Miss Yuen Oi Yee Lisa v. Best Spirits Company Ltd

DCCJ 5723/2016

[2025] HKDC 2144

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 5723 OF 2016

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DECISION

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1.This is the ex parte application of the plaintiff (“Ms Yuen”) for RPO leave to amend the generally endorsed writ in this action to join Billy Ma and Wong Chi Leung as defendants based on the allegations in (i) the draft Statement of Claim lodged under the cover of her letter dated 5 June 2025 (“the draft SOC”) and (ii) points 4 and 5 of her letter to the Law Society dated 12 December 2019: see her letters dated 1 September, 14 October and 28 October 2025 lodged herein and her affirmation dated 6 October 2025 filed in DCCJ 1914/2015.

2.The relevant RPO is the one dated 16 November 2015 in DCCJ 1914/2015 (“the relevant RPO”).[1] According to that order:

(a)  Ms Yuen is restrained by para 5(a) from commencing any fresh proceedings in the District Court concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to DCCJ 1914/2015, LBTC 588/2011 and HCA 2045/2012 against the defendants in that action and their legal representatives (including Hobson & Ma, their current or former employees, officers, partners and consultants) without leave of the District Court.

(b)  Para 5(b) clarifies that she may commence fresh proceedings against Best Spirits Company Limited (“Best Spirits”) under section 66 of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) to claim damages for injury to her feelings “as a result of the contravention identified in the Result of Investigation dated 16 May 2013 of the Privacy Commissioner”.

3.Billy Ma and Wong Chi Leung were the partners of the solicitors’ firm Hobson & Ma. The firm represented some of the defendants in DCCJ 1914/2015 and acted for Best Spirits in this action. The firm closed in January 2025 and Deacons was appointed as the Intervention Agent.

4.The averments in the draft SOC and Ms Yuen’s letter to the Law Society concerning Billy Ma and Wong Chi Leung have nothing to do with the contravention identified in the Result of Investigation mentioned in para 5(b) of the relevant RPO which, subject to what I say below, should be the subject matter of this action. There is no basis to join Billy Ma and Wong Chi Leung in this action.

5.Apart from irrelevant averments, the draft SOC also contains scandalous accusations against Judges and Judicial Officers. For example, Ms Yuen alleges that (a) Lam PJ had “secret communication” with Hobson & Ma (paras 20 to 26, 46 & 82) and “had done the dirty tricks against [her] behind the screen” (para 35) and (b) “Mr Winston Leung lied … under the pressure from a Judge in High Court either Justice Lam or Justice Geoffrey Ma” (para 64). Ms Yuen should not be allowed to file and serve the draft SOC in this action.

6.In my view, this action has a more fundamental problem. Ms Yuen purportedly commenced this action pursuant to the RPO leave granted in HCMP 1087/2005. She alleged in the general indorsement that:

“… This writ is issued pursuant to leaves granted to me by Justice Queeny Au Yeung in High Court on 4^th February 2014 against Best Spirits Company Limited, 8^th April 2015 against Mr MA Wah Yan Billy, Mr WONG Chi Leung & Messrs Hobson & Ma, 2^nd October 2015 against Mr AU-YEUNG Yau Ming Philip, all for my claim of HK$16,000,000.00 under Section 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance which is a precedent case in HKSAR.”

7.When she commenced this action, the draft writ was accompanied by copies of the letters from the High Court dated 8 April 2015 and 2 October 2015 entitled HCMP 1087/2005.

8.According to the judgment of Lam J (as Lam PJ then was) dated 9 January 2006 in HCMP 1087/2005 (reported in [2006] 1 HKLRD 679):

(a)  HCMP 1087/2005 was the application of the Secretary for Justice for a section 27 order against Ms Yuen. Apart from HCMP 1087/2005, the court also dealt with HCA 96/2005 and HCA 509/2005 relating to Ms Yuen. (paras 1, 3 & 6)

(b)  Eventually, the court made the RPO and RAO annexed to the judgment against Ms Yuen, and the Secretary for Justice withdrew the section 27 proceedings. (para 9)

(c)  The vexatious nature of Ms Yuen’s actions that justified the RPO included: “She had difficulties in accepting unfavourable results and she simply commenced fresh proceedings after defeats in previous actions… She repeatedly made unfounded allegations against Tang JA and lawyers acting for her opponents, including allegations of conspiracy. She has threatened to commence legal proceedings against the lawyers.” (para 11)

9.According to the general indorsement on the writ, Ms Yuen is claiming “HK$16,000,000.00 under Section 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance) which is a precedent case in HKSAR” in this action. The subject matter of this action is not related to the proceedings set out in Part A of Schedule 1 or the subject matters set out in Part B of Schedule 1 of the RPO in HCMP 1087/2005 (see para 1(a) & Schedule 1 of the order). That, I believe, was the reason why the High Court granted RPO leave to Ms Yuen.

10.But Ms Yuen is also subject to the relevant RPO, which came after the RPO in HCMP 1087/2005. As a matter of fact, her claim herein is identical to her claim in DCCJ 1914/2015 which was struck out: see the Judgment dated 16 November 2015 in DCCJ 1914/2015. As I explained in that judgment:

“51. In my view, what Madam Yuen is attempting to do in this action is to rerun Mr Lee’s [her husband] case in LBTC 588/2011 in the guise of her own claim under s 66 of the PDPO. Her claim, which is dependent on her husband’s future loss of earnings, is identical to Mr Lee’s claim in HCA 2045/2012. Thus viewed, Madam Yuen is mounting a collateral attack on the correctness of both the LT decision and the CFI decision.

