Clp Power Hong Kong Ltd v. Commissioner of Rating and Valuation
Read the full judgment text of CACV 202/2015 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 2 February 2016.
4. Section 8 and section 8A which are relevant for this appeal are as follows :
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CACV 202/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 202 OF 2015 (ON APPEAL FROM LDGA NO. 241 OF 2004 and LDRA NOS. 365-369 OF 2004) ________________________
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_________________ J U D G M E N T Hon Cheung JA : I. The appeal 1.1CLP Power Hong Kong Limited (‘CLP’) is one of the two electricity companies in Hong Kong. It supplies electricity to customers in Kowloon, the New Territories and outlying islands through its electricity generation, transmission and distribution operation. It operates three power stations in Hong Kong :
1.2The Commissioner of Rating and Valuation (‘Commissioner’) was of the view that the following items formed a part of CLP’s tenement and were rateable under section 8A of the Rating Ordinance (‘the Ordinance’) (Cap. 116):
(Collectively known as the ‘disputed items’). 1.3CLP contended that the value of these disputed items should have been disregarded under section 8(b) of the Ordinance in that they were machinery in or on the tenement for the purpose of manufacturing operations or trade processes. 1.4The Lands Tribunal (Au J, President and Mr W K Lo, Member) upheld the Commissioner’s view. CLP now appeals, with leave granted by the Court of Appeal on 28 August 2015. II. The Statutory Scheme 2.1Rating in Hong Kong is governed by the Ordinance. Rates are assessed annually on the rateable value of a unit of property known as a tenement. By virtue of section 21, the owner and the occupier of a tenement are both liable for the payment of rates, although in the absence of agreement to the contrary, rates are to be paid by the occupier. 2.2The Commissioner is required by section 11 to prepare a valuation list in which all tenements liable to be rated are identified together with their rateable values. New valuation lists are prepared periodically. 2.3Section 7 of the Ordinance deals with the general rule in the ascertainment of rateable value and section 7A deals with the rateable values in the new valuation list. The amount of rates payable is a percentage of the rateable value of the tenement. 2.4Tenement is defined in section 2 as:
2.5Section 2 is supplemented by sections 8 and 8A which deal with the treatment of machinery and plant respectively. These two sections will be discussed in detail later on. It is sufficient for the purpose of giving a general view to adopt the summary of these two sections by Lord Millett NPJ in Hong Kong Electric Co Ltd v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation (No. 2) (2011) 14 HKCFAR 579 :
2.6See also Gordon N Cruden : Land Compensation and Valuation Law in Hong Kong 3rd Edn, Chapter 17, p. 399. III. The case of Yiu Lian and the chattel rule 3.1The case of Commissioner of Rating and Valuation v Yiu Lian Machinery Repairing Works Ltd (‘Yiu Lian’)[1985] 2 HKC 517 (CA) is relevant to this appeal. 3.2The Commissioner sought to impose rates upon certain dry docks floating in the Hong Kong harbour. He maintained that as they were chained to blocks on the sea-bed, in respect of which there were sea-bed leases, the value of the dry docks was to be included on the same principle that the value of chattels on land was included as part of the value of the land. The President of the Lands Tribunal held that under Hong Kong law, which he considered to be the same as under English law, chattels were to be valued for rating purposes as part of the land itself, but that none of the dry docks was sufficiently connected with a piece of land to be taken into account in estimating its rateable value. It was also held that the floating dock was not eligible for a 100% discount as being a piece of machinery under section 8(b) of the Ordinance. 3.3The principle that chattels are to be valued as part of the land for rating purpose is known as the chattel rule. This can be found in the speech of Earl of Halsbury in Kirby v. Hunslet Union Assessment Committee [1906] AC 43 at 47,
3.4This Court in Yiu Lian at page 523, however, disagreed with the Tribunal that the chattel rule is applicable to Hong Kong. The unit for assessment under the English law is ‘hereditament’. This Court held that under English law, the question is one of valuation rather than of construction. The issue in most of the English authorities is what is the value of the realty in the sense of what, apart from the natural configuration of the land, may be taken into account when assessing its rateable value. These authorities did not suggest that ‘lands’ means anything other than realty or that which has become part of it. This Court held :
3.5However, looking at the history of the Hong Kong ordinance, this Court held at page 524 that :
IV. Sections 8 and 8A 4.Section 8 and section 8A which are relevant for this appeal are as follows : Section 8 :
Section 8A :
V. Legislative history of sections 8 and 8A 1) The Commissioner’s paper 5.1The legislative background to section 8 and section 8A is discussed in Property Rates in Hong Kong Assessment, Collection and Administration (2013, 2nd Edition) pp. 20-22 by Mrs Mimi Brown, the then Commissioner of Rating and Valuation :
