中国民生信托有限公司 v. Fu Kwan
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1943/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 29 February 2024.
1. These are the defendant’s applications made by summonses filed in the 4 actions herein on 31 March 2023 ( “the Summonses” ) pursuant to section 18 of the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap.597, Laws of Hong Kong) ( “the Ordinance” ) to set aside the plaintiff’s registrations of 4 rulings dated 1 December 2020 ( “the Rulings” ) made by the Beijing Third Intermediate People’s Court ( “the Beijing Court” ).
Cited by 4 cases · Cites 5 cases
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HCMP 1943/2022 [2024] HKCFI 590 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1943 OF 2022 __________________
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__________________ AND HCMP 1944/2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1944 OF 2022 __________________
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__________________ AND HCMP 1945/2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1945 OF 2022 __________________
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__________________ AND HCMP 1946/2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1946 OF 2022 __________________
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_________________ DECISION _________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.These are the defendant’s applications made by summonses filed in the 4 actions herein on 31 March 2023 (“the Summonses”) pursuant to section 18 of the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap.597, Laws of Hong Kong) (“the Ordinance”) to set aside the plaintiff’s registrations of 4 rulings dated 1 December 2020 (“the Rulings”) made by the Beijing Third Intermediate People’s Court (“the Beijing Court”). B. BACKGROUND 2.On 4 April 2019, the plaintiff and 新華聯控股有限公司 (“the Borrower”) entered into 4 loan agreements (“the Loan Agreements”) pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to advance the sums of RMB 110 million, RMB 120 million, RMB 110 million and RMB 100 million respectively to the Borrower. 3.On the same day, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into 4 guarantee agreements (“the Guarantee Agreements”), pursuant to which the defendant agreed to guarantee the loans granted to the Borrower under the Loan Agreements. 4.Clause 12.2 of the Guarantee Agreements provides that:
5.The Borrower failed to repay the loans under the Loan Agreements. 6.On 13 January 2020, the Beijing Changan Notary Public Office, upon the plaintiff’s application, issued Certificates for Execution (執行證書) (“the Execution Certificates”), authorizing the plaintiff to apply to the relevant People’s Court with jurisdiction to enforce the Loan Agreements and the Guarantee Agreements. 7.On 14 January 2020, the Beijing Court issued a Notice of Execution (執行通知書), under which the Borrower and the defendant were ordered to comply with the obligations set out in the Execution Certificates immediately. 8.Pursuant to rulings dated 20 January 2020, the enforcement procedures were terminated as the parties reached a settlement agreement. 9.On 10 March 2020, the plaintiff applied to resume the enforcement procedures. 10.On 1 December 2020, the Beijing Court issued the Rulings. The Ruling under (2020) 京03执恢46号之二 reads:
11.The above Ruling was issued in respect of the case under HCMP 1943/2022. The other 3 Rulings issued in relation to the cases under HCMP 1944 – 1946/2022 are identical in substance, save that the reference numbers of the enforcement procedures and the amount to be recovered are different[1]. 12.By 4 Ex Parte Originating Summonses filed on 25 November 2022, the plaintiff applied to register the Rulings pursuant to the Ordinance. Leave to register such Rulings was subsequently granted on 7 March 2023. 13.As aforesaid, the defendant then took out the Summonses on 31 March 2023 and applied to set aside the said registrations. C. THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 14.A judgment creditor under a Mainland judgment may apply to the Court of First Instance within the time limit specified in section 7 of the Ordinance to have the judgment registered in the Court of First Instance: section 5(1) of the Ordinance. Pursuant to section 2 of the Ordinance, “Mainland judgment” means “a judgment, ruling, conciliatory statement or order of payment in civil or commercial matters that is given by a designated court”. 15.Section 7 of the Ordinance stipulates that the time limit for making an application for registration of a Mainland judgment shall be 2 years. It shall be calculated:
16.The judgment creditor has to satisfy a number of requirements in order to cause a Mainland judgment to be registered in the Court of First Instance. Section 5(2) of the Ordinance stipulates that:
17.“Chosen court” has been defined in section 2 of the Ordinance to mean “the court or any of the courts specified in the choice of Mainland court agreement or choice of Hong Kong court agreement, as the case may be, as the court to determine a dispute to which the agreement applies”. 18.On the other hand, “choice of Mainland court agreement” has been defined to be “an agreement concluded by the parties to a specified contract and specifying the courts in the Mainland or any of them as the court to determine a dispute which has arisen or may arise in connection with the specified contract to the exclusion of courts of other jurisdictions”: Section 3(2) of the Ordinance. 19.After a Mainland judgment has been registered in the Court of First Instance, any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced may apply to set aside the registration. Such registration shall be set aside if the Court of First Instance is satisfied that:
20.It is undisputed that the burden of proving the ground(s) for setting aide under section 18(1) of the Ordinance rests with the party seeking to set aside the registration. The standard of proof is “on the balance of probabilities”, that is, the usual civil standard: China Citic Bank Corporation Limited (Quanzhou Branch) v Li Kwai Chun & Others [2019] HKCFI 2540, at [38] – [40]. D. THE GROUNDS OF SETTING ASIDE 21.The defendant relied on the following grounds in each of these setting aside applications:-
E. DISCUSSION E1. The No Choice of Mainland Court Agreement Ground 22.It may be recalled that, pursuant to Clause 12.2 of the Guarantee Agreements (“Clause 12.2”), parties agreed that:
23.In other words, it was their agreement that in the event the defendant did not perform his obligations under the Guarantee Agreements, the defendant would waive his right to contest the claim on the merits and the plaintiff could proceed directly to the court sanctioned execution stage, pursuant to Article 238 of the Mainland Civil Litigation Law (“Article 238”). 24.The defendant argued that Clause 12.2, properly construed, does not constitute a “choice of Mainland court agreement” within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Ordinance, because, as explained by the PRC law experts of both sides, the Mainland Courts’ jurisdiction over the disputes arising from or in connection with the Guarantee Agreements has been excluded by this clause. In other words, since there is no court chosen to “determine a dispute” arising out of the Guarantee Agreements, there is no “choice of Mainland court agreement” as such. 25.Reliance has been placed on the expert opinion as expressed in the expert report dated 12 October 2023 of Mr Zhu Zejun and Mr Yang Yifeng, which stated that:
26.Hence, it was submitted that the Mainland Court at most only had jurisdiction over execution matters, but not the disputes themselves. 27.Whether Clause 12.2 qualifies as a “choice of Mainland court agreement” as defined in section 3(2) of the Ordinance is a matter of interpreting the Ordinance applying Hong Kong law: Beijing Renji Real Estate Development Group Co Ltd v Zhu Min [2022] 4 HKC 116, at [40]. In this regard, the crucial statutory provision, section 3(2) of the Ordinance, reads:
28.For the defendant’s argument to succeed, on one hand, one has to limit the word “dispute” in section 3(2) of the Ordinance to mean “dispute on liability”, and on the other hand, to exclude any dispute on enforcement/execution matters, even if those matters are in connection with the Guarantee Agreements. However, there is nothing in the statutory provision which would support the defendant’s constrained interpretation thereof. In my view, the words “in connection with” should not be interpreted in such a narrow way. These words are apparently wide in nature[3] and should cover all disputes other than those which are entirely unrelated to the Guarantee Agreements. Hence, they must be wide enough to cover disputes over enforcement matters. 29.The defendant then argued that Clause 12.2 falls outside the rubric of section 3(2) of the Ordinance because the relevant People’s Court is designated not by mutual agreement of the parties but by operation of statute. Parties had only chosen the regime provided under Article 238 in the event of non-performance on the part of the defendant, but they had not made any choice of Mainland Court at all. 30.To support this argument, reference has been made by Mr Lam SC to the case of Zhu Min (supra). In that case, there was a Partnership Agreement between the creditor and someone else, and there was also a Guarantee. The defendant therein was only a party to the Guarantee but not a party to the Partnership Agreement. The Guarantee did not contain any clause which specified the Mainland Courts or any of them as the court having the jurisdiction to deal with the relevant disputes. However, in the Partnership Agreement, there was such a clause. By virtue of the operation of the principles of construction or substantive legal rules under the Mainland law, the jurisdiction clause in the Partnership Agreement was treated as applicable as between the parties to the Guarantee. Upon the above background, G Lam JA had the following to say:
31.Mr Lam SC argued that, by the same token, the parties to the Guarantee Agreements herein did not choose Mainland Court at all. It was said that, just like the parties to the Guarantee in Zhu Min who were dictated by the choice made in the Partnership Agreement, the parties to the Guarantee Agreements herein were dictated by the PRC law on the court which would have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 238, and the parties herein were not permitted to designate any particular Mainland Court of their choice for enforcement matters. In other words, the designation of the relevant court under Clause 12.2 is based on the effect of Mainland statute, but not provisions of the Guarantee Agreements. That being so, Clause 12.2 cannot be construed as a choice of Mainland court agreement within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Ordinance. 32.I am afraid I cannot accept such arguments. 33.As accepted by Mr Lam, the provisions in the Guarantee in Zhu Min were totally silent on the parties’ choice of court. However, the situation in the present case is different, in that the parties have expressly chosen the regime under Article 238. This is a very important difference, which renders the analysis in Zhu Min inapplicable to the present case. This is because, even though the parties to the Guarantee Agreements have only chosen to give effect to Article 238, which by virtue of regulation 2 of the People’s Supreme Court mandates that specific courts deal with the direct execution process, this is still an agreement of the parties. This is still their choice. 34.Moreover, it should be noted that section 3(2) only requires the parties to choose the Mainland courts or any of them to determine their disputes. By choosing the regime under Article 238, there is no doubt that the parties have chosen the Mainland courts (but not the courts of any other countries) to determine their disputes. The requirement of section 3(2) is therefore satisfied. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer to what Lisa Wong J stated in The Export-Import Bank of China v Taifeng Textile Group Company Limited & Another [2018] HKCFI 1840, at [76]:
35.In both senior counsel’s oral submissions, it has been emphasised that “parties’ autonomy” should be respected, in that they should be free to choose where they should resolve their dispute. Here, the parties have expressly chosen the regime under Article 238, pursuant to which appropriate Mainland court(s) will handle their dispute on enforcement matters. In effect, they have chosen the courts which will be designated pursuant to the Mainland law under the Article 238 regime. Although they have exercised their power to choose in such a limited way, that is still their choice. Why shouldn’t their choice be respected? 36.Mr Lam SC, while he was on his feet, further expanded his argument and submitted that the Ordinance is not catered towards a regime such as that provided by Article 238 but only a judgment which includes a determination of the rights and obligations between parties. 37.With respect, I do not think it is up to the court to add criteria as such. So long as the criteria laid down in section 5 of the Ordinance are satisfied, the Mainland judgments should be registered; and as long as the grounds under section 18 of the Ordinance are not made out, the registration of the judgments should not be set aside. 38.The No Choice of Mainland Court Agreement Ground is therefore rejected. E2. No Payment Order Ground 39.Under this Ground, the defendant argued that the Rulings (see [10] above) are not orders which have the effect of compelling or demanding him to make any payment to the plaintiff. They are not rulings which order the payment of a sum of money within the meaning of section 5(2)(e) of the Ordinance. 40.The views of the PRC law experts are different on whether the Rulings have the effect of ordering the “payment of a sum of money” as a matter of Mainland law. 41.The defendant’s counsel have helpfully summarised the experts’ respective opinion in their skeleton argument which I would gratefully adopt as follows:
42.I accept the defendant’s submissions that, on a plain reading of the Rulings, there was no demand of payment against the defendant at all. Apart from pronouncing the termination of the execution process, the “adjudication” (裁定) did no more than describing the continuing obligation on the part of the defendant to pay. However, it is obvious that it was not an order of payment in itself. It only referred to an obligation which had been pronounced by the Beijing Court sometime ago on 14 January 2020 in its Notice of Execution. 43.This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the amount due was stated in the earlier part of the Rulings. Even though the Court should take the whole Rulings into account, in my view, it does not necessarily mean that it is reasonable to put two parts of the Rulings together, which is the approach suggested by the plaintiff’s counsel. In the present case, I am of the view that such an approach is wrong, and would distort the effect of the Rulings. 44.Insofar as it is suggested by the plaintiff that the conclusion as to whether the Rulings are legally enforceable in the Mainland would shed light to the question as to whether it is an order for payment, I disagree. As pointed out by the defendant’s counsel, the fact that a document is legally enforceable does not shed any light on the nature of the order thereunder. 45.It should also be borne in mind what the experts said in this regard, as helpfully summarised by the plaintiff’s counsel as follows:
46.I would have thought that it is natural for the Rulings to be relied on in the further enforcement procedure (if one is resumed) because they are the latest Rulings which record the result of the enforcement and the corresponding net amount yet to be paid by the defendant. That would become the starting point of the resumed enforcement procedure. However, if the Rulings are “legally enforceable” in this sense, then that only reinforces the defendant’s argument that there was no order for payment made under the Rulings. 47.It was further argued by the plaintiff that, according to its PRC law expert, the adjudication can be challenged by the defendant by submitting a written objection to the Beijing Court, and if the Beijing Court refuses to accede to the challenge, the defendant can apply to the higher court for review. It was therefore said that there is an adjudicative nature in the Rulings. 48.In my view, one has got to consider the whole Rulings in context so as to understand the expert evidence properly. The Rulings are dealing with the enforcement procedure and the amount of money which has been successfully enforced. As pointed out by the plaintiff’s own expert, it is when the defendant disputes the amount recovered upon enforcement (“執行的金額”) or the conduct of execution (“執行行為”) that he can make the challenge and apply for review[5]. Although the result of such challenge/review would have an impact on the outstanding amount payable, that would not make the Rulings an order for payment. 49.Furthermore, one may recall that there is a time limit of 2 years within which the judgment creditor must apply for registration of judgment in Hong Kong. If the plaintiff is right, then that would mean that every time there is a partial execution of a previous order for payment, and whenever the Mainland Court issues “adjudication” like the Rulings, the time of 2 years would run again. That cannot be right. The absurdity of this result reinforces my view that the Ruling simply cannot be an order for payment which is intended to be covered by the Ordinance. 50.I therefore conclude that the defendant has made out the No Payment Order Ground, and therefore the registrations of the Rulings should be set aside. 51.Strictly speaking, there is no need for me to consider the 5 remaining Grounds. However, for the sake of completeness, I shall do so below. E3. The Contravention Ground 52.Under this Ground, the defendant argued that, since the Rulings are not enforceable in the Mainland, the requirement under section 5(2)(d) is not satisfied and therefore the registrations of the Rulings must be liable to be set aside. 53.Section 6(2) of the Ordinance provides that:
54.For this purpose, the plaintiff has produced a Certificate (生效證明) issued by the Beijing Court on 15 November 2022 which certifies that the Rulings have taken legal effect. 55.The defendant argued that the aforesaid Certificate cannot possibly be referable to the Rulings because it predates the Rulings. This argument must be bad because it is factually incorrect: The Rulings are dated 1 December 2020, which predate the said Certificate rather than the other way round. 56.The defendant then argued that the Rulings are not directly enforceable because the plaintiff admittedly has to rely on the Notarisation Certificates and Execution Certificates (and not the Rulings) to apply for enforcement. 57.With respect, I do not think this argument assists the defendant. As pointed out by Mr Man SC, there is simply no requirement of “direct” enforcement under the Ordinance as such. 58.The Contravention Ground is therefore rejected. E4. The Not Summoned to Appear Ground 59.Under this Ground, it was submitted that since the Rulings were given in circumstances where the defendant, who did not appear in the original Court to defend the proceedings, was not summoned to appear according to the law of the Mainland, the registration of the Rulings ought to be set aside pursuant to section 18(1)(f) of the Ordinance. 60.Section 18(1)(f) of the Ordinance reads:
61.It is undisputed that, as a matter of PRC law, there was no court hearing in respect of the Rulings, because the parties had elected to adopt the regime under Article 238. 62.Be that as it may, it was argued by the defendant that there was a breach of natural justice, for the defendant had never been summoned to attend any hearing. 63.It was further alleged that since the defendant was never summoned to take part in any court proceedings, that is the end of the matter, for section 18(1)(f) applies immediately. 64.With greatest respect, these arguments must be rejected. 65.First, I agree with the plaintiff’s analysis that this Ground is only applicable where the law of the Mainland lays down a requirement of summoning the judgment debtor to appear, but somehow the requirement is not complied with. That is apparently not the case here, because pursuant to Article 238, no such summoning would be necessary. The condition of “not summoned to appear according to the law of the Mainland” simply did not exist. 66.Second, I do not accept the defendant’s argument that the words “according to the law of the Mainland” in section 18(1)(f) mean that the mode of summoning is required to satisfy the relevant Mainland law requirement. Taking into account the purpose and the rationale behind this provision, I am of the view that the focus must be on whether the defendant has been summoned to appear, rather than on the mode of summoning. Hence, in my view, the words “according to the law of the Mainland” must be referring to whether the defendant is required to be summoned to appear. 67.Third, while the defendant has placed heavy emphasis on natural justice and procedural fairness, one must not forget that it is undeniable that it was the defendant who agreed to adopt the Article 238 regime, under which he has waived his right to defend. It is not up to him to make a complaint that he was not summoned to appear before the Mainland Court. 68.Fourth, an analogy may be drawn with the situation in Hong Kong where the defendant decides not to contest the plaintiff’s claim by ticking “No” in the Acknowledgement of Service. In such a case, judgment would be entered against the defendant, and he would not be summoned to attend Court. In such a situation, can it be said that section 18(1)(f) is satisfied by the mere fact that the defendant is not “summoned to appear”? Clearly not. 69.The Not Summoned to Appear Ground is therefore rejected. E5. The Public Policy Ground 70.The background of this Ground has been set out by the defendant’s counsel which I gratefully adopt as follows. 71.Following the termination of the Enforcement Procedures pursuant to the Rulings, reorganisation proceedings were initiated against the Borrower. By a Civil Judgment (民事裁定書) dated 9 August 2022, the Mainland Court accepted an application to place the Borrower into reorganisation (“受理湖南富興集團有限公司對新華聯有限公司 [the Borrower] 的重整申請”) (“the Reorganisation”). 72.The plaintiff has itself participated in the Reorganisation and has registered the alleged debt owed by the Borrower with the Bankruptcy Administrator designated by the Mainland Court on around 28 October 2022. Verification of the alleged debt took place at the Borrower’s first creditors meeting on 8 November 2022. 73.As at June 2023, three potential investors have been shortlisted to facilitate the Reorganisation of the Borrower. The identities of such investors were expected to be finalised by mid-to-late July 2023, by which time the Reorganisation would have made substantial progress. 74.Upon the above background, the defendant argued this Ground in the following way:
75.According to the expert evidence adduced by the defendant:
76.With greatest respect to the defendant’s experts, and to the defendant’s counsel who saw fit to rely on this aspect of the opinion, this argument is made to be rejected. 77.First of all, taking the defendant’s case to the highest, it is only possible (可能) that the defendant’s motivation to cooperate in the Reorganisation would be (or had been) adversely affected. However, as pointed out by the plaintiff’s counsel, the defendant himself did not assert that his motivation would be so affected. Hence, this argument immediately falls away. Any argument which is made on the basis of such alleged “detrimental impact” also collapses. 78.Second, I cannot see why it can be said that it is highly unfair and inequitable for the plaintiff to, on one hand, participate in the Reorganisation of the Borrower, and on the other hand, continue to take action against the defendant as guarantor in respect of the same underlying debt simultaneously. After all, it is undisputed that the defendant and the Borrower have joint and several liability to repay the debts. It is absolutely proper for the plaintiff to try to recover the debt from both of them, so long as there is no double recovery. 79.As far as double recovery is concerned, as the plaintiff’s counsel pointed out, there is no reason to believe (and it is not so asserted by the defendant) that any recovery of debts in Hong Kong would not be taken into account in the Reorganisation. Furthermore, given the defendant’s involvement in the Reorganisation, there is no doubt that he would know if there is indeed any double recovery as such. 80.Third, it cannot be against public policy for a creditor to go after his debtor on the basis that such a debtor may as a result be less motivated to cooperate in another matter, even if that matter would affect the rate of recoverability of debt of his company. 81.The defendant’s counsel also queried whether the Beijing Court was aware of the existence of the Reorganisation and the plaintiff’s participation therein when the Rulings were issued. As a matter of fact, since the Reorganisation only started on 9 August 2022, the Beijing Court could not possibly have been aware of it when the Rulings were issued on 1 December 2020. In any event, such knowledge is totally irrelevant for the present purpose. 