Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v. Harmutty Ltd and Others

CACV 208/2008, cacv 210/2008, CACV 211/2008, CACV 212/2008,
cacv 351/2008 and cacv 352/2008

cacv 208/2008

in the high court of the

hong kong special administrative region

court of appeal

civil appeal no. 208 of 2008

(on appeal from HCA NO. 2763 of 2004)

________________________

BETWEEN

CACV 210/2008

in the high court of the

hong kong special administrative region

court of appeal

civil appeal no. 210 of 2008

(on appeal from HCA NO. 2203 of 2004)

________________________

BETWEEN

CACV 211/2008

in the high court of the

hong kong special administrative region

court of appeal

civil appeal no. 211 of 2008

(on appeal from HCA NO. 2746 of 2004)

________________________

BETWEEN

CACV 212/2008

in the high court of the

hong kong special administrative region

court of appeal

civil appeal no. 212 of 2008

(on appeal from HCA NO. 2763 of 2004)

________________________

BETWEEN

CACV 351/2008

in the high court of the

hong kong special administrative region

court of appeal

civil appeal no. 351 of 2008

(on appeal from HCA NO. 2746 of 2004)

________________________

BETWEEN

CACV 352/2008

in the high court of the

hong kong special administrative region

court of appeal

civil appeal no. 352 of 2008

(on appeal from HCA NO. 2763 of 2004)

________________________

BETWEEN

(Heard together)

Before: Hon Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA in Court

Dates of Hearing: 2 & 3 March 2009

Date of Judgment: 3 March 2009

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Judgment: 10 March 2009

___________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

___________________________

Hon Rogers VP:

1.These were appeals from a judgment of Saunders J given on 18 January 2008.  The matters before the judge were three applications summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court.  After no less than 12 days hearing, the judge gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff.  In September 2008 the judge heard applications that the costs of the action should be paid personally by the directors of some of the companies against whom judgment had been given.  Those persons were a Mr Hu Hung Chiu, Mr William Yip Chi Hung and Mr Ben Chung Che Ling.  Those persons had not been parties to the Order 14 proceedings.

2.Appeals were brought by all parties against whom judgment had been given and on this appeal Mr Hu also sought to intervene and appeal against the costs order that had been made against him.

3.This court allowed the appeals and set aside the orders on the basis that the actions included claims by the plaintiff based on allegations of fraud and, therefore, they did not fall within the terms of Order 14; the court, thus, had no jurisdiction to entertain applications summary judgment.  The reasons were to be given in writing

Background

4.As already indicated, the hearing of the Order 14 application in the court below took 12 days.  This court was informed that the plaintiff’s opening itself took some 5 days.  Those facts, of themselves, demonstrate conclusively that the applications for summary judgment under Order 14 should not have been allowed to proceed.  There is an adage that if the parties need to sit down in the course of an Order 14 application, the matter is not fit for summary judgment.  Applications for summary judgment are only suitable where the court can be satisfied that not only is there no defence but there is no fairly arguable point to be argued on behalf of the defendant.  The court cannot embark upon a mini-trial based on affidavit.  Except in the most clear and blatant cases, it is impossible for a court to put itself in the position of having to make findings of fact.  It should rarely be necessary for a plaintiff, in making an application for summary judgment, to do more than verify the statement of claim.  If, thereafter, a defendant can show a triable issue that should, there and then, be an end to the application.

5.This court was informed that, in this case, far from simply verifying the statements of claim, the plaintiff’s application was supported by 10,000 pages of documents.  On this appeal this court was presented with some 58 box files of documents, albeit, no doubt, there will be found numerous instances of duplication of documents in those bundles.  In addition there were some 7 box files of authorities.  The judgment below runs to nearly 80 pages.  It is scarcely any exaggeration that any of these facts, again, on their own demonstrates the unsuitability of the cases for summary judgment.

6.Nevertheless, once judgment had been given this court was faced with the question of considering that judgment.  In short it can be said that the plaintiff’s case is that its monies were used by the defendants to make investments which were represented by real estate in the guise of a substantial part of the South Horizons development in Aplichau and houses in the Shouson Hill area as well as shares in a publicly listed company in Hong Kong and other companies.  The three different actions with which these appeals are concerned relate to the different types of property.

