Cheung Tak Wing v. Director of Administration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 136/2014 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 November 2018.
1. In this judicial review, the applicant seeks to challenge the constitutionality and lawfulness of:
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 10 cases
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HCAL 136/2014 [2018] HKCFI 2557 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 136 OF 2014 _______________
_______________ Before: Hon Au J in Court Date of Hearing: 6 September 2017 Date of Further Written Submissions: 31 October 2017 Date of Judgment: 19 November 2018 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.In this judicial review, the applicant seeks to challenge the constitutionality and lawfulness of:
2.Effectively under the Permission Scheme:
3.In this challenge, the applicant says the Permission Scheme is unconstitutional as it amounts to unjustified restrictions on (a) the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly protected under Article 27 of the Basic Law (“BL27”) and Articles 16 and 17 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (respectively “BOR16” and “BOR17”); and (b) the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs protected under Article 21(a) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“BOR21(a)”). In the premises, the Decision made pursuant to it is also unlawful. 4.The applicant therefore asks for a declaration that the Permission Scheme is unlawful and unconstitutional. He also asks to quash the Decision. 5.The applicant is represented by Ms Gladys Li, SC (together with Mr Jeffery Tam). The Director, opposing this application, is represented by Mr Johnny Mok, SC (together with Mr Johnny Ma). 6.Before I consider the arguments raised in this application, it is helpful to first set out the relevant background related to this present challenge. B. BACKGROUND B1. The Central Government Offices and the Forecourt[2] 7.The Central Government Offices (“the CGO”), the Chief Executive Office (“the CEO”), the Legislative Council Complex (“the LCC”) and the Tamar Park collectively occupy the Tamar Site. The Site was allocated to the Director under a Permanent Land Allocation. 8.The CGO has two wings: East Wing and West Wing. The Forecourt is located outside the East Wing. 9.The Forecourt is designed and designated as an integral part of the CGO and is under the management responsibility of the Director. 10.In summary, the Forecourt serves the following functions:[3]
B2. Public access to the Forecourt and the rationale for implementing the Permission Scheme[5] 11.Prior to the commissioning of the CGO at the Tamar site, the Government has presented to the LegCo Panel on Security on 29 August 2011, vide an information paper on “Security Arrangements and Handling of Public Meetings and Public Processions at the Central Government Offices and during Visits of Political Dignitaries to Hong Kong”, the proposed arrangements for members of the public to conduct POEs at the Tamar, which can be summarized as follows:
12.These arrangements have been implemented since the commissioning of the new CGO in late 2011, and are generally the same as those implemented for the former CGO at Lower Albert Road. 13.Historically, when the open compound of the former CGO at Lower Albert Road was formally allocated to the then Director in 2002, the then Director as the land allocatee recognized the need to facilitate public expression of opinions while maintaining the orderly and effective operation at the former CGO. Measures of access control were put in place at the open compound of the former CGO whereby the designated public activity area (“DPAA”) which used to be at the open compound was relocated to an open area outside the West Gate near Battery Path; access to the compound was restricted only to those members of the public who had business with offices there; and the holding of public meetings or processions at the open compound required prior permission which was in essence the same as the arrangement under the Permission Scheme. In other words, public meeting or procession on working days was not allowed and the then Director’s prior permission was similarly required before any public meeting or procession could be held inside the open compound on Sundays and public holidays. 14.It is the Government’s position that the Forecourt is not a public place or a public open space, and the public (in the absence of the requisite licence or permission) do not have any right of access to it. The Government as landowner has a private right to exclude members of the public from the use of the Forecourt, or impose restrictions or rules to regulate its use. Members of the public passing through the Forecourt area and those who are granted permission to use the Forecourt for public activities are licensees. The setting up and implementation of the Permission Scheme and the erection of the perimeter fence at the Forecourt involved the exercises of private right of the Government as a landowner for better management of its land. 15.As mentioned above, under the Permission Scheme, members of the public may apply to the Director for holding public meetings or processions at the Forecourt on Sundays or public holidays during specified hours from 10:00am to 6:30pm, on a first-come-first-served basis. Irrespective of the number of participants involved, holding a POE at the Forecourt requires prior permission of the Director. Members of the public may apply to the Director by filling in and submitting an application at least two days prior to the event. An application to conduct POEs at the Forecourt may be made by the completion of an application form which can be downloaded from the website of Admin Wing. The application form is accompanied by the “Guidance Notes to the Application for Permission to Use the Forecourt for Public Meetings/Processions and Submission of Petition Letters” (“Guidance Notes”), and both documents can be downloaded from the Admin Wing’s website or obtained by calling the Admin Wing directly. 