Ac v. Mfhj
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 17626/2012 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 3 August 2018 before His Honour Judge I Wong.
Matrimonial Causes – Variation of Maintenance – Consent Order – Material Change in Circumstances – Financial Needs – Child Support – Costs. The court considered an application to vary a consent order for child maintenance. The petitioner sought an increase while the respondent sought a reduction and damages. The court found a material change in circumstances due to the respondent's career setbacks and the petitioner's financial independence. The maintenance was suspended for a period and then varied to $5,800 per month. Claims for damages and refunds were dismissed. Costs were awarded partially to the respondent.
Legal issues: Variation of maintenance order · Material change in circumstances · Financial needs of parties and child · Respondent's claim for refund and damages · Maintenance arrears and suspension
Outcome: Maintenance suspended and varied; applications dismissed.
Cites 4 cases
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FCMC 17626 / 2012 [2018] HKFC 127 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NUMBER 17626 OF 2012 ----------------------------
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__________________ Judgment __________________ Introduction 1.This trial deals with various money matters, the main issue being whether the maintenance payable by the respondent father for the benefit of their daughter should be varied or not. The parties are poles apart. The petitioner mother is seeking a substantial increase whilst the respondent father is seeking a discharge of his obligation, and at the same time, a monthly sum of $12,500 payable by the petitioner as maintenance for their daughter. Background 2.The petitioner, now aged 39, is an Indonesian-Chinese and was brought up there. The respondent is French and now 44 years old. The parties met in London when the petitioner was studying for her master’s degree and the respondent was working there. After the petitioner had returned to Indonesia for good in 2005 the parties decided to live together. They chose Hong Kong and so they came in 2006 and have since been living here. They gave birth to their only daughter in September 2006 who, in this judgment, is referred to as “SF”. SF is now 11 years old. 3.On 27 November 2012 the petitioner petitioned for divorce on the ground of the respondent’s unreasonable behaviour. At that time, both parties were legally represented. The petition was initially contested with an Answer. With the assistance of their solicitors, after a few scuffles the parties were able to settle their disputes resulting in turning the petition to an uncontested one and 3 consent summonses embodying the terms of their settlement. The first consent summons was on the arrangement of SF, then followed by the second and the third consent summons dealing with the maintenance of SF and the parties’ financial matters respectively. The Settlement Reached by the Parties upon their Divorce – the 3 Consent Orders Consent Order dated 29 November 2013 (“the 1st Consent Order”) 4.By the 1st Consent Order, the joint custody of SF is granted to the parties with care and control to the petitioner. The respondent is to have access to SF from 6:00 pm Friday until 9:00 am the following Monday for 3 consecutive weeks; leaving one weekend for the mother to stay with the daughter. On the top of that, the respondent would also have access from 6:00 pm to 8:30 pm every Wednesday. As for long holidays, without going into the details, the overall arrangement is that each party is to have an equal share of the time if he or she would like to take SF out of Hong Kong. 5.There are also undertakings embodied in the order that they would keep the other party informed of and consult with each other as regards the major decisions in relation to SF including but not limited to medical, educational and religious issues and the selection of extra-curricular activities and that SF will continue to attend her piano class every Saturday and Mandarin class every Tuesday and Thursday and no other extra-curricular activities shall be committed to without the consent of the other party. 6.Turning to the financial aspects, the same were settled during the Financial Dispute Resolution hearing of 7 July 2014, resulting in 2 consent orders. Consent Order dated 30 July 2014 (“the 2nd Consent Order”) 7.The 2nd Consent Order contains an undertaking by the respondent that he is to pay “the school expenses directly payable to the school including school fees, school trips, school bus fees and the like in full for the child of the family, (SF) until she shall reach the age of 18 years of age or completes full time education whichever is the later”. 8.There is also an order that the respondent is to pay the petitioner a monthly sum of $8,000 per month for the maintenance of SF. This is the very order subject to review at this trial. Consent Order dated 30 October 2014 (“the 3rd Consent Order”) 9.As for the petitioner’s application for her own ancillary relief, the parties decided to have a clean break on that. In brief, the 3rd Consent Order expressly provided that the settlement terms are for full and final settlement of each’s claim against the other. The respondent had to pay the petitioner a capital sum of $4,420,000 by 2 equal instalments. 10.There are also various undertakings, acknowledgments or agreements given by the parties. I only need to set out those that are relevant to the issues before me:
11.Decree nisi was granted on 30 October 2014; and it was made absolute on 22 January 2015. 12.While what the parties had at the time of their divorce might only have been a few scuffles, the real battles were in the aftermath. Troubles soon emerged even before the granting of the decree absolute. In no time the parties found themselves in court again on the respondent’s applications in November 2014 for (1) varying the lump sum payment from 2 instalments to 6; and (2) for varying SF’s monthly maintenance from $8,000 to zero. These were caused, according to the respondent, by the downturn of his career resulting in a plunge of his income and his inability to raise funds for the lump sum. Fortunately, before the respondent’s applications came to trial he was able to honour his agreement. According to him, it was not until July 2015 that he was able to liquidate his apartment in London, which allowed him to be able to make the payments in full out of the net proceeds of $6,125,000. The applications were withdrawn by way of a consent summons on 31 August 2015 with an order that the respondent was to bear the petitioner’s costs. The Applications 13.The applications now before me are the latest ones only. As can be seen below, the parties are now at their loggerheads, up to the point, in my view, of being somewhat irrational and even puerile in maintaining his or her own stance. 14.There are a number of applications from both sides. The first 2 gun-shots were fired by the petitioner. 15.First, on 13 March 2017, with the leave of the court the petitioner took out a judgment summons on which she alleged that the respondent defaulted in paying SF’s monthly maintenance as from April 2016. 16.Secondly, on 27 April, 2017, she applied to have the monthly maintenance for SF to be increased from $8,000 to $60,000. That, she said, is for renting a larger accommodation for her and the daughter. 17.The next day, on 28 April, 2017, probably a reaction to the petitioner’s application, the respondent applied to have the monthly maintenance to be reduced to zero. Then on 10 July, 2017, he took out 3 further applications for:
18.In his affirmation of 10 July 2017, the respondent even claimed for monthly maintenance in the sum of $12,500 payable by the petitioner for the benefit of SF. 19.By an order dated 26 June 2017, the petitioner’s judgment summons was adjourned pending the determination of the variation applications. The respondent’s application regarding SF’s access and holidays is being dealt with separately. A social investigation report has already been submitted to the court and the matter is due to be dealt with by way of a Children Dispute Resolution on 21 August 2018. Hence, this Judgment would deal with the financial matters only. 20.There is also a small matter. By an order dated 24 October 2017, upon the application of the respondent, I gave an order that the registration of the petitioner’s Notice of Application against the respondent’s property be vacated with costs reserved. I would also need to dispose of the costs issue here. 21.Lastly, it is necessary to mention that at the time of this trial, there was a taxation proceedings taken out by the petitioner for the assessment of her costs arising from the respondent’s previous withdrawn applications for variation of the lump sum instalments and the monthly maintenance referred to in [12] above. I am told that there will be a further hearing before the taxing master on 31 August 2018 in order for the matter to be concluded. Present Situation of the Parties 22.The petitioner is living with SF and a domestic helper in a 44 m2 2-bedroom rented apartment in Kennedy Town. This has been her home since she moved out of the former matrimonial home in June 2012. She is now working as a business support manager in a leading bank with a monthly salary of $45,000. 23.SF is attending Year 5 in an international school in Aberdeen. She is staying with her father from Friday to Monday on 3 consecutive weeks according to the 1st Consent Order. 24.As regards the respondent, he has been living in the former matrimonial home in Pokfulam with his girlfriend (referred to in this judgment as “NC”) since October 2014. The respondent has a baby daughter OV borne to him by NC. She is now 2 years old and is due to commence schooling this coming September. The former matrimonial home is a 130 m2 3-bedroom apartment purchased with a mortgage in the respondent’s name. SF has her own room during access while OV shares a bedroom with the domestic helper. 25.The respondent has always been in the finance field. He is now working as a broker in a securities and futures company. The Parties’ Stance The Petitioner’s Case 26.The petitioner’s case is simple – the settlement reached in 2014 must remain intact with the exception that the maintenance ought to be increased. Her reason is also simple and straightforward. As mentioned above, the petitioner is presently renting a 2-bedroom apartment at Kennedy Town. With only 2 bedrooms, SF has to share her bedroom. The petitioner wants to provide SF with her own room. SF is growing up; in time, this is what the daughter should have. She considered that since she is already paying some of SF’s living expenses, the respondent should be entirely responsible for the additional rental as a result of getting a larger, 3-bedroom apartment. Anyway, that was the life-style during the marriage. The Respondent’s Case 27.It seems clear to me that the respondent wants a revamp on the arrangement regarding the maintenance of SF. He maintained that since the petitioner has obtained a capital split of $4,420,000, if she wants to enjoy a larger accommodation she should do so at her own costs. The petitioner’s application, clothed in the form of child’s maintenance, is in reality for spousal maintenance in disguise. The parties have already obtained a clean break. The petitioner should not be allowed to do so. 28.As for the discharge of the $8,000 maintenance, the respondent alleged that the petitioner did not spend the entire sum of $8,000 on SF. Indeed, he went so far as to say that “the petitioner is very happy that she does not have to spend a penny on her daughter’, and that the maintenance was never used for SF’s daily needs. 29.Despite the fact that he was not obliged to do so by any court orders, he shouldered SF’s piano and Mandarin classes even when he was in great financial hardship but the petitioner unreasonably refused to share the expenses or even discuss the issue with him. The respondent said why he has been able to survive despite all the setbacks in his career was due to borrowings that he has had from his girl-friend NC. His liabilities to NC now stand at $2,289,000. 30.Both parents are having the joint custody of SF and the petitioner is now earning more or less the same as he is, the fairest arrangement should be for SF’s “school fees and the like”, extra-curricular activities and daily expenses to be shared between them. The respondent further adds that the maintenance must be reduced to ‘nil’ to prevent adding any further aggravation between the parties and allow both sides to move on with their own lives. The Legal Principles 31.The Court’s power to grant an order for variation is governed by s11(1) and (7) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (the “MPPO”) which provides as follows:
32.In the case of AEM v. VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36, [2008] HKFLR 106, Cheung JA explained the modern approach in dealing with such an application at paras 14.4-8 of the Judgment:
33.As to the weight to be attached to the original order, Tang VP (as he then was) said in HCTT v. TYYC [2008] HKFLR 286, [2008] 5 HKC 86 at paras 15-16,
34.HCTT v. TYYC was a case on variation of a consent order. By way of a separate opinion, Lam J (as he then was), reminded that family courts must be astute to guard against unmeritorious application for variation by litigants who have second thoughts about settlements they have knowingly reached on their own volition: [43]. 35.Speaking specifically on periodical payments in a consent order, Lam J said in [47],
36.Lam J further said in [49] of HCTT v. TYYC, supra, that application for variation should not be pursued when in substance the grounds advanced for variation tantamount to re-argument of the same issues that have been argued before the court before the making of the original order. 37.Based on the above authorities, the principles can be summarized as follows,
38.Guided by these principles I now proceed to deal with the applications. Issues to be Determined 39.The parties’ applications in respect of the maintenance order are two faces of the same coin; so they ought to be dealt with in one-go. I believe the proper approach to deal with these applications is to address the following issues:
What are the basis and intended effect of the settlement of the parties as embodied in the consent orders? 40.Clearly, back in 2014, it was after the parties had come to an agreement that the petitioner was to have the care and control of SF then they turned to money matters. 41.In my view, the basis and intended effect of the settlement can easily be discerned from the consent orders. As far as SF is concerned, from the undertakings given by the respondent as set out in 2nd and 3rd Consent Orders, it is evident that at the time of the settlement the respondent agreed to be responsible for all SF’s education and related expenses. Anyway, the respondent accepted in trial that it was the case. 42.As for SF’s living expenses, as I see it, notwithstanding that the respondent agreed to pay a monthly maintenance of $8,000, it is clear from the undertakings set out in sub-paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of [10] above that the petitioner would continue to work and contribute to the living expenses of SF in addition to the monthly maintenance receivable from the respondent; otherwise there would not be any need for them to deal with the tax liabilities, in particular, who is to claim the tax allowance in respect of SF. Further, they agreed that the maintenance of SF would be reviewed on a regular basis. Reading all these agreements and acknowledgements together, the view one can reasonably arrive at is that SF’s living expenses would be shared between her parents. As to who is going to have a bigger share or whether there should be an equal share would of course depend on the review to be carried out by them the frequency of which is said to be no less than annually and during January of every year. Needless to say, the review would base on their financial situation and personal circumstances and the outcome of which would be determinative of who would be entitled to the tax allowance. 