Kwok Cheuk Kin and Another v. Director of Lands and Others
Read the full judgment text of CACV 234/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 13 January 2021 before Poon CJHC, Lam VP, Au JA.
Constitutional law – Basic Law – interpretation – Article 40 – protection of 'lawful traditional rights and interests' of New Territories indigenous inhabitants ('NTIIs') – New Territories Small House Policy – Ding Rights – historical context of NTIIs' pre-1898 custom to build houses for their own occupation on their own land – recognition by Colonial Government from 1898 and formal endorsement in 1959 – Small House Policy introduced 1972 – protection of small house grants in Annex III of Sino-British Joint Declaration – Basic Law Articles 40, 120 and 122 – whether the Ding Rights are 'lawful traditional rights and interests' of the NTIIs under BL40 – whether the entire Small House Policy, including all three forms of grant (free building licence, private treaty grant, and exchange), is shielded from constitutional challenge on grounds of discrimination based on social origin/birth and sex contrary to BL25, BL39 and BOR22 – contextual and purposive construction – coherence principle – CEDAW reservations by UK (14 October 1996) and PRC (10 June 1997) – Sex Discrimination Ordinance Schedule 5, Part 2, Paragraph 2 – whether 'lawful traditional rights and interests' require historical tracing exercise to pre-1898 rights and interests – whether the Small House Policy is constitutional in its entirety. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals by the respondents and the interested party and dismissed the applicants' appeals, holding that the Ding Rights in their entirety constitute the NTIIs' 'lawful traditional rights and interests' within the meaning of BL40 and that the entire Small House Policy is constitutional. The Court rejected the tracing exercise and held that 'lawful traditional rights and interests' are those recognized as such in the Hong Kong legal system at the time of the promulgation of the Basic Law on 4 April 1990. Reading BL40 together with BL120 and BL122 in light of Annex III of the Joint Declaration and the CEDAW reservations, the Ding Rights are protected from any discrimination challenge based on sex or other grounds, including birth or social origin. The Court further held that, in any event, relief would have been refused on the grounds of phenomenal and unexplained delay and the applicants' lack of standing. The judgment of Chow J ([2019] HKCFI 867) and the orders of 30 April 2019 were set aside, and the judicial review application was dismissed.
Legal issues: Constitutional protection of the Ding Rights under BL40 · Refusal of relief on grounds of delay and standing
Outcome: Appeals by the respondents and the interested party allowed; applicants' appeals dismissed. The Judge's judgment of 8 April 2019 and the orders made on 30 April 2019 set aside insofar as they declared private treaty grant and exchange unconstitutional. Applicants' application for judicial review dismissed. The entire New Territories Small House Policy, including all three forms of grant (free building licence, private treaty grant, and exchange), is constitutional and lawful by virtue of BL40.
Cited by 5 cases · Cites 19 cases
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CACV 234/2019 CACV 317/2019 CACV 319/2019 [2021] HKCA 54 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 234, 317 AND 319 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 260 OF 2015) __________________
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________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ 1.Article 40 of the Basic Law (“BL40”) stipulates:
2.In these appeals arising from the judgment of Chow J dated 8 April 2019,[1] it falls to this Court to determine the constitutionality of the New Territories Small House Policy (“Small House Policy”). As accepted by the respondents and the interested party and found by the learned Judge, the Small House Policy is inherently discriminatory on the grounds of social origin or birth and sex in contravention of articles 25 and 39 of the Basic Law (“BL25” and “BL39”) and article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“BOR22”). The crux of the appeals is whether it nevertheless falls within the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests in BL40,[2] thus being rendered lawful and constitutional. A. Small House Policy 3.The Small House Policy was approved by the then Executive Council on 14 November 1972[3] and has been implemented since December of the same year to date. Over the years, the details of the Small House Policy had been modified and changed from time to time. The parties have all along proceeded on the basis that the Small House Policy as it now stands is in substance the same as approved in 1972 and the subsequent modifications or changes do not have any material impact on the issues before the courts. 4.The current Small House Policy is contained in a pamphlet dated December 2014 published by the Lands Department (“Pamphlet”) and explained in details in the 2nd affirmation of Chow Man Yee, Assistant Director (Estate Management) of the Lands Department, filed in the proceedings below on 5 June 2017 (“CMY2nd”). Under the Small House Policy, an indigenous villager in the New Territories may apply for permission to erect, for once in his lifetime, a small house on a suitable site within his own village[4] upon meeting the following criteria:[5]
5.A small house grants take three forms: (a) free building licence (on private land); (b) private treaty grant (on Government land); and (c) land exchange (surrender and re-grant).[9] In the case of application for free building licence or exchange, the land under application must be registered in the applicant’s name.[10] 6.An administrative fee will be levied from small house grants. A premium at a concessionary rate calculated by Government will also be charged by reference to the form of grants used.[11] Currently, the premium payable is:[12]
7.Applications for small house grants on Government land from villagers living overseas will be refused unless the District Lands Officer is satisfied that the applicant intends to return and reside in his village. The District Lands Officer may however consider overseas applications for small house grants on private land.[13] 8.An application for a small house site outside the applicant’s own “Heung” will not be considered, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the District Lands Officer that his ancestor has already settled in the new “Heung” under application, and there are no local objections to his application.[14] 9.As described in the Pamphlet,[15] a small house is basically a building in the New Territories constructed in accordance with the provisions of the Buildings Ordinance (Application to the New Territories) Ordinance (“BO(ANT)O”).[16] Its main features are that the building shall neither contain more than three storeys nor exceed a height of 8.23 metres (27 ft.) and the maximum roof-over area of the house shall not exceed 65.03 square metres (700 sq. ft.). Under the BO(ANT)O, a certificate of exemption in respect of building works should be obtained from the District Lands Officer prior to the commencement of any building works unless plans prepared by an authorized person have been approved by the Building Authority. The owner should also apply for separate certificates of exemption for site formation works and drainage works from the District Lands Officer and shall not commence any works on site before obtaining the necessary certificates of exemption, or securing approval of plans by the Building Authority. 10.Since 1972, the Government has introduced various measures to enhance the Small House Policy, including the requirement of non-alienation and requirement of statutory declaration of ownership.[17] 11.Over the years, the rights of a male New Territories indigenous villager to apply for permission of a small house grant under the Small House Policy has been commonly referred to as “the Ding Rights”,[18] which we will adopt for easy reference in this Judgment. B. Proceedings below 12.In the judicial review proceedings below, the applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Small House Policy on three grounds. First, it discriminates against persons of “non-indigenous” status in contravention of BL25, BL39 and/or BOR22. Second, the Small House Policy and the relevant exemption in the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (“SDO”)[19] discriminate against female indigenous villagers based on sex, in contravention of BL25, BL39 and/or BOR22. Third, the Government has failed in its duty to manage, use or develop land in Hong Kong for the benefit of all Hong Kong residents, in contravention of article 7 of the Basic Law (“BL7”). 13.The respondents and the interested party invoked BL40. They argued that the Ding Rights are lawful traditional rights and interests within the meaning of BL40, thus renders the Small House Policy constitutional and lawful. 14.In his very careful and thorough judgment, the Judge found that the Small House Policy is discriminatory based on social origin/birth and/or sex in contravention of BL25 and BOR22 in the absence of any justification attempted by the respondents or the interested party satisfying the proportionality test.[20] The real question is whether the Small House Policy is rendered lawful by BL40.[21] 15.Turning to BL40, the Judge identified four constituent elements which have to be satisfied before protection is given, namely, (1) there are some rights and interests; (2) those rights and interests are lawful; (3) those rights and interests are traditional; and (4) they are rights and interests of the NTIIs.[22] On the 1st element, the Judge noted the difference between the respondents and the interested party as regards the precise rights or interests which might be enjoyed by the New Territories indigenous villagers to build small houses, but found that it was not necessary to resolve the difference in this case. He said he would focus on the Ding Rights which he considered could properly be regarded as “rights or interests” capable of being protected by BL40.[23] On the 4th element, the Judge observed that those who were qualified to benefit under the Small House Policy could clearly be regarded as falling within the expression “NTIIs” in BL40.[24] He therefore concluded that the real issues were whether the Ding Rights could satisfy the “traditional” and “lawful” elements in BL40.[25] 16.The Judge outlined the parties’ respective contentions as follows:
