HKSAR v. Chun Wo Construction and Engineering Co Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 251/2003 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 June 2003.
1. The Appellant, which is a limited company, was the contractor responsible for a construction site in Tin Shui Wai. It appeared before P L Chan, Esq. in the Magistrate's Court at Sha Tin on two charges arising out of events at that construction site on 13 August 2002. Both charges were brought under the Construction Sites (Safety) Regulations, Cap. 59. One was that the Appellant, being the contractor responsible for a construction site at which there was being carried out a process which resul
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HCMA000251/2003 HCMA 251/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 251 OF 2003 (ON APPEAL FROM STS 900319-20/2002) ____________
____________ Coram: The Hon Mrs Justice V. Bokhary in Court Date of Hearing: 11 June 2003 Date of Judgment: 25 June 2003 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.The Appellant, which is a limited company, was the contractor responsible for a construction site in Tin Shui Wai. It appeared before P L Chan, Esq. in the Magistrate's Court at Sha Tin on two charges arising out of events at that construction site on 13 August 2002. Both charges were brought under the Construction Sites (Safety) Regulations, Cap. 59. One was that the Appellant, being the contractor responsible for a construction site at which there was being carried out a process which resulted in particles of material being produced in such a manner that they were likely to enter the eyes of a workman engaged in the process, failed to ensure that the workman used the suitable goggles provided. This charge, which I will call the "goggles" charge, was laid under Regulations 43(b), 68(1)(a) and 68(2)(b). 2.The other charge was that the Appellant, being the contractor responsible for a construction site, failed to ensure that no timber with projecting nails was used or left on the site where the projecting nails were a source of danger to workmen working there. This charge, which I will call the "nails" charge, was laid under Regulations 51, 68(1)(a) and 68(2)(b). 3.On 20 January 2003, the Magistrate convicted the Appellant on both charges. The Appellant appeals against both convictions. In respect of the 'nails' charge, it also appeals against sentence and the order for costs. I will come to that later. I will deal with conviction first. Conviction 4.Two perfected grounds of appeal against conviction have been filed. They read as follows:
5.It is convenient to deal with ground 2 first. In dealing with it, I will begin by setting out what the Magistrate said in his Statement of Findings about the evidence which he accepted, namely that of PW1 who was the only prosecution witness. 6.This is what the Magistrate said about PW1's evidence on the "goggles" charge:
7.As to PW1's evidence on the "nails" charge, the Magistrate said:
8.Two defence witnesses were called. This is what the Magistrate said about their evidence, which he rejected:
9.Although he rejected DW2's evidence, the Magistrate said that he would have convicted on the "nails" charge even if he accepted DW2's evidence because:
10.As it happened, however, the Magistrate accepted PW1's evidence and rejected the evidence of DW1 and DW2. This is what the Magistrate said as to why:
11.Even though a Magistrate - and the same applies to a District Court Judge, I might add - does not say so in terms, an appellate court would normally take him to have assessed the witnesses' demeanour not in isolation but in the context of all the circumstances of the case including its inherent probabilities. And an appellate court would normally trust a professional tribunal not to convict by accepting prosecution evidence and rejecting defence evidence except after a careful consideration of all those circumstances and with the criminal burden and standard of proof firmly in mind. Appellate courts normally take professional tribunals to have behaved in the foregoing way because that is the natural way for professional tribunals to behave. If there is any actual indication to the contrary in any given case, that is another matter. But there is no such indication in the present case. Ground 2 asserts without foundation that the Magistrate relied "only" on demeanour as if he did that in a way which was blinkered to all else. This ground fails. 12.I will now revert to ground 1. It arises out of the part of the case about which the Magistrate said this in his Statement of Findings:
13.If a statutory offence requires certain mens rea or is of strict but not absolute liability in that it admits of some defence, then that would arise out of the true construction of the statute. It would not be a matter of a "common law defence". 14.What is the defence which it is submitted is available on the true construction of these regulations? This is how it is put in the skeleton argument provided by Mr Mumford for the Appellant:
Regulation 43(b), being the one under which the "goggles" charge was brought, reads:
Regulation 51, being the one under which the "nails" charge was brought, reads:
15.The defence argued by Mr Mumford under each of those regulations is this. Even if the Appellant failed to ensure the existence of the state of affairs which those regulations require it to ensure, a defence would still, Mr Mumford submits, be available. It is a defence, Mr Mumford submits, if the Appellant proves on balance that it believed for good and sufficient reason, albeit erroneously, that the state of affairs which it was required to ensure existed actually existed. 16.The evidence on which Mr Mumford submits that this defence was made out consist partly of defence evidence which I have held the Magistrate justifiably rejected, partly of documents and partly of certain evidence which the prosecution had not disputed at the trial. The documents really go to support the evidence which had not been disputed by the prosecution at the trial. This undisputed evidence was that of DW1, the Appellant's safety officer, that, to quote from para. 19 of the Magistrate's Statement of Findings, the Appellant "had a system of safety procedures, which were implemented". So this was a system which, even though it was implemented, failed to bring about the state of affairs which the Appellant was required to ensure under each regulation. The defence for which Mr Mumford argues, assuming it exists in law, is not made out merely by having a safety system which is implemented. Merely having a safety system aimed at a certain result does not of itself provide good and sufficient reason for believing that the result had been achieved. 17.Assuming without deciding that there is under each of these regulations a defence in law like the one for which Mr Mumford argues, I am satisfied that no such defence was made out on the evidence in the present case. So this ground also fails. 18.Mr Mumford for the Appellant said that if the defence existed in law but the Magistrate held that it did not exist in law, then the Appellant must succeed without reference to the facts. I reject that argument. The Court is concerned with the correctness of the result and not merely every pronouncement of law made by the Magistrate in the case. No party can succeed on academic points unrelated to the facts of the case. 19.In the result, neither conviction can be disturbed, and the appeal against convictions is dismissed. That leaves the appeal against sentence and costs. Sentence 20.Each charge was brought under a separate summons. On each charge, the Magistrate fined the Appellant $15,000 and ordered it to pay $2,500 costs. In respect of the "nails" charge, the Appellant also appeals against sentence and the order for costs. 21.Here Mr Mumford's submission is that the sentence on the "nails" charge should not have been as severe as the one on the "goggles" charge because the Appellant has no previous conviction similar to the one on the "nails" charge even though it had four previous convictions similar to the one on the "goggles" charge, the last such conviction having been on 12 May 2000. 22.In my view, the Magistrate would have been entitled, if he had seen fit, to sentence considerably more heavily on the "goggles" charge than he did. The physical safety of persons was involved. All things considered, I feel unable to say that the sentence on the "nails" charge was not one which the Magistrate was entitled to pass. As to the order for costs, I am of the view that the Magistrate was entitled to make it. Accordingly, I also dismiss the appeal against sentence and costs.
Representation: Mr Christopher Mumford, SC, instructed by Messrs Chan & Tsu, for the Appellant Mr Joseph Wong, SGC of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent |
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