HKSAR v. Law Wing Hong
Read the full judgment text of CACC 169/1998 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 11 November 1998 before Power VP, Mayo JA, Stuart-Moore JA.
Criminal law – attempted rape – leave to appeal against conviction and sentence – sufficiency of evidence – alleged misdirections in summing-up – delay in complaint – corroboration – bruises – use of knife – whether sentence manifestly excessive – Starting point of six years endorsed – On 14 June 1997 applicant dragged complainant into kitchen of bookshop, held knife to her throat, ordered her to lie down, forced her to remove clothes and attempted penetration but failed to obtain an erection – Whether trial judge misdirected jury by stating applicant had ordered complainant to remove her clothes – Held: direction correct as complainant so testified – Whether trial judge misdirected by stating knife was brandished at complainant's vagina – Held: slip, but immaterial and not capable of causing injustice – Whether trial judge misdirected as to cause of bruises – Held: no, complainant gave evidence of being grabbed and pulled backwards – Whether absence of fingerprint evidence on knife assisted applicant – Held: neutral factor – Whether victim's delay in reporting to police for four days undermined prosecution – Held: judge left delay and explanation to jury – Whether medical evidence of bruises insufficient – Held: judge properly directed that bruises were capable of innocent explanation – Whether trial judge unfairly selected passages from applicant's letters – Held: judge fairly left jury to assess the letters and acknowledged they were not a clear confession – Whether sentence of six years' imprisonment manifestly excessive – Held: six years entirely appropriate for a vicious and determined attempt to rape involving a knife – Leave to appeal against conviction and sentence dismissed.
Legal issues: Leave to appeal against conviction for attempted rape · Leave to appeal against sentence of six years' imprisonment for attempted rape
Outcome: Leave to appeal against conviction refused; leave to appeal against sentence refused.
Cited by 24 cases
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CACC000169/1998 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL 1998, No.169
------------------------------- Coram: Hon. Power, V.-P., Mayo & Stuart-Moore, JJ.A. Date of Hearing: 17 September and 11 November 1998 Date of Judgment: 11 November 1998 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Power, V.-P. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. The applicant faced one count of attempted rape. It was particularized that he, on 14th June 1997, at the Second Chance Book Shop, ground floor, No.28 Pak She Street, Cheung Chau, attempted to rape Pauline Deary. He pleaded not guilty to that count and was, after trial before Deputy Judge de Souza and a jury, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 years. He now seeks leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence. 2. It was the prosecution case that the victim Pauline Deary was the Chairman of the Prisoners' Friends Association and that she became acquainted with the applicant while he was serving a prison sentence. Both she and her friend Miss Jane Crawley visited him over a period of 6 to 7 years and when he was released from prison tried to assist him to rehabilitate himself by obtaining part-time work for him at the Second Chance Bookshop on Cheung Chau. Thereafter he lived and at times worked at the bookshop. The victim continued to counsel him and, on 14th June 1997, when Miss Crawley was giving a birthday party for her, he was one of the invited guests. The party broke up at about 10:30 p.m. and the applicant and the victim then walked back to the bookshop. The victim was on her way to her own home but intended to stop at the bookshop to pick up some articles which she left there. On the way back, the applicant asked her for a kiss but she refused. After the victim entered the bookshop to collect the articles, the applicant shut the sliding door and started to hug her and again asked her for a kiss. She said she was not willing and then, as detailed by the judge in his summing-up, the following incident occurred:
3. The victim said that she then rang Miss Crawley and left a voice message and that later she saw Miss Crawley and told her what had happened. 4. The judge went on:
5. The judge then went on to refer to the evidence of the victim, in which she admitted to being at a loss as to why she did not mention the knife to the police in her first statement. The judge then detailed the defence evidence which, to use the judge's words, was an allegation of "a total frame-up following rejection of (the victim's) amorous advances". The judge had, when dealing with corroboration, at page 11 of the transcript, set out certain passages from the letters which the victim confirmed the applicant had written to her. When referring to them, he said that the applicant had "said he wrote them offering his apologies to Miss Deary". 6. Also, when dealing with corroboration, the judge had set out the evidence of Dr. Chan Chin-pang as follows:
7. We turn now as to the grounds that have been urged by the applicant. These he set out for the most part in writing. On the first day of the hearing before this court, we adjourned the matter to obtain the transcript because a number of the grounds dealt with matters that had occurred when evidence was being given at the trial. The applicant filed two sets of grounds of appeal. The second set repeated almost all of those contained in the first set but at greater length. The only one from the first set of grounds which we need to deal with is the submission that "the trial judge did not remind the jury to consider why the victim did not report to the police until 4 days later". There is no ground for complaint in this regard. The trial judge referred to the delay and set out the victim's explanation for it. It was for the jury to decide what weight they gave to the fact of delay and to the evidence explaining it. 8. We turn to the second set of grounds. (1) The applicant firstly complains as to discrepancies between the statements of the victim and her evidence. The statements of the victim were not, except as to parts of her first statement which were read to her during cross-examination, evidence at trial, nor are they before us. That being so, the applicant cannot now rely upon them. This court can only consider the evidence that was placed before the jury. (2) The applicant complains of a number of misdirections. The first of these suggested misdirections is the statement of the trial judge when detailing the evidence of the applicant when he said:
The applicant contends that the victim in her evidence had never accused him of ordering her to remove her clothes. This is not so. The evidence on this matter is clear. At p.76 of the record, the following passage appears:
9. Quite clearly the victims was stating in her evidence that the accused had ordered her to remove her clothes. 10. The second matter of complaint occurs out of a statement made by the trial judge when explaining the use that could be made of recent complaint. He said:
11. The applicant complains that Miss Crawley in her evidence had never said that the victim said that the applicant pointed the knife at her vagina and brandished it. He is correct, when he makes this complaint. This was a slip on the part of the trial judge. Miss Crawley, as the transcript reveals, had never said that she was told by the victim that the knife was pointed at her vagina. It was an unfortunate slip but was, we are satisfied, not a matter which could have resulted in any injustice to the applicant. 12. The third complaint arises out of the following statement by the judge:
13. The applicant contends that the victim had never given any evidence to this effect, and that she made no mention as to why there were minor bruises on her in her forearms. An examination of the evidence, however, indicates that there is no substance in this complaint. The transcript, at p.81, reads as follows:
14. We turn then to the fourth matter of complaint of a misdirection. This concerns a statement by the judge when dealing with a letter written by the applicant to the victim. The judge said:
15. The applicant says that he never admitted writing to the victim to apologize. He says that the real fact of the matter was that he had written the letters because he wanted to save himself from the predicament of being falsely accused of rape. The evidence in this matter is as follows.