17.Noting that there is no definition or further explanation of the expression “tradition” in the Basic Law, and after going through the drafting materials for the purpose of identifying the purpose of BL40, the Judge agreed with the respondents’ submission that “traditional” rights and interests of the NTIIs which are protected by BL40 are confined to those traceable to the rights and interests of the NTIIs before the commencement of the New Territories Lease, that is the Second Convention of Peking,[26] in 1898. Such rights and interests do not include those practices which only came into being afterwards unless they are traceable to the previous rights and interests of the NTIIs.[27] He noted that the word “traceable” does not appear in the Basic Law and he only used it for the purpose of elucidating the concept of “traditional” as used in BL40. He considered that a right or interest can properly be regarded as “traceable” if it captures or reproduces the essential feature(s) of a right or interest that was enjoyed by the NTIIs before the commencement of the New Territories Lease.[28] 18.The Judge went through the tracing exercise concerning land holding and land administration in the New Territories,[29] beginning with land tenure before the New Territories Lease, continuing with the New Territories Lease and the Proclamations and speeches by the Governor, Sir Henry Blake, in 1898 and 1899; the change of land holding from common/customary tenure to Crown lease; land sale in village areas in the New Territories before 1972 including public auction, private treaty, and restricted village auction. 19.The Judge then discussed the history of free building licence[30] and concluded that the Ding Rights in the form of free building licence could be properly regarded as a traceable right for the purpose of BL40.[31] However, he rejected the submission that private treaty grant or exchange could be properly so regarded.[32] 20.Turning to the “lawful” element in BL40, the Judge held that the purpose of BL40 is to protect or preserve those rights and interests of the NTIIs which could properly be regarded as their “traditional” rights and interests after 1 July 1997. It was clear that at the time of the drafting of the Basic Law, some such rights or interests might be open to objection on the ground that they were discriminatory in nature. It would not be consistent with the purpose of BL40 to allow such rights or interests to be challenged on the ground of discrimination or other grounds of unlawfulness.[33] He accordingly accepted the respondents’ submission that “lawful” means lawful according to the domestic law of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 and not inconsistent with the Basic Law. He rejected the applicants’ submission that “lawful” in BL40 means lawful according to both Qing Law before the New Territories Lease and the domestic laws of Hong Kong after 1997. He was not convinced that the drafters of the Basic Law would be concerned with the state of lawfulness, or legality, of the traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs under Qing Law before 1898. He accepted the interested party’s submission that “lawful” in context is merely descriptive of those traditional rights and interests which were enjoyed by the NTIIs prior to the commencement of the Basic Law[34], but disagreed with it as regards the time frame that such rights or interests had to be enjoyed by the NTIIs in order for them to come within the scope of BL40. 21.In conclusion, the Judge held that of the three forms of land grant under the Small House Policy, only free building licence could be properly regarded as a lawful traditional right or interest of the NTIIs, but private treaty grant and exchange could not be so regarded as they do not satisfy the tracing exercise he propounded for determining if they are traditional for the purpose of BL40. He held that the Small House Policy to the extent that it confers benefits on eligible NTIIs in the form of free building licence is constitutional and lawful but not to the extent that it confers benefits in the form of private treaty grant or exchange.[35] 22.In light of his conclusion on the constitutionality of the Small House Policy, the Judge found it unnecessary to deal with the applicants’ challenge on BL7.[36] 23.Lastly, for the reasons that he gave, the Judge rejected the submissions of the respondents and the interested party that relief should be refused and the judicial review should be dismissed because of the applicants’ lack of standing and the substantial and unexplained delay in bringing the application.[37] 24.After receiving further submissions on relief, the Judge on 30 April 2019 made, among other things, the following orders:
C. Appeals 25.All the parties appealed.[38] C1. Overview of the parties’ submissions 26.In substance, the parties repeated their same submissions advanced before the Judge with some refinements. 27.Mr Martin Lee SC,[39] for the applicants, complained that the Judge erred in not holding that the entire Small House Policy had not been rendered lawful by BL40 which only protects lawful traditional rights and interests of NTIIs, that is, rights and interests which are not against the laws of Hong Kong, including the Basic Law, in particular, BL25 and BOR22. They further contended that in any event free building licence is not a lawful traditional right or interest under BL40 for three reasons. First, “lawful” refers to differential treatment which is justified, and therefore does not infringe BL25 and BOR22. Second, the Ding Rights are not “rights or interests” as the Small House Policy only confers a right to apply under a completely discretionary government policy. Third, the Ding Rights are not “traditional” in that they are not traceable to pre-1898. The free building licence under the Small House Policy has nothing in common with what existed pre-1898, save that the licence is free.[40] 28.Mr Benjamin Yu SC[41] for the respondents and Lord Pannick QC[42] for the interested party contended that the entirety of the Ding Rights of NTIIs under the Small House Policy are protected under BL40. The Judge erred in concluding that BL40 only protects grants under the Small House Policy by way of free building licence but not private treaty grant or exchange. 29.The respondents argued that private treaty grant is lawful as it is part of a well-publicized administrative policy protected and recognized by Hong Kong law. Further, the Basic Law, including BL25, BL39, BL40 and article 122 of the Basic Law (“BL122”), must be read together congruously. The objective pre-enactment materials also show the drafters of the Basic Law had discussed the issue and resolved to entrench the rights and interests of the NTIIs notwithstanding that those rights may be discriminatory. Consequently, the Small House Policy and indeed the private treaty grant cannot be regarded as unlawful because of its discriminatory nature. Private treaty grant is traditional as the rights and interests thereunder are traceable back to, in that they capture or reproduce the essential features of, the rights and interests enjoyed by villagers before the British took the New Territories Lease in 1898. Alternatively, there can be no doubt that one of the objects and purposes of BL40 was the protection of lawful and traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs, and that the rights and interests of the NTIIs under the Small House Policy was, at the time when BL40 was drafted, objectively regarded as one of the lawful and traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs. For exchange, the respondents argued that it is an administrative instrument to overcome practical difficulties faced by an eligible NTII and a means to give effect to the rights and interests under free building licence, which the Judge had declared to be constitutional. It was therefore wrong for him to have declared it unconstitutional or required it to pass the four constituent elements of BL40 separately. 30.The interested party argued that “the lawful and traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs” under BL40 refer to the rights and interests enjoyed by them at the time when the Basic Law was drafted and prior to its coming into force in 1997. The term is descriptive. The entirety of the Small House Policy, inclusive of private treaty grant and exchange, was entitled to mandatory protection under BL40. This is supported by the theme of continuity after resumption of sovereignty enshrined in the Basic Law generally, and for BL40 specifically. BL40 is not concerned with the state of affairs in 1898. The Judge erred in concluding that it was necessary to engage in a historical tracing exercise to determine whether the relevant right or interest captured or reproduced the essential feature of a right or interest enjoyed by the NTIIs prior to the New Territories Lease in 1898. Having regard to the theme of continuity, the admissible extrinsic materials, and BL122, there is no support for the view that the Basic Law intended to constitutionally enshrine free building licence but not private treaty grant and exchange under BL40. On the contrary, the plain intent was to provide for mandatory protection for all forms of land grant under the Small House Policy. The interested party further argued that even on his own interpretation of BL40, the Judge erred in concluding that private treaty grant was not a protected form of land grant under BL40. The Judge ought to have concluded that, on the evidence, the essential feature of private treaty grant, namely, the right or interest to acquire land for building a house, was traceable to those enjoyed by the NTIIs before 1898. The Judge likewise erred in declaring exchange unconstitutional. It should be regarded as a derivate of free building licence or alternatively an