82.For the above reasons, I take the view that the Public Policy Ground is totally unmeritorious. E6. The Material Non-Disclosure Ground 83.Under this Ground, it was alleged that the plaintiff had failed to disclose and/or draw to the Court’s attention matters relating to the ongoing Reorganisation of the Borrower and the plaintiff’s very own participation in the same. 84.For the reasons explained under section E5 above, the Reorganisation of the Borrower is totally irrelevant, particularly when the bankruptcy restructuring of the Borrower is far from complete, and the plaintiff has not recovered anything thereunder.[8] 85.Hence, applying an objective test as to materiality, I am of the view that there was no “material non-disclosure” as alleged. 86.This Ground is therefore rejected. E7. The Miscalculation of Interest Ground 87.Since this Court shall set aside the registrations of the Rulings, strictly speaking, I do not have to deal with the arguments under this head. However, for the sake of completeness, I will deal with it briefly. 88.I will first of all set out the background in relation to this Ground below. For the sake of convenience, I would focus on the figures in HCMP 1943/2022. The circumstances under the other 3 cases are identical to those under HCMP 1943/2022, only the principal amount (and as a result the interest) are different. The relevant background is as follows:
89.On the basis of the above, it was argued that, even if none of the grounds for setting aside the registrations of the Rulings has been made out, the Court should at least discharge part of the registration orders which provide for an inflated amount of interest. 90.The plaintiff has not adduced any expert evidence to challenge the defendant’s case that the interest should only have accrued up to 9 August 2022 by reason of the Reorganisation. However, it was argued on its behalf that:
91.With respect, I do not accept the plaintiff’s submissions. 92.It is undisputed that the registration of Mainland Judgements should be in terms of what was readily apparent on the face of the Mainland judgment, without the necessity of the Hong Kong Court scrutinising the evidence or documents in the Mainland proceedings, or conducting a mini-trial of the evidence as to the correct sum allowed and ordered to be payable by a judgment debtor: Foshan Nanhai Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd v Foshan Ruifeng Petroleum and Chemical Fuel Co Ltd [2019] 2 HKLRD 478, at [39]. 93.Therefore, I do not consider it right for the plaintiff to invite the Court to scrutinise the Execution Certificates. 94.Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the calculation of interest was provided by the plaintiff’s solicitors by letter to the Court. In the event such calculation was wrong which led to an erroneous order, there is no reason why the Court should not take action so as to correct the mistake. 95.Therefore, I agree with the defendant that in the circumstances where all the previous grounds are dismissed, the Court should at least discharge part of the registrations of the Rulings and re-register them by reference to the correct amount of interest. ORDER 96.By reasons of the aforesaid, I order that the registrations of the Rulings be set aside on the ground that the Rulings do not satisfy the requirement under section 5(2)(e) of the Ordinance in that they do not order the payment of a sum of money. COSTS 97.While the defendant has successfully set aside the registrations, many of the grounds which he relied on have been rejected. 98.I therefore make a costs order nisi that the plaintiff shall bear 25% of the defendant’s costs of the Summonses, with certificate for two counsel, to be taxed if not agreed. 99.The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, shall be made by letter, and will be disposed of on paper) within 14 days hereof.
Mr Bernard Man SC leading Mr James Man, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the plaintiff Mr Douglas Lam SC leading Mr Michael Lok and Ms Clara Wong, instructed by Li & Partners, for the defendant [1] Hence, for the sake of convenience, whenever necessary, this Decision would only refer to the orders/rulings made in the subject matter of HCMP 1943/2022, but the discussion would be applicable to the other 3 cases. [2] The part on legal documents has not been pursued by the defendant in the hearing [3] See, for example, VK Holdings (HK) Limited v Panasonic Eco Solutions (Hong Kong) Company Limited (HCCT 19/2014, unreported, 19 December 2014), at [30] [4] Paragraph 55(4) of the plaintiff’s skeleton argument [5] Wang Yuying’s opinion dated 20 September 2023, at §12.3.4 [6] Paragraph 75 of the defendant’s skeleton argument [7] Pages 10 – 11 of the expert report dated March 2023 of Mr Zhu Zejun and Mr Yang Yifeng [8] See the 4th Affirmation of Gu Liang of the plaintiff, at paragraph 9, which is undisputed in the defendant’s affirmation in reply | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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