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HCSA 2/2010
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
民事司法管轄權
高院小額錢債審裁處上訴案件2010年第2號
（原小額錢債審裁處申索2009年第18169號）
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| 申索人 |
Chow Kwong Wah Oliver 周廣華 |
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對 |
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| 答辯人 |
Pasche Hans-Joachim |
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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期：2010年3月10、16日及2010年4月7日
判決書日期：2010年4月15日
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判決書
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1.申請人為小額錢債審裁處 (“審裁處”) 編號SCTC 18169/2009的申索中的申索人。他不服審裁處在2009年12 月31日作出的裁決，憑藉香港法例第 338章《小額錢債審裁處條例》第28(1)條，向原訟法庭提出本申請，要求批予許可以提出上訴。
2.上述申索案中的被告人，是申請人的前租客。與訟雙方在2006年4月27日訂定的租約，涉及位處赫德道一個住宅單位 (“涉案物業”)。
3.上述租約的租期為2006年5月1日至2009年4月30 日 (三年)。首年每月租金為$5,500，其後兩年則為$6,000。被告人應支付等同兩個月租金 ($12,000) 為按金。但申請人同意，被告人曾支付共$12,500的按金。
4.與訟雙方亦以口頭形式協定，申請人同意支付被告人擬將涉案物業裝修所需的費用中的$22,000。該款以被告人原須支付的4個月租金 (2006年6月至9月) 抵銷。
5.被告人其後在2009年3月31日通知申請人，他已離開涉案物業，並將於2009年4月1日將之交回申請人。
6.與訟雙方在2009年4月1日在涉案物業內因交回涉案物業問題爭執，警察奉召到場，被告人未交回涉案物業的門匙而離開。申請人同意，他並無交回$12,500的按金。
7.申請人提出的申索項目為：
(a) 2006年6月至9月的租金及2009年3月及4月的租金$34,000 ($22,000 + $12,000)；
(b) 更換門鎖費用$820；
(c) 更換連接洗衣機水喉費用$1,000；
(d) 更換水泵費用$5,000；
(e) 清潔涉案物業及移走其內的棄置傢具費用$1,500；
(f) 重油涉案物業牆壁費用$7,600；
(g) 更換座廁板$500；
(h) 檢查及清洗冷氣機費用$700；
(i) 更換熱水器$5,140；
(j) 維修窗門費用$1,470；
(k) 修理窗門雲石平台費用$300；
(l) 更換傢具及窗門$11,400。
(共為$69,430，但申請人祇申索其中$50,000)。
8.就前第7(a) 段的申索中，涉及2006年6月至9月租金 ($22,000)的部分，申請人的證供指，被告人拒絕讓他檢視涉案物業是否確曾進行裝修，但被告人未這樣做，故他應支付該段期間的租金。被告人則聲稱，他的前秘書葉小姐 (亦曾在審裁處作供) 告知申請人，他可自行到涉案物業檢視，但他並未這樣做。審裁處信納被告人的證供，及不信納申請人的證供。故裁定申請人未能確立這申索項目。
9.就前第7(a) 段的申索中，涉及的2009年3月及4月的租金 ($12,000)的部分，與訟雙方並不爭議，被告人未支付上述期間的租金。但審裁處裁定依租約的相關條款，申請人需以按金抵銷欠租，故拒絕此申索項目。
10.就前第7(c) 段的申索，申請人指，被告人未經同意，移除洗衣機水喉，故需支付相關費用。被告人則指他從未留意該物品。審裁處不信納被告人曾移除水喉，故裁定申請人不能追討該費用。
11.就前第7(d) 段的申索，申請人指，水泵在3年前安裝。審裁處接受水泵已損壞的說法，但認定水泵是安放在涉案物業外牆，而申請人又未能確立被告人故意破壞水泵。審裁處故此裁定，水泵可能因日久失修而損壞。此外，審裁處亦裁定，與訟雙方口頭協定的維修工作，祇涉及室內範圍。
12.就前第7(e) 段的申索，審裁處信納，被告人確遺下一張座椅。故此，審裁處判定被告人需支付$1,500中的$750。
13.就前第7(f) 段的申索，申請人稱，因被告人未關上窗門，雨水因而進入涉案物業，導致牆壁發霉。被告人否認，並指涉案物業嚴重滲漏，這才是涉案物業的牆壁發霉的原因。審裁處不接納申請人的說法。但審裁處裁定，由於涉案物業的照片顯示，牆壁上有小孔及污漬，被告人需支付相關的修補費用。審裁處評估費用為申索項目的20% ($1,520)。
14.就前第7(h) 段的申索，申請人聲稱，冷氣機滿佈塵埃，而且被告人故意將冷氣機的電線，部分藏於牆內。被告人則指，他曾兩次清洗冷氣機，及沒有干擾電線。審裁處的裁決，與前第10 段所述的類同。
15.就前第7(i) 段的申索，申請人指熱水爐已安裝在涉案物業內約6年，被告人離開後，他發現熱水爐不能運作，並依煤氣公司提議，必須更換。被告人則稱，他交回涉案物業時，熱水爐仍能運作。審裁處裁定單以熱水爐不能運作為由，不足以支持此項申索。
16.就前第7(j) 至7(l) 段的申索，申請人稱，由於被告人沒有關好窗戶，導致涉案物業內的傢具受損。此外，窗門的門鉸及雲石平台都損壞。被告人否認申請人的聲稱。審裁處因窗門的門鉸及雲石平台受損，分別判定$1,470 (前第7(j) 段) 及$300 (前第7(k) 段)，但判定申請人不能追討前第7(l) 段的申索。
17.此外，審裁處亦就前第7(b) 及7(g) 段的申索，判定申請人勝訴 ($820 + $500)。
18.故此，審裁處判定的總申索為$5,360。但申請人從前第3段所述的$12,500中扣除欠租$12,000後 (參看前第9段)，仍管有屬被告人的$500。經抵銷後，總申索判定為$4,860。審裁處另判定判決債項利息及訟費$6,115。
19.第338章第28(1) 條規定：
“如任何一方對審裁處的決定感到受屈，而理由 —
(a) 只涉及法律問題；或
(b) 是因為該申索超越審裁處的司法管轄權範圍，