16.Upon receipt of the application, the Admin Wing will seek the advice of the Police on any potential threat to public order and safety before granting approval. Pertaining to the approval given, the use of the Forecourt for public meetings or processions is subject to a set of users’ conditions (“the Users’ Conditions”) as promulgated and attached to the application form. 17.The Director’s rationale for specifying the opening hours of the Forecourt for POEs on Sundays and public holidays is this:
18.It is also the Director’s position that there are practical difficulties for opening the Forecourt as a POE venue on normal working days (including Saturdays) even after the normal office hours, as there could be meetings, events and other official functions held at CGO during such times. The Forecourt will be required to perform its function as the passageway and drop-off and pick-up area. Admin Wing needs to ensure that the Forecourt pavement would provide a pedestrian link to the footbridge via the escalators for members of the public during its opening hours (ie, between 6:00am and 11:00pm daily) as far as practicable, save for such circumstances when public access has to be temporarily suspended on security grounds or to meet other specific operational needs. Admin Wing therefore has to strike an appropriate balance between the need to maintain the Forecourt under operative condition for the normal operation of the CGO and the LCC on the one hand and the public’s desire to hold POEs at the Forecourt on the other hand. 19.Notwithstanding the specified hours for POEs between 10:00am and 6:30pm on Sundays and public holidays, there had been occasions when the event organizers requested for and were (where appropriate) given some extra time for venue setup or clearance, up to one hour before the scheduled starting time and after the scheduled ending time. As a result, the Forecourt may need to be used for POE related activities starting as early as 9:00am or up to 7:30pm or even later in the evening. 20.Thus, in deciding to put in place the Permission Scheme, the Director had taken into account (among other matters) the fact that the CGO is government property and the land on which it occupies has been allocated to the Director who is required to manage the area and premises in a safe, clean and proper manner. The Director, being the land allocatee, has the responsibility to exercise appropriate control and restriction on the use of the Forecourt, having regard to public order and public safety. In particular, as the Forecourt is required to function as the passageway and drop-off and pick-up area during normal working days (including Saturdays) for use by staff and visitors to the CGO and the LCC, any public staging demonstrations at the driveway of the Forecourt may endanger themselves as well as other road users. Their unauthorized spill over to the pavement in the Forecourt whilst staging demonstrations may also cause obstruction to the access of and even pose threat to other normal users of the pedestrian passageway. The pavement portion of the Forecourt is quite narrow, and hence any public staying on the pavement during working days and working hours would inevitably cause disruption to the visitors to the CGO and the LCC and staff members who need to get into or leave the CGO or go to the LCC. 21.It is the Director’s evidence that he recognizes that the CGO is one of the principal places where the business of Government is carried on and as such the public may wish to make use of the Forecourt for conducting POEs at various times. The Director considers that it is necessary to strike a balance to facilitate public expression of opinions on the one hand whilst maintaining the orderly and effective operation of the CGO on the other hand. Having taken all relevant matters into account, including (among others) the function of the Forecourt, the need to maintain the orderly and effective operation of the CGO (particularly the desirability to avoid disruption to the normal operation of the CGO during working days and working hours), the Director had therefore decided to implement the Permission Scheme. 22.It is also the Director’s position that the Permission Scheme has balanced the operational need and the public’s desire to conduct POEs at the Forecourt and has taken into account other relevant factors such as the availability of the nearby DPAA the Forecourt for public meetings and petitioning, as well as the arrangement to facilitate the handing of petition letters to Executive Council members when the Council holds its regular meetings. B3. The Guidance Notes and the Users’ Conditions 23.The Guidance Notes provide as follows:
24.The Director has also issued a Users’ Conditions[6] which provides as follows:
B4. The applicant’s application and the Decision 25.The applicant is a Hong Kong permanent resident living in Hong Kong. He is a press photographer and a member of the International Association of Press Photographers. 26.On 20 October 2013, the applicant started protesting at the Forecourt (which he describes it as the “Civic Square”[7]) against the decision of the Chief Executive in Council on or about 15 October 2013 of not granting a Domestic Free Television Programme Service Licence to Hong Kong Television Network Limited. 27.The applicant protested for the abovementioned cause until 3 December 2013, and throughout the period, the applicant stayed overnight in the Forecourt daily, sleeping in a tent that he had set up at its corner. 28.On 4 December 2013, the Government published the “Consultation Document on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2016” which announced that the public consultation would last for five months, that is, from 4 December 2013 to 3 May 2014. In light of the publication of the report, the applicant protested for universal suffrage at the Forecourt on 4 December 2013 from approximately 9:00am to 9:00pm daily until the Director’s Decision to Enclose the Forecourt, ie, the last day of the applicant’s protest in the Forecourt was 16 July 2014. 29.On 17 September 2014, the applicant submitted an application for permission to use the Forecourt for a public meeting from 9:00am to 7:00pm on 19 September 2014 (which is a Friday). By a letter sent by the Director to the applicant, the Director refused the applicant’s application to use the Civic Square on 19 September 2014 (ie, the Decision), providing, among others, the following reasons:
30.In other words, the applicant’s application was refused on the sole basis that the intended public meeting fell on a weekday. As mentioned above, under the Permission Scheme, no public meetings and processions can be held at the Forecourt on normal working days (including Saturdays). C. THE RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 31.The rights to freedom of expression, assembly and participate in public affairs are respectively provided in the following constitutional provisions. 32.In relation to the rights to freedom of expression and assembly:
33.In relation to the right to participate in public affairs, under BOR21(a):
34.As accepted by Ms Li, it is well established that the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, whether under the Basic Law or the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, are not absolute and may be subject to restrictions provided that two requirements are satisfied:[8]
35.In this respect, Ms Li has confirmed that in the present application, the reliance on the right to participate in public affairs is only to underline the importance of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, but not as a separate limb under the challenges. It is Ms Li’s case that the exercise of the right to participate in public affairs underscores the importance of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, and hence demands even closer scrutiny by the court on any restrictions imposed on the latter rights. 36.With this understanding, when I consider the grounds of challenge below, I would for convenience only refer to the rights to freedom of expression and assembly whenever necessary. D. THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW 37.As stated above, the applicant challenges the constitutionality of the Permission Scheme and hence also the lawfulness of the Decision. 38.The grounds raised can be summarized as follows:
39.I would consider these grounds in turn. But before I deal with the merits of these grounds, I need to address one matter first. D1. The Court of Final Appeal’s judgment in HKSAR v Fong Kwok Shan Christine[10] 40.After the substantive hearing of this application, the Court of Final Appeal has handed down its judgment in HKSAR v Fong Kwok Shan Christine.[11] 41.This judgment has an important and significant impact on the determination of this application. 42.In Fong Kwok Shan Christine, Ms Fong was a district councillor. She (with some others) was at the public gallery of the LCC on two separate occasions. On each of these occasions, the LegCo Public Works Subcommittee was holding a meeting to discuss a landfill project in her district. She and some fellow residents strongly opposed this project. While at the public gallery, she protested and demonstrated by (a) removing her jacket to show certain characters displayed on her T-shirt; (b) facilitating her assistant to hold up a paper poster (which displayed a complaint message) against the glass panel which walled off the public gallery above the conference room; and (c) chanted slogans opposing the project. These led to a commotion on the first occasion as the security guards sought to seize the sign, and a warning being given by the chairman of the subcommittee on the second occasion, which they ignored. As a result, the meeting on the first occasion had to be adjourned, and the other meeting on the second occasion had to be stood down and reconvened in a different conference room, with the public excluded from attendance. 