administrative practice to give effect to free building licence or private treaty grant which satisfies the requirements of BL40 or does not need itself to do so. 31.Both the respondents and the interested party complained that the Judge erred in not refusing relief and dismissing the judicial review on the basis of the serious and unexplained delay and the applicants’ lack of standing. C2. Two main issues 32.Arising from the parties’ contentions, are two main issues. First, as already alluded to at the outset, concerning the constitutionality of the Small House Policy, the issue is whether, on a proper construction, the Ding Rights are “lawful traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs” in BL40? (Construction Issue). Second, even if the Small House Policy, whether wholly or partially, were found to be unconstitutional, should relief be refused on lack of standing and delay? (Relief Issue). We will deal with them in Parts D and E respectively. D. Construction Issue D1. Factual context of BL40 33.As is now well settled, the courts adopt a contextual and purposive approach in construing a provision of the Basic Law: Ng Ka Ling & Others v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4 at pp.28-29; Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211 at p.224D-G; Vallejos v Commissioner of Registration (2013) 16 HKCFAR 45 at [76]-[77]; Comilang Milagros Tecson v Director of Immigration (2019) 22 HKCFAR 59 at [60]. The context and purpose of a provision of the Basic Law were established at the time when it was enacted in 1990. The materials for identifying them include other provisions of the Basic Law as well as other relevant extrinsic materials including the Joint Declaration, the state of the legislation at or about the time of the Joint Declaration and the enactment of the Basic Law and other pre-enactment materials brought into existence prior to or contemporaneous with the enactment of the Basic Law. 34.Here, BL40 concerns lawful traditional rights and interests of NTIIs. Since tradition by definition has its origin from the past and is passed on through generations, a historical survey going back to the time of the New Territories Lease is necessary to ascertain the rather special factual context in which BL40 was written. When it is properly understood against such a historical context, how BL40 came into being in the manner that it did in April 1990 and the purpose that it aims to achieve will become apparent. A total of twelve contextual matters, taken broadly in a chronological order, are identified below. (i) Status of NTIIs originated from 1898 35.The concept of an inhabitant of Hong Kong as an NTII only came into existence in 1898. The term “New Territories” was itself first used by the Colonial Government to describe the territory in the San On District leased to the British Government under the New Territories Lease.[43] The reason is obvious. As compared with the rest of the Colony, which was ceded to the British Government under the Treaty of Nanking 1842,[44] the leased territory was “new” from the perspective of the British Administration and the Colonial Government. With that in mind, the term “NTII” must have been used to distinguish the inhabitants then residing in the leased territory, now known as the “New Territories”, from the rest of the Hong Kong population. When time passes, the term also includes the descendants of the first generation of NTIIs. In short, NTII as a status has its origin in 1898. (ii) Stated intention to respect customs and usages 36.It was the stated intention of the Colonial Government in the early days of the New Territories to respect the customs and usages of its inhabitants. This is seen from the Governor’s Proclamation of 9 April 1899 (“the Second Proclamation”):
Similarly, in his speech given on the hoisting of the Flag on 17 April 1899, the Governor said:
(iii) Recognition of importance of descent in the male line 37.The Colonial Government had recognized in the early days of the New Territories that “[in] the New Territories as elsewhere continuous decent in the male line is the paramount object in the life of the Chinese, and the necessity for this is the foundation for many of their habits and customs”.[45] (iv) But always subject to law 38.Such intention and recognition of the Colonial Government were necessarily subject to a very important caveat. As much the Colonial Government might have intended to respect the customs and usages of the New Territories, the Governor’s Proclamations did not have any effect or force in law: Winfat Enterprises (HK) Co Ltd v Attorney General [1984] HKLR 32, at pp.43-44, per Roberts CJ. A fortiori, his speeches. Such intention and recognition must be subject to the general laws applicable to the whole of Hong Kong, including the New Territories. (v) General laws applicable in the New Territories 39.The New Territories, now as part of the Colony, was subject to all laws and ordinances in force in the Colony. By the Governor’s Proclamation of 8 April 1899 made pursuant to the New Territories Order-in-Council dated 20 October 1898 (“the First Proclamation”), it was directed that from the 17th day of that month, all laws and ordinances in force in the Colony of Hong Kong should take effect in the New Territories also, and should remain in force there until they were altered or repealed. However, even in 1898, the Colonial Government had already found it expedient to exempt the New Territories from the operation of certain ordinances owing to local conditions and variation. As a result, the New Territories was exempted from the operation of a handful of ordinances.[46] Those exemptions however did not include land title and administration. (vi) New system of land holding in the New Territories 40.From its early days, the Colonial Government had taken active steps to swiftly introduce a new system of land holding in the New Territories, which was fundamentally different from the one in the pre-Colonial era. 41.The Judge summarized the previous land holding system at [60] – [66] of the Judgment, quoting the first instance judgment in Winfat Enterprises (HK) Co Ltd v Attorney General [1983] HKLR 211 and Lord Diplock’s judgment when the case reached the Privy Council in [1985] 1 AC 733 at p.744H. In essence:
42.The new land holding system to be introduced by the Colonial Government took a series of steps:
43.All those steps cumulated in the enactment of three New Territories (Land Court) Ordinances in 1900 (Nos. 4, 8 and 18 of 1900).[48] In particular, section 15 of No. 18 of 1900, which came into force on 23 July 1900, stipulated that:
44.The said Ordinances also set up the Land Court to hear, determine and settle land claims in the New Territories: see section 14 of No. 8 of 1900.[49] As decided by the Land Court, the New Territories was divided into 477 Demarcation Districts which were in turn divided into Blocks, with a Block Crown Lease executed by the Governor and issued for each Block. Each Block Crown Lease contained a Schedule detailing the separate ownership of the properties, the lot number allocated to each piece of land, the user to which the land was put at the date of the survey and the amount of Crown rent payable at that time. Block Crown Leases up to 354,277 lots were issued. These lots are now commonly referred to as “Old Schedule lots”. Unoccupied land was vested in the Crown. Generally speaking, a Block Crown Lease would contain provisions or covenants restricting building on agricultural and garden land. The unclaimed and unoccupied lands in the New Territories were then available for disposal by the Colonial Government at public auction. Those lots sold by public auction were described and now commonly known as “New Grant lots”. They were sold subject to standard sets of conditions published in the Gazette from time to time. 45.In 1910, the New Territories Ordinance[50] was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the administration and regulation of the New Territories. Section 14 repeated section 15 of No. 18 of 1990. Relevantly, section 25 provided that in any proceedings in the Supreme Court in relation to land in the New Territories, the court shall have power to recognize and enforce any Chinese customs or customary rights affecting such land unless the Governor were to exempt the land from the provisions of the Ordinance under section 13(3).[51] The applicable Chinese customary law is the law of the Qing dynasty as modified by customs.[52] 46.In sum, under the land holding system now established by the Colonial Government in the New Territories, from 23 July 1900 onwards, all land in the New Territories became vested in the Colonial Government and all persons occupying land from that date became trespassers unless they were authorized by grant, title or licence. Occupied lands were held subject to Block Crown Leases. Unoccupied lands, now vested in the Government, could be sold by public auction under New Grants. Other than the general land laws, the court had the power to recognize and enforce any Chinese customary law affecting land in the New Territories unless exempted by the Governor. In applying the applicable Chinese customary law, the court consulted the law predated the Colonial era, namely, the Qing law.[53] 47.Once the new land holding system was established, the former system practiced in the New Territories before the Colonial-era had come to an end. The legal position is well summarized by Lord Diplock in Winfat Enterprise (PC), supra, at p.745A-C:
(vii) General policy with regard to small houses before 1972 48.The Colonial Government’s general policy with regard to small houses in the New Territories before 1972 is outlined in CMY2nd at [26] – [46]. The source documents consist of a number of documents of the Executive Council: the memorandum on Land Conversion in the New Territories, XCC 27 dated 2 April 1957 (“the 1957 ExCo Memo”); the minutes of the meetings in October 1959; the memorandum on Land Administration Policy, XCR 343/59 dated 15 October 1959 (“the 1959 ExCo Memo”); the memorandum on Land Conversion in the New Territories, XCR 217/60 dated 24 June 1960; the memorandum on Village Houses in the New Territories, XCR (67)62 dated 17 February 1967 (“the 1967 ExCo Memo”); and a memorandum from the District Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary on Small Houses in the New Territories dated 18 September 1971. A useful short summary of the general policy on small houses before 1972 can be found in an internal Government paper entitled “The New Territories Small House Policy” prepared by the NTA Headquarters in February 1980 (“the 1980 Paper”). 49.In Chapter I of the 1980 Paper on the background of the New Territories Small House Policy, it was recorded:
50.Two points are made abundantly clear. 51.First, the NTIIs’ long-held custom to build houses in their village for their own occupation on their own land held under the Block Crown Lease since 1898, described as a tradition, had been recognized and was officially endorsed by the Colonial Government in 1959. Indeed, in Enclosure 2 attached to the 1957 ExCo Memo, it was stated at [1]:
Relevantly, in connection with “the need to honour our undertakings towards the country people”, Enclosure 2 went on to note at [2] that:
52.The same emphasis on recognition of such custom of the NTIIs was expressed in the 1967 Exco Memo at the outset thus:
53.It would appear that the recognition of such custom of the NTIIs was derived from the Colonial Government’s stated intention of respecting their customs and usages in the early days of the New Territories: see [36] above. 54.Second, such recognition of the NTIIs’ long-held custom to build houses for their own occupation was put into practice by the Colonial Government granting permission to build village houses by way of free building licences; surrender/re-grant; and private treaty grant when applied. 55.As can be seen from the 1959 ExCo Memo, the then arrangements for disposal of land in the New Territories included, among others, private treaty grants of existing areas to existing lots, private treaty grants of new lots; and exchanges. Further, as recorded in the minutes of the Executive Council meeting of 6 October 1959, the Government ordered that the present practice whereby all private treaty grants and sales were referred to Council be continued. 56.In connection with exchanges, the then practice said to be based on the policy approved by the Executive Council in April 1957 was set out at [4] of the 1957 ExCo Memo. In short, the practice was:[54]
The term “conversion” did not accurately describe the process.[55] Nevertheless, it covered both exchange (surrender/re-grant) for New Grant lots and free building licence for Old Schedule lots. 57.The undisputed evidence is that land exchange or surrender and re-grant was a practical way of overcoming common difficulties encountered by the NTIIs trying to apply for free building licences. Typically, an NTII who owned a plot of land, which was not large enough or of a shape not suitable for constructing a small house might, in an appropriate case, apply to surrender his land in exchange for a plot of land which includes his original plot of land or part thereof and the adjoining Government land, on which he could construct a small house.[56] 58.To cope with village expansion, the 1957 policy of charging nil premium for conversion was extended from Old Schedule lots to the pre-war New Grant lots in June 1960.[57] It covered village houses with a roofed-over area of up to 700 sq ft and not exceeding a height limitation of 15 ft, provided that they were built in village areas and that there were no “feng shui” or planning objections. In February 1967, the policy was further extended to cover houses with a roofed-area not exceeding 1,000 sq ft up to a maximum height of 25 ft, provided that the house was genuinely needed for the expanding family needs of a villager. That would be granted only in cases where villagers wished to construct houses within traditional village areas or in natural extensions to those when no suitable land was available with them: see the second page of the minutes of the Executive Council meeting of 28 February 1967 attached to the 1967 ExCo Memo. 59.With regard to private treaty grant, the 1980 Paper mentioned that it had its origin back in 1909 at least. It also mentioned the auction system practiced over the years. This requires some elaboration. 60.As said, unclaimed and unoccupied land in the New Territories were now vested in the Crown and could be disposed of by the Colonial Government. From either 1901 or 1904,[58] land in the New Territories were sold by public auction. The upset price at those auctions was set at a concessionary rate. 61.On 26 November 1908, the then Land Officers wrote to the Governor recommending the sanction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to sell land in the New Territories by private treaty instead of by auction. He reasoned, among others, that applications for small building lots received by the Land Officer were all small lots suitable only for a Chinese dwelling and mostly adjoining other houses in a village; that there was never any competition at the auctions and no interest was taken in the same except by the applicant who put forward the request for sale and the lot was therefore knocked down at the upset price, which was very low; and that it was not a financially worthy exercise. In making the recommendation, the Land Officer stated that:
62.The Governor then took up the matter with the Secretary of State. He wrote that in each case of sale by private treaty, the Land Officer should certify that to the best of his knowledge there was no probability of any competition at the sale and that the applicant (ie the purchaser) was the only person interested. On 22 January 1909, the Secretary gave his approval on the conditions that: (a) only building lots not exceeding 1,000 sq ft or agricultural lots not exceeding 1/8 of an acre could be sold by private treaty; (b) such sale were limited to bona fide applications from Chinese for their own occupation in place where there was not a likelihood of much development in the neighbourhood; and (c) the system of sale by private treaty was not extended to New Kowloon, etc which should continue to be sold by auction. 63.Sales by way of private treaty continued since about 1909 until a few years after World War II when public auctions were re-introduced. 64.Soon afterwards, in the 1950s a practice of restricted auctions developed. As explained in CMY2nd at [37]:
65.The system of restricted village auction ended with the introduction of the Small House Policy in 1972. The use of private treaty grants to make small house grants was intended to replace restricted village auctions as they were effectively private treaty grants in all but name.[59] 66.In short, land in the village areas in the New Territories were sold by way of:
67.In sum, before 1972, the Colonial Government had all along recognized and accepted the NTIIs’ custom, derived from the pre-Colonial era, to build village houses for their own occupation on their own land since the New Territories Lease in 1898. The Colonial Government adopted the policy of giving the NTIIs permission to build such village houses by way of free building licence; exchange (surrender/re-grant) and private treaty grant when applied. None of them were new when being adopted by the Small House Policy in 1972. (viii) Basis of the Small House Policy 68.As stated in the 1972 ExCo Memo, the purpose of the Small House Policy was to control the squatter problems and improve temporary domestic structures and their conditions. It was introduced at a time when close to 60% of the buildings in the rural New Territories were of temporary houses or unlawful houses; and while the rural New Territories had only 10% of Hong Kong’s population, it had nearly 40% of the squatter population.[60] As observed by the Judge, its main objectives were to address the serious squatter problems in the New Territories and to expedite the application process for small house grants.[61] 69.That may well have been the purposes of the Small House Policy. However, the Small House Policy plainly continued the previous practice of small house grant and had in fact elevated it into a formal government policy. As the previous practice was based on the Government’s recognition of the NTII’s customs since 1898 to build village houses for their own occupation on their own land, the Small House Policy must have also operated on the same as its very basis. 70.Such a basis of the Small House Policy is also evident from a letter of 18 December 1975 issued to the Chairman of the Heung Yee Kuk by the Secretary for the New Territories on the proposal of a 5 year non-alienation after grant. There he stated at the outset:
The reference to the opportunity to own a permanent house, properly understood in context, must relate back to the Government’s recognition of the NTIIs’ custom to build a village house on his own land since 1898. (ix) Recognition in legislation 71.Importantly, the government’s previous practice with respect to small houses before 1972 was recognized in legislation. So is the Small House Policy after 1972. 72.The Buildings Ordinance[62] governs the planning, design and construction of buildings and the associated works in Hong Kong. When it was enacted in 1955, its application was confined to “Hong Kong, Aplichau, Kowloon and New Kowloon”. Since 1 January 1961, it had been applied to the New Territories in the manner provided by the Buildings Ordinance 1955 (Application to the New Territories) Ordinance.[63] Regulations made under the latter Ordinance exempted from the procedure of the Buildings Ordinance domestic buildings in the New Territories which did not exceed the specified dimensions. Such houses were known as New Territories Exempted Houses (“NTEHs”). NTEHs plainly included small houses constructed pursuant to the prevailing Government’s practice governing them. They remained the position up to 1972. 73.The Buildings Ordinance 1955 (Application to the New Territories) Regulations were amended on several occasions between 1961 and 1987 to effect changes over the dimensions of the NTEHs. In fact, when the Executive Council adopted the Small House Policy, it also decided that legislative measures be introduced to exercise building control on small houses granted under the Policy. The Buildings Ordinance (Application to the New Territories) (amendment) Regulations 1972 were then passed by the Legislative Council. 