5.2It is of note that this Court’s decision in Yiu Lian was given on 29 November 1984 and section 8A came into existence nearly seven years later in 1991. 2) Explanatory memorandum 5.3The explanatory memorandum to the introduction of section 8A by the Rating (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 1991 (‘Bill’) stated that :
3) The Hansard 5.4In the Hansard of the Hong Kong Legislative Council 27 February 1991 Proceedings, the Financial Secretary when moving for the second reading of the Bill stated that :
5.5The Hansard was produced by the Commissioner without objection from CLP. 4) Legislative Council Brief 5.6Mr Yu SC and Ms Cheng SC for the Commissioner also produced the Legislative Council Brief to this bill. The relevant parts read :
5.7Again, this document was produced without objection from CLP who had earlier asked the Commissioner to provide the case of the utility company appeal referred to by the Financial Secretary in the second reading of the Bill. 5.8As stated by Lord Millett NPJ in Director of Lands v.Yin Shuen Enterprises Ltd & Another (2003) 6 HKCFAR 1 at 15 that, in respect of Explanatory Memorandum and the explanation given by ministers when introducing the Bill :
5.9The Legislative Council Brief is not within the category of such admissible evidence, but, as said earlier, CLP did not object to its production. VI. The Tribunal’s decision 6.1The issue before the Tribunal on this topic is succinctly summarised in its judgment :
6.2It should be pointed out that the Tribunal was wrong in paragraphs 230 and 234 to include ‘boilers’ as a disputed item. The disputed item does not include the boilers, only the supporting steelwork for the boilers. It was accepted that boilers are process machinery within section 8(b). VII. CLP’s arguments 1) The two sections 7.1Mr David Elvin QC and Mr John Litton for CLP submitted that in basic terms, there are two broad stages to the rating valuation process, namely,
7.2Section 8A is an element in the first part of the process, whereas section 8(b) is concerned with the second part. 7.3The effect of section 8A(1), (2) and (3) is to enable land, buildings and structures which are occupied by means of plant (which would not otherwise fall within the definition of a tenement so as to be rateable) to be deemed and rated as separate tenements; thereby imposing a liability on the occupier to pay the rates for the deemed separate tenements; treating the plant by which a person occupies the land, building or structure to be part of a deemed tenement; and defining the type of plant to which the deeming applies. 7.4Mr Elvin submitted that sections 8 and 8A have different purposes :
7.5Mr Elvin also sought assistance from another deeming section, namely, section 9 of the Ordinance which provides that advertising stations are deemed for rating purposes to be a separate tenement where the right to use land for the purpose of exhibiting advertisements is let, reserved or otherwise granted to a person other than the occupier of the land, or, where the land is not occupied for any other purpose, to any person other than the owner of the land, that right shall, subject to subsection (2), be deemed for rating purposes to be a separate tenement in the occupation of the person for the time being entitled to the right, for the purpose of sections 7 and 7A. 2) Machinery 7.6Mr Elvin submitted CLP had adduced evidence that the three disputed items are machinery within the exemption of section 8(b) but because of the Tribunal’s view on section 8A, it did not go on and address this point. He asked for this issue to be remitted to the Tribunal. VIII. The Commissioner’s arguments 1) The two sections 8.1Mr Yu maintained the same stand as the Tribunal in this appeal. He submitted that it is plain from the legislative material (i.e. the Financial Secretary’s speech when moving the second reading of the Bill) that the object of the section was to make clear that plant such as cables, ducts, pipelines and supports for plant or machinery are rateable. In the light of the words of the section construed by reference to its object and purpose, it is reasonably plain that ‘plant’ which falls within section 8A is intended to be rateable. He submitted that CLP’s contention that such value should be disregarded by virtue of section 8(b) cannot be accepted because such contention is contrary to the plain wording of the two sections. The plant referred to in section 8A(3) – cables, ducts, pipelines, railway lines, tramway lines, oil tanks, settings and supports for plant or machinery – is not ‘machinery’ and renders section 8A redundant. 8.2He argued that both of these results are particularly unlikely to have been the legislative intention, given that section 8A was enacted subsequent to section 8, so it is unlikely that it was intended to be overridden by section 8. Whilst section 8(a) is expressed to be subject to section 8(b), section 8A is not so expressed. 2) Machinery 8.3Mr Yu further submitted that in any event, even if there is overlap between sections 8 and 8A, in that some structures can be both plant under section 8A and manufacturing or trade process machinery under section 8(b), the disputed items in the present case are not such machinery. 8.4The evidence from CLP’s experts at best say that the steel supports for the boiler were installed together with the boiler as an integrated whole, but they do not go so far as to say that the supports are actually machinery themselves. That they support an item of machinery, and that they are closely connected to that item of machinery, does not turn them into machinery. Similarly for the pipework and cooling water circuits, and the miscellaneous cables. They might connect machinery, but are not part of the machinery themselves. 