43.She was later charged with the offence of contravening the relevant administrative instructions issued by the President of the LegCo under section 8 of the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance (Cap 382). Under the relevant instructions,[12] persons entering or within the LegCo Chambers’ precincts shall “behave in an orderly manner and comply with any direction given by any officer of the Council for the purpose of keeping order” (under A1, section 11) and while in the public gallery, no person shall “display any sign, message or banner” or “display any sign or message on any item of clothing”, and a person may be refused admission to a press or public gallery if he or she displays or may display any sign, message or banner, or if in the opinion of a LegCo officer that person may behave in a disorderly manner (under A1, section 12). 44.Ms Fong was convicted in the Magistracy, which conviction was upheld on appeal by the Court of First Instance. She appealed to the Court of Final Appeal. Her main grounds of appeal were that A1, sections 11 and 12 were unconstitutional, as they amounted to unjustified restrictions on her rights to freedom of expression, assembly and demonstration, as they failed the prescribed by law requirement as well as the proportionality test. The respondent however contended, which was accepted by the lower court, that the rights were not engaged as the LCC (in common with the Government in relation to government-owned properties) was entitled to exercise its property rights (as private property owner) to deny or restrict access to the LCC.[13] In any event, if the rights were engaged, the instructions were prescribed by law and proportionate. 45.The Court of Final Appeal rejected the respondent’s contention that the rights were not engaged, but dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the restrictions were prescribed by law and satisfied the proportionality test. 46.On the issue of whether the rights were engaged, the Court of Final Appeal took the opportunity to review the various authorities both in Hong Kong and other jurisdictions and laid down the principles on how the court should assess and determine the constitutionality and lawfulness of a restriction on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and demonstration in relation to persons seeking to exercise those rights at another’s property (may it be state-owned government property, commercial property or private property). 47.Relevant for the present purposes, and as far as I can discern, these principles are as follows:
48.These principles are binding on this court. 49.In this respect, the court notes that one of the forefront objections raised by Mr Mok for the Director in this application (as similarly raised by the respondent in Fong Kwok Shan Christine) is that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly are not even engaged in the present case as the Forecourt is in nature not a public place. In light of these principles now laid down by the Court of Final Appeal, this objection needs no further consideration and must be rejected. 50.Bearing these principles in mind, I now turn to look at the grounds of judicial review in turn. D2. The Prescribed By Law Ground 51.The principles governing the prescribed by law requirement are not in dispute. Relevant for the present purposes, they can be shortly summarized as follows. 52.The prescribed by law requirement concerns the requirement to have sufficient legal certainty for any purported limitation of the right of free expression. However, it is well established that sufficient legal certainty does not mean or require absolute certainty, and that a prescription by law inevitably may involve some degree of vagueness in the prescription which may require clarification by the court.[18] 53.Further, the prescription must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able, if need be with appropriate advice, to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Further, the fact that doctrine issues may remain and require to be resolved by the court in an appropriate case merely provides an illustration of the common law at work. The mere existence of debatable issues does not make the law uncertain. A law that confers a discretion is not necessarily in itself inconsistent with the requirement.[19] 54.Ultimately, the question is answered by whether the law is able to enunciate some boundaries which create an area of risk. There will be conduct that falls along the boundaries of the area of risk for which no definite prediction or answer can be given in advance; but the identification of the area of risk will provide guidance to citizens and that suffices for the purpose of certainty. 55.In the present case, Mr Mok submits that the setting up and implementation of the Permission Scheme involves the exercise of the Government’s common law proprietary right as the landowner of the Forecourt to set conditions for its use. The ambit, effect and the exercise of such a right are governed by the common law of property. 56.Ms Li however submits that this does not satisfy the prescribed by law requirement for the following reasons. 57.First, although accepting that the Director has a common law proprietary right to manage its own property, Ms Li says the limits of that power are not sufficiently certain and the consequences are not adequately foreseeable. 