Re Suleman Muhammad

CAMP 116/2025, [2026] HKCA 1874

On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 301

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 116 OF 2025

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 337 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 25 March 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 5 March 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 301).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s reapplication for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) dated 14 November 2023, by which the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2023] HKCFI 2924).

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“The decision were not reasonable and indeed the right and to is protected were not, the Adjudicater was procedurally in proper and for in fair, when assessing whether to accept explanation provided by me and unreasonable requires me to reponse.  The decision of the torture claim appeal board did not include specific assessment of the applicant.  The Court of appeal held in other cases that the exit-ance of legal representation at the Director stage does not necessary mean that there is no potention specific basic which had been advance of properly advance, because of assence of legal representive.” (sic)

5.On 25 March 2026, the applicant also filed a supporting affirmation together with 39 pages of supporting documents (“the Documents”).  In the supporting affirmation, the applicant also claimed that this court had been unfair in failing to allow him an opportunity to clarify his case in an oral hearing.

6.Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 12 August 2026, pages 16 ‑ 21 of the Documents shall be treated as the applicant’s written submissions in support of the present application.  In those submissions, the applicant complained about the lack of language and legal assistance and that decisions by the court had been reached without any oral hearing.  He also claimed that the Board’s Decision was not read or translated to him and he was deprived of the opportunity “to make a full application”.

7.By a letter dated 14 May 2026, the Director of Immigration notified the court that the applicant was removed from Hong Kong in the period between 4 May 2026 and 10 May 2026.

8.In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are just a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected in full: see [4] ‑ [16] of the Judgment.  He has failed to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3].  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

9.Moreover, his allegations on the absence of oral hearing before the Judge and the Board are wholly unfounded on the facts.  According to the court record, the applicant attended an oral hearing before the Judge on 19 October 2023 for his application for leave to apply for judicial review and made submissions with the assistance of an interpreter.  He also attended the oral hearing held on 6 February 2025 before the Judge for his application for extension of time to appeal and also made submissions with the assistance of an interpreter.  The applicant also attended the oral hearing before the Board on 7 August 2017 and gave evidence: see [39] ‑ [40] of the Board’s Decision and [10] of the Leave Decision.  Clearly, the applicant had ample opportunities (both orally and in writing) to present his case fully before the Board and the Judge.  His complaints are thus wholly without basis.

10.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

11.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

12.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant acting in person