8.5Furthermore, as a matter of law, the fact of integration is irrelevant. For rating purposes, the rateability of the boiler should be considered separately from the rateability of its supporting structure. Likewise for the other disputed items. 8.6Further, apart from the argument based on integration with non-rateable assets, CLP did not put forward any evidence that the disputed item (being steelwork supports, cooling water circuits, pipework and cabling) are ‘machinery’ used in ‘manufacturing operations or trade processes’. The defining characteristic of manufacturing operations and trade processes is activity bringing about a transition from one static condition to another: see Jane A Berry (Valuation Officer) v. Iceland Foods Limited [2015] RA 201 at paragraph 65. CLP produced no evidence to suggest that any of the disputed items carried out such activity. IX. My view 1) Construction of sections 8 and 8A (1) The contextual approach 9.1Li CJ in HKSAR v. Cheung Kwun Yin (2009) 12 HKCFAR 568 at paragraphs 11 to 14 identified the modern approach to statutory interpretation : a purposive interpretation was adopted. The statutory language was construed, having regard to its context and purpose. Words were to be given their ordinary and natural meaning unless their context or purpose pointed to a different meaning. Context was to be considered in the first instance, not only when ambiguity was thought to arise. Context was to be taken in its widest sense and included other statutory provisions and the general law. The purpose of a statutory provision might be evident from the provision itself, the recommendation of a report such as that by the Law Reform Commission, the Explanatory Memorandum to the relevant bill or a statement by the responsible official of the Government in relation to that bill in the Legislative Council. 9.2More recently Ma CJ observed in Fully Profit (Asia) Ltd v Secretary for Justice (2013) 16 HKCFAR 351 at 361 :
(2) The flaw of the Commissioner’s view 9.3I disagree with the Commissioner on the interpretation of section 8A. 9.4In my view, the key to resolve the dispute between the parties is to determine whether section 8A is indeed a deeming provision as submitted by CLP. If it is, then, in my view, section 8A has to be discarded in its application in the present case because the disputed items which are said to be rateable are already part of CLP’s tenements and as such it is not necessary to rely on a deeming provision to bring them into the fold of tenements for rating purposes. 9.5Looking simply at the wording of section 8A itself, it points towards the interpretation that it is indeed a deeming provision by the phrase ‘where any land or any building or structure is occupied by a person by means of any plant, such land, building or structure shall … be deemed for rating purposes to be a separate tenement’. To emphasise this point, this section further provides that the land is to be deemed to be a separate tenement ‘whether or not such land, building or structure is otherwise a tenement.’ Mr Yu submitted the word ‘otherwise’ is quite different from ‘not otherwise’. As will be discussed later, I disagree with this view. 9.6Further looking at the words of the section, the inclusion of railway lines and tram lines which occupy the land as plant points towards a more restricted ambit of section 8A and supports the argument that it only covers the situation of land occupied by cables, ducts, railway lines and tramlines etc. without the presence of an existing tenement. 9.7However, looking solely at the ordinary and natural meaning of the words of a statute is no longer the proper approach to statutory interpretation. One also has to consider the context in which section 8A was enacted. In this regard, the legislative history becomes relevant. 9.8The theme of Mr Yu’s submission is that the mischief section 8A seeks to remove is the doubt expressed as a result of Yiu Lian on the rateability of plants such as cables and ducts. He argued that while section 8A seeks to correct the mischief that arose as a result of Yiu Lian, its ambit goes beyond that. This is because of the words ‘whether or not such land, building or structure is otherwise a tenement’. Hence even if, as in the present case, there is already a tenement which housed the machinery, nonetheless under section 8A it is deemed to be a tenement and rateable. Further section 8A is more than merely a deeming provision. Section 8A(2) also provides for the valuation of such tenement and section 8A(3) provides for a definition of plant. 9.9I do not regard the presence of sections 8A(2) and 8A(3) as detracting from the basic purpose of section 8A(1) as a deeming provision. The flaw in Mr Yu’s argument is to elevate the position of a land occupied by cables and ducts into a rateable tenement irrespective of whether a rateable tenement is already in existence as in the present case. I do not consider section 8A has such a wide ambit. The approach advocated by the Commissioner is not apparent from the legislative material. The context of section 8A is clearly to avoid the non-rateability of cables and ducts etc. which occupied the land as a result of this Court not adopting the English chattel rule in Hong Kong. Clearly if the legislation is intended by section 8A to cover an already rateable tenement, it could have said so expressly. 