58.She gives an example seeking to demonstrate the “arbitrariness” of the Director’s exercise of that proprietary right: whilst the Director can forbid the public from accessing the staff offices in the CGO, the Director can allow access to some parts of the CGO, eg, the conference rooms on the ground floor, upon prior registration. Further, in relation to the Forecourt, while the Director previously allowed the public to access the property freely for 24 hours a day, the Director can now forbid the public from doing so. 59.Ms Li therefore says the consequences of the exercise of powers by the Director under the common law of property are therefore not sufficiently certain or predictable, and not adequately foreseeable. It therefore does not fulfil the requirements of legal certainty. 60.Second, Ms Li says the Permission Scheme itself, being only a set of administrative guidelines, also cannot form the legal basis of the Decision. This is particularly so as the Director was not delegated any power by the LegCo to set up the Permission Scheme. 61.With respect to Ms Li, I am unable to agree. 62.As pointed out by Mr Mok, the courts have repeatedly held that the “law” under the prescribed by law requirement includes statute law and unwritten law (including common law),[20] and the court can look at relevant non‑statutory documents, directives and guidelines that are accessible to the parties or public in assessing whether the criterion of foreseeability is satisfied.[21] 63.The courts develop the common law over time, clarifying it and modifying it to meet new circumstances. Provided that the court does not extend the boundaries of liability, such development in the case law would not render the principle too imprecise to satisfy the requirement of sufficient legal certainty: Winnio Lo, supra, at paragraphs 75 - 77. 64.In this respect, as part of the common law, the Director’s exercise of the proprietary right to manage the Forecourt has now been further defined by the Court of the Final Appeal in Fong Kwok Shan Christine. 65.In the premises, the restrictions now imposed by the Director under the exercise of its common law proprietary right, coupled with the terms under the Permission Scheme (which can be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the requirement is satisfied), do satisfy the prescribed by law requirement. With them in mind, a person seeking to enter and use the Forecourt would reasonably be able to advise himself (and if necessary with the assistance of legal advisers) with a reasonable degree of certainty as to the boundary and risks of any consequences[22] in relation to their exercise of the rights of freedom expression and assembly at the Forecourt. 66.I therefore reject this ground of challenge. D3. The Proportionality Ground 67.Under this ground, Ms Li says the restrictions under the Permission Scheme are clearly disproportionate given:
68.Ms Li notes that the legitimate aim said by the Director to be accomplished by imposing these restrictions is to ensure that the normal operation of the CGO (which is the Government headquarter) would not be interrupted. This is particularly necessary, says the Director, as there were various previous occasions of large scale demonstrations, where demonstrators at the Forecourt had refused to leave which resulted in serious disruption of the civil servants going back to work there.[23] These have been explained in detail in the 1st Affidavit of Chiu Yin Wa David at paragraphs 28 ‑ 32 and 36 ‑ 43. 69.However, Ms Li says it is difficult to see how the above restrictions can be regarded to be no more than necessary (and thus proportionate) to accomplish this legitimate aim. 70.I agree with Ms Li. 71.As mentioned above, Ribeiro PJ in Fong Kwok Shan Christine at paragraph 44 has emphasized that it is necessary to weigh up the manner, form and impact of each of the demonstrations at the sites concerned to decide whether a challenged restriction satisfies the proportionality test. This is so since the rights to freedom of expression and assembly extend to the manner in which the protestors wish to express their views and to the location where they wish to express and exchange their views.[24] 72.As a result, although accepting that there are many locations in which, as a matter of common sense, it would be obvious that demonstrations and similar exercise of free expression would be excluded, Ribeiro PJ does not accept that there ought to be some principle excluding in limine engagement of the right in such places. Hence, a proportionality approach should be adopted which enables “individualised and nuanced assessments and caters for the possibility that in exceptional circumstances such rights might be engaged in even such ostensibly improbable places.”