Dewi Septiyani v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
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HCAL 1525/2026 [2026] HKCFI 5394 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1525 OF 2026 BETWEEN
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 1 September 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 June 2026 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:- 2.The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 March 2026 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Amendment 3.In Form 86, the applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondent, when only the Board should be so named. 4.The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a respondent at all. 5.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”. The applicant’s case 6.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above. 7.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or even killed by her husband named Muhamad Gilang Ferdiansyah due to his previous violence on her and her discontinuation of remittance to him after her employment contract as a domestic helper in Hong Kong was terminated. Disposal on paper 8.The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court. Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper. Grounds for judicial review 9.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016). 10.The applicant did not advance any ground for her intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affidavit/affirmation dated 1 September 2026. Discussion 11.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524). 12.Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality as aforesaid. 13.In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 9 June 2026. The applicant was present via Remote Official Visit System as she was detained at the material time, and was thus given the chance to present her case to the Board. 14.As can be seen from paragraphs 45 to 69 of the Board’s Decision, the Board questioned the applicant extensively at the Board’s hearing to try to understand her case better. The Board gave full and detailed reasoning as to why it found that the applicant was not a reliable witness and her evidence made during the Board’s hearing contradicted with what were set out in the applicant’s Non-refoulement Claim Form and given in the screening interview. The Board also found that the applicant might try to fabricate more evidence in the Grounds of Appeal so as to enhance her alleged fear for her safety. The Board found that the applicant’s information and evidence were not believable and her claimed risks could not be established. Thus, the Board would dismiss her appeal/petition. 15.Nevertheless, despite its finding on the applicant’s credibility as summarised above, the Board found that even if the information and evidence of the applicant were to be accepted, it would still dismiss her appeal/petition, and had given its full reasons for such a conclusion in paragraphs 71 to 121 of the Board’s Decision. 16.In gist, the Board found no sufficient evidence showing that the applicant’s husband had a real intention to seriously harm or kill the applicant. The threats from her husband were more consistent with expressions of anger over financial dependency than with a credible, imminent plan to kill her. In these circumstances, the Board considered the applicant’s assertion that she would be seriously harmed or killed by her husband upon her return to Indonesia was too far-fetched, and the Board did not accept that her perceived risk of harm from her husband was real and foreseeable. 17.Moreover, the applicant’s problem with her husband was solely a private dispute that had nothing to do with the Indonesian government or any of the Convention reasons. Having considered the intensity of past ill-treatment the applicant claimed and the nature of the threats made by her husband, the Board did not accept that any ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, inflicted upon the applicant by her husband had attained a minimum level of severity. 18.The Board also noted that the applicant had never sought assistance from the police in Indonesia. The Board found the applicant’s claim that the Indonesian authorities could not protect her was totally her own conjecture without factual basis. The Board found objective information indicating that the Indonesian police and authorities could provide protection to the public, and the Indonesian government had taken practical steps to improve their effectiveness and human rights awareness. 19.Further, the Board had given full reasons in paragraphs 95 to 103 of the Board’s Decision for its conclusion that it was not unreasonable or unduly harsh for the applicant to relocate to a place other than her hometown, such as Jakarta and Medan, to earn a living and to avoid her perceived harm from her husband, if any, upon her return to Indonesia. 20.Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM. 21.The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its decision. 22.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision. 23.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused. Conclusion 24.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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