7.The statements of claim in the three actions aver a number of duties on persons who were directors and officers of the plaintiff including duties not to misappropriate the plaintiff’s assets or corporate opportunities, either for their own benefit or for others, and to ensure that investment of funds belonging to the plaintiff were promptly and properly recorded in the plaintiff’s books and accounts and that the legal and beneficial ownership thereof was properly and clearly vested in the plaintiff.  The statements of claim plead that the various investments were acquired using funds belonging to the plaintiff and with the finance obtained on the strength of the plaintiff’s credit and financial standing.

8.For example, HCA 2763 of 2004 relates to South Horizons.  The fiducairy duties owed by directors, specifically in this case Mr Hu, Mr Tung and of Mr Sun, are pleaded in paragraph 4 in general terms.  They include the requirement to account fully for the assets of the plaintiff and not to misappropriate those assets or corporate opportunities and to keep proper records of investment of the plaintiff and to ensure that all the assets of the plaintiff were properly reported in its financial statements.  In broad terms, paragraph 6 pleads a failure to account to the plaintiff for the activities of what were said to be companies that belong, and should have belonged, to the plaintiff.  In paragraphs 42 to 45 of the statement of claim it is pleaded that those persons, amongst others, also failed to disclose the plaintiff’s interests in what was ultimately the South Horizons property and, indeed, hid the existence of the plaintiff’s interests from the plaintiff, in the result, causing there to be false accounting.

9.HCA 2746 of 2004 relates to what had been termed the Shouson Hill properties.  In short, those were said to be derived from the South Horizons properties.  The manner in which that happened is irrelevant for the purposes of this decision.  Again what is alleged is that, amongst others, Mr Hu, Mr Chung, and Mr Yip were guilty of unauthorised hiding of the plaintiff’s assets and the failure to account for the income to be derived from the Shouson Hill properties and in misusing those properties by mortgaging them for their own purposes.

10.Finally, reference can be made to HCA 2203 of 2004 which relates to what were referred to as the PacMos shares.  This statement of claim opens with the allegation that senior executive directors of the plaintiff including Mr Hu, Mr Tung and Mr Sun made unauthorised and unratified investments including, in particular, the purchase of the PacMos Technologies Holdings Ltd shares and neither reported those holdings to the plaintiff, nor saw that those holdings were reflected in the financial statements of the plaintiff.  The statement of claim goes on to plead that those persons actively sought to conceal the beneficial ownership of the various investments.  Again the fiduciary duties of the directors are pleaded in the same general terms as in the South Horizons action.  The statement of claim goes on to plead not only the unauthorised investment but the concealing of the acquisition from the plaintiff’s board and shareholders and causing the accounts of the plaintiff to be falsely recorded and the financial statements of the plaintiff to be incomplete “and/or false”.  Reference to similar allegations can be made to paragraphs 20, 23, 26, 33, 34, 48, 50 and 54 of the statement of claim in the action.

11.When the application for summary judgment was made before the judge below, the skeleton argument on behalf of the plaintiff ran to some 128 pages and, even that, did not include the annexes.  The first 42 pages of that skeleton made quite clear that the basis of the plaintiff’s claim is that the various directors, including Mr Hu, against whom the allegations are made had been guilty of what was termed “a massive accounting fraud”.  In paragraph 10 of the skeleton argument it was said, for example,:

“While further investigations are still underway, the investigations which had so far been conducted revealed that PEWC’s former officers had channeled a large amount of PEWC’s money into hidden investments through a maze of companies managed from Hong Kong.  Neither these companies nor the investments made were ever reported to the Board or PEWC’s shareholders.  That these former officers were able to get away with this for so long, indicated the implicit trust which was reposed in them by the Board and the power they wielded over the entire operations of PEWC over the years.  But most of all, such investments and what happened to these investments were concealed from the Board and the shareholders by the accounting chicanery which was subsequently discovered.  Hu and his fellow officers betrayed the trust reposed on them by engaging in false accounting over a long period, with the result that knowledge of the real financial position of the company was kept from the Board and the shareholders, causing substantial losses to PEWC.  When the false accounting began to be unmasked, PEWC was faced with a predicament of unprecedented proportions.”