[25] 73.Applying these observations, I agree with Ms Li that the Director cannot demonstrate that the strict and in particular the blanket restrictions mentioned above are no more than necessary to achieve this legitimate aim. For example, it cannot be reasonably seen why the scheme would not even allow an applicant seeking only to demonstrate say by sitting-in alone at the Forecourt on a weekday or Saturday. It cannot seriously be suggested that this would affect in a material way the normal operation at the CGO. 74.Further, it must be noted that the Permission Scheme does not allow any discretion to approve an application made for weekdays or Saturdays by way of exception, say by reference to the manner of the protest or demonstration, or the number of intended participants. In other words, the Permission Scheme would not take into account the manner in which the applicant wishes to exercise the right at the Forecourt and the number of the participants. This is highlighted by the Decision in this case. The applicant’s application was refused for the sole reason that it was in relation to a weekday. There is nothing to show that the Director had sought to consider other factors in refusing the application. 75.The suggestion that there are alternative ways for the would-be protestors to submit their petitions to Government officials or to hold public meetings or proceedings at the mentioned area nearby the CGO[26] does not assist the Director. The restrictions under challenge are the ones in relation to the exercise of the rights to freedom of speech and assembly at the Forecourt. As mentioned above, the rights to freedom of expression and assembly extends to the location that the would-be protestors seek to exercise them. Although a protestor does not have an absolute right to insist on the location, any restriction on him to do so at that location must again satisfy the proportionality test, as discussed above. 76.In the premises, applying the above observations and principles in Fong Kwok Shan Christine, the Director has failed to show that the restrictions imposed under the Permission Scheme are no more than necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of ensuring the normal operation of the Government at the CGO. The Permission Scheme therefore does not satisfy the proportionality test. 77.The Permission Scheme is therefore unconstitutional. D4. The Illegality Ground 78.This ground can be quickly disposed of. 79.It is the Director’s evidence that the Permission Scheme is devised and prepared on the starting and fundamental premise that the Forecourt is not a public place and that he has the right as a private property owner to impose any conditions in allowing people to enter it.[27] As also deposed to by Mr Chiu in his 1st Affidavit at paragraph 21:
80.Ms Li’s pleaded complaint under this ground is that, properly analysed and considered, it is wrong as a matter of fact for the Director to regard the Forecourt as a private land. It should instead be regarded as a public place by reference to its functions (being Government offices) and the fact that it had been, and also had been represented to the outside world by the Government that it was to be, open to the public. 81.Ms Li then further contends that in formulating the Permission Scheme on this basis, this mistake of fact has prevented the Director from properly taking into account the rights and freedoms of the applicants who wish to demonstrate or protest or directly express opinions to the public officials concerned during their working hours.[28] 82.The debate of the distinction and difference between public and private places for the purpose of considering the lawfulness of restrictions imposed on the protected freedom of expression rights at a particular location arose from the judgments in Au Kwok Kuen and Leung Kwok Wah.[29] 83.However, as mentioned above at paragraph 47, such an approach is now no longer valid in light of the Court of Final Appeal’s judgment in Fong Kwok Shan Christine. Hence, this ground based on a complaint of error of fact is also no longer relevant and valid. 84.However, I am of the view that, given Fong Kwok Shan Christine, it can now be said that the Director had committed an error of law, as it is wrong in principle to formulate the Permission Scheme by starting off with the premise that, as a landowner, he could in principle exclude anyone from entering the place to exercise the rights of freedom of expression and assembly. This is explained by Ribeiro PJ at paragraphs 29 ‑ 30 as follows:
85.On this basis, I therefore conclude that the Director committed an error of law in formulating the Permission Scheme. The Permission Scheme is therefore tainted with an illegality and therefore unlawful. E. CONCLUSION 86.For the above reasons, the applicant succeeds in this application on the Proportionality Ground and the Illegality Ground. I would therefore declare that the Permission Scheme is unconstitutional for being inconsistent with BL27, BOR16 and BOR17. I would also quash the Decision made pursuant to the Permission Scheme. 87.In this respect, it must be emphasized that Ms Li has fairly and rightly accepted that the Government (through the Director) is entitled and has power as landowner to manage the use of the Forecourt by imposing restrictions and conditions. Hence, she accepts that even if the present Permission Scheme is declared unlawful, it is up to the Director to reconsider and devise a new scheme that would satisfy the proportionality test. 88.There are no reasons why costs should not follow the event. I will therefore make an order nisi that costs of this application be to the applicant, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel. The applicant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations. 89.Lastly, I must also thank counsel for their helpful assistance in this matter.