則可向原訟法庭申請上訴許可，而原訟法庭如認為適當，可予批准。”
20.本申請的申請書列載的申請理由，分別涉及第338章第28(1)(a) 及 (b)條。
21.除本“判決書”以下詳述的理由外 (詳見後第28至34 段)，本申請的申請書聲稱涉及第338章第28(1)(a) 條的申請理由，其實性質都屬針對審裁處就證供可信性及/或如何評定及/或衡量涉事實的裁斷。
22.在行使普通法的各地法院的上級法庭在多宗案例中說，要成功地令上級法庭對原審法庭這種性質的裁斷作出干預，上訴人(或申請人) 需顯示：
(1) 原審法庭在法律論點上，作出錯誤指示；或
(2) 原審法庭的裁斷，完全沒有相關的證據基礎支持；或
(3) 原審法庭的裁斷，完全違背已呈交的證據所顯示的結論。
23.英國上議院在Edwards v Bairston [1956] AC 14一案中說：
“When the case comes before the court it is its duty to examine the determination having regard to its knowledge of the relevant law. If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determination, it is, obviously, erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the court must intervene. … there, too, there has been error in point of law. I do not think that it much matters whether this state of affairs is described as one in which there is no evidence to support the determination or as one in which the evidence is inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or as one in which the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination. Rightly understood, each, phrase propounds the same test. For my part, I prefer the last of the three, … ” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加) (第36頁)。
24.英國上議院其後在Griffiths v J P Harrison (Waterford) Ltd. [1963] AC 1一案中亦說：
“Harrisons appealed to the High Court seeking to get the decision of the commissioners reversed. Now the powers of the High Court on an appeal are very limited. The judge cannot reverse the commissioners on their findings of fact. He can only reverse their decision if it is “erroneous in point of law.” Now here the primary facts were all found by the commissioners. They were stated in the case. They cannot be disputed. What is disputed is their conclusion from them. And it is now settled, as well as anything can be, that their conclusion cannot be challenged unless it was unreasonable, …. It is not sufficient that the judge would himself have come to a different conclusion. Reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusions, and often do. Juries do. So do judges. And are they not all reasonable men? But there comes a point when a judge can say that no reasonable man could reasonably come to that conclusion. Then, but not till then, he is entitled to interfere. ….” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加)。
25.故此，要成功地作出這一類推翻原審裁斷的申請，申請人要顯示的是：
“ … when the question is asked whether the evidence upon which the commissioner could arrive at their findings, I take it that this means whether (to adapt the words … in Edwards v Bairston) the contrary conclusion is the true and only reasonable one.” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加) (英國上議院在Griffiths一案中第10至11頁的用詞)。
26.審裁處在作出不利申請人的裁斷時，已充分考慮與訟雙方所提的證據及論據。因此，該等裁斷全屬審裁處基於已呈堂證據而可作出不利申請人的裁斷的範疇，並不涉及法律論點。
27.申請人在本申請聆訊時相對冗長的聆訊時間所作的口頭陳述，基本上祇是重覆前第21段所述的事項，及對香港司法制度作出他的個人意見及批評。
28.本申請中，真正可被視為屬法律論點的事項是：