12.The skeleton argument goes on to consider the history of the matter first of all, under the heading “How PEWC discovered the accounting fraud”.  In paragraph 17 it was said:

“These audit working papers showed a highly disturbing picture and provided vital clues towards the unmasking of the accounting fraud which took place from at least 1994 onwards.”

13.There are then paragraphs that deal with what was said to be the manipulation of the accounts of, in particular, the plaintiff and it is then said that Mr Hu, in particular, had taken steps to destroy books and records so that what was said to be his wrongful acts were not revealed.

14.In the judgment below of 18 January 2008, the judge reflected those arguments throughout his judgment.  For example, in paragraph 37 of the judge referred to the plaintiff having discovered various transactions which he said had been “plainly orchestrated by Mr Hu, the true extent of the debt owed by CPE to PEWC had been concealed from PEWC.”  In paragraph 39 the judge referred to discovery of records which revealed the full extent of the fraud that had been carried out.  Under the heading “The hidden corporate structure” the judge said in paragraph 42:

“42.      Central to the case for PEWC is the contention that, between 1990 and 1995, various companies were formed, primarily by Mr Hu, ostensibly owned by PEWC, using PEWC funds, and that these companies were never reported to the full board of directors of PEWC, or properly disclosed to the board to enable them to be reflected in the financial statements of PEWC as subsidiaries.”

15.In paragraph 72 he said:

“72.      I am satisfied that the evidence justifies the submissions made by Mr Neoh, in paragraphs 30-35 of his skeleton argument, and Annexes 3 & 7 to the skeleton, that the various companies used by Messrs Hu, Tung & Sun were formed using funds of PEWC, but were never reported to the full Board of PEWC nor were they recorded in PEWC’s financial statements as subsidiaries of PEWC.  There is nothing in the affidavits filed by the various defendants to detract from this conclusion.  The assertion that the complexity of the matter and the large number of documents might mean that other information will rise in the course of discovery and a full trial is not a sufficient basis to avoid this finding.”

16.In paragraph 93 the judge referred to the plaintiff not being fixed with knowledge of directors who were acting fraudulently and in paragraph 194 the judge said:

“194.    It equally cannot be argued to the contrary that in the conduct described above they have acted in breach of that fiduciary duty.  The overwhelming inference from the whole of the facts is that it is Mr Hu, who is controlling the companies presently owning the proper relevant property, and that he is doing so for his own benefit, and the benefit of Messrs Tung & Sun.”

17.Finally in paragraph 267 the judge said:

“…In the present case I am satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged that burden, and has established that by virtue of the concealment undertaken they could not have discovered the fraud without exceptional measures which they could not reasonably have been expected to take.  The defendants have failed to discharge the burden upon me to establish an arguable case to the contrary.”

18.These matters are important because, whilst Order 14 r. 1(1) provides that a plaintiff who has served a statement of claim may apply for judgment against the defendant in respect of a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such claim, where there is no defence, sub rule (2) provides:

“(2)      Subject to paragraph (3) this rule applies to every action begun by writ other than-

…………

(b)   an action which includes a claim by the plaintiff based on an allegation of fraud,”

19.The wording of Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) makes quite clear that what is excluded is an action where there is a claim which is based on an allegation of fraud.  Two matters are clear from that.  The first is that there may be one or more claims in the action and the rule envisages that one of the claims may not be based on an allegation of fraud but another may be.  In those circumstances it is clear that an application for summary judgment under Order 14 will not lie.  Secondly, the rule is not confined to excluding actions in which one of the claims is a claim for damages for fraud, what is excluded is any action where there is a claim in respect of which the underlying allegations on which the claim is based constitute an allegation of fraud.  It is clear that if rule 1(2)(b) applies there is no jurisdiction for the court to entertain an application for summary judgment.