43.As regards the division of family assets between them, the petitioner accepts the lump sum was a capital split and meant for a ‘clean break’. It was settled after the parties had exchanged 2 rounds of their Form Es. She said, in her Answers to the respondent’s Questionnaire, that the sum was carefully calculated to ensure that it would be sufficient to meet her needs so that she does not have to go back to court and claim against the respondent again. Has there been a material change in the circumstances since the consent orders? 44.Apart from doing some part-time modelling work, the petitioner was not working during the 4 ½ years of their marriage. Upon moving out of the matrimonial home in June 2012 she started working full-time. The petitioner is now being employed by a bank with a monthly salary of $45,000. Her salaries have increased from $27,000 in November 2012 to what it is now. Though there were some setbacks in the interim, it is glaringly apparent that she has been making tremendous progress in her career. 45.In contrast, the evidence is that the respondent suffered serious setbacks in his career. Before the breakdown of the marriage, the respondent earned $195,000 per month. Looking back, that was his heyday. At the beginning of the divorce proceedings in 2012, he was earning $70,000 only. The significant downturn came when the respondent was dismissed in October 2013 and subject to investigation by the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) which lasted from November 2013 to December 2015. The impact of the investigation was that it brought him enormous difficulty in getting a job as a broker because each and every time his employer or potential employer would have to answer enquires from SFC in order to obtain a broker license for him. He was unemployed for 7 months from November 2013 to June 2014 and his broker license was suspended by SFC for 3 months from December 2015 to March 2016. To keep him afloat, he had to work for a finance-company-owned food delivery business from July 2014 to October 2014 earning $39,000 per month. He managed to return to the finance-related field in December 2014. With the exception that he was unemployed in November 2015 and from April 2016 to December 2016, he has since then been working on and off for various companies with income ranging from $50,000 to $90,000 per month. 46.In evidence, the respondent believed he is back to normal now but the securities market is not as lucrative as before. That is why he is earning much less than before. 47.The petitioner does not accept that there has been a deterioration in the respondent’s financial situation. Whilst she accepted that there has been a drop in the respondent’s income since the divorce, she believed the situation has been created by him and is self-serving. The respondent is so experienced in the financial field. During the marriage, he worked as an equity trader or broker earning $177,000 to $195,000 per month, she questioned why the respondent would have the need (as claimed by him) to have borrowed so much money from NC and presently with merely $10,000 odd in his bank account. She specifically pointed out that there was no reason for the respondent to have worked for a food delivery company from July 2014 to October 2014 earning a meagre income of $39,000 only. She believed the respondent deliberately chose to sacrifice his income and live on savings in order to avoid his obligation to pay the $8,000 maintenance. 48.When being asked if the petitioner’s contention is true, it would mean, assuming that the respondent is earning about, say, $50,000 per month, he is sacrificing as much as $150,000 per month in order to avoid a liability of $8,000. It does not make sense because $8,000 is merely a minuscule fraction of $150,000. The petitioner agreed that this does not make sense and commented that it is unfathomable why the respondent would have done that. 49.With respect, I cannot agree with the petitioner. Her contention is groundless and is unsupported by evidence. As I see it, she turned a blind eye to the impact of the SFC investigation that had brought onto the respondent. SF’s normal school fee should have been $14,400 per month. Upon his application in early 2015 on the ground of poverty, the respondent has been allowed to pay a reduced fee of $3,085 only. This remains to be the situation up to now. The school policy is that concession would only be granted to a student for a maximum of 5 years. SF has been enjoying the concession for 4 years and thus, this is an additional reason why the respondent would like SF to transfer to an ESF school which has a similar concessionary policy. The unchallenged evidence is that the school has a screening mechanism. The respondent’s financial situation has been under the review of the school; and for this purpose, he has to submit his pay-slips and bank statements to the school. I accept that the school would not grant such a concession lightly without giving due regard to the respondent’s precarious situation. The school must have satisfied itself that the respondent is genuinely in financial difficulty before allowing him to pay a reduced fee. Yet, the petitioner refused to accept the situation. In trial, she even mentioned that the respondent could have saved up a lot of money from the concession. 50.I am conscious that at the time of the settlement the respondent was already subject to SFC’s investigation and he had been unemployed for 7 months. I gather that probably the respondent had under-estimated its impact on him. As for the petitioner, since the divorce in 2015 she has achieved financial independence. As can be seen below, she has left the lump sum essentially intact and additionally, she manages to have savings out of her salaries. In great contrast, the respondent suffered a major setback in his career. He is gaining ground now but as of now, financially speaking, the petitioner is definitely much healthier than the respondent. I find there has been a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties. The Petitioner’s Earning Capacity 51.As said, the petitioner is now working in a leading bank with a monthly salary of $45,000. She has a master’s degree and is only 39 years old. Given her high educational qualification and young age, I believe in due course she would be promoted to higher position with better remuneration. The Petitioner’s Financial Resources Lump Sum 52.According to her Form E dated 27 May 2017 the petitioner has net assets in the region of $3,944,000 inclusive of about $3,800,000 in the banks, of which $3,774,000 was the lump sum she received from the respondent via the Director of Legal Aid. Significantly, the petitioner said she has not spent a cent and the entire sum is sitting in her bank account. There is still a balance of $646,000 being retained by the Director of Legal Aid pending the settlement of the legal costs. Further, it should not be forgotten that there is also a pending taxation proceedings referred to in [21] above. Whatever the outcome of the taxation, I think it is safe to assume that the petitioner will receive a further sum (likely to be in 6 digits) in due course. Thus, inclusive of these two future sums, her cash should be in the region well over $4,000,000. Jewelleries 53.The petitioner’s latest Form E of 27 May 2017 did not disclose any jewelleries and personal valuables. In her Answers to the respondent’s Questionnaire, she said she had sold her engagement ring, wedding band and her Franck Muller watch to cover her expenses that were well over $500,000, majority of which on rents, as there was no financial support for 3 years before the settlement of the ancillary relief in 2015. However, in evidence, she said she had given these jewelleries to her father as early as before she moved out of the former matrimonial home in June 2012. She accepted that accordingly she should not have put these items in her previous Form Es. As for the purpose of giving the jewelleries to her father, the petitioner’s evidence is confusing and contradictory. Initially, she said she gave the jewelleries to her father in order to help him out. Her father was in financial difficulty at that time. Subsequently, she offered another version: the purpose was for some cash to cover her living expenses because she had already exhausted her savings since moving out of the former matrimonial home. In other words, it was the father who helped her out. 54.The petitioner’s 1st Form E of 21 March 2013 disclosed jewelleries and personal valuables worth of $179,000. The items and their value gradually reduced to $116,500 in her Form E dated 30 June 2014, to $110,500 in Form E dated 5 May 2015 and finally disappeared in the latest Form E of 27 May 2017. At the same time, her Form Es made disclosure of her father’s financial assistance. She stated her liability to her father was $96,000 in her 1st Form E of 21 March 2013, $144,000 in her 2nd Form E of 30 June 2014, and it increased to $240,000 in her 3rd Form E of 5 May 2015; but this liability disappeared in her latest Form E of 27 May 2017. 