香港特別行政區 訴 梁伊媛

HCMA 290/2020

[2022] HKCFI 2268

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

申請終審法院上訴許可之證明書

案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2020年第290號

(原西九龍裁判法院刑事案件2020年第88號 )

——————————

——————————

——————————

——————————

裁決理由書

——————————

引言

1.本庭在2022年4月19日駁回申請人針對定罪及判刑的上訴，詳情見《判案書》^[1]，在此不贅。

2.申請人根據香港法例第484章《香港終審法院條例》第 32(2) 條提出動議^[2]，向本庭申請證明書，證明案件的決定涉及具有「重大而廣泛的重要性」的法律爭議，以讓她向終審法院申請上訴許可。本席在7月22日駁回申請方的申請，說會頒下書面理由。本席現給予理由如下。

法律議題

3.申請人提出的法律議題如下：

“In the absence of clear statutory stipulations such as in the case under sections 2(2) and 47 of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap. 134, whether the concept of ‘constructive possession’ is applicable to section 9 of the Trade Description Ordinance, Cap. 362 (and/or section 118 of the Copyright Ordinance, Cap. 528)?？”

4.就法庭在考慮應否批出證書時，須考慮到申請方提出的法律爭議是否合理可爭辯 (reasonably arguable)，參見Lee Kin Pong v HKSAR^[3]；及HKSAR v Fong Kwok Shan Christine^[4]。

考慮

5.申請方陳詞指在「判案書」的第55段，本席指出《商品說明條例》第9條並沒有給予「管有」一詞一個特別的解釋。在此情況下，法庭一般會採用普通法的概念以理解何謂「管有」並引用《危險藥物條例》及其有關案例作為例子。可是，本上訴所提出的先決問題正正就是說「法律構定管有」是否也適用於《商品說明條例》第9條。申請方所指的「法律構定管有」，是指：

「當任何人知悉某物件的存在及性質，而同時對該物件有控制或支配權，則雖然物件並非在其實質管有下，物件是在其『法定構定管有』下」

6.上述法律議題只是和申請人的控罪二^[5]有關，因為控罪一是關於申請人親手出售一件贗品予海關人員(PW1)。

7.本席不同意申請方提出的上述法律議題有任何合理可爭辯之處。首先，「法律構定管有」是一個常見的普通法概念，其應用範圍並不限於《危險藥物條例》之下的案件。在 R v Okoro (No 3)^[6]，Irwin上訴庭法官如此說：

“45 We are clear that the statute requires proof by the Crown of possession of the pornography or images of child abuse, as a preliminary step before the burden of proof shifts to the accused, to establish the statutory defences. An accused cannot be convicted in relation to material of which he was genuinely totally unaware. Nor could a defendant be said to be in possession of a digital file if it was in practical terms impossible for him to access that file. However, for these statutory purposes we are clear that possession is established if the accused can be shown to have been aware of a relevant digital file or package of files which he has the capacity to access, even if he cannot be shown to have opened or scrutinised the material. That represents the closest possible parallel to the test laid down in the authorities set out above, and appears to us to be consistent with the criminal law of possession in other fields, such as unlawful possession of drugs.

46 It follows that in this case, two elements had to be made out in order for an individual to have possession: (1) the images must have been within the defendant’s custody or control, i.e. so that he was capable of accessing them; and (2) he must have known that he possessed an image or a group of images. It is clear that knowledge of the content of those images is not required to make out the basic ingredients of the offence; instead that issue is dealt with by the statutory defences. …”

8.第二，申請方從未具體說明為何「法律構定管有」不適用於控罪二，也從未交代清楚是否只有「實際管有」才可以適用。申請方在其定罪上訴的書面陳詞^[7]只是說：

「15． 至於『法律構定管有』，根據Chan Sun v R [1956] 40 HKLR 55的論述，並非一定適用在《危險藥物條例》以外的法例：

“In matters of larceny, a long line of cases has shown that where a master employs a servant whose duty it is to take care of the chattels belonging to his master, then if the master is in constructive possession of those chattels, the physical custody or control which the servant obtains of such chattels does not amount to possession in law. But this conception of the word ‘possession’ does not necessarily extend to the use of the word in every branch of the law or in every statute, and care is necessary to determine whether it is used in this sense when possession of dangerous drugs or other prohibited articles is in question. In such cases the considerations which led the courts in matters of larceny to decide that a servant did not have the possession of those goods which he held on behalf of his master do not necessarily apply and in many instances they cease to apply because the legislature has deliberately excluded them.”

16． 上訴人的陳詞因此是，在《商品說明條例》下，被告員工不能被視為「法律構定管有」被告公司處所中的應用偽造商標的貨品。」(底線為申請人後加)

申請方由「法律構定管有」「並非一定適用」，一躍而成為「在《商品說明條例》下，被告員工不能被視為『法律構定管有』被告公司處所中的應用偽造商標的貨品。」，本席不能理解當中的邏輯飛躍。關於在《商品說明條例》之下控罪二的罪行元素及豁免條款，本席在「判案書」中已作討論^[8]，在此不贅。

9.第三，本席同意答辯方的見解，即Chan Sun v R ^[9]對本案並無幫助，因為在該案法庭指出「管有」的概念，需視乎不同法例的背景:

“Insofar as criminal law is concerned, a primary division may be drawn between the use of the word as meaning:—

‘Physical Possession’ which arises when there is immediate and direct manual control or detention of the article and

‘Constructive Possession’, which arises when the control over the article is not physical or immediate but is exercised through some other person holding on behalf and subject to the directions of the person who has constructive possession,

The single word ‘possession’ may contemplate either or both of these meanings and since there is no universally valid connotation that can be said to flow from the use of the word in any or every branch of the law, it is necessary to determine in what sense this elusive word is used in the particular branch of the law under consideration and then to apply that particular sense to the facts of the case”. (底線後加)

就本案而言，正如在本席「判案書」的第55段指出，沒有任何理由為何上述普通法「管有」的概念不適用於《商品說明條例》第9 條。 反之，在「判案書」第56段，本席指出在以往的同類案件中，法庭一直沿用普通法「管有」的概念：香港特別行政區 訴 冠超珠寶(香港)有限公司 ^[10]；及香港特別行政區 訴 賴倬明 ^[11]。

10.第四，本席已在「判案書」的第58段指出案中指向申請人「管有」在店內涉案的貨品環境證據，並以重審的方式裁定：

「59． 基於以上證據的累積份量，本席認為可以得出以下顯而易見，而且可合理地被認為是無可推諉的結論：

(1) 上訴人作為店舖的唯一售貨員，而且是從2018年5月開始被聘用，她對店內售賣的存貨及銷售情況必然瞭如指掌；

(2) 雖然上訴人並不是店內貨品的擁有者，但它們顯然是在她的管轄及控制之下，她可以在她認為是合適的時候和情況下從貨架或倉庫內拿走或移動貨品；及

(3) 基於她作為店員的職務需要，她亦必然有意圖，亦有權力控制那些貨品。

…」

結論

11.基於以上，本庭駁回申請方的申請，拒絕批出相關的證明書。

答辯人：由律政司高級檢控官陳立恩代表

申請人：由施文律師行延聘王熙曜大律師及嚴康焯大律師代表