20.That the matter is, indeed, a matter of jurisdiction was demonstrated in the case of Kays Impex Corporation (HK) Ltd v Arbuthnot Export Services Ltd (26/07/1974, CACV 32 of 1974) to which this court drew the parties’ attention.  In commencing his judgment Briggs CJ said that the statement of claim contained allegations based upon the alleged fraudulent conduct of the defendants.  There had, apparently, been an agreement that only one point would be taken on the appeal in that case.  However, although the court felt bound by that agreement, because the matter that there was the alleged fraudulent conduct had been raised, Briggs CJ said in paragraph 16 of the judgment that, because it was a question which went to the jurisdiction of the court, the court felt obliged to deal with the point, albeit with the greatest reluctance.

21.In paragraphs 18 and 19 of the judgment the judge went on to deal with the question as to whether judgment could, nevertheless, be obtained under Order 14 in respect of a claim that did not rely on the allegation of fraud.  He said:

“18.      The present action is an action which was begun by a writ and it includes a claim by the plaintiff based on an allegation of fraud.  The summons under Order 14 should therefore never have been taken out, or if taken out, should have been dismissed.

19.       In Order 14 proceedings it is always open to a plaintiff to proceed on part of his claim.  For example, if a plaintiff has two claims included in the writ, and he knows that there is a possible defence to the first claim but not to the second, he may ask for judgment for the second claim, the first claim will then be tried.  However, such a case presupposes that the claims are not excluded from the operation of that Order by rule 2.  Once a claim based on an allegation of fraud appears on the writ order 14 is inapplicable.  It is not open to a plaintiff to elect not to proceed with the claim based on fraud and to ask for judgment on an alternative claim not based on fraud.  To do so would violate the clear wording of the order itself.”

22.Trainor J agreed with the judgment of Briggs CJ.  Amongst the cases listed as having been cited in the course of argument was Gurney v Small [1891] 2 QB 584.  In that case Wills J said at page 586:

“It must be remembered that the right to obtain final judgment in a summary manner is one of purely statutory creation; it is no part of the common law jurisdiction of the Court, but is given by rules which have the force of an Act of Parliament, and it is only exercisable in the cases provided for in and subject to the conditions imposed by those rules.”

23.There are two decisions at first instance in Hong Kong in which the court had to consider Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) and where it has been held, as had Briggs CJ, that what was excluded was an action in which there was a claim based on allegation of fraud as distinct from a claim for fraud.  In Peninsula Fur Trading Ltd. v George Chen Dah-shing & others HCA 3550/1987, 14 March 1988, Barnett J said that the case involved a long term thoroughly dishonest course of conduct and that although fraud was not expressly pleaded, it was an inherent allegation in the plaintiff’s case.  In consequence, the action was “beyond question based upon an allegation of fraud and is not amenable to O.14 proceedings.”

24.In the case of Skink Limited (In Liquidation) v Comtowell Limited and another [1994] 1 HKLR 26 Kaplan J referred to that statement of Barnett J with approval.  The Skink case involved an application for summary judgment for a declaration that two assignments should be set aside under section 60 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance Cap. 219 on the grounds that at the time of the assignments, the plaintiff intended to defraud its creditors within the terms of the section.  Kaplan J held that such a claim was excluded because of Order 14 r. 1(2)(b).  In doing so he considered the English Court of Appeal decision in the case of Newton Chemical v Arsenis [1989] 1 WLR 1297.

25.In the Newton case, the Court of Appeal had before it a case against a salesman who had pleaded guilty to false accounting.  The relevant facts were summarised in paragraph 6(8) of the statement of claim cited at page 1301B of the judgment of Nicholls LJ, as he then was:

“The defendant submitted divers claims for commission and received and/or accepted payment of commission from the first plaintiffs in respect of the purported orders which were not genuine and/or were a wholly or partly fabricated by the defendant and/or where: (i) no sale of such products was, in fact, made; and/or (ii) the numbers and/or value of such products actually sold was less than the amount and/or value thereof appearing on invoices and/or sales reports submitted and/or made up by the defendant.”

