Re Mandol Pobitro
|
CACV 74/2026, [2026] HKCA 1877 On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 619 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 74 OF 2026 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1152 OF 2021) _______________
_______________
_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.On 21 April 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 10 April 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 619). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Lewis Law (“the Judge”) dated 16 January 2026, by which the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2026] HKCFI 172). 2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them here. After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1. 3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. 4.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:
5.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions in support of his present application on 4 May 2026. In those submissions, the applicant complained that the Board had been procedurally improper and unfair in failing to consider or give weight to relevant considerations, and that his enemy remained powerful. He also complained that the Board had erred in law in failing to consider the country of origin condition that his country would not be able to protect him from his enemies. He further claimed that the decision makers did not “observe [his] fear properly” and it remained unsafe for him to return to home country. 6.In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit. His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence. General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. His allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [3] ‑ [10] of the Judgment. He has not identified any specific error in the Judgment. It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3]. His assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal. 7.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance. 8.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. 9.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.
The applicant acting in person |
Summaries and metadata are generated from the judgment. Report an error
Cases cited in this judgment