74.The Buildings Ordinance 1955 (Application to the New Territories) Ordinance and the regulations made thereunder were replaced by the BO(ANT)O on 16 October 1987. Under the BO(ANT)O, the Director of Lands may issue certificates of exemption to eligible buildings in the New Territories so that they can be exempted from the specified provisions of the Building Ordinance and the regulations made thereunder. The dimensions and building requirements of an eligible building is described in the Schedule, which correspond those of a small house under the Small House Policy. 75.Thus, although the Small House Policy is an administrative policy, one key aspect of its implementation, namely control over size, dimensions and other building requirements of the small houses, requires statutory backing as an exemption from the general application of Buildings Ordinance. As such, it has all along been recognized in legislation since 1972. 76.There are two other Ordinances, which came into force after the promulgation of the Basic Law, in which the Small House Policy is also recognized. They are the SDO,[64] in particular, Schedule 5; and the Government Rent (Assessment and Collection) Ordinance (“GRACO”).[65] As will be seen in a moment, they were enacted to give effect to the agreement made by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning small houses as evidenced in Annex III of the Joint Declaration. (x) Preservation of small house grants in Annex III of the Joint Declaration 77.The Joint Declaration was signed on 19 December 1984 and took effect on 27 May 1985 when the instruments of ratification were exchanged. By virtue of paragraph 6 of the Joint Declaration, the UK Government and the PRC Government declared that land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters would be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III. Annex III in turn provided for the protection of land rights and land leases granted by the Hong Kong Government before 1 July 1997.[66] 78.Relevantly, both Governments agreed in Annex III:
79.In paragraph 1, the protection to be conferred by the future HKSAR applies to all leases and all rights in relation to such leases. Rights in relation to the leases held by the NTIIs mainly include the right to apply for small house grants. Accordingly, it covers small house grants. This view is reinforced by the rent benefits with regard to small houses in paragraph 2. Those benefits are plainly predicated on the basis that small house grants would continue to be validly granted beyond 30 June 1997 despite its inherently discriminatory nature. In other words, paragraphs 1 and 2 in Annex III evidenced an agreement reached by both Governments to preserve and protect small houses granted before the resumption of sovereignty on 1 July 1997 and thereafter. Both Governments envisaged that the Small House Policy under which small house grants are made would continue after the coming into force of the Joint Declaration and beyond 1 July 1997. 80.At [58] of the Judgment, the Judge observed that there was no evidence based on the drafting materials on the two Governments’ agreement that the rights of the NTIIs, including the right of male descendants to build small houses and not to increase their land rent. He went on to say:
81.With respect, the Judge’s reading of paragraph 2 of Annex III had missed the point. While it is true that there is no express provision in the Joint Declaration or Annex III on the protection of male descendants of the NTIIs to build small houses, the rent benefits in paragraph 2 must be underpinned by the continued validity of small house grants as agreed by the two Governments. The Judge had also failed to read paragraph 2 together with paragraph 1 and to give due regard to the term “all rights in relation to such leases” in paragraph 1, which obviously covers small houses grants. 82.Eventually, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex III were given effect by virtue of articles 120 of the Basic Law (“BL120”) and BL122. We will consider BL120 and BL122 when we look at the purpose and objective of BL40. (xi) Drafting materials 83.We next come to the contemporaneous drafting materials of BL40 between 1986 and 1989. 84.The general principle regarding the utility of drafting materials for the purpose of interpretation is well settled. Drafting materials as pre-enactment materials are relevant not because the drafters’ subjective mind as revealed might be used as an interpretation aid, which never is, but because they form part of the legislative history which may importantly informs the purpose of the constitutional provision under construction: see the two decisions of the High Court of Australia in Cole v Whitfield and Another [1987-1988] 165 CLR 360, at p.385; and Brownlee v The Queen [2001] 207 CLR 278, at [7]-[8]. That is how we will approach the drafting materials of BL40. 85.The Judge summarized the effect of the drafting materials of BL40 as follows:[67]
Subject to what we will say below on our reading of the drafting materials, we are in broad agreement with the Judge. (xii) No legal challenge 86.Finally, the Small House Policy had never been subject to any legal challenge since 1972 until the proceedings below. In other words, until the Judgment below, the Small House Policy in its entirety had all along been recognized as lawful in the legal system before and after 1997, notwithstanding its inherent discriminatory nature and the fact that the BOR came into force in 1991. D2. Purpose and objective of BL40 87.In ascertaining the purpose and objective of BL40, its specific historical context is instructive. In Vallejos, supra, Ma CJ at [82] said that the court must take as the factual context, the scheme whereby foreign domestic helpers were allowed to enter and reside in Hong Kong subject to the highly restrictive conditions. Those were the facts that marked out foreign domestic helpers as a class and characterise the nature and quality of their residence in Hong Kong while employed as such. Those facts must necessarily be at the centre of the court’s deliberations when it considered whether it was congruent with the concept of “ordinary residence” as employed in article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law to treat them as a class not ordinarily resident. Likewise, the historical factual matrix outlined in Part D1 above shows that the NTIIs are treated as a class of their own when it comes to their traditional rights and interests and the protection that they enjoy. Those facts must lie at the centre of our deliberations on the purpose and objective of BL40. 88.As already pointed out, NTIIs as a status to distinguish them from the rest of Hong Kong’s population had its origin in 1898 when the New Territories Lease came into force. By adopting the term “NTIIs”, the drafters must have 1898 in mind. At that time, the NTIIs already enjoyed certain rights and interests, derived from the customs and usages practiced in the New Territories in the pre-Colonial era, which were unique to them because of their status and the assurances given to them on behalf of the Colonial Administration. Subject to and if necessary as modified by laws in terms of their recognition, their form and the manner in which they were exercised and enjoyed, when such rights and interests were passed down from the first generation to their descendants, they became the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests as recognized in the legal system. 89.As evident from the drafting materials, the drafters of the Basic Law were presented with certain specific rights and interests, said but not necessarily accepted by all to be traditional and lawful, which the NTIIs presently enjoyed and would continue to enjoy. In drafting BL40, the drafters plainly aimed at protecting those extant rights and interests of the NTIIs which were recognized in the legal system as traditional and lawful at the time. 90.On the “traditional” aspect, the drafters clearly did not intend to protect some rights and interests which might have been traditional but had already become extinct at the time or which might be asserted to be traditional sometime in the future. Whether a right or interest is traditional for the purpose of BL40 is to be determined by reference to the state of affairs in April 1990. So BL40 does not entail the tracing exercise advocated by the respondents and accepted by the Judge for the purpose of determining if an asserted right or interest is a traditional right or interest of the NTIIs entitling its protection. The Judge at [55] of the Judgment cited Tse Kwan Sang, supra, and Koon Ping Leung, supra in support of the tracing exercise. However, it should be noted that most of the historical and drafting materials pertaining to the construction of BL40 were not presented before the courts, as is here in these appeals. Thus the two cases should not be regarded as authoritative on the “traditional” aspect of BL40. 91.Further, human experience shows that traditional rights and interests might evolve when they were passed down from one generation to another without however losing its essential features. Or that there might be occasional gaps and disruptions here and there without however really breaking their continuity or rendering them extinct. The drafters must have clearly intended to protect a traditional right and interest of the NTIIs although it might not be enjoyed in exactly the same manner in its pre-1898 form provided it retains its essential or core features. Such intention accords with the cardinal principle that a constitutional provision must be interpreted to protect the essence of the right in question from impairment: see W v Registrar of Marriages (2013) 16 HKCFAR 112 at [65]-[67]. The drafters must have also intended to protect a traditional right or interest despite some occasional gaps or disruptions which did not break its continuity or render it extinct. 