Secretary for Justice v. Li Man Tak and Others
Read the full judgment text of CAAR 1/2005 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 26 April 2007.
1. This matter now comes before us as an application by the Secretary for Justice (the applicant) under section 81A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221, leave having been granted on 15 July 2005, to review the sentences imposed in the District Court on 25 June 2005 by Judge Sweeney in regard to each of the respondents. This application follows the dismissal of an application for leave to appeal against conviction in CACC 303/2005 by Li Man-tak where the facts with which we are present
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CAAR 1/2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL APPLICATION for review NO. 1 OF 2005 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 689 of 2004) ____________________ BETWEEN
____________________ Before: Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Suffiad J and Barnes J Date of Hearing: 26 April 2007 Date of Judgment: 26 April 2007 ______________________ J U D G M E N T ______________________ Stuart-Moore, VP (giving the judgment of the Court): Background 1.This matter now comes before us as an application by the Secretary for Justice (the applicant) under section 81A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221, leave having been granted on 15 July 2005, to review the sentences imposed in the District Court on 25 June 2005 by Judge Sweeney in regard to each of the respondents. This application follows the dismissal of an application for leave to appeal against conviction in CACC 303/2005 by Li Man-tak where the facts with which we are presently concerned are fully set out in the judgment. In the same proceedings, Tan Chye-seng, Nicholas (D4) was successful in his appeal against conviction. 2.It suffices, for present purposes, to provide a brief account of the allegations against each of the respondents, Li Man-tak (D1) whose sentence in total was 3 years’ imprisonment, and Lin Chak-pui, Louis (D2) and Foo Tiang-hock, Adrian (D3) both of whose sentences totalled 2 years’ imprisonment. The principal submission of the applicant is that the totality of the sentences each of them received was manifestly inadequate. 1. There were seven charges before the court. These included two charges, 2A and 2B, which were alternatives to charge 2. In due course, the 3rd charge resulted in acquittals and the 5th charge was left on the file. 3.The 1st charge, on which D1 was convicted after trial and to which D2 and D3 pleaded guilty, alleged a conspiracy to offer advantages to an agent, contrary to sections 9(2)(a) and 12(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201, and sections 159A and 159C of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200. The particulars of this charge were that D1, D2 and D3:
4.The judge took a 2-year starting point for each of the respondents on the 1st charge. Giving a one-third discount to D2 and D3, they each received a sentence on this charge of 16 months’ imprisonment. The sentence for D1 was 2 years’ imprisonment. 5.The judge convicted D1 on charge 2B whereas D2 pleaded guilty to charge 2A. These charges each alleged a conspiracy in identical terms to the 1st charge but the particulars of charge 2A, where they differed from the 1st charge, were that D2 conspired with D1, D3 and D4 to offer advantages … to D4:
6.Again, the particulars of charge 2B were in slightly different terms and alleged against D1, D2 and D3 (and D4) that they conspired to offer advantages … to D4:
7.The judge again took a 2-year starting point on these charges. In D1’s case, taking totality into account, he ordered that one year of the sentence should be served consecutively to the sentence on the 1st charge, making 3 years in all. D2, received the usual discount of a third for his plea, leaving 16 months on charge 2A. As to this, the judge ordered that 8 months should be served consecutively to the sentence on the 1st charge, making 2 years’ imprisonment in all. 8.D3 pleaded guilty to the 4th charge of accepting an advantage as an agent, contrary to sections 9(1)(a) and 12(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201. The particulars were that he:
Again the judge adopted a starting point of 2 years and reduced this by a third to 16 months ordering that 8 months of D3’s sentence should be served consecutively to his sentence on the 1st charge, making a total of 2 years’ imprisonment. 9.In addition to the custodial orders made by the judge, he ordered that the $700,000 seized from D3’s safe deposit box at his bank should be forfeited to the government. A similar order was made in respect of the monies represented by a cheque for $591,000 which D2 admitted receiving as the result of the conspiracy covered by the 1st charge. This review is not concerned with the propriety of those orders. Overview of prosecution’s case 10.Mr McWalters SC, on the applicant’s behalf, has put before us a most useful synopsis of the evidence which in large measure we can adopt. He correctly pointed out that there were three separate areas of corrupt conduct covered by the charges on which the respondents were convicted. Two of these concerned D1 whose family controlled about forty-five per cent of the shares of Kwong Hing International Holdings (Bermuda) Limited (“Kwong Hing”). This company, which manufactured and sold knitted fabric and dyed yarn, was registered in Hong Kong as an overseas company and was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 11.In short, D1, an executive director of Kwong Hing, made corrupt efforts to manipulate the value of Kwong Hing’s stock by offering bribes to employees of two other companies whose opinion about the worth of Kwong Hing stock could influence the perception in the marketplace of its value. These employees were D3 who was a fund manager of ING Investment Management Asia Pacific (Hong Kong) Limited (“ING”) and, allegedly, D4, who was a research analyst for UBS AG (“UBS”). 12.In D1’s dealings with D3 and D4, D2 was used as an intermediary together with his colleague, Vincent Yum. D2 and Vincent Yum, who gave evidence for the prosecution under immunity, worked for an investment company, SBI E2-Capital China Holdings Limited (“SBI E2”) which advised its clients (including Kwong Hing and ING), about share placements. D2 was the director in charge of the Corporate Finance Department and Vincent Yum was in charge of the Equity Capital Market Department. 13.The conspiracy, the subject of the 1st charge, related to bribes of $589,000 paid by D1 to D3 for D3 to arrange for ING to purchase blocks of Kwong Hing shares and to hold them for six months and $591,000 was paid to D2 as intermediary. Vincent Yum received a similar sum. In all, the corrupt money involved in this charge was said to be just under $2.4 million. 14.The 2nd conspiracy involving D2 on charge 2A and D1 on charge 2B related to a bribe offered by D1 to D4 for D4 to arrange the publication by UBS of a favourable market research report on Kwong Hing, again with D2 acting as an intermediary. D4 was said to have received a share amounting to $800,000 out of the total bribe of a million dollars offered by D1. Vincent Yum as intermediary received $100,000 and D2 was offered an amount representing a percentage of the value of the shares involved in this conspiracy which was likely to have amounted to a high figure. However, as officers attached to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) carried out the arrests of the corrupt participants on 25 February 2004, D2 was unable to receive any payment. 15.The third area of criminality to which Mr McWalters directed our attention concerned D3 alone on the 4th charge. D3 admitted that Vincent Yum entered into an agreement with a person known as Lee Yuen-tsu, Lincoln, to assist a company known as LeRoi Holdings Limited to effect placement of its shares. The amount to be paid to Vincent Yum was to be calculated by reference to the difference between HK$0.17 per share and the placement price of the shares. 20 percent of this amount was to go to Vincent Yum who then approached D3 who, in turn, agreed to use ING’s funds to take up a tranche of LeRoi’s shares in return for a monetary reward. 16.In September 2003, Vincent Yum, through a subsidiary of SBI E2 placed a total of 120 million LeRoi shares to investors, including 18 million to ING, at a placing price of HK0.37 per share. After Vincent Yum had received his share of the profit, he paid D3 HK$1 million as his reward for ING taking a placement of LeRoi shares. 17.Further background to the case appears as we have said in the earlier judgment given in CACC 303/2005 which we do not for present purposes need to repeat. 18.When dismissing D1’s leave application on 13 September 2006 in CACC 303/2005, this court (at paras. 110 and 111) described the offences as a “very serious case of corruption, involving the managing director of a public listed company and senior employees of leading international finance houses in Hong Kong” adding that it was “a fraud against not just the company and its shareholders or the respective financial houses, but the public at large”. Emphasis was also placed on the impact on Hong Kong’s image as a world-class financial centre. Mitigation 19.The judge in the court below took into account the mitigation advanced on behalf of each of the respondents. In the light of this and having read “eloquent letters” in support of what had been stated, the judge was satisfied that the respondents, all of whom had clear records, came from hard-working and respectable families. In this respect, they had suffered “a great fall from grace” and he described each of them as facing “personal, financial and career ruination”. He went on to say:
The application 20.Earlier in his sentencing remarks, in a comment which is criticised by Mr McWalters, the judge had spoken of D1 as merely having made efforts to “illegally ramp up the share price of his family-owned textile company” which was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Mr McWalters contended also that the judge had erred by belittling the impact of the respondents’ conduct when describing this as the tilting of a level playing field in favour of a particular company by corrupt means. In addition, he submitted that the judge had failed to give proper weight to the breach of trust which was involved in the conduct of D3 or to the impact of D3’s conduct on the company employing him. 21.The stance taken by the applicant overall was that the sentences imposed by the judge failed to reflect the need for sentencing in cases involving corruption to contain a significant element of general deterrence. In this regard, Mr McWalters emphasised the importance of giving proper weight when sentencing to the impact of conduct which adversely affected the integrity of the securities marketplace in Hong Kong as well as the particular impact in the present case upon institutional and private investors who may have acted upon the endorsement of Kwong Hing by ING and UBS. 22.Mr McWalters criticised also the application of the totality principle in regard to all the respondents and the narrow focus of the judge’s sentencing remarks (set out in paragraphs 23 to 25 of the Reasons for Sentence to which we have already referred) without making reference also to the corrupt means by which these conspiracies were carried out. 23.With these considerations in mind, Mr McWalters submitted that the starting points adopted by the judge were manifestly inadequate and furthermore, as each respondent faced charges involving two separate and distinct conspiracies, the judge would have been fully entitled to have imposed wholly consecutive sentences in respect of them. Mr McWalters accepted, however, that if the judge had adopted proper starting points for these offences, there might then have been room for the application of the totality principle. 24.We can see some force in the applicant’s submissions in so far as these sentences were, in our opinion, plainly on the low side. This is not, however, to say that we consider that they were so inadequate as to call for our intervention. In this respect, the respondents can regard themselves as having been fortunate to have received merciful sentences which, on these facts, were undeserved. 25.Accordingly, this application is refused.
Mr McWaters, SC, DDPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Applicant. Mr Andrew Macrae, SC, Mr Joseph Tse, SC and Ms Maggie Wong Pui Kei, instructed by Messrs Tai, Mak & Partners, for the 1st Respondent (D1). Mr Grossman, SC, instructed by Messrs Waller Ma & Huang & Yeung, for the 2nd Respondent (D2). Mr Andrew Bruce, SC, instructed by Messrs P C Woo & Co., for the 3rd Respondent (D3). |
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