9.10Mr Yu also referred to one of the disputed items, namely, ‘support for the boiler’ and submitted that it came within the words of section 8A(3), namely, ‘setting and supports for … machinery’. Again this is a very restricted view by simply construing the section solely by reference to the meaning of the words used, an approach now disapproved by the Court of Final Appeal. 9.11The Commissioner’s interpretation will create a conflict between sections 8 and 8A in that, in respect of the same tenement, one under section 8 and the other deemed under section 8A, the former is non rateable if the condition on manufacturing operations or trade process is fulfilled, but the latter is rateable even if the condition is fulfilled. In other words, assuming the disputed items are used as adjunct to the tenement and for the purposes of manufacturing operations or trade processes, the rate payer can seek exemption under section 8(b). But, since the definition of ‘plant’ includes ‘machinery’, by virtue of the Commissioner’s approach, what has been exempted will be brought back as rateable items under section 8A. 9.12In Yarmouth v. France (1887) 19 QBD 647 a workman was injured by a horse and sought compensation under the Employers’ Liability Act. The issue was whether the horse was ‘plant’ within the meaning of the Act. Lindley LJ held, page 658 :
9.13Under this definition, machinery comes within the meaning of plant because it is an ‘apparatus used for carrying on the business’. This being the case, the Commissioner’s argument, apart from being an extremely strenuous interpretation of section 8A, creates an extremely unsatisfactory situation. This will render section 8 devoid of any true meaning and impose such an absurd result that the Court should strive to avoid giving section 8A such a meaning. In my view, the proper interpretation of section 8A is that it does not cover the situation like the present one where there is already a rateable tenement. 9.14Mr Yu relied upon the so-called ‘piecemeal’ principle in rating law. He referred to the case of Shell-Mex and B. P. Ltd. v. Holyoak [1959] 1 WLR 188 (‘Shell-Mex’)where the House of Lords at page 199 came to the view that for the purpose of the English rating legislation it is permissible to split up for rating purposes installations which are for practical purposes indivisible. 9.15In Shell-Mexa company constructed an underground petrol container beneath the pumps of a petrol station. The container consisted of a concrete base with brick walls, having a concrete rendering. On the base rested concrete cradles on which was placed a large metal cylinder containing large volume of petrol. The space round the outside of the cylinder was packed with dry sand and the whole was covered with slabs of reinforced concrete except for a manhole through which the cylinder was filled. 9.16Section 24(1) of the Rating and Valuation Act 1925 (‘Act’) provided that :
9.17Under and by virtue of an order made under later subsections of the same section (The Plant and Machinery (Valuation for Rating) Order, 1927) the classes of machinery and plant deemed to be part of the hereditament under the said Schedule III to the Act included class 4 described as :
9.18The issue is whether the metal cylinder falls to be rated as part of the hereditament. It is rateable if this question can be answered in the affirmative only if (1) it is a ‘tank’ within the meaning of the Order and (2) it is a building or structure or in the nature of building or structure. 9.19The House of Lords held by a majority of three to two that the metal cylinder was not rateable but the concrete housing was rateable. Lord Reid who gave one of the majority speeches, held at 199 that :
9.20Lord Denning in Manchester Marine Ltd. v. Duckworth (Valuation Officer) [1973] 1 WLR 1431adopted Lord Reid’s approach. The case is concerned with section 21 of the General Rate Act 1967 :
9.21The question is what part or parts of the dry docks come within ‘plant or machinery’ in section 21(1)(b) so as to be excluded from rates. Lord Denning referred to Shell-Mex and observed at 1435 that :
9.22Ryde on Rating and the Council Tax stated that :
9.23I do not agree that Lord Reid had propounded a principle which is applicable to all rating cases so that one should look at, as in this case, the three disputed items in a piecemeal manner and decide if they come within the ambit of section 8A. The part of Lord Reid’s judgment which I have underlined, emphasized that he was considering the specific legislation in question which allowed different items to be separately rated. Likewise in Manchester Marine Ltd. However, our section 8A is differently worded and one just cannot distill from Lord Reid’s judgment a universal principle applicable to all rating law and import it wholesale to our own legislation. (3) Other issues 9.24There are other issues canvassed by the parties on the interpretation of section 8A. I have considered these arguments but I do not need to address them since I have focused on the germane points upon which the appeal turns. 2) Machinery 9.25Mr Yu submitted that CLP had not adduced evidence that the three disputed items are machinery and come within the exemption of section 8(b), namely, manufacturing operations or trade process. 9.26He referred to The New Oxford Dictionary of English on the meaning of machine, namely, an apparatus using or applying mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task. 9.27In Auckland City Corporation v. Auckland Gas Co. Ltd. [1919] NZLR 561, Sim J at 586 stated the term of ‘machinery’.