26.Nicholls LJ said that the allegation in that paragraph did embrace a claim that the defendant put forward claims for commission which he knew to be false.  However, he went on to say that the plaintiffs had chosen not to put the claim on the basis of Derry v Peek fraud.  It would seem that Nicholls LJ and the other judges took a view of the restriction under Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) which was, perhaps, in their own words artificial.  At page 1303A-E Nicholls LJ said:

“In setting out this analysis one cannot but be conscious of a large element of artificiality.  In practice in the course of proving that the defendant claimed commission on non-existent sales the plaintiffs will prove that the defendant was aware of the true position.  He was aware of the true position because he had fabricated the invoices.  He put forward false claims.  It is this feature which underlies what happened in this case, as alleged and deposed to by the plaintiffs.  Further, an implied term to claim only in respect of actual orders comes very close to being no more than an implied term that the defendant would act honestly.

Despite this I do not feel constrained to conclude that this case falls outside the scope of Order 14.  As presently framed, Ord. 14 r.1(2)(b) is itself somewhat anomalous.  If “fraud” in that rule had been interpreted by the court as having a wide meaning, so that all cases in which a plaintiff alleged dishonest conduct by a defendant were outside the scope of the order, the argument based on artificiality and contrivance would be powerful.  But once fraud is to be understood as having the strict meaning of Derry v. Peek fraud, this argument is far less compelling.  Once it is accepted that claims based on allegations of all forms of dishonest conduct other than Derry v. Peek fraud can, in a suitable case, be the subject of summary judgment, I confess to having difficulty in understanding why the same should not also be true of a claim based on an allegation of Derry v. Peek fraud, being outside Order 14, I do not perceive what is the principle which justifies requiring a plaintiff today to prove trial a claim based on Derry v. Peek fraud, alone of all forms of dishonesty.  The rule could with profit be reconsidered by the Supreme Court Rule Committee.”

27.Whilst he appreciated that there was a divergence of views between the Hong Kong case and the English case, Kaplan J did not consider that he was bound by that decision as regards the claim in the case before him.  In my view Kaplan J was correct.  The decision of the House of Lords in Derry v Peek (1889) 15 App. Cas. 337 established that in an action for deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud.  After reviewing the authorities, Lord Herschell said at page 374:

“First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice.  Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, care less whether it be true or false.”

28.The importance of the case was that it demonstrated the fact that although a false statement, made carelessly and without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud it does not necessarily amount to a fraud.  If a statement had been made in the honest belief that it were true it would not be fraudulent.

29.Hence, in so far as the Newton decision proceeded on the basis that deliberate dishonesty was required in order to satisfy the meaning of the word “fraud” in Order 14 r. 1(2)(b), I have no difficulty.  If, and in so far as, it is suggested that the Newton case is authority for the proposition that although a plaintiff’s case may include a claim which is based on an allegation of deceit involving deliberate dishonesty, the plaintiff may nevertheless proceed to apply for summary judgment on some other claim for example, conspiracy, bribery or a claim for money had and received or under constructive trusts, then I consider that the wording of the rule does not allow that.

30.The application of Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) in this case was considered by the judge below as a preliminary matter in the hearing for summary judgment.  In the reasons for ruling handed down on 2 April 2007 the judge said at paragraphs 19-21:

“19.      The causes of action upon which Mr Neoh relies to seek summary judgment do not include a cause of action based on an allegation of fraud.  Three causes of action are pursued in the summary judgment applications against the various defendants who are to be subjected to that procedure.  They are first, allegations based upon a resulting trust, second, allegations based upon a constructive trust, and third, a claim based upon money had and received.

20.       Mr Neoh’s argument, which I accepted, was that in relation to each of those three causes of action, while a fraud was the means by which the funds were transferred out of PEWC, and were concealed from PEWC, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish the fraud to establish the cause of action.  It is sufficient, Mr Neoh says, if he can demonstrate simple that PEWC’s funds were used for the acquisition of the property.  The particular means by which the funds came to be used in that way, while interesting and illustrative, do not constitute an essential step in the causes of action.  The crucial element is not how the funds came to be used, but that PEWC’s funds were used to acquire the property.

21.       I was satisfied that in order to find liability upon the causes of action upon which Mr Neoh relies, a finding of fraud, in the classic sense, is not required.  That said, I record that Mr Neoh appreciates the heavy burden upon him having regard to the requirement of knowledge involved in establishing a constructive trust.”