(a) 與訟雙方在2009年4月1日在涉案物業的會面，性質是否屬被告人已交回涉案物業的管有權；
(b) 租約按金是否可用以抵銷欠租。
29.就前第28(a) 段所述的事項，申請人稱，上述會面並不屬交回涉案物業管有權性質，這是因為被告人當日並未依約：
(1) 交回門匙；
(2) 移除所有物品；
(3) 支付欠租。
30.與訟雙方在2009年4月1日會面後，無論申請人是否同意，被告人已在他完全知悉的情況下，離開涉案物業。此外，被告人的作為，亦使人有合理理由相信，他再沒有管有涉案物業的意圖。故此，申請人在前第29(1)至29(3) 段所倚仗的事項，在法理上不屬基本性的違約作為，而僅屬可追討損害賠償的違約作為。審裁處已就該等作為可能導致的損害賠償，作出裁斷 (詳見前第7至18段 (尤其前第7(a)、(b) 及 (e)、8至9、12及17 段))。
31.就前第28(b) 段所述的事項，涉案的租約中有關租約按金的條款是第2條。該條款的原文是：
“2. To secure the due performance and observance of the stipulations terms and conditions hereinbefore contained and on the Tenant’s part to be performed and observed the Tenant shall on the signing of this Agreement pay to the Landlord by way of deposit the sum of Hong Kong Dollars at the expiration or sooner determination of the said term of tenancy and provided that the rent hereby stipulated or any sums of money owing and due by the Tenant to the Landlord under and by virtue of these presents shall have been fully paid and all the stipulations terms and conditions on the Tenant’s part hereinbefore contained shall have been duly performed and observed the Landlord shall refund to the Tenant the said deposit of $12,000 without interest within fifteen days after the Tenant shall have duly delivered to the Landlord vacant possession in good order and condition in respect of the said premises.”。
32.上訴法庭在Orient Bright International Ltd. v Hiang Kie Hong Kong Ltd. CACV 220/2004 (2005年5月11日) 的判決，對與租約按金相關的法律原則，作出以下論述：
“16. Mr Pao who appeared for the plaintiff relied on the decision of the Full Court in Wong Kam-kong v Intercontinent Mercantile Co. [1968] HKLR 331 at 339 and 344 for the proposition that at common law there is no bar to a landlord forfeiting the deposit if there is a stipulation as to the deposit and the forfeiture of it in the agreement. In such a case, the deposit is not recoverable and therefore cannot be used as a set off against the claim for arrears of rent unless some equitable principle is applicable. That authority has since been followed. See, for example, McConnell v. Bak Ling Enterprises Ltd., unrep., HCA 4246 of 1983, 23 December 1983, and Re Kwong Ngai Ping [2004] 3 HKC 258.
17. In the present case, clause 5(a) of the tenancy agreement is clear: the deposit is to be forfeited in the event of any breach or non-observance or non-performance by the tenant of its obligations under the lease. It was not pleaded or argued that the deposit was not reasonable in amount or the provision for its forfeiture was a penalty. Clause 5(a) did not require the plaintiff to give credit for the deposit in respect of damages otherwise recoverable. …
18. In the McConnell case, Mantell J observed that:
“… there may well be jurisdiction in equity to grant relief against forfeiture of the deposit if either the agreement providing for forfeiture or, possibly, the act of a forfeiture itself is unconscionable.”