9.28An example of how the exemption of section 8(b) operates can be found in The Cross-Harbour Tunnel Co Ltd v Comr of Rating and Valuation [1978] HKLTLR 144, [1977-1979] 1 HKC 81. The parties agreed that 80 percent of the tunnel ventilation system was machinery and not part of a trade process and that water ducts formed part of the rateable tunnel structure. 9.29The Tribunal held at 159 it did not consider the provision of ventilation, be it by machinery or ducting, in such circumstances as a provision for the purpose of a trade process. It was of the view that the whole ventilation system was an adjunct to the tenement and must, in accordance with section 8(a), be regarded as part of the tenement and there should not be any allowance for the system as working expenses. 9.30As to the Commissioner’s submission that CLP had not adduced evidence below on machinery, my view is that it had. CLP’s experts Mr Jupp and Mr Taylor gave evidence and its counsel argued before the Tribunal that the disputed items were structurally part of or functionally ancillary to the process machinery (boilers, generators, transformers, pumps etc.) and, therefore, were not rateable under section 8(b) :
9.31The reference to the above can be found in the following documents :
9.32The Commissioner’s expert Mr Allen also confirmed the views of CLP’s experts on item 2 (Mr Allen at Day 26/51 transcript). 9.33As to Mr Yu’s argument that the evidence of CLP in respect of the steel support for the boiler, the pipework and cooling water circuits and the miscellaneous cables do not suggest that they are part of the machinery themselves or machinery used in manufacturing operations or trade processes and that integration is not enough, my view is that they may or may not point towards such a conclusion but in view of the Tribunal’s acceptance of the Commissioner’s case on ‘plant’, it did not go on to address the issue of machine and its exemption. 9.34Mr Elvin argued that it is not now open to the Commissioner to argue that these items are not machinery within section 8(b) by way of the respondent’s notice, having relied only on its submissions as to the construction of section 8A, without advancing evidence or making submissions to the Tribunal that the disputed items were not, as a matter of fact, part of and ancillary to the process machinery. He relied on Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356 per Bokhary PJ at paragraphs 37 and 38 who held that where a party has omitted to take a point at the trial and then seeks to raise that point on appeal, he will be barred from doing so unless there is no reasonable possibility that the state of the evidence relevant to the point would have been materially more favourable to the other side if the point had been taken at the trial. 9.35In my view, the issue here is not whether the Commissioner is barred from taking this point because he had chosen not to adduce evidence below as suggested but rather whether the evidence below is capable of supporting the CLP’s case on section 8(b). To that, the Tribunal has made no findings. In my view, the only way to resolve this issue is to remit the matter back to the Tribunal for it to consider whether the evidence before it supported CLP’s case on section 8(b). But since the composition of the Tribunal has changed since its decision, the appropriate approach is for the parties to apply to the President of the Tribunal for direction on how such evidence is to be dealt with at the retrial. X. Conclusion 10.Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The decision of the Tribunal is set aside and the rateability of the three disputed items is to be remitted back to the Tribunal for consideration. XI. Costs 11.There will be an order nisi that CLP is entitled to the costs of the appeal and also of the costs below on the issue concerning the disputed items with certificate for two counsel. Hon Kwan JA: 12.I agree with the judgment of Cheung JA. Hon Barma JA : 13.I agree with the judgment of Cheung JA.
Mr David Elvin QC and Mr John Litton, instructed by Holman Fenwick Willan, for the appellant Mr Benjamin Yu SC and Ms Yvonne Cheng SC, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 202/2015