Re Hayat Khawar
Read the full judgment text of CACV 142/2023 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 16 June 2025.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) given on 5 May 2023 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 31 December 2018 [1] (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 Februar
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CACV 142/2023, [2025] HKCA 553 On appeal from [2023] HKCFI 1206 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 142 OF 2023 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 15/2019) ____________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) given on 5 May 2023 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 31 December 2018[1] (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 February 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant’s non‑refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong illegally on 16 January 2016 and surrendered to the Immigration Department on the same day. Subsequently, he lodged a non-refoulement claim made by way of a written representation dated 22 June 2016. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by his uncle Umer Hayat by reason of a land dispute. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [4] to [9] of the Judge’s decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[2]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 27 February 2018 (i.e. the Director’s Decision), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk[3], the BOR 3 risk[4], the persecution risk[5] and the torture risk[6]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Board. After a hearing on 12 November 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on 31 December 2018 by the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. The Board found that the inconsistencies and contradictions in the applicant’s evidence rendered his account of events, on which his alleged threat of harm was said to be based, unreliable and incredible. The Judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 3 January 2019 seeking to judicially review the Board’s Decision, without setting out any grounds for review. 7.In the applicant’s supporting affirmation, he stated that the problems in his home country were still unresolved, and that if he were refouled his life would be in danger. 8.After summarising the facts and background of the case, giving due consideration to the Decisions of the Director and the Board, the Judge refused to grant leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [14] to [16] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 9.In the Notice of Appeal dated 10 May 2023, the applicant claimed that he was unaware of the “reasons” for the Judge’s decision. 10.The applicant lodged written submissions on 24 May 2023, which contained no more than repetitions of the alleged dangers he may face should he be refouled, as well as his dissatisfaction, without elaboration on the same, against the Judge’s decision. 11.On 28 August 2024, the applicant filed an affirmation with the court (“the Withdrawal Application”), applying to “close [his] case no CACV 142/2023”. 12.The applicant did not request an oral hearing and consented to the appeal being disposed of on paper by the court. We will accordingly deal with the appeal on paper on the basis of the materials already filed with the court. Discussion 13.There is no reason why the present appeal should not be dismissed on the basis of the Withdrawal Application alone. However, we have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the appeal. 14.The applicant has in his Notice of Appeal failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review, it is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening. The applicant has wholly failed to do so. 15.As this court has repeatedly held, an application for leave for judicial review is not a rehearing of the appeal to the Board and the court’s role is not to act as an avenue of further appeal from the Board. It is incumbent on the applicant to point out the procedural or other public law errors allegedly committed by the Board. The Judge would not be required himself to come to a view on whether the applicant would face any of the proscribed risks of harm upon return. The court should not usurp the role of the Board and will only intervene if public law grounds for doing so are established. See Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160, Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152, Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162, and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163. The Judge considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board and found no basis for intervening. In our view, he was clearly correct to do so. 16.As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision. 17.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] Erroneously dated 12 Marc 2018 in the applicant’s Form 86. [3] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [6] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. |
Cases cited in this judgment