92.On the “lawful” aspect, as said, the drafters intended to protect existing traditional rights and interests which were recognized as lawful in the legal system at the time. Contrary to the applicants’ argument, the drafters did not intend to leave open the question of lawfulness to be determined by the courts after the Basic Law came into effect by reference to the Qing law, or the law before 1 July 1997 or thereafter. For it would result in much uncertainty and render the promise to give constitutional protection to the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests already included in BL40 as early as April 1990 inefficacious, which clearly is not what the drafters intended. 93.In our view, “lawful traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs” in BL40 mean those which are, as a matter of historical fact, recognized to be the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests in the Hong Kong legal system at the time of the promulgation of the Basic Law on 4 April 1990. Applying the theme of continuity, BL40 continues and elevates the recognition and protection to a constitutional level for such lawful traditional rights and interests of NTIIs after 1 July 1997. D3. Ding Rights 94.As shown in the historical survey in Part D1, it is beyond doubt that the Ding Rights were as a matter of fact recognized in the Hong Kong legal system as lawful traditional rights and interests of the NTIIs during the drafting stage despite the heated debates about their discriminatory nature. They were recognized as traditional in that they originated from and retained the essence of the NTIIs’ pre-1898 customs to build a house for their own occupation on their own land despite the change of the land holding system after 1898 and the disruptions caused by World War II. They were recognized as lawful in that they were embedded in legislation and in the form of a government policy, giving rise to legal consequences enforceable in court.[71] They were not made unlawful by any statute, nor were they subject to any legal challenge or court decision denouncing them to be unlawful. They had all along been recognized and accepted to be lawful. 95.The Ding Rights continued to be recognized in the legal system as the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests when the Basic Law was promulgated in April 1990. It therefore falls within the ambit of BL40 and merits the constitutional protection in full despite its inherently discriminatory nature. Since the protection has been elevated to the constitutional level, BL40 shields them from any challenge against their legality based on discrimination or other constitutional grounds including the equality provisions such as BL25, BL39 and BOR22. If such challenge were allowed, it would defeat the whole purpose of BL40. 96.We have already pointed out at [92] above that generally speaking, the question of lawfulness of the NTIIs’ rights and interests in BL40 does not involve a determination by reference to the law before July 1997. In respect of the Ding Rights, we would add this. The Small House Policy was never subject to any legal challenge since 1972, not even after the BOR came into force in 1991. Since the respondents and the interested party accepted that the Small House Policy is inherently discriminatory, one might be tempted to argue that it must have fallen foul of the BOR before July 1997 had a challenge been mounted. In fact, this would appear to be the applicants’ argument when they contended that lawfulness of the Ding Rights must be determined by the law before 1 July 1997, which includes the BOR. However, we do not find such an argument convincing. As will be seen below, because of the CEDAW reservations,[72] a weighty factor in construing the relevant articles in the BOR, the Small House Policy might well have survived a discrimination challenge based on sex, or social origin and birth. Further, it is not entirely clear if the agreement reached by the UK Government and the PRC Government on small house grants as evidenced in Annex III of the Joint Declaration would impact on the challenge and if so how. In short, it is doubtful such a notional challenge based on the BOR if made prior to 1 July 1997 would succeed. This speculative exercise does not add anything to the analysis at hand. 97.Our construction of BL40 is entirely consistent with the general purpose of the Basic Law. In Ng Ka Ling, ibid, Li CJ described the general purpose of the Basic Law in these terms:
One of China’s basic policies is to implement the agreement made by the UK and PRC Governments on land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters as contained in Annex III, which as demonstrated, includes the preservation of small house grants beyond 30 June 1997. Conferring on the Ding Rights the constitutional protection under BL40 gives effect to one key aspect of that basic policy and achieves, on its part, the general purpose of the Basic Law. 98.Our construction of BL40 is further supported by the coherence principle. Briefly stated, the Basic Law must be read as a coherent whole: Comilang (CFA), supra, per Ribeiro and Fok PJJ at [61]. There are two aspects of its application in the present case. 99.First, the coherence principle mandates that BL40 must be read together with BL120 and BL122. It is because an article of the Basic Law should be read with and in light of other articles, especially those addressing the same or similar subject matter, to produce a harmonious and congruous instead of a discordant meaning: Chief Executive of HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council [2017] 1 HKLRD 460, per Cheung CJHC (as he then was) at [51]. 100.BL120, which gives effect to paragraph 1 of Annex III, stipulates:
It confirms that all land grants, including small house grants made pursuant to the Small House Policy irrespective of their form, made up to 30 June 1997 shall be continued to be recognized and protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 101.BL122, which implements paragraph 2 of Annex III, provides:
A number of points are worth noting:
102.Reading BL120 and BL122 together, insofar as small house grants made pursuant to the Small House Policy are concerned, irrespective of the form and whether they are made before or on 30 June 1997, they will continue to be recognized and protected under the law of the HKSAR. When BL40 is construed together with BL120 and BL122, the Ding Rights must fall within the scope of NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests. Any contrary construction would render BL120 and BL122, insofar as small house grants are concerned, quite meaningless. 103.With respect, the Judge failed to construe BL40 contextually and coherently with BL120 and BL122.[73] 104.Mr Lee, for the applicants, argued that BL120 and BL122 do not assist the construction of BL40. He first submitted that BL120 is a general provision; whereas BL122 is only a specific provision dealing with the quantum of future rent of properties in the New Territories on which small houses, among others, were built, and/or might continue to be built, by successful applicants under the Small House Policy. Nothing in BL120 or BL122 therefore suggests that the Small House Policy must be maintained. Mr Lee next submitted that “all rights in relation to such leases” in BL120 are not intended to include the Ding Rights but only to inchoate rights of action relating to land; adverse possession and modifications of conditions. Finally, Mr Lee argued that had the drafters intended to include the Ding Rights, they could have expressly provided for it in BL40, as they did in BL122 for small house grants. 105.With respect, we disagree. The fundamental fallacy in Mr Lee’s reading of BL120 and BL122 is that it fails to take heed of the coherence principle. On his first point, it fails to take into account the proper context of BL120 and BL122 and ignores the obvious points as mentioned at [101] and [102] above. On his second point, such restrictive construction of the term of BL120, which is expressed to be all-embracing, is wholly unwarranted. On his last point, as readily seen from the drafting materials, BL40 is clearly meant to be a general provision to protect all NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests including but not limited to the Ding Rights. 106.The second aspect of the application of the coherence principle explains how BL40 should and indeed can be read together with BL25, BL39 and BOR22 as a coherent whole. 107.Both the UK and PRC Governments are parties to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). Both Governments were evidently aware of the inherent discriminatory nature of the Small House Policy against female when they made the Joint Declaration, which might fall foul of the CEDAW. Thus on 14 October 1996, the UK Government entered into a reservation with respect to its application to Hong Kong whereby:
The PRC Government made a similar reservation on 10 June 1997. 108.It should also be noted that the reservation made by the PRC Government is given effect by Schedule 5, Part 2, section 2 of the SDO, which effectively exempt the Small House Policy from the operation of the SDO. 109.These reservations with respect to the application of CEDAW is a weighty aid to the interpretation of the Basic Law and the BOR: see Comilang Milagros Tecson v Director of Immigration [2018] 2 HKLRD 534, per Cheung CJHC (as he then was) at [5]; and ZN v Secretary for Justice [2018] 3 HKLRD 778, per Lam VP at [202]. They seek to ensure the continued application of the laws which enable male indigenous villagers to exercise certain rights in respect of property, which clearly include the Ding Rights, after 1 July 1997 despite their discriminatory nature against female. BL40 must be construed consistently with these reservations: see Comilang (CFA), supra, at [24]-[35]. Under such construction, the NTIIs must be entitled to exercise the Ding Rights, despite its discriminatory nature against female, as their lawful traditional rights and interests by virtue of the reservations. 110.While the CEDAW reservations render a discrimination challenge against the Ding Rights based on sex impermissible, it must also inform the construction of BL40 in the context of a discrimination challenge based on other grounds, such as birth or social origin. The reason is again coherence. 