Re Subhash Kumar
Read the full judgment text of CACV 412/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 1 February 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 17 August 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 1 December 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 23 October 2015 and 9 June 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 7 cases
|
CACV 412/2018 [2019] HKCA 152 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 412 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1079/2017) -----------------------------------
-----------------------------------
___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 17 August 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 1 December 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 23 October 2015 and 9 June 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of India. He entered Hong Kong on 16 September 2005 and was permitted to remain until 30 September 2005. He overstayed and was arrested on 21 December 2007. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 11 November 2008. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from a person identified as DS who had a land dispute with the applicant’s family. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [5] of the CALL-1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 23 October 2015 (“the Director’s First Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s First Decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3]. 5.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 9 June 2017, the Director also assessed the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk[4], and decided against him. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 29 September 2017, at which it considered both Decisions of the Director, the Board dismissed the appeal on 1 December 2017 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. 7.At [22] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s case was not credible. The Board was also satisfied at [51] to [53] that state protection would be available for the applicant and at [54] that internal relocation would be viable. The deputy judge’s decision 8.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 14 December 2017 which contained no ground for seeking relief. 9.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 14 December 2017, the applicant advanced various grounds for judicial review which are summarised below:
10.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [12] to [17] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 11.In the Notice of Appeal dated 23 August 2018 the applicant did not advance any grounds of appeal. 12.In his affirmation filed in support of the appeal dated 23 August 2018, the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:
13.In Exhibit A to the affirmation, the applicant repeated the matters raised in his affirmation dated 14 December 2017 filed in support of his application before the judge. 14.In his skeleton submissions dated 24 December 2018, the applicant raised two grounds. The first ground is concerned with the high standard of fairness. The second ground is concerned with the duty to act fairly. Both grounds are apparently concerned only with the decisions of Board and the Director. 15.We heard the appeal on 30 January 2019. Discussion 16.As to the first ground of appeal raised in the affirmation dated 23 August 2018, the judge did not refer to state acquiescence and as is clear from the Board’s Decision, this was not the basis of that decision. 17.In any event, an application for leave for judicial review is not a rehearing and the court’s role is not to act as an avenue of further appeal. It is incumbent on the applicant to point out the procedural or other public law errors allegedly committed by the Board. The judge would not be required to come to a view on state acquiescence even if this ground had been raised before him, as the primary decision maker is the Board. The court should not usurp the role of the Board and will only intervene if public law grounds for doing so are established. See: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160, Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152, Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162, and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163. 18.As to the second ground, the judge gave reasons for dismissing the leave application at [12]-[17] of the CALL-1 Form. As noted by the judge, the applicant failed to give particulars of the grounds for judicial review put forward by him. The judge has clearly given sufficient reasons after considering all the available material. 19.As for the matters raised in the applicant’s skeleton, those are apparently directed at the Board and the Director but not to the judge. Those matters thus have no bearing on the outcome of this appeal. 20.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 412/2018