香港特別行政區 訴 李月嫦

HCMA 93/2020

[2020] HKCFI 2575

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

判罰上訴

案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2020年第93號

(原東區裁判法院傳票2019年第27900號)

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判案理由書

1.上訴人被票控一項「在提供依據《房屋條例》第 25(1) 條所指申報表指明的詳情時，明知而作出虛假陳述」罪，違反香港法例第 283 章《房屋條例》第 26(1)(a) 條。傳票指，她在或約於2018 年5 月14 日，在提供申報表時，明知而作出虛假陳述，聲稱她沒有在香港及香港以外擁有土地/物業等。上訴人在控方撤回傳票後申請訟費失敗。她就裁判官拒絕頒下訟費令的命令，提出的上訴已被判得直，本席並已頒下訟費令，以下是理由。

控方案情

2.案情指，上訴人的母親為一公屋單位的住戶，租約由1980 年4 月1 日生效，一直繳交原有租金。

3.鴨脷洲邨辦事處約於2018 年5 月14 日收到由上訴人家庭遞交的一份「2018 年度(4 月)申報表」(下稱「申報表」)，申報為2017 年4 月1 日至2018 年4 月30 日。申報表內當中聲稱單位住戶並無擁有香港及香港以外的土地/物業，令該家庭可繼續以原有租金租住有關單位。然而，調查發現，上訴人自1988 年3 月5 日起與另外兩人以聯權共有形式持有位於香港石排灣道60 號仁勝大廈4 樓A 室的住宅物業。

4.根據裁斷陳述書中所敘述案件的時序：

「房屋事務主任梁天信曾於2019 年6 月3 日向被告人發信，邀請她在2019 年6 月14 日就申報表上明知而作虛假陳述一事錄取警誡口供。2019 年6 月13 日，被告人致電梁主任，於通話中，梁主任再次向被告人解釋調查內容，但被告人稱她已遷離上址公屋單位，早已不是公屋居民，並已多次叮囑戶主辦理刪除公屋戶籍手續，但戶主一直拖延，她亦無計可施，並謂對申報表毫無印象。

房屋署於2019 年7 月25 日向被告人提出告發。案件於2019 年9 月10 首次提訊，被告人由律師代表出席聆訊，並申請押後以索取控方文件。被告人律師代表於2019 年11 月26 日案件再提訊時，再次申請押後以便提供辯方文件讓律政司考慮及就案件的處理方式進行商討。

2020 年1 月7 日，控方考慮了辯方文件後，認為申報表上的簽署有可能不是被告人作出的，於是向法庭申請撤回傳票。」

裁判官就上訴人訟費申請的裁決

5.裁判官根據本案不爭的證供，認為上訴人「任由刪除戶籍一事不了了之」、故此她的行為明顯自招嫌疑。她亦沒有第一時間向調查主任闡明申報表上的簽署並非由她作出，一直至她被檢控後，律師代表是於傳票發出後才向控方提供資料（包括被告人的簽名式樣），她保持緘默令控方相信指控她的案情較實際為強。裁判官認為上訴人有責任及理應在調查階段向調查主任披露申請表中的簽名非由她本人簽署，及在該階段提供她的簽名式樣。裁判官認為辯方陳詞指，上訴人在電話中向梁主任提及的內容足以令控方察覺申報表有冒簽的可能性的說法，甚為牽強。裁判官認為：

「若然被告人於調查階段向調查人員解釋申報表非由她簽署，這必然會影響控方的檢控決定，事實上，控方正正因這原故而撤控。」

上訴理由

6.上訴理由，現綜合概述如下：

（1）裁判官錯誤認為上訴人的行為構成自招嫌疑；

（2）裁判官錯誤認為上訴人的行為令控方相信指控她的案情較實際為強；及

（3）裁判官未有充分考慮上訴人在調查階段有權行使其憲法上保持緘默的權利。

7.上訴人的大律師陳詞，控方作出檢控前，已經得悉上訴人擁有私人物業，自可就土地註冊文件上的簽名與申請表上的簽名互相比較。控方無論在作出檢控前後，都可取得相關的證據。上訴人向梁主任所提供的資料亦非不準確。故不能被說成在被檢控前故意不披露某些她獨有的資料而令控方相信指控她的證據較實際情況強。

答辯人回應

8.答辯人回應指，上訴人致電梁主任的通話記錄並非在警誡下作出、亦不能確認對話雙方的身分，準確性無從得知，故聲稱的內容不具對上訴人有利的證據價值。而即使根據上訴人所稱，她第一時間只是對梁主任稱對該申報表沒有印象，及查問申報表的內容，但卻從沒有否認她簽過該申報表。答辯人續指，上訴人30 年均沒有更新戶籍，是嚴重的不作為，被聯絡後又拒絕出席由處方安排的會面，自是自招嫌疑無疑。上訴人所提出的難言之隱只與撤銷控罪一事有關，與訟費並無直接關係。

判決

9.根據香港法例第 492 章《刑事案件訴訟條例》第 3 條，裁判官在處理任何簡易罪行後，判被告人無罪，則裁判官可命令將訟費判予被告人。

10.一般來說，假若被告人的行為本身招致嫌疑，或被告人令控方相信控方案情較實際情況有力，或被告人之獲釋乃基於技術上的情況，則被告人不應獲得訟費。

11.終審法院在 [2000] 1 HKLRD 113案的判案書第 117 頁有以下指引：

“When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costs incurred in defending those charges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising the discretion must obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced. This cannot be confined to any particular period of time . . . it follows that, generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial . . . Wrapped up with this is the strength of the case against the defendant and the circumstances under which he came to be acquitted . . . ”

「當一名被告人因某些罪行被檢控而被判無罪時，一般情況下，他理應由公帑支付他答辯控罪所招致的訟費，以作補償。雖然有上述一般原則，在考慮他應否被剝奪全部或部分訟費時，行使酌情權的法官必需考慮其一般行為，只要該些行為和他被控的罪行有關。該些行為不應局限在某時段……一般而言，有關行為應該是被告人在調查及審訊階段時的行為……另外亦要考慮針對被告人證據的強弱及被告人被裁定無罪的情況……」（非官方翻譯）

12.在Secretary for Justice and Lam Chiu Fong [2009] 2 HKLRD 484一案中，上訴庭分析了Ting James Henry一案，並指出：

“32. In the course of that judgment, Li CJ stated:

‘16. It may often be the case that a defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial is such that it brings suspicion on himself, providing a ground for refusing him costs. Such conduct has been described as “most relevant” to the discretionary exercise. However, it is incorrect to suggest (and the authorities give no warrant for suggesting) that a defendant can only be regarded as having brought suspicion on himself by virtue of his conduct during the investigation or at trial and not otherwise. The discretion is not bounded by any such inflexible rule. By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion upon himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs following an acquittal on the charges laid, provided always that the discretion is not exercised so as to undermine the presumption of innocence, and in particular, provided that its exercise does not involve the court in adopting a position at variance with the defendant’s acquittal by the tribunal of fact.’ [Emphasis supplied]

(per Stuart-Moore VP and Beeson J)

司徒敬法官說：

“42. It seems to me that in cases where charges are withdrawn, the starting consideration is the same as that established by the authorities, to which Stuart‑Moore V‑P and Beeson J have referred above, where there has been an acquittal, namely, that there should be an award of costs in favour of the person charged unless there is positive reason for making a different order. Where the essential facts are realistically in dispute, and the person charged has not by his conduct brought suspicion on himself or led the investigating authorities to believe that the case against him was stronger than in fact it was, then when a charge is withdrawn the costs discretion ought to be exercised in favour of that person.

43. But this is not a mechanical process. It will always be highly case-sensitive as to the facts and the submissions made before the tribunal. There is a difference between cases that have been prosecuted to a conclusion, where findings of fact have been made, and a case where a charge is withdrawn. In both instances the presumption of innocence applies and the starting consideration on the question of costs is the same. But in a case such as the present, where charges are withdrawn, no findings of fact are made and it would be unrealistic and undesirable to expect the tribunal faced with a costs application to conduct a trial merely for determination of that issue. The matter must therefore be approached with common sense.

44. Most particularly, it will be important for the court to know the reasons for withdrawing the charge, what the proposed evidence was, the apparent strength of that evidence, including the question whether there was evidence from a clearly independent source to support the complaint and, importantly, what undisputed indicia there are as to the charged person’s conduct in the setting of the factual circumstances giving rise to the alleged offence and in the investigation of them.

45. For example, where allegations put by the police to a suspect are met with silence in the face of undisputed conduct which on an objective view appears culpable, a denial of culpability for the first time when the charge is withdrawn and the matter comes before a magistrate for determination as to costs will be a positive reason for not awarding the suspect his costs.” (Emphasis added)

13.裁判官認為本案有「強而有力的客觀事實支持控罪」，見上訴卷宗第 9 頁P 行[1]，不在此贅。裁判官認為，根據上訴人對梁主任的說法，即戶主一直拖延刪除她的戶籍，她必然知悉自己仍是有關單位戶籍的成員之一，在搬離單位後有申報的責任卻任由刪除戶籍一事不了了之。明顯是自招嫌疑。

14.根據Lam Chiu Fong案，法庭應考慮席前的事實及律師的陳詞，在分析的過程中運用常識。大律師在陳詞時曾指出上訴人的背景，她是在1988 年因為遭到家庭虐待，遷離有關單位之後，從來沒有接觸過家人。在此說的大前提下，她在遷離該單位後並不知悉公屋住戶填寫申報表的內容並非沒有可能。她稱多次叮囑戶主辦理刪除其公屋戶籍手續不果一點，頂多可以顯示她知道她曾被其列為住戶之一。從此引伸說上訴人不主動更新戶籍，是嚴重的不作為，有心隱瞞房署為家人牟利看來有點牽強。事實上，答辯方在庭上同意，住戶遷走後戶主有責任通知房署，住戶本身未必有嚴重法律責任、但會鼓勵他們向房署通報，因為始終政府資源不應被濫用。

15.本席不認同答辯人所指，上訴人和梁主任的通話內容不具對上訴人有利的證據價值的陳詞。裁判官在裁斷陳述書中顯示了他曾倚賴當中的內容：即上訴人曾向梁主任稱「對申報表毫無印象」，甚至要查問申請表內的內容[2]、她根本連表格都不曾見過[3]。如果上訴人從來沒有見過有關的表格，她不知道個別住戶須簽署及作出沒有物業的聲明並非不可能。但這情況與一名被告故意在審訊前不作任何解釋而導致不必要的檢控，不盡相同。較佳的做法自是向梁主任進一步了解有關的表格的內容作出回應，但根據梁主任的口供記錄，在上訴人查問申報表上的內容後，梁主任的回覆是由於她不錄取口供，署方不方便向她披露申報表上任何資料。看來，她頂多可能是沒有完全和有關當局合作至令有關當局滿意的程度，但是不等同她自招嫌疑：

“She, perhaps, did not co-operate as fully with the police as they would have liked but nothing that she did or said and none of her actions brought suspicion upon herself.”[4]

16.房署在2019 年7 月25 日向上訴人發出傳票。期後上訴人委托律師代表她後，律師向控方提供資料（包括被告人的簽名式樣）及就申報表上的簽署解釋。由此可見，上訴人並非故意在聆訊前不披露她對指控的解釋而導致不必要的檢控：“deliberately held back from giving a pre‑trial explanation, thus probably leading to an unnecessary prosecution”[5]。

17.該案援引了Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at page 565：

“14. . . . if a defendant has been given the opportunity of explaining his or her version of events before a charge is laid and refuses the opportunity, and it later appears that an explanation could have avoided a prosecution, it may well be just and reasonable to refuse costs . . . ”

18.在本案中，上訴人在被檢控前給予檢控方認為過於簡單的回應時，沒有律師代表。她在被檢控後，提供了簽名式樣，律師和控方的斡旋和商討後，控方最終撤訴。如上所述，雖然上訴人應該可以在更早的階段提供更詳盡的解釋，畢竟她在檢控前未有獲得法律意見，不知道自己的權益，她在被檢控後已委派律師盡量與控方合作最後導致檢控被撤銷。綜觀整個時序及情況而言，本席亦不認為上訴人的行為令控方相信指控她的案情較實際為強。

19.由於本席已判上訴人得直，上訴人亦可獲上訴的訟費。

答辯人：由律政司高級檢控官徐和中代表香港特別行政區。

上訴人：由潘繼洪張宗泉律師行轉聘鄭愷晴大律師代表。