香港特別行政區 訴 賴卿鴻

Read the full judgment text of DCCC 200/2012 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 4 June 2012.

1. 本案有兩名被告人,第一和第二被告人共同面對及承認一項串謀販運危險藥物,該罪行是違反香港法例第134章《危險藥物條例》第4(1)(a)及(3)條,和200章《刑事罪行條例》第159A及159C條。第一被告人另面對及承認一項盜竊罪,該罪行是違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第9條。

Cites 7 cases

Case No.DCCC 200/2012
Court
District Court
Date04 Jun 2012
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCCC200/2012

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2012年第200號

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  香港特別行政區  
   
  賴卿鴻 (第一被告人)
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主審法官: 區域法院暫委法官吳蕙芳
日期: 2012年6月4日上午10時17分
出席人士: 律政司檢控官吳卓樺小姐,代表香港特別行政區
  羅志林先生,由法律援助署委派的楊錦園陳漢標陳炎波律師行延聘,代表第一被告人
控罪: [1] 串謀販運危險藥物(Conspiracy to traffic in a dangerous drug)
  [2] 盜竊罪(Theft)

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判刑理由書

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控罪

1.本案有兩名被告人,第一和第二被告人共同面對及承認一項串謀販運危險藥物,該罪行是違反香港法例第134章《危險藥物條例》第4(1)(a)及(3)條,和200章《刑事罪行條例》第159A及159C條。第一被告人另面對及承認一項盜竊罪,該罪行是違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第9條。

有關第一被告人的案情撮要

第一:盜竊罪(第二項控罪)

2.2012年1月14日下午6時左右,警員在九龍城太平道與自由道交界處附近截停第一被告人,並從他的背包內搜到一個不屬於第一被告人的銀包。第一被告人向警員訛稱是替朋友(即控方第一證人)保管該銀包。經調查後,發現控方第一證人在一個月前左右遺失該銀包及其內的財物,並已報警處理,於是警員以盜竊罪拘捕第一被告人。警誡下,第一被告人聲稱約一個月前,在深水埗麗閣邨拾得屬於朋友(即控方第一證人)的銀包,他出於貪念,所以沒有將它交還給物主,其內的港幣300元則被他花光。

第二:串謀販運危險藥物(第一項控罪)

3.稍後第一被告人被帶往警署,搜身時,在他背包內搜獲六個共載有36.26克粉末,內含26.82克氯胺酮的可再封透明膠袋,於是警員以販運危險藥物罪拘捕第一被告人。警誡下,第一被告人聲稱涉案的氯胺酮(俗稱“K仔”),是供自用的。

4.其後第一被告人在錄影會面中承認以下事實:

(i) 2011年11月他的同學(即第二被告人)問他是否有興趣販毒,由於第一被告人需要金錢,因此表示同意;

(ii) 自此,他協助第二被告人販毒;

(iii) 販毒手法如下:第二被告人會安排將氯胺酮交給他,並將顧客的聯絡詳情通知他,而第一被告人則負責將氯胺酮帶給顧客,及向其收取貨款;

(iv) 每次成功交易後,他可獲得港幣100元;至今他已賺取約港幣10,000元;

(v) 2012年1月14日在指示下,第一被告人收取了五小包和三大包氯胺酮,並分別以港幣350元及港幣1,000元,將一小包和一大包氯胺酮售出。因此當他被拘捕時,身上只有四小包和兩大包的氯胺酮;

(vi) 至於他被拘捕時所管有的其中一部流動電話,則是作聯絡毒品買家之用;以及

(vii) 身上的現金中,有港幣1,700元是與顧客交易所得的款項。

例外罪行及販毒罪的判刑案例:

5.上訴庭在SJ v Hii Siew Cheng (CAAR 7/2006)已定下販運「K仔」的量刑指引。10至50克純重量的「K仔」,其刑期為4至6年;

6.販毒的罪行屬例外罪行(excepted offence)。香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第109A條中,對監禁年齡在16至21歲之間的人的限制,並不適用於本案販毒的罪行。一般而言,若罪行性質屬於嚴重的話,判刑前法庭不需要索取有關被告人的報告。但判刑近似一門藝術,因案而異,而非一項機械式的任務(mechanical exercise);

