, unreported; HKSAR v Huynh Bat Muoi [2001] 4 HKC 643 and SJ v Yeung Hon Keung Larry [2007] 4 HKC 397. [14] [2001] Cr App R 218: The tachograph record in that case indicated that the driver of the passenger coach had been taking a break, but in fact he continued driving during the alleged break time, and there had not been another driver driving as suggested on the record. Related statutes: Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 s. 9(1)(g) in the UK, which is identical to the provision of s.69(a)(vii) of the Crimes Ordinance in Hong Kong. [15] CACC 422/2010, 26 March 2013, unreported. [16] This Chinese translation was provided by the Respondent. [17] This Chinese translation was provided by the Respondent. [18] Appeal Bundle p.239 H-J. [19] Appeal Bundle pp 79-81. |
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