Rehman Saqib v. Director of Immigration

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 230/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 March 2023.

1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 31 January 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1665 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

Cites 7 cases

Case No.HCAL 230/2023[2023] HKCFI 848
Court
High Court CFI
Date30 Mar 2023
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 230/2023

[2023] HKCFI 848

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 230 of 2023

BETWEEN    
  Rehman Saqib Applicant
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;          or
    consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.   Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.   A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 31 January 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1665 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 15 March 2023.

The procedural history

4.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He came to Hong Kong on 7 March 2009 illegally and was arrested by police on the same day.  On 10 March 2009, he lodged his non-refoulement claim on the grounds of the Torture risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2] and the Persecution risk[3].

5.By Notice of Decision dated 12 January 2015 (“the Director’s First Decision”), the Director refused his claim on the above risks.

6.The applicant appealed the Director’s First Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). The Board, by the Board’s First Decision dated 10 May 2016, dismissed his appeal against the Director’s First Decision.

7.His claim on BOR 2 risk[4], Right to Life, was refused by the Director’s Notice of Further Decision dated 27 January 2017 (“the Director’s Second Decision”) and his appeal to the Board was dismissed by the Board’s Second Decision dated 26 July 2018.

8.His application to the Court of the First Instance for leave to have judicial review of the Board’s Second Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 27 September 2019 (the “Court’s Order”).

9.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 9 June 2020.

10.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 6 October 2020.

11.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 23 September 2021.

12.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 9 November 2022.

13.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

14.The applicant’s previous claim was based on his allegations that if he returned to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by his parental uncle, Abdul Malik (“Abdul”) over a farmland dispute.

15.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated.

16.The applicant’s appeals to the Board against the Director’s First Decision and the Director’s Second Decision were dismissed by the Board. The Board found that Abdul did not intend to harm or kill him; that there was no involvement of the state in the incidents; and that state protection would be available to him and internal relocation was a viable option for him.

17.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

18.For his application for his subsequent claim, the applicant had submitted his statement together with a hand-written statement and 2 photographs for the immigration officer’s consideration. In gist, he is currently in fear of being harmed or even killed by Abdul, who and his men had come to his family house to threaten to kill him.  Abdul had also assaulted his family members.  The immigration officer took the view that his current fear originated from his land dispute with Abdul, which had already been considered and rejected by the Board.

19.The Director therefore found that the applicant had failed to submit additional materials, which when considered together with his previous clam, would give him a reasonable chance of success for his subsequent claim.  The Director therefore dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

20.The applicant has filed an affirmation in which he set out grounds as follows: the Director had set the threshold too high; his problems remain in Pakistan and the Decision is biased; he did not have legal representation service; there was no screening process for his application; there is no appeal to the Board and the Director’s Decision is biased and was made on wrong case management.

DISCUSSION

21.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision.  The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

22.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he understands the Director’s reasons for rejecting his subsequent claim. However, he admitted that he had relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application.

23.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:

“13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.”

24.The reasons stated in his affirmation fall apart as he had admitted in court that he relied on the same facts in his previous claim in support of his present application.  Therefore, there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process.  The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him.  See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

26.RPO is appropriate for the present case.  See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process.  The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him.  Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say.

29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

30.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 30th day of March 2023.

  (C.S. FUNG (Ms))
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 30 March 2023

Rehman Saqib

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 30 March 2023

Director of Immigration
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
L/M (26774) in ImmD RA 7/37/C
(formerly RBCZ/646/09 and RBCZ/9001593/16)
 
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)


Form CALL-1



[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[4] This refers to the risk under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (Risk of violation of the right to life)