111.In Comilang (CFA), ibid, Ribeiro and Fok PJJ held that the immigration reservation contained in section 11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance[74] excluded from the scope of the provisions of the BOR given constitutional effect by BL39, immigration legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from Hong Kong and the application of such legislation. Further (and relevantly for present purposes), the Basic Law must be interpreted as a coherent whole, consistently with section 11. Therefore, section 11 was not confined to rights in the BOR but extended by necessary implication to cognate rights in the Basic Law in the specific immigration context. 112.Consistent with the CEDAW reservations excluding a discrimination challenge based on sex, BL40 must be construed to also exclude a discrimination challenge based on other grounds, such as birth or social origin, available in the Basic Law or the BOR. Such construction ensures that a coherent constitutional scheme is laid down in BL40 to protect the Ding Rights as the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests. 113.What remains is Mr Lee’s argument that since the NTIIs at most can only have a right to apply for a small house grant under the Small House Policy, the Ding Rights fall short of rights and interests under BL40 whatever they might entail. The respondents and the interested party complained that the applicants did not take the point below. Leaving that aside, we are simply unable to accept Mr Lee’s argument. 114.It is trite that as a government policy, the Small House Policy creates legal obligations on the part of the Government to act upon it when faced with an application by an eligible NTII under the doctrine of legitimate expectation as explained by the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Siu Tung & Others v Director of Immigration (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1, at [92]; or by a related but free-standing principle articulated by Laws LJ in R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [68]; quoted with approval by Lord Wilson JSC in Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 4546, at [29]:
115.Corresponding to the Government’s obligations, an eligible NTII must have a right to the determination of his application in accordance with the Small House Policy. It is plainly within the ambit of rights and interests for the purpose of BL40. 116.For the above reasons, we hold that on a proper construction of BL40, the Ding Rights fall within the NTIIs’ lawful traditional rights and interests entitling them to the constitutional protection in full, despite their inherently discriminatory nature. The Small House Policy is constitutional in its entirety. D4. Alternative case based on the Judges’ approach 117.To complete the discussion on the Construction Issue, we will very briefly deal with the alternative case by reference to the Judge’s construction of BL40 including the four constituent elements that he had identified and, in particular, the tracing exercise. 118.We agree with the Judge that the real issues were whether the Ding Rights could satisfy the “traditional” and “lawful” elements in BL40. 119.On the “traditional” element, if contrary to our view in Parts D2 and D3, tracing is necessary, we agree with the Judge that a right or interest could properly be regarded as “traceable” if it captures or reproduces the essential feature(s) of a right or interest that was enjoyed by the NTIIs before the commencement of the New Territories Lease. For the reasons that the Judge gave, we agree with him that the Ding Rights in the form of free building licence is a traceable right for the purpose of BL40. However, we think he erred when he did not reach the same conclusion for private treaty grant and exchange. 120.As mentioned at [41] above, land in the New Territories had for many years before 1898 been held under the “customary tenure” based on custom or traditions. Land held under the “customary tenure” was notionally divided into “topsoil” and “subsoil”. To see if private treaty grant is a traceable right, the focus is on the rights and interests of the topsoil tenants of the customary tenure. They are summarised at [41(2)] and we will not repeat them here. 121.As summed up at [66] above, land in the village areas in the New Territories after 1898 were sold at concessionary rates by way of public auction from (a) around 1901 to 1904 or 1909; (b) public treaty grant from around 1909 to a few years after World War II; (c) restricted village auctions (which were effectively private treaty grants) from 1950s to 1972; and (d) private treaty grants since 1972. We agree with Mr Yu and Lord Pannick that the essential or core features of a NTII’s right to apply for new land to build a house under the “customary tenure” were preserved by the successive ways of disposal of land in the New Territories. To recap, it is clear from the evidence that:
122.The fact that the land was sold at the concessionary rate whatever the ways of disposal might be over the years is significant. As rightly submitted by Mr Yu, the concessionary rate convincingly showed that private treaty grant was intended to enable an eligible NTII who did not own any agricultural land to, subject to the Government’s consent, acquire building land at a price commensurate to the costs he would have to incur had he acquired agricultural land and applied to convert it into building land via free building licence. Put in the simplest terms, he would be placed in the same position as if he were an owner of an Old Scheduled lot who could apply to build a house via free building licence. 123.Mr Lee SC placed much reliance on the fact that both women and non-villagers could obtain building land both before and after the New Territories Lease. However, we agree with Mr Yu that the reality on the ground, as accepted by the Judge, is that they have always been regarded as anomalies as the rights and interests in question should be confined to male villagers only. 124.In the circumstances, we agree with Mr Yu and Lord Pannick that the rights and interests enjoyed by an eligible NTII under a private treaty grant capture or reproduce the essential or core features of an eligible villager’s right to apply for new land to build a house under the “customary tenure” in the pre-Colonial era. 125.For exchange, we also accept the submissions of Mr Yu and Lord Pannick that it is just a derivate of free building licence: see [57] above. 126.On the “lawful” element, we agree with the Judge.[75] 127.For completeness, we reject all the applicants’ arguments which we have not already specifically dealt with. 128.It follows that even adopting the Judge’s approach on BL40, we would have come to the same conclusion as we did at [116] above. E. Relief Issue 129.In light of our conclusion on the Construction Issue, the Relief Issue has become academic. We only need to state the following brief reasons why we differ from the Judge. 130.The length of delay in commencing the proceedings below is not only serious. It is, as Mr Yu has submitted, phenomenal. The Small House Policy was introduced in 1972. The BOR was enacted in 1991. The Basic Law has been in force for 23 years. And the lack of explanation for such a delay is simply glaring. 131.As pointed out by Mr Yu and Lord Pannick, the prejudice caused by the delay to third parties and detriment to good administration is substantial and goes beyond the potential hardship to the NTIIs who currently own small houses. 132.It is well established that interest in good administration lies essentially in a regular flow of consistent decisions, made and published with reasonable dispatch; and in citizens knowing where they stand, and how they can order their affairs in the light of the relevant decision: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393 at [23]-[26]; R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal, ex p Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738 at 749H. Here, the Small House Policy has been consistently and regularly applied since 1972, which has affected many in the New Territories. In fact, between 1972 and 2018, a total of 111,995 applications were received, of which 8,657 applications were still being processed as at 30 June 2018. Many eligible NTIIs and their families have conducted affairs on the basis that the Small House Policy is a lawful policy, with an expectation of being able to build a small house in the future. The prejudice caused to them is on any view huge. Moreover, the Small House Policy involves important decisions of planning and scarce land allocation, which forms part of the land administration in the New Territories generally. The delay therefore also indirectly but adversely affects the interest in the land administration in the New Territories, which has been operating over the years on the basis that the Small House Policy is a valid and lawful policy. 133.With respect, the Judge had not taken into account these important factors. 134.On standing, we agree with Mr Yu and Lord Pannick that the applicants did not have sufficient standing. They have not indicated any intention to build a small house. They do not suggest that they have any interest in any land, actual or potential, in the New Territories which is affected by the Small House Policy. They have not said that but for the Small House Policy, they would have gained some land or housing benefit. In short, they do not have any interest over and above that of an ordinary resident which give them standing to bring the judicial review. 135.In the circumstances, we would have refused relief on the ground of delay and lack of standing even if we were to hold that the Small House Policy was, wholly or partially, unconstitutional. F. Dispositions 136.In consequence, we allow the appeals brought by the respondents and the interested party and dismiss the applicants’ appeals. We set aside the Judges’ judgment of 8 April 2019 on the constitutionality of private treaty grant and exchange and the orders that he made on 30 April 2019. We dismiss the applicants’ application for judicial review. 137.On costs, we direct the parties to lodge their written submissions, limited to 2 pages, within 14 days. We will then decide the matter on paper. 138.Lastly, we would like to thank counsel for their able assistance.