…

59. For present purposes, Mr Lam [defence counsel] does not dispute that based on the investigation result of the Privacy Commissioner … there is contravention of DPP5 on the part of D8. So insofar as Madam Yuen has suffered any injury to feelings by reason of D8’s contravention of DPP5, she may have a claim against D8 under s 66.

…

61. As I have explained at the hearing, it is ultimately for Madam Yuen to formulate her claim insofar as she is alleging any injury to feelings as a result of the contravention. At present, her claim as pleaded is dependent on Mr Lee’s loss of earnings. Apart from mentioning the term ‘injury to feelings’ and suggesting that her claim is over and above Mr Lee’s loss, there is no pleading pertaining to any injury to feelings.”

11.Ms Yuen’s appeal was dismissed, and the Court of Appeal (“CA”) commented in the Judgment dated 18 February 2016 in HCMP 3305/2015:

“12. After carefully going through the evidence before him, the Judge concluded that the action was a re-litigation of LBCT 588/2011 and HCA 2045/2012. Those actions were commenced by the applicant’s husband but had already been dismissed. The Judge found that the applicant had a direct interest in the outcome of her husband’s claim in those actions and was therefore his privy. She cannot re-litigate those matters by virtue of the action below. In our view, the Judge was entirely correct in his analysis and reasoning.”

12.Thereafter:

(a)  Ms Yuen applied for RPO leave in August 2016 to commence fresh proceedings against D1, D3, D4 and D6 of DCCJ 1914/2015 for “HK$16,000,000.00 under s 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486)”. That application was dismissed.

Upon Ms Yuen’s appeal, the CA commented, “As rightly pointed out by the Judge, the Intended Action is a mere repetition of DCCJ 1914/2015, which had already been struck out. The applicant is not entitled to resurrect that action, which the Judge had found to be an abuse of process, in the guise of a fresh action. The Judge was entirely correct in making the Order. The applicant’s intended appeal has no merits whatsoever…”: see para 7 of the Judgment dated 28 November 2016 in HCMP 2652/2016.

Ms Yuen’s application for leave to further appeal to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) was dismissed: see the Judgment dated 22 December 2016 in HCMP 2652/2016.

(b)  Ms Yuen applied for RPO leave in November 2016 to commence fresh proceedings against Billy Ma, Wong Chi Leung, Hobson & Ma and Philip Au-Yeung for “HK$16,000,000.00 under section 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance which is a precedent case in HKSAR”. That application was dismissed.

Upon Ms Yuen’s appeal, the CA commented, “The bulk of the court papers and documents put in by the plaintiff bear no relevance to her present leave application. The plaintiff essentially recites her past litigation history, exhibits voluminous correspondences she had with the court and others, in addition to mounting attacks on judges who had previously dealt with proceedings concerning her. The plaintiff’s grounds of appeal and the written submissions come nowhere near showing that the Judge was in error in concluding that the intended fresh proceedings were mere repetition of DCCJ 1914/2015 and DCCJ 1915/2015, both of which had been struck out. It is plain that the intended appeal in no way satisfies the threshold of reasonable prospect of success.”: see para 17 of the Judgment dated 3 March 2017 in HCMP 1/2017.

Ms Yuen’s application for leave to further appeal to the CFA was dismissed: see the Judgment dated 2 May 2017 of the CA in HCMP 1/2017.

(c)  Ms Yuen applied for RPO leave again in January 2023 to commence fresh proceedings against D6 of DCCJ 1914/2015 for “Compensation under Section 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) of HK$16,000,000.00”. That application was dismissed.

Upon Ms Yuen’s appeal, the CA commented, “Having reviewed all the documents provided by the plaintiff, we are of the view that the intended appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.”: see para 13 in [2023] HKCA 797.

13.When Ms Yuen commenced the present action, she initially named Philip Au-Yeung, Billy Ma, Wong Chi Leung and Hobson & Ma alongside Best Spirits as defendants in the draft writ. When she was reminded by the Registry of the relevant RPO, she deleted the other intended defendants and issued the writ herein against Best Spirits only.

14.But the problem with this action remains. This court and the Court of Appeal have repeatedly ruled that the formulation of her claim is not acceptable. And her identical claim in DCCJ 1914/2015 against Best Spirits (as D8 of that action) was struck out. In the present instance, she may not use the RPO leave in HCMP 1087/2005 to circumvent the relevant RPO.

15.Para 10 of the relevant RPO provides that should Ms Yuen issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of para 5 of the order without first seeking the leave of the District Court, such fresh proceedings should be referred to the designated judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed. I take the view that Ms Yuen’s claim herein is caught by the terms of the relevant RPO and should be dismissed.

16.It has been 20 years since the RPO in HCMP 1087/2005 and 10 years since the relevant RPO. It is clear from the above that Ms Yuen has not learned a lesson and persists in her vexatious activities. Notwithstanding the unfavourable results, she keeps coming back in her attempts to file the same claim against her opponents and their lawyers. Worse still, she has again resorted to making unfounded allegations against Judges and Judicial Officers and the lawyers acting for her opponents, such as allegations of conspiracy.

17.For the above reasons:

(a)  the application for RPO leave to join Billy Ma and Wong Chi Leung in this action is dismissed; and

(b)  this action is dismissed.

18.Apart from returning the acknowledgment of service, Best Spirits has not taken steps in these proceedings. I make a costs order nisi that there be no order as to costs in this action. Unless an application has been made to vary the order nisi, it shall become absolute 14 days after the handing down of this decision.

19.I direct a copy of this decision be sent to Best Spirits and Deacons by ordinary post for their reference.

The plaintiff appeared in person