Ms Gladys Li, SC & Mr Jeffrey Tam, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the applicant Mr Johnny Mok, SC & Mr Johnny Ma, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent [1] The Forecourt has also frequently been referred to by many members of the public as the “Civic Square” for the purposes of holding public meetings, proceedings and staging protests. For the purpose of this judgment, I think it is more appropriate and only proper to adopt its official description as “the Forecourt”. [2] See generally the 1st Affidavit of Chiu Yin Wa David, paragraphs 6 - 21. [3] See 2nd Affidavit of Chiu Yin Wa David at paragraph 7. [4] See the layout plan of the Forecourt (exhibited as “CYWD-6” to the 1st Affidavit of Chiu Yin Wa David), marked and coloured blue. [5] See generally paragraphs 22 - 32 of Chiu Yin Wa David’s 1st Affidavit; paragraphs 7 - 11 of Chiu Yin Wa David’s 2nd Affidavit. [6] Formally entitled “Conditions of Use of the East Wing Forecourt of the Central Government Offices at Tamar”. [7] See footnote 1 above. [8] Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229, at paragraphs 12, 18 and 20; HKSAR v Chow Nok Hang (2013) 16 HKCFAR 837 at paragraph 31. [9] See: Hysan v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372 at paragraphs 52 - 53, 134 - 135 per Ribeiro PJ. [10] (2017) 20 HKCFAR 425. [11] On 4 October 2017. At the court’s direction, the parties have thereafter submitted further written submissions concerning the impact of the judgment on this application. [12] Administrative Instructions For Regulating Admittance And Conduct Of Persons (Cap 382A). [13] In support of this argument, the respondent relied on the authorities of, among others, HKSAR v Au Kwok Kuen [2010] 3 HKLRD 371 and HKSAR v Leung Kwok Wah [2012] 5 HKLRD 556. [14] Paragraphs 23 ‑ 69. [15] Paragraphs 29 and 30. [16] Paragraphs 36 - 38. [17] Paragraphs 39 - 54, applying Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 23 per Laws LJ and Mayor of London v Hall [2011] 1 WLR 504 at paragraphs 37 and 42 perLord Neuberger MR (as he then was). [18] See Fong Kwok Shan Christine, supra, at paragraph 76, citing Mo Yuk Ping v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 386 at paragraph 61, Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 381. [19] Hong Kong Television Network Ltd v Chief Executive in Council [2016] 2 HKLRD 1035 at paragraphs 83 - 89 per Cheung CJHC, citing among others, Winnie Lo v HKSAR (2012) 15 HKCFAR 16 at paragraphs 77 - 78; Mo Yuk Ping, supra, at paragraphs 61 - 62; Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245 at paragraphs 47, 49 and 52; Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 at paragraph 31. [20] Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No 1) (1979‑1980) 2 EHRR245 at paragraph 47. [21] Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347 at paragraph 88; Hong Kong Television Network Ltd v Chief Executive in Council [2015] 2 HKLRD 1035 at paragraph 121 perAu J (this part of the judgment is not overturned on appeal). [22] As submitted by Mr Mok, insofar as the foreseeable consequence of flouting the Permission Scheme is concerned, the Director would have the right to evict the persons who enter or remain at the Forecourt without permission as trespassers. The basis of such a right at common law is the law of tort of trespass. [23] See paragraphs 18 - 22 above. [24] See paragraphs 42 and 44 of the judgment, citing Mayor of London v Hall, at paragraphs 37 and 42; Tabernacle, supra, at paragraph 37. [25] See paragraphs 48 - 54. [26] See for example paragraph 7 of the Guidance Notes and paragraph 10 of the Users’ Conditions, as well as paragraphs 11 and 22 above. [27] See paragraph 1 of the Guidance Notes as well as the Users’ Conditions. [28] In support, Ms Li relies on observation of Laws LJ at paragraph 38 of Tabernacle, supra. [29] See paragraph 44 and footnote 13 above. | ||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment