Mak Yuk King v. The Personal Representativesof Wong Wah Wai, Deceased
Read the full judgment text of CACV 47/2013 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 12 February 2015.
1. I agree with the judgment of Yuen JA.
Cites 3 cases
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CACV 47/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 47 OF 2013 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 850 OF 2009) ------------------------ BETWEEN
AND BETWEEN
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_______________________ J U D G M E N T _______________________ Hon Cheung JA: 1.I agree with the judgment of Yuen JA. Hon Yuen JA: 2.This is an appeal by Mr Wong Tak Seng (“Mr Wong”) from the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Burrell (“the judge”) given on 19 February 2013. As the judgment was written in English, this judgment is also written in English although the appeal was conducted in Chinese. An interpreter will be made available to Mr Wong if he is present when this judgment is handed down, and a Chinese translation will be provided to him in due course if he so requests. Background 3.Mr Wong’s father Wong Wah Wai (“the deceased”) died on 8 July 2008 aged 74, intestate. The following assets (“the Assets”) were in his sole name at the time of his death:
Proceedings 4.In proceedings commenced against Mr Wong as personal representative of the deceased’s estate, Madam Mak Yuk King (“Madam Mak”) claimed that she had been living with the deceased as man and wife since 1993 and that:
further or alternatively,
5.The trial took place over three days in January and February 2013. Both parties were legally represented. Madam Mak gave oral evidence and called five witnesses. Mr Wong also gave evidence and called one witness. Facts 6.1.The deceased had a complicated personal life. He married in China when he was 21. According to the documentary evidence, he and his wife had two children, a daughter and a son (Mr Wong). 6.2.However before Mr Wong was born, the deceased (then in his mid-20s’) left China. He went first to Macau, and a year later moved to Hong Kong. In the judge’s words the deceased had “no contact of any relevance” with his wife after he left China (para. 8, Judgment). 7.The deceased lived on his own in Hong Kong, eventually setting up a clinic selling herbs and practising as a herbalist and bonesetter. 8.1.In 1989, when the deceased was in his 50's, he met Madam Mak when she consulted him at his clinic. She later began working for him as his only employee and received $4000 a month. 8.2.Their relationship developed. In 1993 Madam Mak divorced her husband, from whom she had separated some 10 years ago. The judge found that the deceased and Madam Mak gave a banquet in her home town announcing their relationship as de facto man and wife, and Madam Mak and her two daughters (then in their teens) lived with the deceased. The deceased and Madam Mak treated each other as man and wife, and he supported her daughters whose father died a year after the divorce. 8.3.More importantly for present purposes, after they started to live together as man and wife, Madam Mak no longer drew a wage, even though she continued to work at the clinic. The judge accepted her evidence that she worked longer hours, and expanded the scope of her work to include sourcing herbs in Hong Kong and the mainland at no or reduced cost with the help of her family and contacts. As a result the clinic prospered. 9.Six years later (in 1999), the deceased and Madam Mak decided to acquire a flat as their residence. The Flat was bought, without a mortgage, with profits from the clinic. The Flat was registered in the deceased’s sole name, and the judge found that this was because Madam Mak was registered as a tenant of a public housing unit and she did not wish to lose the unit. It was an unchallenged fact that the title deeds to the Flat were kept by Madam Mak. 10.1.As far as home life was concerned, the deceased and Madam Mak and her daughters regarded one another as family. The daughters’ education was funded by profits from the clinic. When one of them got married, photographs showed the deceased participating at the wedding party as part of the family. From time to time, the deceased went on vacation with Madam Mak and/or her daughters. 10.2.In other words, the deceased’s life with Madam Mak was no different from that of a normal married couple who worked together at a business. 11.1.Coming then to Mr Wong, he was born after the deceased had left China and they only met for the first time in 1980, when Mr Wong was 20 years old. In 1992, the deceased helped Mr Wong set up home in Macau by buying a flat for him. 11.2.Nevertheless the judge found that Mr Wong did not enjoy a close relationship with the deceased. Mr Wong’s travel records showed that in the 4 years from June 2004 to July 2008 (when the deceased died), he only made 8 visits from Macau to Hong Kong, on each occasion returning to Macau on the same day. The judge further noted that no photographs of the deceased with Mr Wong or the latter’s children were produced. 12.This then was the background against which the judge had to decide whether
Judgment 13.1.The judge found that the deceased had made a gift of the Flat to Madam Mak by way of donatio mortis causa, and that the requirements of a common intention constructive trust were satisfied in respect of the other Assets. 13.2.As far as the cash in the bank account was concerned, it stood originally at about $1m. After taking into account the cost of funeral expenses and a withdrawal of $300,000 for Mr Wong’s use for legal expenses, the judge ordered that the balance (thought to be about $500,000) should be paid to Madam Mak. The judge indicated that in ordering the balance to be so paid, he had taken into account the evidence that Madam Mak would have to repay relations on the mainland from whom she had borrowed money for the deceased’s medical expenses there (para. 39, Judgment). 13.3.As for the securities, the judge considered that it would be equitable to apportion the securities account equally between the deceased and Madam Mak. Appeal 14.1.Mr Wong appealed. The grounds in his notice of appeal were brief, and challenged the judge’s findings of fact. 14.2.In his oral submissions Mr Wong said when the deceased was in hospital and knew he was terminally ill, the deceased had said that he had “幾百萬” (“a few millions”, the first word “幾＂indicating “at least three”), and since there was only about $1m in cash and $1m in securities, that meant that he regarded the Flat as his, and that he had not intended to give it to Madam Mak. 14.3.Mr Wong also submitted that if there was a common intention that Madam Mak was to have a beneficial interest in the Assets, the deceased would not have held them in his sole name, and he pointed to the fact that a flat in Panyu had been held by the deceased and one of Madam Mak’s daughters as co-owners. 14.4.Mr Wong also submitted that Madam Mak was still claiming comprehensive social security assistance until 2001. New documents 15.In addition to written submissions, on 15 January 2015 Mr Wong had filed a clip of documents with the court. These comprised:
16.We ascertained at the hearing that none of those documents had been produced at trial. However there was no application from Mr Wong for leave to adduce fresh evidence, and it was far too late for him to make an application at the hearing of the appeal itself. 17.1.In any event, even assuming that prior to the hearing of the appeal he had made an application to adduce these documents as fresh evidence, he would have failed to satisfy the first condition of Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. 17.2.As far as the first two sets of documents were concerned, they were his own documents and could have been obtained at the trial with reasonable diligence. 17.3.As for the last set of documents, they relate to a point which had in fact been made at the trial concerning the issue whether a flat in Panyu had been co-owned by the deceased with Miss Cheung (paras. 40-42, Judgment). As these were official registry documents, again this was evidence which could have been obtained at the time of trial with reasonable diligence. 17.4.When asked why these documents had not been produced at trial, Mr Wong was only able to say that his lawyers had not asked him to do so. 17.5.As the first condition of Ladd v Marshall has not been satisfied, I have not taken these documents into account on appeal. It is not necessary for me to consider whether they would have assisted Mr Wong in his appeal in any event. Discussion Donatio mortis causa 18.I shall first recount the judge’s findings in respect of the claim of donatio mortis causa, because if this principle applied, then the Flat would not fall to be included as part of the deceased’s assets, even if originally the Flat was acquired either for himself alone or on the basis of common intention constructive trust. In a donatio mortis causa situation, a donee becomes absolutely entitled to the property on the donor’s death and the property is not part of the donor’s assets at all. Thus it has been said that a donee takes not under, but against, the deceased’s personal representative (Re Estate of Lung Nga Lai Eilly [2014] 4 HKLRD 823, para. 7). 19.1.The judge found that about a month before the deceased died, when he was seriously ill with cancer in hospital in Guangzhou after having received treatment for a few months,
19.2.Although the judge did not specify any particular statement(s) from the oral testimony of Madam Mak and other witnesses, that is his finding of fact after having seen and heard the witnesses. He held:
20.1.However in a passage following, the judge also said this:
20.2.I have to say that at one stage I had some difficulty with that passage. If all that the deceased had said was that he intended to put the Flat into joint names when he returned to Hong Kong, the requirements of donatio mortis causa would not have been satisfied. 20.3.That is because a donatio mortis causa is a present gift (albeit a conditional one). If the deceased’s only intention was to put the Flat into joint names when he returned to Hong Kong, his gift of the property (or an interest therein) would not be made until he signed the conveyancing document to make Madam Mak a joint tenant. 20.4.Further, a joint tenant acquires an immediate interest in property (which can be converted any time into a tenancy in common by way of severance), and so the property would not pass only upon death as in a donatio mortis causa. 20.5.Moreover in the passage referred to in para.20.1 above, the words “(presumably having recovered from his illness)” appear to be inconsistent with the finding referred to in para.19.1 that the deceased knew of the seriousness of his illness. 