HKSAR v. Lo Shing Bou
Read the full judgment text of CACC 660/1997 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 3 February 1998.
1. The applicant faced one count that he, together with Chow Pak-yau ("Chow"), on or about 12th May 1995, in Hong Kong, lent Yeung Hon-man the sum of $10,000 at an excessive rate of interest. He pleaded not guilty to that charge but was found guilty after trial before Judge Chua in the District Court and was sentenced to imprisonment for eight months. He now seeks leave to appeal against that conviction.
Cited by 3 cases
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CACC000660/1997 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL 1997, No.660
------------------------------- Coram: Hon. Power, Ag. Chief Judge H.C., Nazareth, V.-P & Leong, J.A. Date of Hearing: 3 February 1998 Date of Judgment: 3 February 1998 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Power, Ag. Chief Judge H.C. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. The applicant faced one count that he, together with Chow Pak-yau ("Chow"), on or about 12th May 1995, in Hong Kong, lent Yeung Hon-man the sum of $10,000 at an excessive rate of interest. He pleaded not guilty to that charge but was found guilty after trial before Judge Chua in the District Court and was sentenced to imprisonment for eight months. He now seeks leave to appeal against that conviction. 2. The prosecution evidence came principally from Yeung Hon-man, the victim, and from his brother-in-law Mui Yat-kai ("Mui"). 3. It was the prosecution case that in October 1994, the victim had borrowed $15,000 from a loan shark. He paid an extortionate interest on that loan until March of 1995. At that time repayment in full was demanded and he sought Mui's help to raise a further loan. Mui put him in touch with Chow. On 12th May 1995, Chow deposited $9,200 in the bank account of the victim's sister. This was a $10,000 loan but was less that amount by $800 which was said to be for "handling charges". Interest of $1,250 was to be paid every 15 days, i.e. on the 11th and 26th of each month, and there was a late payment surcharge of $125 per day. 4. It was an admitted fact that Chow had opened a Heng Seng Bank savings account and that in May, June and July, four payments of $1,250 each were paid into that account. The victim said that in June he and Mui met Chow and the applicant at the entrance of the Tai Wing Wah Restaurant in Yuen Long. He gave evidence that the applicant at that meeting said that:
He said that the applicant gave him a Hongkong Bank account number into which the interest of $1,250 was to be paid. The victim said that thereafter he had paid, according to his memory, about $29,000 into that account. 5. There were, importantly, admitted facts in this matter. It was, in our view, an admission of crucial significance that the victim had, from July of 1995 until March of 1996, made 16 payments totalling $22,800 into the Hongkong Bank account of the applicant. It was also admitted that the payments of $1,250 threw up an effective interest rate of 432.298% per annum and that the applicant had a clear record. 6. By March 1996, the victim was unable to pay any more interest. He said that he met the applicant, Chow and another person on about 17th March at the Si Lei Dik Restaurant. Chow, after speaking to the applicant, came over with the applicant and told the victim that he could terminate the loan by paying $16,000 by four installments into the applicant's Hongkong Bank account. He was asked for an IOU which he gave to Chow. He said that he made only one of the $4,000 payments by giving $3,000 cash to the applicant on about 21st March and by depositing $1,000 through a friend into the Hongkong Bank account. 7. The trial judge said:
8. We refer particularly to the finding by the judge that the contradictory statements by Mui did not cause her to doubt that the meeting at the Tai Wing Wah Restaurant had taken place. 9. Mr. Matthews, who also appeared for the applicant below, has argued three grounds. In the first, he submits that the judge failed properly to evaluate the evidence and in particular, but not limited to, the evidence of Mui as to whether or not a meeting took place outside the Tai Wing Wah Restaurant in Yuen Long where the applicant was alleged to have been introduced to PW1 as the provider of the unlawful loan. 10. The thrust of Mr. Matthew's argument is that Mui in his evidence in chief not only made no mention at all of any such meeting but positively indicated that no such meeting had taken place and that the trial judge failed to make specific mention of that when assessing the evidence. He refers also in this regard to the cross-examination of Mui which he says made manifest the need for particular care in this regard. The cross-examination reads as follows:
The interpreter was then asked to read a passage from the statement which were as follows:
11. There was, however, no response to this by Mui. What happened was that the cross-examiner went on to his next question, without requiring the witness to either acknowledge or explain what was in the statement. He asked:
12. The trial judge considered this cross-examination with particular care. Indeed she sent for the transcript before coming to her decision:
13. The question before this court as posed by Mr. Matthews was whether the judge's finding was flawed given that she accepted the evidence of the victim as to the meeting outside the restaurant without reference to the fact that Mui, in his evidence in chief, had indicated that no such meeting took place and despite the cross-examination of Mui which left that question unresolved. In our view it was not. The judge we have no doubt had in mind the conflicts between the evidence of the victim and Mui. The evidence of the victim which she accepted was clear and was never challenged in cross-examination. It was further given cogent support by the admitted facts. We do not consider that her failure to mention the evidence in chief of Mui lays any basis for the suggestion that she failed properly to evaluate the evidence. 14. The second ground is that the judge failed adequately or at all to consider the discrepancies between the evidence of PW1 and PW2. 15. The principal discrepancy is the one with which we have already dealt above. 16. We were referred to other suggested discrepancies. Firstly, it was suggested that the evidence leaves in doubt the identity of the person to whom the loan was made. We do not agree. There was clear evidence, if it was accepted and the judge did accept it, that the victim, through his brother-in-law, obtained a loan. 17. Secondly, it was suggested that the evidence did not establish that the applicant was the lender. Again if evidence as to the meeting outside the restaurant was accepted, and it was, it clearly established that the applicant was the lender. 18. Thirdly, there was a submission that the evidence from the victim that the meeting was in June should have left grave doubts as to his credibility as, given the dates in the admitted facts, the meeting could not have taken place in the month of June but must have been in July. The judge was, however, aware of this matter and dealt properly with it as follows:
19. Mr. Matthews arguing his third ground submits that this was a case which turned on fundamental issues of credibility, particularly in view of the fact that both the victim and Mui had, in relation to matters before the court, told lies to the police in the course of the mitigation, and that the judge's decision was flawed as she failed to remind herself in any way of the clear record of the applicant. This court has held, and we repeat, that a professional judge sitting alone is not required to make specific mention of the good character of a defendant except in exceptional circumstances which did not, we are satisfied, exist in the present case. 20. There was cogent evidence against the applicant. It came from PW1 and it was given support of the strongest kind by the admitted facts. We are satisfied that the judge was right to act upon that evidence and to convict.
Representation: Mr. A.A. Bruce, S.C. & Mr. Vincent Wong (D.P.P.) for the Respondent. Mr. Matthews (Messrs. Ip, Kwan & Co.) for the Applicant. |
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