31.In my view, consideration not only of the skeleton argument put forward on behalf of the plaintiff but, importantly, also of the judgment of 18 January demonstrates quite clearly that, although the claims made in the case may be framed in respect of constructive trust, resulting trust and money had and received, the claims in the action are based on allegations of fraud that include deliberate dishonesty.  As is pointed out in Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings 16^th edition page 841, an action in fraud will usually include one or more of a number of distinct causes of action amongst which are listed “money had and received” and “constructive trusts: knowing receipt and dishonest assistance”.  Furthermore, as Mr Whitehead SC, who appeared for Mr Hu, pointed out, in paragraphs 18-07 and 18-08 of Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 19^th Edition and the third supplement thereto, it is made quite clear that active non-verbal conduct can amount to deceit.  In this case, the allegations of the concealment of facts from the plaintiff when there was a duty to disclose, and the connivance at the preparation of false financial statements and accounts would be clear allegations of fraud.

32.In my view, it is no answer to the challenge in this case that the provisions of Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) exclude this action, to say that the plaintiff can proceed on one or other or all of the three causes of action, namely resulting trust, constructive trust and money had and received, for the simple reason that the necessary allegations which are made by the plaintiff include allegations of fraud.

33.Mr Neoh SC, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, sought to rely on a statement of Godfrey JA in the case of Tan Eng Guan And Another v Southland Co Ltd and other [1996] 2 HKLRD 117 when he said that he considered that the approach of Barnett J and Kaplan J had been incorrect.  He went on to say that the approach of the English courts should be followed.  Quite apart from the fact that Nazareth VP said that he would prefer not to express any view on the matter of the construction of Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) and to reserve that for future argument and that he thought the point had not been sufficiently addressed in argument, it is not entirely clear what aspect Godfrey JA was referring to.

34.The Southland case involved an allegation of fraud on the minority.  That is a very different form of claim to an action for deceit.  If Godfrey JA was simply saying that fraud on the minority was not encompassed by the word “fraud” in Order 14 r. 1(2)(b), then I have no difficulty whatsoever in agreeing with him.  If, however, he was attempting to say that despite the fact that claims in an action were based on allegations of fraud which encompassed deliberate dishonesty, Order 14 r. 1(2)(b) did not apply to other claims in the action, then I consider he was clearly wrong.  I would add that Godfrey JA had been in the court in the appeal from the decision of Kaplan J in the Skink case but had decided the appeal on the basis that the facts showed an arguable defence.

35.I have set out my reasons at considerable length partly because this appeal was disposed of in a fraction of the estimated time and, as already indicated, enormous expense has been involved in bringing and conducting these proceedings for summary judgment.  This court ordered that the matter should be remitted to the judge in charge of the commercial list.  In my view these are cases which require strong case management.  When stripped of the background facts, many of which are almost certainly not likely to be disputed, the fundamental issues in the cases appear to me to be narrow.  Although these actions involve assets of considerable value, the real dispute between the parties appears to me to lie in a small compass.

Hon Le Pichon JA:

36.I agree.

Mr Anthony Neoh SC & Ms Barbara Wong, instructed by Messrs W.K. To & Co., for the Plaintiff/Respondent in all appeals (“PEWC”)

Mr Clifford Smith SC & Ms Rachel Lam, instructed by Messrs Tanner De Witt, for the 18^th & 19^th Defendants in CACV 208/2008/Appellants (“Blinco & Patagonia”)

Mr Simon Westbrook SC & Mr Jeevan Hingorani, instructed by Messrs Laracy Gall, for the 1^st, 3^rd, 4^th & 7^th Defendants in CACV 210/2008; and the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd & 8^th Defendants in CACV 211/2008; and the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd & 17^th Defendants in CACV 212/2008/Appellants (“the Corporate Defendants”)

Mr Robert Whitehead SC & Mr Steven Kwan, instructed by Messrs Haldanes, for the 4^th Defendants in CACV 208, 211, 212, 351 & 352/2008; and the 8^th Defendant in CACV 210/2008/Intervener (“Mr Hu”)

Messrs Lovells, for 5^th & 6^th Defendants in CACV 208, 211, 212, 351 & 352/2008 (“Yip & Chung”) (Attendance excused)

Mr Edwards Alder, instructed by Messrs Kennedys, for the Joint and Several Receivers