21.1.However I do not think that what the judge meant in the passage referred to in para. 20.1 was that he found donatio mortis causa to have been proved by the statement in that passage, or that the statement was all that the deceased had said. 21.2.Reading that passage in context, I think the judge was reconciling his finding of donatio mortis causa (as a result of other statements made by the deceased referred to in para. 19.1) with the deceased’s statement regarding his intention to put the Flat into joint names should he be fortunate enough to recover from his illness. (In fact when the deceased returned to Hong Kong he was already so ill that he could only be given palliative care and he died in less than a week). 21.3. Accordingly I do not think the passage referred to detracts from the judge’s finding of donatio. 22.1.The judge’s judgment was based on findings of fact, and despite Mr Wong’s submissions (which were also made at trial by his counsel), it is well-established that an appellate court should be very slow to interfere with findings of primary fact. As Lord Hoffmann said in Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1997] RPC 1 and repeated in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360:
22.2.To this, Bokhary PJ added in Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336:
22.3.I do not see any grounds for this court to overturn the judge’s finding that the deceased had made a donatio mortis causa of the Flat to Madam Mak. Common intention constructive trust 23.I come now to the other Assets. 24.1.The judge found that the remaining assets (ie the cash and the securities) had been acquired “since and as a result of” the deceased and Madam Mak becoming de facto man and wife (para. 19, Judgment). They had been acquired with the income of the clinic, which had prospered with Madam Mak’s contributions after 1993. 24.2.The judge found that the deceased and Madam Mak had shared a common intention that they would both be beneficially entitled to the assets, and he accepted Madam Mak’s evidence of the deceased’s representations to her that she and her daughters would be looked after even after he died (paras. 30-31, Judgment). 24.3.The judge also found that Madam Mak had relied upon such representations to her detriment. He said (para. 34, Judgment):
24.4.He found it would be unconscionable for the deceased’s estate to deny Madam Mak’s beneficial interest whatever it might be (para. 31, Judgment). 24.5.As for the point made by Mr Wong as to the Assets having remained in the deceased’s sole name, the judge found that this was because the deceased and Madam Mak were of a generation, background and culture where it would be regarded as normal to place a family’s assets in the name of the head of the household (para. 20, Judgment) and the Panyu property was a different matter of which there was insufficient evidence at trial for the judge to make a proper finding (paras.40-42, Judgment). As for Madam Mak’s claim for social security assistance, this was a matter of which the judge was aware, just as he was aware that she continued to hold onto her public housing unit even after she had started living with the deceased at the Flat. Apportionment Cash 25.Originally there was about $1m cash. However, the account was reduced by funeral expenses and a sum of $300,000 for Mr Wong to use on legal expenses. The judge ordered that the balance (thought to be about $500,000) should be paid to Madam Mak. However it would be noted that the judge was aware that Madam Mak had borrowed quite substantial sums of money from her relations (nearly $300,000 from the husband of a niece) for the deceased’s medical expenses on the mainland (para. 39, Judgment). The order for the balance to be paid to Madam Mak was therefore a rough and ready calculation which was consistent with an equal apportionment which the judge was entitled to make on his findings of fact. Securities 26.As for the securities account, the judge also ordered equal apportionment. He referred to “second guessing what a will might have said had one been written” (para. 37, Judgment). However when a court considers a common intention constructive trust, the focus is on both parties’ common intention at an earlier point in time, not on one party’s testamentary bequests. I think what the judge meant was that whilst the deceased and Madam Mak had shared a common intention that they would both be beneficially entitled to the assets when they were acquired, it was not their intention that the survivor would take the entirety on the death of the other, and that the deceased had intended to retain his share of the cash and securities accounts as he would have wished to provide for his son. Again this was consistent with an equal apportionment which the judge was entitled to make on his findings of fact. Order 27.For the reasons set out above, I would dismiss the appeal with an order that the costs of the appeal should follow the event ie the appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs. Hon D Pang J: 28.I also agree with the judgment of Yuen JA. Hon Cheung JA: 29.Accordingly the appeal is dismissed and the appellant is to pay the respondent the costs of the appeal.
Mr Ken To, instructed by Joseph Leung & Associates, for the plaintiff (respondent) The defendant (appellant) appeared in person |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 47/2013