Baig Mirza Noman v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 47/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 17 March 2023.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26 July 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1923 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 47/2023 [2023] HKCFI 688 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 47 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26 July 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1923 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 8 February 2023. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He came to Hong Kong on 11 July 2009 illegally, the same day he was arrested by police. He lodged his non-refoulement claim on 13 July 2009 on Torture risk[1], BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3] and Persecution risk[4]. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 17 February 2015 and Notice of Further Decision dated 12 June 2017 (“the Director’s Decisions”), the Director refused his application on all applicable grounds. 6.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. Having considered the applicant’s reasons, the Board dismissed his appeal by the Board’s Decision dated 27 April 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”). 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 7 August 2020 (“the Court’s Order”). 8.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 29 April 2021. 9.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 15 September 2021. 10.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 22 April 2022. 11.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 6 May 2022. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 13.The applicant’s previous claim is on the basis that, if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by his paternal uncle, Mirza Shoukat Baig because of a dispute over the ownership of the house. 14.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 15.The applicant appealed to the Board against the Director’s Decisions. The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and found that the applicant’s evidence was unreliable. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 17.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant had submitted his statement and some documents to the immigration officer. In gist, he is currently in fear that he will be harmed or even killed by his enemies if he returns to Pakistan. This is the same issue in his previous claim and had been rejected by the Board. He also claimed that his cousin was killed by Shoukat. But the evidence is only hearsay evidence, which cannot be tested. Also, he mentioned his cousin was killed. But his cousin’s death is not related to the applicant’s case. His 4 articles on the news of bombing in a religious school is not related to his case, too. His father’s statement that he was attacked is hearsay evidence and even if there were such attacks, there is no evidence to show that the attacks are related to his case. They are irrelevant for his application. 18.The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 19.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. In his affirmation, he does not want to go back to his country because his life will be in danger. DISCUSSION 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he agreed that he repeated his story in his previous claim. But the immigration officer did not believe him and his life will be in danger if he returns to Pakistan. 22.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
23.The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim and I dismiss his application. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 28.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 29.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 30.RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant. Dated the 17th day of March 2023.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
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Cases cited in this judgment