HKSAR v. Chang, Louise Su Lin
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 650/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 February 2016.
1. The appellant was charged with one charge of careless driving, contrary to section 38(1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374 of Laws of Hong Kong. The appellant pleaded not guilty and was convicted after trial in the Kwun Tong Magistrates’ Court by Deputy Special Magistrate Mr Andrew Hung (referred to as “the magistrate” below) and fined $800. The appellant appealed against the conviction.
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 3 cases
|
[English Translation — 英譯本] IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 650 OF 2015 (ON APPEAL FROM ESS 26615/2015) ______________________
______________________
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1.The appellant was charged with one charge of careless driving, contrary to section 38(1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374 of Laws of Hong Kong. The appellant pleaded not guilty and was convicted after trial in the Kwun Tong Magistrates’ Court by Deputy Special Magistrate Mr Andrew Hung (referred to as “the magistrate” below) and fined $800. The appellant appealed against the conviction. 2.After hearing, I allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence. I now give my reasons. Facts of the case 3.Ms Catherine Ko, SADPP (Acting) on behalf of the respondent recounted the cases of both sides in her written submissions, which I adopt as follows:
Grounds of appeal 4.Mr Foster Yim of counsel, representing the appellant, initially put forward nine grounds of appeal altogether, alleging that the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory, and subsequently withdrew his allegation that the magistrate had been “unfair”. 5.In my view, in this appeal I am only required to deal with one of the grounds: ground (7) — the magistrate was wrong in refusing the appellant’s explanation. My consideration 6.There was no independent witness in the present case, and only those two persons knew what had happened. The incident happened at 11:49 pm and the speed limit of the road was 50 kph. With regard to the traffic at that time, if a driver intended to exceed the speed limit, he could do so under suchobjective circumstances. PW1, ie the bus driver, and the appellant were both involved in the matter. They were both interested parties as regards who had or had not driven carelessly. Neither of them was “an independent witness”. They both might try to minimize their involvement in the matter. 7.The burden of proof lay on the prosecution. If what the defence said was or might be true, that means the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had driven carelessly. [1] 8.The magistrate indicated that he did not believe the exculpatory explanation given by PW1 [sic] under caution and two of the reasons given were:
9.I find the reasons that the magistrate has relied on all incorrect. Why did the presence of twenty odd passengers on board lead to the conclusion of “simply making it impossible for PW1 to drive at excessive speed”? Whether a driver is or will be driving at excessive speed is up to the driver. The number of passengers does not inevitably “make it impossible” for the driver to exceed the speed limit. 10.The magistrate also said “[impossible] for PW1 to drive at excessive speed even if he wanted to because of his scruple of being complained by passengers”. In the present case, there is no evidence showing that PW1 had scruple of being complained by the passengers. Moreover, if this argument of the magistrate were correct, no professional driver would drive at excessive speed. 11.Furthermore, the magistrate said that he was not satisfied with what the appellant said because she only said that the bus was “very fast” but could not tell the actual speed. This is a view that I think is arguable. Many people cannot accurately tell speed or distance but can give descriptions only with abstract wording such as “very fast” and “very far”. 12.In the present case, the magistrate was wrong in refusing what the appellant said. If what the appellant said was or might be true, then the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt successfully. 13.In dealing with this appeal by way of “rehearing”, I only have the transcript of the trial and did not have the advantage of listening to and observing the witnesses at first-hand. I could not make findings on facts in respect of whether the version given by PW1 or the appellant was reliable.[2] Under such circumstances, the prosecution has failed in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had committed careless driving. Conclusion 14.In the light of the above reasons, I allowed the appeal with the conviction quashed and sentence set aside.
Ms Catherin PC Ko, SADPP (Acting) of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Foster HC Yim, instructed by Messrs Tony Kan & Co, for the Appellant Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and vetted by Mr Patrick W.S. Cheung,Barrister-at-law. [1] See the authority Archbold Hong Kong 2016 4-210 and the precedents cited therein, including: Sze Kwan Lung & Others v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 475, Law Chung Ki & Another v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 701 and Liberato & Others v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 [2] See HKSAR v Ip Chin Kei & Others [2012] 4 HKLRD 383 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCMA 650/2015