7.本庭已於2012年5月15日就第一項串謀販運罪行判處同是中四學生的第二被告人,36個月監禁,其判刑的考慮因素已詳列在該判刑理由書中。

8.基於本案的性質,案件及第一被告人的背景,青少年罪犯的自新問題以及公眾利益,法庭認為索取教導所中心報告是合適的。

第一被告人及案情背景

9.由辯方大律師的陳詞及懲教處所撰寫報告中,本席得知以下的資料:

(i) 第一被告人現年15歲,為一名中四學生。他與69歲的父親一同居住,而現年40歲的母親早於2004年已離開家庭,也甚少與第一被告人聯絡和見面。

(ii) 第一被告人沒有刑事犯罪紀錄。當他在小學時,父親仍能有效地監管及照顧他,其操行亦算好。當升中學後,成績卻是差強人意,他誤交一些有黑社會背景的同學,包括本案的第二被告人,更追隨他們左右。其行為、思想及成績開始出現極大的偏差。而年紀老邁的父親因體弱多病,再也不能夠有效的管教他。父親現倚賴綜援過活,每天只能給第一被告人20元作為午餐費,沒有多餘的錢供他作消遣之用。在損友的慫恿下,第一被告人承認曾三次吸食「K仔」。後因貪念,在2011年11月偷取了控方第一證人的銀包。同時亦被不良份子利用,遭第二被告人利誘下,成為販毒份子。最終因被發現干犯上述的盜竊罪及串謀販毒罪而被捕。事後他深感懊悔,已遠離損友,決定彌補過失。保釋期間他仍繼續求學,為前途而作出努力。

(iii) 第一被告人的中學老師稱他性情善良,與同學相處融洽,很得老師和同學們的喜愛。他們得知第一被告人觸犯法例感到震驚和痛心,認為他是愚昧無知,誤信他人所致。案發後,第一被告人在行為上已有很大的改善,且主動參與義工服務,盡力地協助有關人士,態度積極。

(iv) 在還押期間,第一被告人相當合作,亦作好負上刑責的準備,對自己過往心存僥倖,懷有貪念而犯的罪行感到十分後悔。失望和自責的父親很是痛心,亦極擔憂兒子的前途。他認為兒子入世未深,頭腦簡單,在貪念的驅使下犯案,但相信兒子已吸取慘痛的教訓,不會再犯。父親表示會極力支持兒子的自新,協助他回返正軌。

(v) 在所得有關第一被告人的資料以及經品格和態度的評估後,懲教處視第一被告人在精神及健康上是適宜被羈留於教導所。懲教處認為:第一,須加強第一被告人遵法守紀的概念;第二,紀律性的教導,包括教育和職訓,以及獲釋後受法定的監管,這一切將對第一被告人的自新會有所裨益。因此建議將第一被告人羈留於教導所,接受教導及感化(reformation)。

判刑的差距(Disparity in sentence

10.兩名被告人皆涉及同一案件,但其個別可有的求情因素因人而異,包括各被告人在案中所扮演的角色、其品行、刑事前科、對其劣行的態度和承擔。

11.基於第一被告人的合作和坦白招認,才令招攬他販毒的第二被告人被繩之於法,以及承認有關控罪,這因素對第一被告人而言,確有相當大的幫助,加上第一被告人沒有刑事前科,年紀較輕,事後他仍能積極面對和作出承擔。當本席考慮刑罰性質時,以上都是重要和不可缺的求情因素。

12.HKSAR v Leung Pui Shan([2008] HKC 241 CACC 317/2007 5th February 2008 unreported)一案中,Stock JA指出:

“Consistency in sentencing is important but consistency does not dictate blindness to individual circumstances of a case and to those of an offender. An overly rigid pre-occupation with uniformity can be inimical to individual justice.”

13.有關判刑上差距的原則,法庭將會引援《Sentencing in Hong Kong, 6th Edition》,Cross and Cheung第217, 218和220頁內如下的引述:

“The application of the parity principal in sentencing requires that like should be treated alike and that where there are relevant differences, due allowances should be made for them: Postglione v R (1997) 145 ALR 408. In Miletic v R (2008) 183A Crim R 72, 81, it was said that ‘the essence of the principle is that any discrepancy in sentencing should be justifiable.’ Where more than a single offender has engaged upon the same crime, the court will seek ‘to arrive at a sentence which, if not exactly the same for both, fairly takes into account any relevant and significant differences in the degree of their criminality and/or their personal circumstances’: HKSAR v Wong King Wai [2008] 2 HKC 614, 624.