16. The applicant clearly did, in answer to two of the questions, agree that he had apologised, but it must be said that he then went on to explain why he had done so. All of this evidence was before the jury and it was for their determination. We are satisfied what the judge said in the passage complained of could not possibly have misled the jury. (3) We turn to the third complaint which is that the evidence of bruises was of no real weight. It is difficult to see how the applicant can make any complaint along these lines as the judge told the jury
17. There is nothing in this ground. (4) In the fourth ground, the applicant complains that there was no evidence of fingerprints on the knife. It is true that there was not, but lack of fingerprint evidence is a neutral factor. Of course if fingerprint evidence is given and either implicates an accused or exonerates him by establishing that the fingerprints are those of some other person, then it can be evidence of very substantial importance. Where, however, there is no fingerprint evidence at all, it proves nothing either way. (5) In his fifth ground, the applicant suggests that the timing of events as sworn to by the victim could not possibly by true. We find nothing of any merit in this suggestion. Clearly there was sufficient time for the events in either the victim's or the applicant's version to have occurred. (6) In Ground 6, the applicant suggests that it is unbelievable given the version of the victim that sexual intercourse did not occur. This was very much a matter for the common sense of the jury to decide and it was left to them. We cannot help but comment that, on a reading of the transcript, the evidence of the victim has a distinct ring of truth about it, but her credibility is is not a matter for our decision nor was it for the trial judge. It was for the jury to decide whether or not the victim was telling the truth and this decision was left for them. (7) In his 7th Ground, the applicant suggests that if the incident happened as the victim suggested it did, one would have expected to have found more bruising on her body. This, again, is a matter of fact which was for the jury. (8) In his eighth Ground, the applicant suggests that Miss Crawley never accused him of attempted rape but only of indecent assault. This is not so. In her evidence she accused him of attempted rape and, indeed, she did so from the very outset. Miss Crawley gave evidence (at p.107):
18. The victim, moreover, in her first written statement, that was read to her by defence counsel:
19. There is nothing in this ground. (9) In his 9th Ground, the applicant complains that the quotations from the letters read to the jury by the trial judge were selective and were adverse to him. The judge did read parts of the letters, but he clearly left it to the jury to make their own assessment of them saying:
20. Further having read passages, he very fairly told the jury:
21. So much for the applicant's written grounds, today he has referred to what he suggests were contradictions in the evidence of the victim. The matters to which he has made reference were, in our view, no more than one would expect to find in the evidence of any victim of an attack such as occurred in the present case. There was nothing in the final submissions of the defendant. 22. The application for leave is of no merit and it must be dismissed. Sentence 23. The applicant has also sought leave to appeal against sentence. In his grounds said no more than that the sentence was obviously too heavy and was unfair and unreasonable. 24. The judge when sentencing said that the accused had been convicted of a most serious offence of attempted rape. He went on, rightly, to note that the incident must have been a terrifying experience for the victim. His evidence was that she clearly believed that she was to be done serious harm and indeed that she thought that she might be killed. He took into account that it was what he characterized as "a sad and tragic case of a man has lost much of his youth in prison and now stands to return there for a period of time". He said that he recognized that he was a filial son and that he had acted out of character and that, to use his words, "the whole sordid affair was unpremeditated". 25. He went on, however, to say:
26. We are satisfied that the judge was correct when he passed that sentence. This was a vicious and determined attempt to rape the victim. In our view, six years was an entirely appropriate sentence. 27. The application for leave to appeal against sentence is also, therefore, dismissed.
Representation: Mr. D.G. Saw, S.C. leading Miss Denise Chan (D.P.P.) for the Respondent. Applicant in person. |
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