Komal Patel and Others v. Chris Au and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 183/2014 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 August 2015.
1. This is an application by Retribution for leave to appeal against this Court’s decision dated 7 July 2015 refusing to vary the freezing injunction order dated 11 July 2014.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 2 cases
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HCA 183/2014 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 183 OF 2014 ________________________
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________________ DECISION 1.This is an application by Retribution for leave to appeal against this Court’s decision dated 7 July 2015 refusing to vary the freezing injunction order dated 11 July 2014. 2.By my decision dated 7 July 2015, I refused Retribution’s application to vary the injunction. The order sought under Order 29 of the Rules of the High Court was in the following terms which I highlight by bold type instead of red as stated therein.
3.Retribution seeks leave to appeal against the interlocutory decisions, namely, the injunction order of 11 July 2014 and the refusal to vary the injunction order of 7 July 2015, pursuant to section 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4. In deciding whether to grant leave to appeal, I have to be satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. 4.The proposed grounds of appeal essentially complain of two matters. First, the injunction order of 11 July 2014 was granted on an erroneous legal basis and froze more assets than the plaintiffs’ total claim. Secondly, the injunction order was highly unusual as it effectively provided no allowance to Retribution in respect of legal fees and thus resulted in manifest unfairness to it. 5.It is well settled that the purpose of an injunction is to preserve assets so that the claimant’s claim can be satisfied and should cover anything against which a judgment could be enforced. 6.The funds frozen is the sum of SGD 11.98 4 million which were monies that were transferred to Retribution’s bank account and represent part payment of L Capital’s acquisition of a 51% stake in KDT BVI. 7.Mr Douglas Clark, who appears with Mr Martin Ho for Retribution, argues under the first ground that the injunction order cannot extend beyond the plaintiffs’ proprietary claim of two-thirds of the funds. This is only part of the plaintiffs’ claim where it is alleged that the 1st and 3rd plaintiffs are the beneficial owners of one-third each of the shareholding of Retribution with the other third beneficial ownership to the 1st defendant. On this aspect of the dispute between the parties, both the 1st and 2nd defendants in their respective pleaded cases, say that the funds frozen belong to the 1st defendant, as representing part payment of the purchase of his interest in KDT BVI held on his behalf by Retribution. The significance of this is that on the cases pleaded by the parties it is not asserted that the funds frozen belong to Retribution. 8.The issue as to the beneficial ownership of the shareholding of Retribution is only one aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim as summarised below in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim dated 18 June 2015:
9.Mr Clark seeks to quantify the plaintiffs’ claim which he submits is a total sum less than the funds frozen. On his calculations, by converting the sum of money from Singaporean dollars into Hong Kong dollars, he submits that the total liquidated claims amount to about $96 million and the total amount frozen amount to about $112 million which therefore leaves an excess amount of about $16 million. He submits that these calculations are made by taking the plaintiffs’ case at its highest. As I explained in my decision, I accepted the plaintiffs’ submissions on this issue and the calculations will undoubtedly be subject to a more precise determination at trial. 10.Mr Clark complains that there is no upper limit in respect of the funds frozen in the injunction order. He refers to cases concerned with injunction orders where the amount is unlimited but this is not really on point in the present case as the funds frozen are a fixed amount. Whilst unlimited orders are rarely justifiable in ordinary freezing injunction cases, there are instances where it may be appropriate for the courts to place no financial limits on the injunction, either because the full quantum of the claimant’s claim is unascertainable (or unascertainable to a reasonably accurate or reliable degree), or because it is just and equitable that all assets should be preserved until investigations have been carried out or the matter has been finally determined. See Macy’s Candies Ltd v Chan Man Hong [1997] HKLRD 554 and Gee on Commercial Injunctions (5th Edition, 2004) at 116-122. 11.In any event the injunction order is for the fixed amount of SGD 11.984 million which as submitted by the plaintiffs is frozen to cover the plaintiffs’ overall claim against the defendants. 12.The second ground questions whether it was legally permissible to provide no allowance to Retribution in respect of legal fees in the injunction order of 11 July 2014. This issue was raised for the first time at the variation hearing on 25 June 2015. The reason for the variation application is explained in the 2nd defendant’s 6th affirmation and seems to be motivated out of a desire to obtain access to the funds frozen in order to pay legal fees that have been substantially incurred by the 1st and 2nd defendants. See paragraph 11 of my decision. On the 1st and 2nd defendants’ pleaded cases, the funds in question belonged to the 1st defendant and not to Retribution. In my decision, I questioned why provision should be made for Retribution’s legal fees from monies that are claimed to belong to the 1st defendant on the cases pleaded by the defendants and that are also at the very heart of this dispute. 13.I am not satisfied that the intended appeal has any reasonable prospect of success and I see no reason why leave should be granted in the interests of justice. The application for leave to appeal is therefore refused.
Mr Barry Hoy, Robertsons, Solicitors for the plaintiffs Mr Douglas Clark and Mr Martin Ho, instructed by Au & Vrijmoed, for the 3rd defendant |
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