55.The petitioner was not working full-time during the marriage. On the evidence, I accept she received some financial assistance from her father and this was disclosed in her Form Es, as detailed above. However, this does not necessarily mean her evidence regarding the giving of the jewelleries to her father is truthful. As a matter of fact, on the above analysis and for the reason set out in the following paragraph, I disbelieve the petitioner’s assertion that she has departed the possession of the jewelleries. 56.In August 2016 the petitioner gave $199,999 to her father and she said it was a gift. That was the time after she had received the lump sum from the respondent. She stressed that her father had debts of over $1,100,000 and this money was to relieve some of his burden. On her own evidence that her father had helped her out on rentals, the logical inference I can draw is that the $199,999 was for repayment of her liabilities to her father. This also explains why her latest Form E reported ‘zero’ liability to her father; and this is also another reason why I do not believe that the petitioner has surrendered her jewelleries to her father. 57.For obvious reason, the value of the jewelleries and their whereabouts should not feature significantly in the present application, but these matters show the length the petitioner is prepared to go in making up a story. The Petitioner’s Financial Needs 58.The petitioner’s Form E of 27 May 2017 stated her current monthly expenses are as much as $56,877. 59.The petitioner emphasized that she is very careful with money and does not spend unnecessarily. She claimed her food and household expenses are $6,000 and $2,000 respectively and the utilities expenses are $4,500 totalling $12,500 but as the respondent rightly pointed out, her credit card statements and the records of her cash withdrawals as shown on the bank statements do not support the amount. According to the respondent’s calculation, on the basis of the petitioner’s bank statements, the average amount is merely $2,572. 60.Household expenses are $2,000. Notwithstanding that she wrote down “groceries” at the “Household expenses” box, in order to justify the amount, she said this would include the charge of a locksmith, say $500, if she loses her key. In my view, this kind of blunder may happen once in a while but this is certainly not something that the petitioner would have to spend regularly on a monthly basis. 61.The petitioner is also inconsistent in her evidence. When being questioned as to why her food expenses are as much as $7,818 (Home: $6,000 + Out of Home: $1,818), she said they include going out for entertainment with friends or SF, but at the same time she has already included entertainment expenses of $500 for herself and $600 for SF. 62.Subsequently, the petitioner made some reductions on some of the items. On the last day of the trial, she informed the court that the monthly rental has been increased to $23,000. The original figures and the revised figures are shown in the Schedule below.
Discussion 63.A convenient way to gauge the veracity of the petitioner’s expenditure is to adopt a macro-view by looking at her general financial situation. 64.According to the petitioner, at the time of the consent orders (ie around July 2014) she was earning $23,500 per month but her Form E of 30 June 2014 stated her monthly expenses at $41,977. 65.In May 2015 her salary was reduced to $15,000. Fortunately, a month later in June 2015, she got another job with a salary of $38,000. Her monthly expenses were reported to be $45,660 in her Form E of 5 May 2015. 66.The petitioner’s salary has been further increased to $45,000 since September 2016; and as referred to above, her monthly expenses are said to be $55,678. 67.According to her own figures, the petitioner should always have been in the red. Quite to the contrary that it is the case, the petitioner said in evidence that she spends what she earned and she has about $8,000 left before-tax every month. She made use of this excess money to increase her MPF contribution, top up her medical insurance and buy a sofa and a piano for SF. She also went for a skiing holiday with SF in Tokyo in March 2016, a trip to Australia for attending her sister’s wedding in April 2016, a sea-cruise with SF to the Mainland and Vietnam, a trip to Germany and a trip to Indonesia in 2017. Earlier this year, she and SF returned to Indonesia for holiday. She has a plan of going to the United States with SF in the near future. She agreed that despite the absence of maintenance payment, SF’s standard of living has not been compromised. 68.When being asked how she was able to manage financially, she vaguely referred to her savings and the assistance from her father. However, on the basis of the evidence before me, there was no way she could have saved substantially or consistently during the marriage. As soon as she moved out of the former matrimonial home, she had to incurred rental expenses the amount of which took up a large portion of her income. At some point, she mentioned that at that time all her savings were gone; and at another point, she also testified that her father was in financial difficulty. 69.It is not in dispute that the respondent ceased paying SF’s maintenance since April 2016. If the petitioner’s expenses are truly as much as what she reported and given that she has been able to keep the lump sum by-and-large untouched up to this day, one can only reasonably come to either one of the two conclusions. The first is she has undisclosed assets upon which she can rely to cover her deficits. The second is that she has inflated her expenses. 70.The respondent’s case is that the petitioner has inflated her expenses. There is no allegation that she has any undisclosed assets. Taking all the evidence in a round, though I may not agree with the respondent’s suggestion that the petitioner’s food, household and utilities expenses are as low as $2,500 odd that he is trying to put it, what I am sure is she has grossly inflated her expenses to the extent that her figures are virtually unreliable. 71.Doing the best I can, on the evidence before me, I reckon that the petitioner’s financial needs per month are around $40,000. In other words, she has inflated roughly 39% of her expenses. I estimate that out of this $40,000, adopting the same proportion according to her figures, $4,460 can be attributable to SF’s expenses ($6,200 ÷ 1.39) and $13,953 being SF’s share of general expenses (($38,790 ÷ 1.39) ÷ 2) making a total of $18,413. I would round it up to $18,500. In doing so, I have disregarded the domestic helper’s share of the general expenses. I accept that if the petitioner had not been given the care and control of SF, she would not have to hire a helper. It is fair that the helper’s expenses are to be shared between the petitioner and SF. 72.I am fully conscious that my assessment may not be accurate. The petitioner should understand that if anyone is to blame for this she is the one because she failed to give a full and frank disclosure of her financial needs. The Respondent’s Earning Capacity 73.The respondent has been working as an equity broker for his present employer since January 2017. There is some ambiguity over how much he is earning. In evidence and in some of the documents he stated he is earning $48,500 or $50,000 but the statement of account issued by his employer (Exhibit “R-4”) shows during the year 2017 he was paid a total sum close to $900,000; that is, an average of $75,000 per month. The figure that he reported in his latest Form E of 8 May 2017 was $537,000 over a period of 5 months. The respondent explained that the money was advanced payment and so it is subject to adjustment. His actual income would depend on the amount of commissions he is entitled to and that in turns would depend on how good his business is. That said, he fairly accepted that at the relevant time he has had $75,000 per month available for his disposal. 74.The Inland Revenue assessed the respondent’s income at $366,673 for the year 2014/2015, at $543,258 for the year 2015/2016 and at $500,130 for the year 2016/2017. There is no reason for me to doubt the assessments nor is there any suggestion that the respondent has other source of income. I accept the respondent’s explanation. The monthly sums are advanced payments and they are subject to final adjustment according to the business he brought in at the end of the yearly period. Doing the best I can, I reckon that he should have a monthly income of about $60,000 per month. The Respondent’s Financial Resources 75.The petitioner challenged that the respondent has not disclosed (1) his securities account with HSBC and (2) his shareholdings in a US company. 76.I accept the respondent’s explanation that the securities account in fact belonged to his friend. This matter was subject to investigation by SFC which accepted that was the case. This is supported by the Decision Notice of 21 December 2015 issued by SFC (Exhibit “R-5”) pursuant to which the respondent was suspended for 3 months. 77.As for the shareholdings that is worth about €50,000, the respondent explained that he was holding the shares as a trustee for his father. He had already made the disclosure when the parties were negotiating for settlement back in 2014. The petitioner accepted that she was aware of the shareholdings back then but did not recall the respondent having disclosed the trust arrangement. I consider that if the respondent had already disclosed the shareholdings back in 2014, it would not be necessary for him to conceal this asset now. On balance, I find the respondent’s version more believable. 78.The respondent’s Form E of 8 May 2017 reported a net worth of $3,306,000. This is mainly the net value of his former matrimonial home. As far as liquid asset is concerned, he only had $11,414 in his bank account. Refinance 79.Sometime in early 2017 the respondent was contemplating selling the former matrimonial home so as to make use of the sale proceeds for repayment of his credit card liabilities and NC’s loans. He had an offer but was not able to accept because of the registration of the petitioner’s Notice of Application as a lis pendens at the Land Registry against the property. That was the notice she registered back in 2012 during the divorce proceedings. The petitioner refused to have the notice vacated from registration notwithstanding the respondent had already paid the lump sum in full. He therefore had to apply to court and was granted an order by this court for the vacation of the notice on 24 October 2017. In December 2017 he obtained a re-finance on the former matrimonial home by extending the repayment period with the same loan amount. That was made possible after the vacation of the Notice. The immediate result is that his monthly mortgage payment has been reduced from $50,000 to $38,000. This has relieved some of his burden. Additionally, as part of the deal, he received a rebate of $100,000, which provided him with some extra cash. He agreed that the re-finance has alleviated some of his financial burden. He has no plan of selling the property now. Whether the respondent owes any loans to NC? 80.The respondent said he was burning cash since October 2013. After he was dismissed in October 2013 he was sued by his former employer and subject to investigation by SFC and so had to incur legal costs of around $420,000. This is additional to the legal costs of about $220,000 that he spent on the divorce. At the same time, he had to support his own living, mortgage payment of $52,000 per month and SF’s school fees. NC kindly offered lending money to tide him over. The first sum was $100,000 in November 2013 and thereafter NC lent him money on irregular intervals. The respondent reported NC’s loans in his 1st Form E dated 27 June 2014. At that time, it was $1,100,000. The figure rose to $1,400,000 in his Form E of 5 May 2015 and stood at $1,800,000 in his latest Form E of 8 May 2017. In evidence, he said it is now around $2,289,000; in other words, the average monthly sum was $47,590 over a period of 48 months. The loans were used for various purposes including those for the benefit of SF. I gather this is the reason why he said in trial on 6 March 2018 that NC paid for SF’s school fees and maintenance. 81.NC testified what made her possible to assist was the US$700,000 settlement money she received from her own divorce proceedings. Since at that time she was living with the respondent, she offered to lend him money, interest free. In return, the respondent promised to pay her back. 82.The petitioner believed the alleged loans are fake. It is a conspiracy between NC and the respondent. The respondent had the financial means; it was unnecessary for him to have incurred such liabilities. The truth is the transactions are just on paper. The whole exercise is an attempt to avoid the respondent’s obligation to her. The petitioner even asserted that there could be the possibility that the funds transferred by NC to the respondent have been transferred back to her. Discussion 83.To begin with, there is no challenge on the part of the petitioner that sums were transferred from NC to the respondent. There is absolutely no evidence in support of the petitioner’s suspicion that monies have been transferred back to NC. On the evidence before me, the respondent indubitably had been in dire financial difficulty. He had to support his own household. The mortgage payment alone was already $52,000 and there is no challenge on his evidence that he spent substantially on his legal fees. All these happened at the time when there was a plunge in his income. It appears that at the relevant time, the petitioner also accepted that the respondent was in receipt of some form of financial assistance from NC. After the respondent had ceased payment of maintenance in April 2016, the petitioner, in her email dated 27 January 2017 to the respondent, suggested that NC could have paid the maintenance on the respondent’s behalf first. On the evidence before me, I believe the transactions are genuine; they are for settling the respondent’s various financial obligations. 84.The next question is the nature of these transactions, viz, whether they are loans as alleged. 85.Leaving the exact amount aside, NC’s ‘lending’ bears all the hallmarks of a soft-loan. NC testified that she loved the respondent so she loaned him the money. She even admitted that the respondent is her “Mr Right” with whom she is willing to spend the rest of her life. The loans were over a period of about 48 months and they were not in writing. She said she expected everything back. She does not know when this would happen. She is patient. She is not going to take the respondent to court. She may have to wait many years until one day the respondent pays her back, whether it is $100,000 or $500,000. The monies that NC said to have lent included those that are said to be for the repairs and registration of the family car, the domestic helper’s salary, the family’s airfare and lodging expenses to Koh Samui, Thailand and the renovation of the former matrimonial home. In evidence, NC admitted that notwithstanding the car is registered in the respondent’s name she too has had the use of it. Needless to say, the domestic helper, the Koh Samui trip and the renovation must have been for the family of which NC is a member. Further, many of the sums were for the respondent’s credit card liabilities. I can infer that many items of the spending were also for the benefit of the family. Lastly, the respondent said he went to London twice for selling the apartment, with one connecting trip to France in 2015. At the invitation of NC, he went to Tokyo, Koh Samui and Singapore for holidays in 2016 and to Italy and Boston in 2017. 86.In the analysis, the only conclusion I can reach is that not all the monies in question are loans. Given NC’s evidence as I have referred to above, it is unnecessary to come to a conclusion as to which sums are loans and which are not; nor is it possible to do so. The respondent has started a family with NC since the arrival of OV in July 2015. The evidence is, and I so find, that NC has been making substantial financial contributions for the maintenance of this new family, inasmuch as that they benefit SF as well. A part of her contributions come in the form of soft-loans with no definite date of repayment, if they are to be repaid at all. In the context of the present proceedings, the financial assistance of NC is a financial resource of the respondent to which I have to give due regard. The Respondent’s Financial Needs 87.The respondent’s latest Form E of 8 May 2017 reported a total expense of $119,850. In trial, he adjusted the figure to $60,835. His explanation is that it is in part due to NC’s contribution to the family expenses; in particular, NC is now using the car so she is responsible for the expenses. She is also paying the costs of the domestic helper and meals out of home. Some of SF’s expenses are being shouldered by NC as well. Finally, the mortgage payment has been reduced due to the re-finance exercise mentioned above. The original figures and the revised figures are shown in the Schedule below.
88.Given that the mortgage instalment of $38,000 already takes up more than 60% of the total expenses, I consider $60,835 is a reasonable sum. I am of course conscious that on the top of this $60,835, there are also contributions from NC; and it is more likely than not that some of this $60,835 are money from NC. 89.SF’s $6,785 are the school fees and her expenses when staying with her father. On the top of these, there is an entertainment expense of about $500 per month for OV and a future expense of about $3,100 being her school fees starting from September 2018. This would be borne by him or NC. 90.I consider the figure is reasonable. As for SF’s share of the general expenses, she is staying with her father during the weekends roughly 3 times a month only, I think little purpose can be served by descending into the precise percentage of her share. Some items such as the mortgage instalment is a capital expense; as such I do not consider it appropriate to attribute a share of it to SF. I would take a broad-brush approach by giving a figure of $3,000 which should in the main her share of the food and utilities expenses. I also add another $500 to reflect SF’s expenses shouldered by NC and not included in the above schedule. Hence, SF’s monthly needs whilst staying with her father are about $10,285 ($6,785 + $3,000 + $500). I would round it up to $10,500. SF’s need for a larger accommodation 91.The petitioner said in evidence that ideally she would find a 3-bedroom apartment with a maid’s room. She and SF would each have one bedroom and the remaining one as the study room. If it is a 3-bedroom apartment without a maid’s room, then she has to forgo the study room so that the domestic helper may occupy the 3rd room. She agreed that a 3-bedroom apartment would also be able to accommodate her parents who would come to Hong Kong once every month or two. 92.The respondent opposes to the application. His stance is that the petitioner has the means; she should resort to her own money. Discussion 93.The petitioner time and again emphasizes that the lump sum she received from the respondent was a capital split. As mentioned above, in her Answers to the respondent’s Questionnaire, she said the lump sum of $4,420,000 was carefully calculated at the time of settlement to ensure that it would be sufficient to meet her needs so that she does not have to go back to court and claim against the respondent again. Contrary to what she said in her Answers, she said, in evidence, that the money does not include her housing need. Hence, the respondent should be entirely responsible for the increased rental resulting from a larger accommodation. She also based her case on ‘life-style’ recovery. She needs a 3-bedroom apartment because that was what she had during the marriage. She did not consider she should use the lump sum or even part of it. She has to keep the money for her and SF’s future. She looks for security. She would like to put the money into some form of investment. She is still waiting for the best opportunities. For all these reasons, she insists that the respondent should pay more maintenance. Not only that, she also insists that the respondent has the ability to pay. He was earning close to $200,000 per month at the time of the marriage. The respondent was very experienced in the financial field. There is no reason why he is earning so little now. 94.Her initial application was to have the monthly maintenance to be increased to $60,000. At the time of trial, the figure was reduced to $40,000. 95.During the Pre-trial Review, the petitioner indicated that since there was a remote possibility that SF would move to another school, she was not sure whether she would continue to live in the same neighbourhood. She also mentioned that there were plans for SF to go to study in London in 4 to 5 years’ time. At one point, she even indicated that she was not going to move at all given the high rentals on the Hong Kong Island; and so it would be better to have the money spent on SF’s education in the UK. At another point, she expressed her worry that the respondent would not honour the maintenance order in which event she would have to bear the increased rentals. She agreed that if she was not going to move then there was no need to have any increase in the maintenance but later on, she retracted to say in any case she would need to have some increase. 96.In trial, the petitioner confirmed that whatever the situation regarding the choice of school, she intended to move to a 3-bedroom apartment that is close to SF’s school. 97.However, in her closing submissions, the petitioner had a change in mind. Her latest stance is that even with $40,000 maintenance per month she would continue to stay at the current apartment for fearing that the respondent may fail to honour his obligation. She considered that the increased maintenance would allow her and SF to enjoy stability of life, not having to move out when the respondent suddenly stop the maintenance again whilst having the choice to maintain a reasonable standard of living accommodation, ie covering the rent for an apartment of about 800 ft2 if she wants to. 98.The petitioner repeatedly said she wants to be reasonable. With respect, I do not have a glimpse of it. It is apparent that she does not know her case, at the very least she is ambivalent and not serious about her application. On the evidence before me, I am sure that the plan of moving to another school is a very rudimentary one, if it can be called a plan at all. The petitioner admitted there is no urgent need at all. She is contended with the present living environment. The petitioner said that it would be nice to have the accommodation upgraded. I agree with her. It is a matter of common-sense that in most cases, people would generally embrace the idea of having a nicer living condition. Yet, another common-sense is the idea has to be fuelled by money in order to make it a reality. The parties settled their financial dispute by way of a capital split and on a clean break basis. The petitioner was legally represented at that time, I am sure that in coming to the conclusion she and her team had and, in particular, on the amount of capital payment, the marital standard of living must already have been taken into account. Thus, the petitioner cannot rely on the standard of living at the time of marriage to give ‘herself’ a 3-bedroom apartment. I would be very surprised if her housing need was not one of the factors that she and her legal team had considered in the bargain. The petitioner is sitting on cash of about $4,000,000. It is of course up to her to determine how she is going to spend her money. If she chooses not to spend it – not a single cent of it – on renting a larger accommodation, this is her choice but her decision does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that she is entitled to look into the respondent’s pocket. 99.As for SF, there is no urgent need in this regard; and most importantly, there must be some source of finance available in order to make it a reality. The arrangement of SF was settled prior to the financial matters. By the time the parties came to an agreement over the financial matters, it had already been agreed that SF would be spending a bigger portion of her time with her mother. The basis and intent of the settlement was that both parents would be responsible for the maintenance of SF; so in my view, the court should consider, at least as a starting point, the possibility of having the housing need of SF to be shared by both parents. On that analysis, the petitioner’s lump sum cannot be ring-fenced as ‘untouchable’. With the findings that I have come to regarding the respondent’s financial resource and given the latest stance of the petitioner, I do not find she has a case to increase the maintenance whether on the ground of seeking a larger accommodation or otherwise. The Respondent’s claim for refund and damages 100.At this juncture, it is a convenient point to digress to deal with the respondent’s claim for refund and damages before coming to the question of how the financial needs of SF should be shared between the parties. 101.As referred to in [17], the respondent claims for the refund of tuition fees of SF’s Mandarin and piano classes, the damages that he has suffered as a result of the petitioner’s refusal to withdraw the registration of her Notice of Application and the petitioner’s unreasonable and uncompromising stance regarding the Child Tax Allowance. Claim of Child Tax Allowance 102.Immediately following the settlement with the respondent, the petitioner claimed tax allowance in the year 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 on the basis that she also incurred living expenses for SF. This infuriated the respondent and probably added fuel to his aversion to his former wife. It was not until 6 July 2017 that the parties finally came to an agreement that the respondent was to claim the tax allowance for the years 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 and in return, the petitioner was to claim for the years 2016/2017 and 2017/2018. It was also agreed that they would alternate the child tax allowance on a “take turns” basis as from 2018/2019. 103.In my view, the fact that the petitioner claimed the tax allowance immediately following the settlement is reproachful. She should not have done so. This is contrary to the expressed agreement reached between the parties: see [10]. There is no suggestion that she had discussed or tried to discuss with the respondent before she did that. 104.At trial the respondent said he was forced to come to an agreement with the petitioner at that time. I consider it is somewhat disingenuous for him to say so. Anyway, with the latest agreement, the respondent agreed that the Inland Revenue should have repaid the overpayment of about $50,000 if it had not been for other issues he had with the tax authorities. It follows that his damages would probably be the loss of interest on the refund. Refusal to engage in discussion according to the Consent Orders 105.The respondent said with a view to solve all the issues between them, on 27 January 2017 he wrote, by email, to the petitioner making various proposals. It is not necessary for me to refer to the offers and suggestions made by him, it suffices for me to say that it was clearly the intention of the respondent to start the discussion process but apparently, the petitioner was not interested in it at all. 106.The undisputed evidence is that despite the undertakings and agreement set out in the 3rd Consent Order, the petitioner all along refused to discuss. There was no excuse for her not to do so. Refusal to vacate the Notice of Application 107.The petitioner accepted that despite the respondent’s repeated demands she refused to vacate the registration of her Notice of Application. She did so on the advice of her former solicitors. In my view, regardless of whether she said about the advice is true or not, she should have readily conceded to the respondent’s request upon receipt of full payment of the lump sum. There was no excuse for her not to do so. 108.I agree that the registration of the Notice of Application had prevented the respondent from selling the former matrimonial home when he intended to do so in early 2017. What he should have done was to come to court for timely assistance. The respondent said if he had sold the property, he would have been able to repay all his liabilities including the maintenance in arrears and the NC’s loans; and in addition, same as the petitioner, he would have been sitting on several millions of cash which would give him a different perspective of life. I do not know whether all these would have happened or not. All I know is if he had sold the property he would not have been able to obtain the benefits out of the re-finance of the property; and certainly he would have to incur rental expense for his family. The Respondent’s Response 109.The respondent has ceased paying SF’s maintenance since April 2016. He explained he was made redundant in March 2016. Except for a brief period of 12 days in July 2016 when he got another job, the respondent was unemployed throughout from April 2016 to December 2016. He admitted he could have resumed payment as from January 2017 when he found his present job but he did not do so due to the numerous quarrels he had had with the respondent over a number of issues, including the dispute over the child tax allowance, the sharing of SF’s extracurricular activities expenses, the petitioner’s judgment summons, her application to increase SF’s maintenance and her refusal to vacate the registration of the Notice of Application. He admitted these reasons are still valid as of now. When being put by the court that, according to what he said, it would mean he had the ability to pay the respondent then retracted somewhat and vaguely referred to his high outstanding credit card liabilities. 110.The respondent’s financial predicament was all the time viewed with distrust or, at the very least, unsympathetically by the petitioner. The petitioner’s persistent defiance of her agreement and undertakings that caused intense antagonism between the parties should meet with disapproval from the court. I can understand why the respondent was disgruntled over the situation. Again, the respondent should have taken out appropriate applications or sought directions from the court for the timely resolution of their dispute before it went from bad to worse. Instead, he unwisely resorted to his own method by giving a halt on the maintenance. He is not entitled to disregard the court order. On that view, he placed himself on the same indefensible footing as the petitioner. 111.Based on the above, I have come to the view that both are to blame, though to some extent the petitioner is more culpable. 112.Whilst I can understand why the respondent felt aggrieved by the situation in which he found himself when dealing with the petitioner, it does not necessarily mean that he has a lawful claim or merits in his claims. The respondent paid the tuition fees out of his own volition; there is no order enjoining him to do so. More importantly, there are no provisions in the MPPO to empower the court to make such orders. There are provisions in the Ordinance, being sections 13 and 23, for the court to order repayment under certain situations but clearly these provisions are not applicable to the present case. 113.That said, it does not preclude the court from taking these matters, where relevant and substantiated, into consideration in an application for variation under s 11 of the MPPO. Under the section, the court may vary, discharge, suspend or revive a suspended maintenance order. The court also has the power to back date any order for variation, even to a date prior to the making of the application: Grey v Grey [2009] EWCA Civ 1424, [2010] 1 FLR 1764 at [60]; and Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children, §14.62. In the exercise of its power, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case: s 11(7) of the MPPO. How the Financial Needs of SF should be shared between the parties? 114.Based on the calculations in [71] and [90], SF’s monthly needs under the petitioner’s care are about $18,500 and those under the respondent’s care are $10,500; making a total of $29,000. These already include the school fees and the piano lessons. 115.SF used to have piano and Mandarin classes every week. This is expressly provided for in the 1st consent order. Significantly, there is no provision in the order as to who is to be responsible for the tuition fees but not in dispute is that at the time of the settlement it was the respondent footing the fees. 116.SF discontinued her Mandarin class when the respondent stopped paying the fees in about April 2016; it was more or less the same time when he ceased paying the maintenance. Since the petitioner speaks Mandarin pretty well, she has committed to teach SF Mandarin. With this new arrangement, I take the view that the lessons may be dispensed with. As regards the piano lessons, the petitioner has been paying the fees following the cessation of payment on the part of the respondent. I consider that the existing situation should continue – the parties should continue to pay what they are paying now. 117.Both parties’ respective earning capacities are much closer now. As said earlier, the petitioner’s financial situation is undeniably much healthier than that of the respondent. Following this analysis and without seeking to be arithmetically precise, I have come to a conclusion that the petitioner and the respondent should be responsible for 45% and 55% of SF’s expenses respectively. In other words, according to my assessment, the petitioner should be responsible for $13,050 ($29,000 X 45%) and the share for the respondent is $15,950 ($29,000 X 55%). The respondent is already footing $10,500; it means there is a shortfall of $5,450. SF is growing and too would be her needs. To cater for her growing needs and the inflation in a few years’ time, I would assess it at $5,800. This would, I hope, save further quarrels between the parties. Whether or not the maintenance order needs to be varied. If the answer is in the positive, to what extent? 118.In trial, the petitioner said the maintenance has not been paid since April 2016. Further, the respondent failed to pay the maintenance from August 2014 to July 2015, a total of $96,000 (ie for 12 months). 119.Whilst the respondent accepts that he defaulted since April 2016, he denies the maintenance from August 2014 to July 2015 remains unpaid. 120.According to the letter dated 21 August 2015 by the petitioner’s solicitors, as at 20 August 2015, the arrears of maintenance (from April 2015 to September 2015) were $40,000 (ie 5 months). That was about the time when the respondent was able to sell his apartment in London. Subsequent to this letter, on 26 August 2015 the respondent paid $48,000 said to be the arrears of maintenance up to August 2015 as well as the advance payment for September 2015. At the same time, he also paid $441,600 being part of the lump sum payment. Accordingly, the petitioner’s contention is unsupported by the contemporaneous evidence. It is not true for the petitioner to say that the maintenance from August 2014 to July 2015 is still outstanding. 121.The respondent might have been restrained from having more entertainment than he used to have but the evidence before me is that by and large his standard of living has not been diminished substantially. He continues to live in the former matrimonial home and enjoys several overseas trips a year. I accept that he has sold his scooter but there is still a car available for the family. He managed to fly his mother from France to Hong Kong and spent $1,328 to dine with her in a high-end restaurant in February 2017. I am sure he was able to provide for his loved ones if he was willing to do so. It was merely because of the parties wrangle that he did not resume payment of the maintenance. 122.The respondent was unemployed since April 2016 till the end of the year. At about the same time (September 2016) the petitioner secured her present job which gives her $45,000 a month. Additionally, the petitioner is sitting on $4,000,000. On the top of this, she will in due course receive another sum from the Director Legal Aid: see [52]. 123.I too take note that the registration of the Notice of Application unreasonably barred the respondent from liquidating the former matrimonial home. Another matter that I have to bear in mind is the respondent will have to pay the petitioner’s costs likely to be in 6 digits after conclusion of the taxation proceedings later this year referred to in [21]. I am sure this would put a severe strain on his financial resources. This is a financial responsibility that I should not ignore in the present proceedings. 124.Taking all the matters in a round and trying to do fairness to the parties, I consider the maintenance sum should be varied to $5,800 per month as from October 2016 and that the maintenance should be suspended from April 2016 to December 2017. In coming to the conclusion that the maintenance is to be suspended up to December 2017, I give some weight to the petitioner’s evidence that even without the respondent’s maintenance SF’s standard of living has not been compromised. 125.There is accordingly an arrears of maintenance from January 2018 to August 2018. The respondent should be able to repay them by 24 monthly instalments. 126.There is no formal application on the part of the respondent for the payment of $12,500 maintenance by the petitioner. Even if there were, I would have dismissed it. Orders 127.For the above reasons, I give the following orders:
Costs of the Applications 128.The petitioner fails entirely in seeking an upward increase of the maintenance while the respondent has a mixed success. He succeeds in seeking a downward adjustment but fails on the others. At the same time, many of the issues in disputes are in his favour. Seen in this light, I am of the view that the respondent should be awarded half of the costs of the applications. I therefore give an order nisi that the petitioner do pay the respondent half of the costs of the following applications:
Costs of the Respondent’s Application for Vacation of the Notice of Application 130.As said in [20], on 24 October 2017 I gave an order that the Notice of Application be vacated from the Land Registry. For the reasons that I have set out in [107] and [108], I see no reason why costs should not follow the event and so I order that the petitioner do pay the respondent the costs of the application, to be summarily assessed. Conclusion 131.This litigation is clearly born out of mistrusts and suspicions of the parties to each other. The parties should be reminded that they are having the joint custody of SF; the settlement reached back in 2014 evidently anticipated them to place some trust on the other side for the sake of SF. I would urge the parties to abide by their agreement and undertakings. Specifically, they should review the maintenance of SF on a regular basis.
CA, the Petitioner, appeared in person FMHJ, the Respondent, appeared in person | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under FCMC 17626/2012