Situations inevitably arise in which the differential treatment of co-accused is justifiable. Mitigation is an obvious example. The mitigation which is available to one accused may not avail another: Attorney General’s Reference No 37 of 1999(Mark Charles)[2002] Cr App R(S) 209, 212.

It is in the public interest that the leader of a criminal enterprise should be punished more severely than his followers: AG v Tam Ka Lok and others [1990] 1 HKC 201, 206. Greater culpability is deserving of greater punishment.

Although the co-accused should be punished in a like manner if other things are equal, the situations of different offenders are often different, and markedly so. The age, antecedents and circumstances of offenders, as well as their levels of culpability, may differ considerably, and this may need, quite legitimately, to be reflected in sentence.

Attorney General’s Reference Nos 62, 63 and 64 of 1995 (O’Halloran and others [1996] 2 Cr App R(S) 223, 227) Lord Taylor CJ said:

“We resist the suggestion that where strong mitigation is available to one of a number of defendants all of the defendants are entitled to climb on the bandwagon and share the benefit of the mitigation which applies to one. There is no disparity, in our view, if there are differentials between sentences of co-defendants where one defendant has a great deal of mitigation in his or her favour and the others do not. This is not disparity; it is justice.”

判處教導所令或監禁刑罰?

14.教導所令並非一個寬鬆的刑罰選擇(soft option),在AG v Fong Ming Yuen [1989] 2 HKLR 177 and 181,Silke VP解釋說:

“The sentence passed by the judge does entail a deprivation of liberty. In effect a custodial sentence. When the Commissioner of Correctional Services decides, it is at his discretion, that the Respondent should be released after a period not exceeding three years there will be a further period when the Respondent will be under the strict supervision of officers of the Correctional Services Department. He will also be subject to recall to the Centre if he misbehaves during the supervision period.”

15.R v Cheung Wing Wai and others [1993] 2 HKCLR 139 and 142一案中,Bokhary JA指出:

“It must be remembered that detention in a training centre can be for up to three years and that even then there can be post-release supervision for up to another three years thereafter. The principal purpose of detention at a training centre is of course rehabilitation. But there can be no doubt that rehabilitation under such circumstances carries with it considerable punitive and deterrent elements.”

判刑

16.本席仔細考慮有關案件及第一被告人的背景,包括第一被告人的品格、履歷、精神、身體、健康、其過往行為、其犯罪情況、參與的角色及其刑責、懲教處所撰寫的報告、判刑的原則以及量刑的法例。第一被告人明顯的需要接受一段有紀律性的訓練,而教導所將授予他機會改造自己,成為奉公守法之人。本席信納第一被告人在教導所接受紀律性教導,以及獲釋後受一段時期的法定監管,這些會比判處監禁更有利於他的自新,這也是符合公眾和社會的利益。

17.與第二被告人所接受的監禁懲罰比較,判處第一被告人進入教導所是合理的懲罰,既不過於寬鬆,亦非不公平[1]。因此,就第一和第二項控罪,本席現判處第一被告人羈留在教導所,接受教導和感化(reformation),並同期執行。

  吳蕙芳
  區域法院暫委法官

[1] In R v Lau Ming Sang [1988] HKCU 132 (CACC 150/1988, 7 September 1988), where an accused who had been imprisoned complained that his co-accused had been sent to the training centre, the court responded that the sentence imposed upon the latter was designed to assist his rehabilitation and the two methods of disposal could not usefully be compared.  Fuad VP said:

‘Of course, appellate courts must have regard to grave disparities in deciding whether a sentence on a co-defendant is to be maintained.  However, in this case, we do not think that any question of disparity arises in its true sense.  The sentence imposed upon the second defendant was one selected by the judge in view of his record and his age, and was designed to help in his rehabilitation.  We do not think it is comparing like with like to contrast the training order with the sentence imposed on the applicant in the circumstances.’

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under DCCC 200/2012