Mr Martin Lee SC leading Mr Jeffrey Tam and Ms Isabel Tam instructed by Ho Tse Wai & Partners for the 1st Applicant and instructed by Ho Tse Wai & Partners, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the 2nd Applicant Mr Benjamin Yu SC leading Mr Mok Yeuk-Chi and Mr Anthony Chan instructed by the Department of Justice for the 1st to 3rd Respondents Lord David Pannick QC, Mr Jat Sew-Tong SC, Mr Jin Pao SC and Mr Danny Tang instructed by T K Tsui & Co for the Interested Party [1] [2019] HKCFI 867 (“Judgment”). [2] In Secretary for Justice v Chan Wah (2000) 3 HKCFAR 459, Li CJ remarked at p.477D-F that BL40 covered the benefits relating to land granted to male NTIIs under the Small House Policy. It is accepted that the Chief Justice’s remark is obiter: see Koon Ping Leung v Director of Lands [2012] 2 HKC 329, per Lam J (as he then was) at [26]-[27]; Secretary of Justice v Liu Wing Kwong [2014] 2 HKLRD 155, per DHCJ Marlene Ng (as she then was) at [63]-[64], and Court of Appeal in CACV 160/2013, 4 March 2016, per Au J (as he then was) at [37]. Thus neither the respondents nor the interested party sought to rely on Li CJ’s remark in Chan Wah for the purpose of these proceedings here and below. [3] See the Memorandum for Executive Council dated 31 October 1972, XCR(72)219 (“the 1972 ExCo Memo”). [4] Pamphlet, (II) Explanatory Notes, §(a). [5] Pamphlet, (I) How to apply for a Small House Grant, (c) Eligibility Criteria §§(a)-(e). [6] See also Pamphlet, supra, (B) Definitions, §(a) for the same definition of “indigenous villager”. A recognized village is one, which is shown on the list of recognized villages approved by the Director of Lands: see Pamphlet, supra, (B) Definitions, §(b). [7] “V” Zone refers to “village type development” Zone. Pursuant to section 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance, Cap 131, planning permission will have to be obtained from the Town Planning Board for erection of small houses outside the “V” Zones as shown on statutory plans such as Development Permission Area Plans and Outline Zoning Plans: see Pamphlet, (II) Explanatory Notes, §(h). [8] Referring to a 300 ft distance surrounding a recognized village where small house applications are considered, although consideration will also be given to applications for sites within a “V” zone in a Development Permission Area/Outline Zoning Plan which encircles a recognized village: Pamphlet, (II) Explanatory Notes, §(c). [9] Pamphlet, (I) How to apply for a Small House Grant, (B) Definitions, §(c). Although in § (c)(i), it is stated that a small house grant includes any of the three forms of grants, as a matter of fact, they are the only forms of small house grants. [10] Pamphlet, (II) Explanatory Notes, §(d). [11] Pamphlet, supra, §(f). [12] CMY2nd, at [87]. [13] Pamphlet, supra, §(e). [14] Pamphlet, (III) Important Points to Note, §(b). There, the word “Heung” is used, presumably as a transliteration of the Chinese word “鄉”. [15] (II), Explanatory Notes, §(g). [16] Cap 121. [17] For details, see CMY2nd, Part B2. [18] In Chinese, “Ding Rights” is “丁權” and “Ding” means “丁”, a male person. [19] Cap 480. [20] Judgment, at [22]-[24]. As propounded in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372; applied in the context of discrimination: see QT v Director of Immigration (2018) 21 HKCFAR 324, at [84]-[87]. [21] Judgment, at [19]-[24]. [22] Judgment, at [36]. See a similar formulation in Law of The Hong Kong Constitution, 2nd Edition, at [30.004]. [23] Judgment, at [38]. [24] Judgment, at [39]. [25] Judgment, at [40]. [26] Signed on 9 June 1898 and took effect on 1 July 1898. [27] Judgement, at [55]. [28] Judgment, at [115]. [29] Judgement, Part X. [30] Judgment, at [100]-[114]. [31] Judgment, at [116]. [32] Judgment, at [119]-[125] for private treaty grant and at [126] for exchange. [33] Judgment, at [128], read together with [41]. [34] Judgment, at [129]. [35] Judgment, at [2], where the Judge summarized his holdings. [36] Judgment, at [135]. [37] Judgment, at [136]-[144]. [38] The interested party brought CACV 234/2019; the respondents, CACV 317/2019; and the applicants, CACV 319/2019. Respondents’ notices, supplementary notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal, as the case may be, have also been filed. Before the hearing, the applicants sought leave to amend their amended notice of appeal and their respondents’ notices to include a ground based on double proportionality. We refused to give leave as it is simply not engaged because, as will be seen shortly, the equality provisions relied on by the applicants and BL40 should and can indeed be read as a coherently whole, giving rise to no competing rights that need to be resolved by the double proportionality analysis. [39] Leading Mr Jeffrey Tam and Ms Isabel Tam. [40] The applicants also sought to argue that the application of the double proportionality test would favour the striking down of the Small House Policy. As we did not give leave to them to amend the notice of appeal, they are not allowed to run this point. [41] Leading Mr Mok Yeuk Chi and Mr Anthony Chan. [42] With Jat Sew-Tong SC, Mr Jin Pao SC and Mr Danny Tang. [43] See, e.g., The Report on the New Territory During the First Year of British Administration dated 19 February 1900 submitted by Mr Stewart Lockhart to the Governor (“the 1900 Report”), at §1; The Report on the New Territories, 1899-1912 laid before the Legislative Council by command of the Governor on 22 August 1912 (“the 1912 Report”), at §1. [44] Signed on 29 August 1842. [45] The 1912 Report, at §92. [46] The 1900 Report, under the part entitled “Legislation”, 2nd paragraph. Those exemptions do not concern this appeal. [47] Judgment at [62(4)], the summary is based on the evidence of the respondents’ expert, Dr Patrick Hugh Hase. As noted by the Judge, the applicants’ expert, Dr Cheung Sui Wai, took issue on the legal status of the “customary tenure” and disagreed that houses could only be built in the village areas of the New Territories with the consent of the village communities as such a role was not permitted under the Qing Code. He also said that women were allowed to own land and houses under the Qing Code. The Judge nonetheless at [66] of the Judgment found that whatever might be said about the formal or strict legal status of the “customary tenure” system as described by Dr Hase, its existence cannot be disputed. It was practised by the village communities in the New Territories for many years prior to 1898. Significantly, the Judge observed that “[this] much is not … disputed by Dr Cheung”. Before us, there is no challenge on the finding by the Judge on the existence of the “customary tenure” system of holding land in the New Territories for many years before 1898. [48] See Winfat Enterprises, supra, at pp.40-42 for a brief description of the legislative history. [49] The Land Court was constituted on 1 June 1900 with Mr H.E. Pollock as President, Mr H.H.J. Gompertz and Mr J. H. Kemp as Registrar. [50] Cap 97. [51] Section 25 and section 13(3) remain in force and are section 13 and section 7(2) of the current version of the New Territories Ordinance with necessary modifications to reflect the resumption of sovereignty in 1997. [52] A common example of the court recognizing and enforcing Chinese customary law concerns t’so and tong. See Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, Vol. 42: New Territories, Second Edition, at [285.039]-[285.068] for a useful summary. [53] By virtue of the New Territories Land (Exemption) Ordinance, Cap. 452, as from 24 June 1994, in respect of New Territories land other than rural land, such land is deemed to have always been so exempted by the Governor from the date of the grant of the Government lease. The exemption does not apply to land in the New Territories held in the name of any clan, family or tong, and it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the New Territories. See further Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, supra, [285.033]-[285.037]. [54] The 1957 ExCo Memo, at [9], approved by the Executive Council at the meeting on 9 April 1957. [55] See the 1957 ExCo Memo, ibid. [56] CMY2nd, at [56]. [57] CMY2nd, at [53]. [58] According to the available evidence, the first sale by way of public auction is not entirely clear. The Judge referred to the relevant evidence at [83] and [84] of the Judgment. [59] The 1972 ExCo Memo, at [6] and [7]. [60] CYM2nd, at [61] and [62]. [61] Judgment, at [14] and [17]. See also Chapter II of the 1980 Paper, the 3rd paragraph where the two main objectives were stated. [62] Cap 123. [63] Then Cap 322. [64] Which came into force on 23 May 1996. [65] Cap 515, which came into force on 30 May 1997. [66] It also provided for the setting up of the Land Commission, which was to be dissolved on 30 June 1997. [67] Footnotes 68 to 70 are footnotes 35 to 37 in the Judgment. [68] See, for example, (i) the minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Special Group held on 22 April 1986, at paragraph 4; (ii) the “Background” section of the Seminar Report mentioned in paragraph 51 below, at paragraph 2; (iii) the note to article 17 of the discussion draft of the Basic Law considered at the Third Plenary Session of the Basic Law Drafting Committee on 29 November 1986; (iv) the Special Group’s Final Report on the Rights and Interests of Indigenous New Territories Inhabitants passed on 14 March 1987, at paragraph 3.2.3; and (v) the Public Consultation Report, Vol 5, dated October 1988 prepared by the Basic Law Consultative Committee, at paragraph 1. [69] See, for example, the Public Consultation Report, Vol 4, dated October 1988 prepared by the Basic Law Consultative Committee, at paragraph 6.1. [70] [1999] 3 HKLRD 267, at 285D-I. [71] See [114] below. [72] Defined and discussed at [107] - [112] below. [73] Judgement, at [131]-[134]. [74] Cap. 383. [75] Judgment, at [128]-[129]. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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