Singh Narinder Pal v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

CACV 100/2026, [2026] HKCA 1798

On Appeal from [2026] HKCFI 86

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 100 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1294 OF 2020)

________________________

BETWEEN

_____________________

_____________________

JUDGMENT

_____________________

Hon H. Au-Yeung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

THE APPLICATION

1.On 2 April 2026, this Court handed down a judgment ([2026] HKCA 596) (“the Judgment”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew (“the Judge”) dated 28 January 2026 refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review.  The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2.The facts and issues in the applicant’s appeal, as well as the reasons for dismissing it, were set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

3.By a Notice of Motion filed on 16 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal by stating that:

“I would like to inform Court of Final Appeal.  There are same Error in my Law Maker authorities.  They were not perperly investigation in my claim.  They not give me Justice. Decision maker make my decision same like Torture Claims Appeal Board/ director of Immigration.  I do not Think my case determined fairly.”.

4.In his written submissions lodged on 30 April 2026, he alleges numerous deficiencies in the decisions of the Director, Board and the Judge without particulars (such as the Judge’s failure to “apply” irrationality and procedural unfairness to the decisions of the Director and the Board, irrationality in the Board’s decision as to state protection and the Board failed to give him sufficient chance to arrange relevant evidence).  He also states that he will face hardship and death and that he fears torture if refouled.  Some of these arguments were not raised in the substantive appeal before us. 

5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on paper.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents before the Court.

DISCUSSION

6.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484, Laws of Hong Kong) (“the Ordinance”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, from any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

7.In the present application, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters which he has raised.

8.Further, the Notice of Motion has not identified any error in the Judgment. 

9.It is not permissible for the applicant to raise the new arguments in the written submissions at this stage.  In any event, they are bare assertions.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. 

10.Moreover, it is trite that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion to re-run arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (CACV 221/2013, unreported, 14 November 2014 at [2] and [3]).

11.We are therefore satisfied that this application has no merits.  Neither do we see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance.

DISPOSITION

12.For the above reasons, the matters advanced by the applicant do not constitute valid grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. 

13.The Notice of Motion filed on 16 April 2026 is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person