See also Wong Kam-kong at 344. It is therefore clear that the court has power to grant relief against forfeiture should the circumstances so warrant.
19. It is to be noted that relief against forfeiture was not part of the defendant’s pleaded case. That aside, in the present case, as in the Wong Kam-kong and McConnell cases, there was nothing unconscionable in the clause permitting forfeiture. A deposit representing three months’ rental and management fees is not out of the ordinary, particularly having regard to the length of the term which, in the present case is 4 years. The question which arises is whether there was anything unconscionable in the conduct of the plaintiff in forfeiting the deposit. On behalf of the defendant it was submitted that the breaches were unintentional in as much as the defendant believed that there has been a binding settlement. …” (上文獲強調處，由本席後加)。
33.而有關香港租務法的法律典籍Merry: Hong Kong Tenancy Law (2003年) 第4版說：
“Forfeiture of deposit
The landlord does not of course have to return a deposit, no matter when paid, if he has the power to forfeit it and that power has been properly exercised. The power of forfeiture can be expressly given; it has also been said to arise by implication from the nature of a deposit as security that the tenant will perform his obligations under the lease. If, however, the deposit is expressly or impliedly forfeitable as liquidated or agreed damages, the landlord would seem to be precluded from suing for any damages arising from the breach over and above the amount of the deposit.
Where the landlord’s actual loss is less than the amount of the deposit, the forfeiture will bring him a windfall gain. Hong Kong authority suggests that, despite the penal effect of the forfeiture, the courts have no power to strike down the clause and can interfere only where the clause, or act of forfeiture, is unconscionable, in which case the court may, depending on the circumstances, relieve the tenant from all or part of the forfeiture. …” (上文獲強調處，由本席後加)。
但該書的作者認為，上述法律原則過於拘謹。他認為，由於租務按金的目的，僅為提供租客違約時的保證金，法庭就沒收按金給予寬免的酌情權，應單以秉行公義為考慮點。他在該書中說：
“… This expectation stems from the nature of the deposit as a security, that is as a fund making the landlord safe to which he may look for compensation for actual loss that he has sustained. More recent authority suggests that the doctrine of penalty is not, as the Hong Kong cases assume, completely separate from the power of the court to relieve against forfeiture, but that they in fact share a common origin. It may therefore be that if a clause providing for forfeiture of a deposit is a penalty, this is relevant both to the court’s exercise of its discretion to relieve against forfeiture and, indeed, empowers the court to rule that the whole clause is unenforceable and the forfeiture therefore wrongful. …” (上文獲強調處，由本席後加)。
34.前第31段引述的租約條文，並無述明申請人可將租務按金沒收。故此，審裁處就前第7(a) 段的申索作出的判決 (詳見前第9 段)，並不涉及與法律問題有關的錯誤。
35.審裁處在2009年12月3日作出原裁決。申請人不服，要求審裁處覆核該判決。審裁處經聆訊後，在2009年12月31日維持原裁決，並命令申請人支付訟費$517。
36.申請人在本申請指，由於覆核聆訊並不涉及新證據或論據，審裁處不應進行聆訊，而應以書面陳述方式處理。
37.是否以聆訊方式處理覆核申請，屬審裁處酌情權範圍。以本申請而言，申請人在聆訊時所作的口頭陳述，前後長達約1個半小時。他在陳述完結前表示，本席在他發言期間從未發問，令他感覺聆訊過程並不公平。依此可以推論，假如審裁處當時改為僅以書面陳述方式處理他的覆核申請，申請人極可能感覺司法程序更為不公。
38.故此，審裁處的處理方式，亦不涉及與法律問題相關的錯誤。申請人在覆核申請中是負方。依有關訟費的一般慣例，訟費應由負方付予勝方。
39.本申請的申請書聲稱與第338章第28(1)(b)(該申索超越審裁處的司法管轄權範圍) 相關的事項，是被告人沒有出席在審裁處進行的幾次聆訊，及侵害申請人的個人私隱。
40.但上述事項，都不屬第338章第28(1)(b) 所述的範圍(詳見前第19段)。
41.基於以上各點，本席拒絕本申請。
申索人：無律師代表，自行應訊
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